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China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.

The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030. 

This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.

Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.

However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.

It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.

But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.

Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry. 

Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.

Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.

• What does the plan say about peaking coal?
• What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
• What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
• How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

Article Contents Expand menu

• What does the plan say about peaking coal?
• What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
• What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
• How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

What does the plan say about peaking coal?

Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.

The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy. 

Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.

The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:

“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”

However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.

The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.

Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region. 

Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions. 

But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.

The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. 

Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.

In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.

It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”. 

The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.

The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.

The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:

• Peaking coal consumption;
• “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
• Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
• Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
• “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
• Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
• Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
• Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.

The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.

“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”. 

A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”. 

This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy” 

However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption. 

State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.

“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.

While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.

Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.

“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.

What does the plan say about China’s coal production?

The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.

The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.

The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.

Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”. 

Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024. 

“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.

Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.

It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.

This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.

New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.

This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.

The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented. 

Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.

What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?

The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.

The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption. 

Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.

In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.

It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.

This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.

Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.

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Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.

China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.

Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.

It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]

The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.

At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.

In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.

Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively. 

In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.

However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”. 

She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.

How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.

As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.

Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.

A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.

But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.

China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.

The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”

The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions. 

Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.

As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.  

Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds: 

“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”

related Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? 06.08.2026 China policy Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change? 29.07.2026 China policy Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’ 09.07.2026 China policy Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy

The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

Methane Emissions From Wildfires: Trends and Anomalies, Zhu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 

Wildfires emit smoke particles and trace gases including greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, impacting the environment and leading to detrimental impacts on human health and economy. The estimation of spatially and temporally resolved methane emissions from biomass burning (BB) provides critical information in developing measurement-informed methane inventories. The use of satellite active fire products (fire radiative power) is an effective pathway to investigate wildfire emissions around the world. In this study, the Global BB Emissions Product-eXtended algorithm is employed to estimate long-term temporal variation and geographic distribution of methane emissions from BB using satellite observations from the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer and the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite. Globally, on average about 19 Megatonnes of BB methane are released to the atmosphere every year, nearly half of it originating from Africa, where BB represents a significant proportion of the total methane emissions. Our findings show that methane emissions from wildfires are substantial and can exceed other source sectors during extreme wildfire events, negating gains from years of emission reductions from anthropogenic sources. The contribution of fires to the methane budget is significant for regions with intense fire activities. Effective wildfire prevention and management could be beneficial to rapidly reduce methane emissions from BB.

Diurnal asymmetry in heat stress intensification across Bangladesh, 1985–2024: Accelerated nighttime warming and emerging urban risk, Kamruzzaman et al., PLOS Climate

Bangladesh’s rapidly growing cities are becoming hotter, but how heat stress is changing over the day–night cycle has remained unclear. Using 40 years (1985–2024) of hourly Universal Thermal Climate Index (UTCI) data from ERA5-HEAT, we examined long-term changes in physiologically relevant heat stress across Bangladesh and its major cities. Results show a clear day–night imbalance in warming: nighttime heat stress (UTCI???) is rising faster than daytime extremes. National trends indicate increases of +0.03 °C per decade for UTCI???, +0.02 °C for daily mean UTCI, and +0.01 °C for UTCI???, with the strongest warming occurring in the early morning hours. These national spatially averaged trends reflect the mean across all 194 grid cells; individual grid cells show local trends of +0.1 to +0.4°C per decade, and the cumulative nighttime warming over the full 40-year period reaches approximately 1.0–1.7°C across most of the country. This signals a steady loss of nighttime cooling that people rely on for physical recovery. The most pronounced nighttime warming occurs in western and southern Bangladesh. Major cities—including Dhaka, Rajshahi, Khulna, Chattogram, and Sylhet—show additional intensification consistent with, but not directly attributed to, urban heat-island dynamics at the spatial scale of this analysis. The number of very strong heat stress days (UTCI > 38 °C) has increased by 4–15 days per decade, and cities such as Rajshahi and Dhaka now experience more than 150 such days annually. Together, these findings indicate a transition from occasional heat extremes to persistent, 24-hour heat stress, increasing risks to health, labor productivity, and urban resilience. By identifying when heat stress is rising fastest and where it is concentrated, this study provides evidence to support city-specific heat-action plans, early-warning systems, and climate-responsive urban design in rapidly warming regions.

