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Armenia is reconsidering its plans for a new nuclear power plant after a fresh proposal from Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom and a sharp revision of the country’s future electricity needs, potentially opening the door to decades of continued dependence on Russian nuclear technology.

The discussions come as Armenia works to extend the operating life of its aging Metsamor nuclear power plant, whose sole functioning reactor was commissioned in 1980 and is now expected to remain in service until at least 2036.

During a September 29 meeting in Yerevan, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev presented Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan with proposals for new nuclear generating capacity, including a Russian-designed VVER-1000 reactor capable of producing approximately 1,000 megawatts of electricity.

The proposal is one of several under consideration by Armenia, which has also explored nuclear cooperation with the United States, France, South Korea and China.

Pashinyan emphasized that no decision had been made and that the government would evaluate competing proposals on economic and technical grounds, including their cost, safety, construction schedules and guarantees.

But according to Bellona nuclear expert Alexander Nikitin Armenia’s eventual decision will be shaped as much by geopolitics as by its electricity requirements.

A changing calculation

Until recently, Armenia had favored replacing Metsamor with one or more small modular reactors, whose relatively modest generating capacity appeared better suited to the country’s limited electricity market.

But on October 1, Pashinyan acknowledged that the government’s calculations had changed.

According to the prime minister, new investment projects, including facilities associated with artificial intelligence, have substantially increased Armenia’s anticipated electricity requirements.

Just over a year ago, he said, Armenia had an electricity surplus. Now, investment commitments have created the prospect of a deficit.

“I have said dozens of times before that we need nothing more than a modular nuclear power plant,” Pashinyan said. “But now, due to this change, we have to understand that, most likely, a modular plant will not be enough for us.”

He suggested that a reactor with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts might prove a more practical alternative, although experts are still examining the question.

The shift could improve Rosatom’s prospects. Unlike many proposed small modular reactor designs, Russia’s conventional VVER technology has an established operating history, something Moscow has emphasized in promoting its nuclear exports.

Yet a large reactor would also present challenges for Armenia’s relatively small electricity grid, requiring careful consideration of how the country would manage the sudden loss of such a substantial generating unit.

Nikitin, however, believes Armenia should continue exploring smaller reactors rather than concentrating its future nuclear generating capacity in one large facility.

“Given Armenia’s heightened seismic activity, I believe the country would be better served by establishing several power-generation centers using small modular reactors based on designs currently being offered by nuclear companies from the United States, South Korea, France or even China,” he said.

He also suggested that Armenia could establish an international consortium to develop small modular reactors, potentially including Rosatom, since cooperation with the Russian corporation will remain necessary as long as Metsamor continues operating.

Keeping Metsamor running

Meanwhile, Armenia remains dependent on its existing nuclear plant.

Metsamor’s second reactor, a Soviet-designed VVER-440 unit, began operating in 1980. Both of the plant’s reactors were shut down following the devastating 1988 Armenian earthquake, but the second was restarted in 1995 amid severe electricity shortages.

Today, it supplies a substantial share of Armenia’s electricity, estimated by Nikitin at approximately 30 to 40 percent.

Rosatom is participating in a modernization program intended to extend the reactor’s operation until 2036, when it will have been in service for 56 years, excluding its period of shutdown.

Likhachev has said he sees no technical obstacles to reaching that target. He also disclosed that Armenian officials are examining the possibility of a further extension until 2046.

Such an undertaking would require extensive additional investment in safety systems, equipment modernization and spent-fuel storage. Likhachev acknowledged that the necessary expenditures could substantially increase the cost of electricity generated by the plant.

Nikitin describes the extension as an interim measure driven by Armenia’s difficult energy circumstances rather than a desirable long-term solution.

“Extending the operating lives of nuclear power plants has become common practice in virtually every country. There is nothing unusual about it in itself, although aging equipment can certainly be expected to cause problems, particularly when subjected to external stresses such as earthquakes,” he said.

He warned that Armenia’s seismic conditions and the limitations of Metsamor’s original Soviet-era design make replacing the plant particularly important.

“The sooner Armenia develops a new nuclear power infrastructure, the less likely it will be to encounter problems with a plant built to an outdated design that did not incorporate many of today’s safety requirements,” Nikitin said.