Significant soil warming across Alaska permafrost and non-permafrost regions from 1997 to 2023, Oliver & Phillips, Frontiers in Climate

Air temperatures in Alaska are increasing at twice the rate of the contiguous United States. Soil temperatures have been shown to be increasing across various landscapes but have overall received less attention. No comprehensive studies have been conducted in Alaska looking at soil temperature trends on a broad scale. In this paper we synthesized soil and air temperature data from 43 weather stations across Alaska spanning a 27-year period (1997-2023). Stations were divided into three regions based on permafrost extent (continuous, discontinuous, and no permafrost). Soil temperature trends were calculated at 5, 20, and 50 cm depth in all three permafrost regions, and additionally at 70, 95, and 120 cm depth for the continuous permafrost region only. Annual average soil temperatures increased significantly across all regions with the fastest warming rates occurring at the highest latitudes. Whole profile warming averaged 0.64, 0.37, and 0.35°C dec-1 in the continuous, discontinuous, and no permafrost regions, respectively. Warming was not slowed by increasing soil depth. Air temperatures warmed faster than soil (p < 0.05) in the continuous permafrost region (1.15°C dec-1) but were not significantly different from soil in the discontinuous and no permafrost regions (p > 0.1). Seasonally, soils in the continuous and discontinuous regions warmed fastest in the winter months, whereas in the no permafrost region soils warmed fastest in the summer months.

Optimizing the Rainwater Harvesting and Roof Sprinkling System to Adapt to Urban Extreme Heat, Yu et al., Earth s Future

Roof watering is a novel strategy for reducing air conditioning energy consumption and mitigating excess urban heat, yet its application is often constrained by water availability. To address this challenge, we propose an adaptation strategy that integrates rainwater harvesting tank with roof sprinkling to strengthen urban heat resilience. We develop a new module implemented in the Community Land Model Urban (CLMU) to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed strategy, whose parameters were further determined by a framework using multi-objective optimization combined with a transformer-based tabular foundation model. This integrated modeling framework enables the optimization of the proposed strategy and provides insights into its impacts on air conditioning energy consumption and its co-benefits on the urban thermal environment. Results show that the temperature threshold for triggering sprinkling is a more important parameter than rainwater tank size or sprinkling intensity. The optimal strategies effectively reduce cooling energy demand, lower extreme temperatures, and decrease heatwave days. However, a trade-off exists between rainwater tank size and the reduction in cooling energy consumption and heatwave days. Additionally, the energy saving is more pronounced under higher atmospheric temperatures. The implementation of the rainwater harvesting and roof sprinkling system in CLMU provides valuable insights for improving urban resilience and can be further coupled into Earth system model for large-scale studies.

From this week's government/NGO section:

State of the Climate in 2025, Blunden et al., American Meteorological Society

The authors provide a comprehensive, observation-based assessment of Earth’s climate system that not only documents what happened during a given year (e.g., 2025), but also how that year compares to previous years in the observational record. Thus, it is critical to have continuous, long-term observations of various components of the Earth system to document variability and change over time. Many of these observations, both current and historical, are also assimilated into various reanalysis products (e.g., ERA5 and MERRA-2), which are physically constrained representations of the Earth system and are used extensively throughout the State of the Climate report. Reanalyzes are particularly useful in regions where in situ and satellite observations are sparse.

Built for backup, contracted to run: China’s coal support system risks crowding out clean power, Qin et al., The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and Global Energy Monitor

New coal power plants entering operation in China reached the highest first-half year level since 2016, with 10 GW entering operation for every 1 GW retired, despite a policy shift towards tighter control of new project approvals. China commissioned 30 GW of new coal power, up 43% from last year, while retiring only 2.7 GW. Another 25.4 GW started construction; Coal power generation rebounded 3.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, reversing the 2025 decline. The rapid expansion of coal power capacity led to worsening oversupply, reflected both in the increase of wasted wind and solar generation and in falling utilization of coal power plants; The rebound was not evidence of a broad return to coal following LNG shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. China’s combined domestic coal production and imports in fact fell by 1.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, rather than expanding in response to the external energy shock. Growth in clean energy supply and electrification helped offset the fall in oil supply and limit increases in fossil fuel consumption; Estimated wind and solar curtailment, including both reported and unreported curtailment, reached 360 TWh in H1 2026, up 49% year-on-year. Had this electricity been absorbed, the additional power supply could have met all demand growth and allowed coal power generation to fall. 132 articles in 58 journals by 1667 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Regime shifts of AMOC-sea surface temperature relationship, Fan et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76149-4

Trends in the Seasonal Cycle of the Equatorial Pacific Cold Tongue, Jiang et al., Journal of Climate Open Access pdf 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0049.1

Observations of climate change, effects

Diurnal asymmetry in heat stress intensification across Bangladesh, 1985–2024: Accelerated nighttime warming and emerging urban risk, Kamruzzaman et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000848

Globally and intergenerationally unequal exposure to hourly heat extremes, Liao et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02724-8

Recent History of Surface Ocean Acidification Extremes That Compound Marine Heatwaves, Gregor & Gruber, AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2025av002112

Significant soil warming across Alaska permafrost and non-permafrost regions from 1997 to 2023, Oliver & Phillips, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1887902

Spatiotemporal Patterns of Drought and Flood Abrupt Alternation and Their Driving Factors in China from 1951 to 2020, Li et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology Open Access pdf 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0187.1

State of the Climate in 2025, Zhao et al., Atmospheric and Oceanic Science Letters Open Access 10.1016/j.aosl.2026.100897

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

The rise of AI in weather and climate information and its impact on global inequality, Mozaffari et al., npj Climate Action Open Access pdf 10.1038/s44168-026-00412-z

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Intensification of the North Pacific Storm Track in the Mid-1980s: Internal Variability Versus External Forcing, Yang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124032

Machine learning-based projection of China's ski resort suitability under CMIP6 scenarios, ZHAO et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.08.002

Projections of Earth's Hottest Surface Temperatures in CMIP6, Wilson et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122540

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Advances in regional climate science in South America and Central America during the CORDEX Era, Bettolli et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001015

Global fully coupled climate-aerosol CMA-CPSv4 – Part 1: Aerosol simulation performance, Zheng et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-7279-2026

Impact of mesoscale eddy parameterization on Arctic Atlantic Water circulation and heat transport in the eddy-permitting grey zone, Pemberton et al., Ocean science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-2375-2026

Statistical Downscaling of Daily Temperature and Precipitation From Regional Climate Models in Complex Mountain Terrain, Matiu et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70545

Underestimated Arctic “Radiator Fin” Effect in Climate Model Simulations, Huang & Huang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122725

Cryosphere & climate change

A nine-year record of slush on the Greenland Ice Sheet, Glen et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-4345-2026

A State-Space Model for Monitoring Greenland Ice Sheet Surface Elevation Change from CryoSat-2, Andersen et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-4327-2026

Arctic sea ice loss amplifies local evaporation influence on water vapor isotopes: insights from cruise observations, Zhang et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-11189-2026

Destabilization of seasonal snow cover under climate warming: Mechanisms and implications from four decades of satellite observations across mainland China, Wu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105644

Future climate change will intensify snow drought in the high-latitude water tower, Changbai Mountain, Xu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105646

Glacier mass balance response to extreme precipitation events in the Western Himalaya, India, Kumar et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105643

Glacier surges on James Ross Island, Antarctica, and their relationship with climate, Davison et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-4293-2026

Snow-eater heat waves of the western United States, Rhoades et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb3361

Synchronous Holocene thinning of Pine Island Glacier and its tributaries influenced by ice-shelf unpinning, Johnson et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76244-6

Sea level & climate change

Diverse response of extreme sea levels amplification and more vulnerable deltas/islands in the northern South China Sea by the end of the 21st century, Chen et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.021