A decision with lasting consequences

For Armenia, choosing a replacement reactor involves more than selecting generating capacity.

In recent years, Pashinyan’s government has moved toward closer relations with the European Union while effectively freezing its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Armenia has also discussed the possibility of withdrawing from the Eurasian Economic Union.

Nikitin argues that Moscow views these developments with concern and regards nuclear cooperation as one means of maintaining its influence over Armenia.

“Russia is doing everything it can to preserve the country’s dependence on Rosatom, pursuing various initiatives and offering proposals through the nuclear corporation that appear attractive at first glance,” he said.

In Nikitin’s assessment, the strategic purpose of these offers is to discourage Armenia from moving further away from Russian-led institutions and toward the European Union.

Russia already supplies Metsamor’s nuclear fuel and provides technical services. Awarding Rosatom the contract for a replacement plant could preserve that relationship for decades through fuel deliveries, maintenance, specialized equipment, personnel training and nuclear safety support.

“If Armenia agrees to build another Russian nuclear power plant, it will effectively become dependent on Rosatom — and therefore Russia — for nearly a century,” Nikitin warned.

He pointed out that the long-term relationship between a nuclear plant and its technology supplier extends well beyond construction, encompassing fuel supplies, spent-fuel management and the maintenance of specialized equipment.

Choosing a Western or Asian supplier could diversify Armenia’s nuclear partnerships, although alternative technologies would bring their own financing, licensing and construction challenges. Pashinyan has said Armenia expects to select its new reactor technology by the end of 2027, perhaps sooner.

With construction likely to take many years, the government faces a narrowing window in which to replace Metsamor before its planned retirement. For Nikitin, the choice goes to the heart of Armenia’s relationship with Russia.

“The decision to build a new nuclear power plant in Armenia will undoubtedly be driven more by politics than by energy considerations,” he said.

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Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom has taken full control of one of the country’s largest logistics companies, consolidating an expanding transport empire that now stretches from Arctic icebreakers to Black Sea grain terminals.

The acquisition, announced October 7, gives Rosatom the remaining 51 percent of Delo Group, a major Russian container and freight operator, from its founder Sergei Shishkaryov. Rosatom already owned the other 49 percent.

The takeover is the latest step in Rosatom’s transformation from a nuclear energy corporation into a sprawling state conglomerate with an increasingly important role in Russia’s international trade.

Bellona expert Alexander Nikitin sees a broader political purpose behind the expansion.

“Putin trusts Rosatom,” Nikitin said. “That is why Putin is giving Rosatom access to resources the nuclear corporation could previously only have dreamed of.”

According to Nikitin, the corporation’s rapid growth has become particularly pronounced since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Building a transport empire

The purchase gives Rosatom complete control of Delo’s network of maritime terminals, rail infrastructure and container operations.

According to Reuters, the company operates a container fleet with capacity exceeding 220,000 twenty-foot equivalent units, or TEUs, and approximately 40,000 railway platforms. It also controls the KSK grain terminal at Novorossiysk, one of Russia’s largest grain export facilities, with annual handling capacity of up to 10 million tonnes.

Rosatom already controls another major shipping company, FESCO, which operates maritime and rail freight services linking Russia’s Far East with domestic and international markets.

According to Russian business newspaper Vedomosti, Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev said the corporation’s combined logistics operations now account for approximately 50 percent of Russia’s container-handling market and 44 percent of its rail container transport.

The acquisition followed a prolonged disagreement between Rosatom and Shishkaryov over Delo’s future. Under a shareholder buyout mechanism initiated earlier this year, Rosatom acquired the founder’s stake for a reported 77 billion rubles, approximately $900 million. Interfax reported that Rosatom financed the purchase with borrowed funds.

Nikitin argues that the acquisition belongs to a much larger pattern of concentrating strategically important industries under Rosatom’s control.

The corporation’s influence, he said, now extends across “nuclear and conventional weapons, advanced technologies across the civilian nuclear design and construction industry, mineral resources in the Arctic, including rare earths and precious metals,” as well as logistics infrastructure.

“Rosatom is becoming the managing corporation for Russia’s major port facilities,” Nikitin said, citing Vladivostok, Kaliningrad, Novorossiysk, St. Petersburg and Nakhodka.