Increasing Frequency of Coastal Erosion Indicated by a Hindcast Model of Storm-Driven Forcing Calibrated With Beach Stratigraphy, Schmelz et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007482

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Planetary energy budget during abrupt glacial climate events set by Atlantic Ocean heat valve, Buizert et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02070-6

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Abalone Mortality Associated With Hypoxia in Tidepools During a Summer Heatwave, Gagnon et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74126

Arctic sea-ice variability is linked to long-term changes in bowhead whale foraging, Teixeira et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108344

Beyond temperature: The environmental constraints of high-mountain microrefugia, Vrábel et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70422

Blue rings in Scots pine indicate cooling in the early and late growing season at the northern treeline, ?ermák et al., Dendrochronologia Open Access 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126592

Climate Warming Is Causing an Increasing Dominance of Smaller Moth Species, Ellis et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access 10.1111/geb.70294

Continental-Scale Biodiversity Predictions Are Influenced by Climatic Variability and Extreme Weather, Cohen et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71028

Coupling Climate Downscaling With Species Distribution Models to Identify Potential Climate Refugia for Giant Panda Forage Bamboos, Shang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74162

Denning Phenology Mediates Sea-Ice Loss Impacts on Early Reproductive Success in Polar Bears, Naciri et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71042

Evaluation and Forecasting of Habitat Suitability and Thermal Growth Responses in the Mud Clam Geloina coaxans under Climate Change, Liu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108337

Future NDVI projections and ensemble strategy comparison in Inner Mongolia under CMIP6 scenarios, Li et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.3389/fevo.2026.1921058

Global threat exposure of islands in a changing world, Marino et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2534106123

Hydraulic traits govern opposing range shifts of montane trees under warming, Zhang et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02726-6

Metabolic Responses of Mammals to Temperature Anomalies Vary Across Climates, Rubalcaba & Correas-Araus, Global Ecology and Biogeography 10.1111/geb.70293

Oxygen Deprivation Implicated in Rapid Coral Mortality Under Acute Heating Events, Dhillon et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71030

Projecting the impact of climate change on the lipid profile of the hydrocoral Millepora alcicornis: Relative lipid homeostasis under warming and ocean acidification, Marrero et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108349

Resident and Migratory Falcons' Breeding Phenology and Productivity Respond Differently to Weather and Climate Change Across the Arctic, Gulotta et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71022

The Impact of Climate Change and Human Habitation on Long-Term Ecological Stability, Staples et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access 10.1111/geb.70296

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Accelerating biomass loss from forest disturbances across Europe, Kowalski et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02032-y

Carbon dioxide fluxes of two differently managed sites in a former Scots pine plantation in response to widespread drought mortality, Sulzer et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111398

Decadal doubling of Siberian methane emissions due to warming-induced fires and methanogenesis, Zhu et al., Science Open Access 10.1126/science.aea5828

Global Change Impacts on Mineral-Associated Organic Matter: Consequences for Soil Carbon Persistence, Jia & Feng, Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71037

Global methane emissions from rice paddies are now increasingly quantifiable, Mehla et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03902-4

Mechanical thresholds constrain global peatland carbon accumulation, Mahdiyasa et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-66259-w

Methane Emissions From Wildfires: Trends and Anomalies, Zhu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046687

Persistence of Arctic Ocean acidification under negative emissions, Köhn et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02715-9

Snow depth shifts greenhouse gas balance during freeze–thaw periods in grasslands, Luo et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70421

The impact of artificial intelligence on carbon emission intensity: evidence for an early-stage inverted U-shaped relationship, Wang, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1756431

Decarbonization

A policy-navigation framework for exploring hydrogen integration pathways in Great Britain towards net zero, Abuella et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115535

Charging infrastructure network expansion for electric vehicles in Norway from a grid perspective: Barriers and solutions, Hjelkrem & Flataker, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115528

CO2 mitigation potential of biomass-derived charcoal in Indian iron and steel industry: A case study from Karnataka, Tikadar et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102093

Decarbonization potential and limits of e-fuel policies in the EU, Campos-Rodríguez et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115529

Evidence of predation events by marine mammals at offshore wind farms, Bicknell et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-65167-3