The Arctic connection

For Rosatom, the acquisition is about more than moving containers. Since 2018, the corporation has been responsible for developing the Northern Sea Route, while its nuclear icebreaker fleet provides the infrastructure necessary to keep Arctic shipping lanes navigable.

Moscow has repeatedly promoted the route as a strategic commercial corridor connecting Russian Arctic resources and Asian markets.

But expanding Arctic shipping requires considerably more than icebreakers. It also depends on cargo terminals, railway connections, container services and reliable transport networks linking the Arctic to the rest of Russia.

By combining Delo with FESCO and its existing transport operations, Rosatom is seeking to bring more of that infrastructure under unified management.

In remarks published by Vedomosti, Likhachev described the corporation’s goals as strengthening Russia’s transport sovereignty, maintaining international freight connections and developing both the Northern Sea Route and the broader Trans-Arctic transport corridor.

The corporation also argues that consolidating its logistics businesses will eliminate overlapping investments and could save as much as 100 billion rubles over the next decade.

Whether those savings materialize remains uncertain.

The acquisition does not mean that all these operations will directly serve the Northern Sea Route. Many of Delo’s most important assets lie far from the Arctic. But the consolidation gives Rosatom a much larger role in determining how Russian freight moves between ports, railways and international markets.

More than a commercial transaction

The acquisition also illustrates how closely Russia’s largest state corporations are becoming intertwined with the country’s broader strategic priorities.

As Reuters reported, Shishkaryov said he intends to devote a substantial portion of the proceeds from the sale to Russia’s national security needs, although he provided no details about how the money would be used.

For Nikitin, however, Rosatom’s growing power is about more than overcoming commercial obstacles.

“Rosatom is becoming an institution the Kremlin can rely on when necessary,” he said.

Concentrating so many resources under its roof, Nikitin argues, is making Rosatom increasingly important to the country’s political leadership.

“Today, it is impossible to name another Russian company that has expanded so dramatically or accumulated so many resources as Rosatom,” he said. “In every sense, it has become the most trusted asset of Russia’s current leadership.”

The post From reactors to shipping: Rosatom tightens its grip on Russian transport appeared first on Bellona.org.

August brought signs of growing pressure on several fronts for Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom, from questions surrounding major construction projects abroad to the first decline in its foreign revenue in a decade.

Meanwhile, at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine, repeated attacks, losses of external power and difficulties securing diesel fuel underscored the precarious conditions surrounding Europe’s largest nuclear station.

Paks II faces a political — and environmental — rethink

In Hungary, the future of the Russian-built Paks II nuclear power plant has come under renewed scrutiny from the new government of Prime Minister Peter Magyar.

Magyar said in August that experts considered the existing permit for the project untenable and that the government was conducting a comprehensive review that would determine, among other things, whether Rosatom could continue building the plant.

Rosatom chief Alexey Likhachev insisted work was continuing according to plan. But Magyar pointed to the project’s long delays: under the original contract Paks II was supposed to be operating by 2024, while Hungary has already spent around 1 trillion forints (€2.8 billion) on the project. At the same time, Budapest is proposing to more than double its 2026 budget financing for Paks II, suggesting that abandonment of the project is not currently on the table.

Bellona nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov argues that the review should extend beyond the project’s finances. Extreme heat and exceptionally low water levels in the Danube forced the existing Paks plant to sharply reduce output this summer, raising questions about the cooling system planned for two additional reactors.

“At the same time, judging by Hungary’s continued financing of the project, a complete abandonment of Paks II does not appear to be under consideration,” Gorchakov said. “Under these circumstances, in addition to the financial questions already raised about the project’s cost, the problems facing the existing Paks plant due to extreme heat and low water levels in the Danube also raise the question of whether the project’s environmental parameters should be reconsidered — in particular, its cooling system.”

The existing plant already imposes a substantial thermal load on the Danube, while Paks II would add another 9.5 GW of thermal capacity. Gorchakov argues that increasingly frequent heat and drought could make the present cooling design difficult to sustain.

Rosatom’s foreign revenue falls

Those uncertainties come as Rosatom has acknowledged an unusual reversal in its international business. Its newly released 2025 annual report shows foreign revenue falling 4.1 percent to about $17.2 billion, even as overall revenue rose 7.9 percent to 3.33 trillion rubles. Its lifetime foreign project portfolio nevertheless increased to $206.2 billion.

Gorchakov called the decline significant because it follows 10 consecutive years of growth, with foreign revenue increasing by more than 20 percent annually during the previous five years.

Importantly, the decline does not appear to come from Rosatom’s nuclear fuel business. Bellona estimates that nuclear fuel-cycle deliveries increased substantially to the United States and China, and likewise rose in the European Union.

Instead, Rosatom’s report attributes the decline to lower revenues from nuclear plant construction. Gorchakov says this could partly reflect projects such as Bangladesh’s Rooppur plant and Turkey’s Akkuyu reaching later construction stages, but may also reflect “difficulties and additional costs associated with sanctions pressure, the search for alternative ways to transfer funds abroad, and changing suppliers.”

Egypt illustrates the ambiguity. Leaked documents concerning the Rosatom-built El Dabaa plant reportedly described construction defects, nuclear safety culture problems and a possible 18-month delay to the first reactor. Egyptian authorities disputed the characterization. Yet only days later Cairo and Rosatom began discussing adding two more Russian reactors to the four already under construction. See our article from August for more detail.

Zaporizhzhia survives on an increasingly thin margin

The situation at Zaporizhzhia is considerably more immediate. The plant lost its sole remaining external power connection four times during August. After the fourth outage, on August 20, it remained disconnected for roughly three weeks and depended on emergency diesel generators.

That exposed another vulnerability: Russian officials told IAEA inspectors that the last delivery to the plant’s diesel storage facility had occurred in March. A planned May delivery had been prevented by fighting, leaving fuel for approximately 10 days of emergency-generator operation. Operators progressively reduced the number of running generators from seven to four and eventually two, while cooling pumps were operated intermittently to conserve electricity.

The crisis unfolded amid repeated drone incidents around the station and tentative discussion of a possible Russian-Ukrainian energy ceasefire. Bellona nuclear expert Alexander Nikitin sees a larger issue emerging from those developments: ZNPP is no longer simply a civilian nuclear facility endangered by war, but has itself acquired military and political value.

‘Despite the military value of the territory around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, judging by their actions, both sides are trying to prevent the plant from permanently losing its potential energy and political value,” Nikitin writes. “This suggests that ZNPP is viewed not only as a source of nuclear risks, but also as a potential asset in future negotiations.’

That possibility makes preserving the plant important for reasons extending beyond nuclear safety. As Nikitin notes, a destroyed plant has little negotiating value; an intact one retains both political and economic importance.

But the August outages also demonstrate why any future agreement concerning nuclear facilities would have to extend beyond simply prohibiting direct attacks on reactors. Transmission lines, substations and other external infrastructure are essential to keeping a nuclear plant safe.

As Nikitin argues, the war has blurred a boundary nuclear regulation traditionally assumed was clear: a civilian nuclear facility can remain civilian in formal terms while simultaneously becoming an element of military strategy.

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The International Atomic Energy Agency has suspended one of its most senior Russian officials — but for reasons largely unrelated to the questions about Russian influence at the agency that have surrounded him since Moscow seized Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

Mikhail Chudakov, an IAEA deputy director general and head of its Department of Nuclear Energy since 2015, was placed on administrative leave this month pending an internal ethics investigation, according to Bloomberg.

The investigation concerns a 76-page book, Treatise on Life, which Chudakov published under the pseudonym Valentin Voyutin in 2025. The book contains disparaging descriptions of feminists and LGBT people and expresses support for authoritarian government.

According to Bloomberg, the book came to the IAEA’s attention after Chudakov promoted it among members of Vienna’s young nuclear community. Members of the group subsequently brought it to the agency’s ethics office. The IAEA, Chudakov and Director General Rafael Grossi have not publicly commented on the case.

But Chudakov’s suspension has reopened a different question that predates the book by years: whether a former senior official of Russia’s state nuclear industry should have remained in one of the IAEA’s most influential positions after Russia invaded Ukraine and Rosatom became directly involved in the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant.

Greenpeace International raised precisely that issue in March 2022, less than two weeks after Russian forces seized Zaporizhzhia. In a letter, the organization called on Grossi to suspend Chudakov, citing his decades-long career in Russia’s nuclear establishment and requesting disclosure of any communications between him and Rosatom officials following the invasion.

Greenpeace argued that Chudakov’s presence could undermine Ukrainian confidence in the confidentiality of information shared with the IAEA during the nuclear crisis. No public evidence has emerged showing that Chudakov provided confidential information to Rosatom. Chudakov nevertheless remained in his position for another four years.

The significance of that position extends well beyond the IAEA’s response to Zaporizhzhia. The Department of Nuclear Energy works with countries planning new nuclear programs and oversees areas including reactor technology, small modular reactors, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear infrastructure and training.

Chudakov has also headed the IAEA’s International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, or INPRO, and chaired the steering committee of its Platform on Small Modular Reactors and their Applications.

Mikhail Chudakov

At the same time, cooperation between the IAEA and Russian nuclear institutions continued after the invasion.

In October 2024, the agency renewed and expanded the status of Rosatom’s Technical Academy as an IAEA Collaborating Center. Joint programs have continued to bring nuclear specialists from other countries to Russian facilities.

In September 2025, Chudakov personally led an IAEA delegation to Rosatom’s Akademik Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant in Chukotka. The visit was hosted by Rosenergoatom, where Chudakov previously held senior positions, at a time when Rosatom was increasingly promoting floating and land-based small reactors to potential foreign customers.

For Bellona nuclear expert Alexander Nikitin, such relationships point to a broader problem confronting the IAEA since Russia’s invasion. The war, he says, has divided nuclear countries into aggressors, victims of aggression and relatively neutral states, while the international nuclear industry continues to operate largely under rules created before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“The international nuclear sector continues to function without a referee and under the international regulatory framework that existed before the war,” Nikitin said.

That makes the individuals making decisions within the IAEA particularly important, he argues, including decisions about supporting nuclear projects in countries seeking to develop nuclear power.

But determining when ordinary IAEA cooperation crosses the line into advancing Rosatom’s interests is considerably more difficult.

According to Bellona nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov, Ukraine’s desire to remove Chudakov following the invasion was understandable, but attempting to do so simply because of his Rosatom background and continuing contacts with the Russian nuclear industry had little prospect of succeeding under IAEA rules.

“It is extremely difficult to prove that he is working specifically in Rosatom’s interests rather than those of the IAEA — which could indeed provide grounds for his removal,” Gorchakov said.

The problem, he says, is the unusually close overlap between their interests. The IAEA promotes the development of nuclear energy internationally. Rosatom also develops nuclear energy internationally, albeit for its own commercial and political purposes.

None of Chudakov’s contacts with Russian nuclear organizations therefore necessarily demonstrates improper conduct. Other major nuclear countries also host IAEA training and technical programs, while the agency necessarily works with the nuclear industries of its member states.

And although the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference have repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning Russian actions in Ukraine, Gorchakov notes that they have never instructed the IAEA Secretariat — Grossi and the staff working beneath him — to cease cooperation with Russia or Rosatom.

“Many of Chudakov’s contacts and actions in his position at the IAEA can have perfectly understandable explanations arising from his official responsibilities and, at least formally, do not contradict them,” Gorchakov said.

Even Ukraine’s membership on the IAEA Board of Governors from 2023 to 2025 failed to change that situation.

Yet days after Chudakov’s suspension, Ukrainian military intelligence added a new allegation. It claimed on September 16 that Chudakov helped secure the depiction of Russian-occupied Crimea as Russian territory in the IAEA’s Power Reactor Information System, or PRIS, and that Russian representatives were seeking the use of Russified names including “Rovno,” “Khmelnitski” and “Zaporozhye” for Ukrainian nuclear locations.

Those allegations have not been independently confirmed by the IAEA.

For Gorchakov, the irony is that after years of controversy over Chudakov’s Russian connections, none of those issues ultimately caused his suspension. Instead, Chudakov appears to have created the grounds himself.

“It was only when Chudakov himself created a problem through his book — which apparently contains numerous clear conflicts with the Agency’s ethical standards — that it became possible to accomplish, at least partially, what had previously proved impossible to achieve or demonstrate through other means,” Gorchakov said.

His suspension may remove one controversial official. But the larger question — how an international nuclear organization should work with the nuclear industry of a member state waging war and occupying another country’s nuclear power plant — remains unresolved.

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