Impact of renewable energy communities on the Italian day-ahead electricity market: A scenario analysis, Koltunov et al., Energy Policy pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115518

Linking photovoltaic development with energy storage: A review of solar-to-battery integration pathways, Kashyap et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102096

Geoengineering climate

Assessing combinations of regional MCB designed to target multiple climate response objectives, Mason et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-10861-2026

Middle atmosphere chemical and dynamical effects in the CCMI-2022 stratospheric aerosol injection scenario, Jörimann et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-11207-2026

Aerosols

A global model of dust mineralogy: Impacts on aerosol absorption, radiative balance and climate, Liu et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122263

Effects of East Asian Anthropogenic Aerosol Emissions Reduction on Summer Extreme Heat Events in Eastern China, Shu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045994

Global fully coupled climate-aerosol CMA-CPSv4 – Part 1: Aerosol simulation performance, Zheng et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-7279-2026

Climate change communications & cognition

Beyond the Greenwash: Understanding and Mitigating the Impact of Misleading Native Advertisements from Fossil Fuel Companies, Krishna et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2714124

Climate imagination. Dispatches from hopeful futures, Blanchard, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2709209

Delay Means Death: Development of a Scale to Measure Public Support or Rejection of Climate Delay Discourses, Wójcik et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103168

Discourses on the roots and resilience of climate misinformation: perspectives from the Canadian agri-food sector, Kabir & Chowdhury, Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2713878

IPCC experts as passeurs actors: A new typology of international experts in domestic science-policy interfaces, Gaveau et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104464

National Survey Explores Associations between Climate Knowledge, Visual Interpretation, Sociodemographics, and Flood Risk Perceptions in U.S. Adults, Ruckert et al., Weather Climate and Society Open Access pdf 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0216.1

Transportation and Climate Behaviors: Comparing Difficulty of Transportation-related Behaviors Across Different Populations, Naseri et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103173

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A Machine Learning Framework for Rice Yield Prediction under Heat Stress: Enhancing Model Training through Crop-Simulation-Based Scenario Generation, R et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0201.1

Cover crops for soil carbon sequestration and sustainable agroecosystem: a review of ecological processes, Demissie et al., Ecological Processes Open Access 10.1186/s13717-026-00738-w

Designing farmer-centered extension programmes for low-carbon agriculture: evidence from a discrete choice experiment in China, Jiang et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.33204022.v1

Global methane emissions from rice paddies are now increasingly quantifiable, Mehla et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03902-4

Impacts of Future Oil Palm Expansion on Carbon and Hydrological Fluxes Across the Tropics, Xu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120846

Long-Term Analysis of Winter Wheat Yield and Climatic Influences in Ukraine, Grabovska et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70524

The possibility of growing winter crops in the face of global warming; variation in seed yield and phytochemistry of selected fenugreek (Trigonella foenum-graecum L.) genotypes, Yaldiz & Camlica, Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-66442-z

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Changes in tropical cyclone size over the western North Pacific, Feng et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100946

Climate change impacts on streamflow in a dam-regulated Mountain Watershed in South Korea using SWAT and CMIP6 projections, Sadiqi et al., Arabian Journal of Geosciences 10.1007/s12517-026-12568-3

Climate extremes expose groundwater risks, Wei & Cao, Science 10.1126/science.aek2112

Future climate change will intensify snow drought in the high-latitude water tower, Changbai Mountain, Xu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105646

Global River Discharge Projections From a Large Multi-Model Ensemble of CMIP6 and ISIMIP3b Simulations, Seubert et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007982

Periodic extreme rainfall in a warmer climate due to stronger convectively coupled waves, Quan et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed1634

Record-Breaking Atmospheric River Drives April 2024 Extreme Precipitation in the United Arab Emirates and the Surrounding Gulf Region, Massoud et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-26-0052.1

Climate change economics

Beyond the mean: the macroeconomic consequences of shifting temperature anomaly distributions, Winter et al., Climatic Change 10.1007/s10584-026-04257-7

Geopolitical fragmentation, climate risk, and crude oil price dynamics: Evidence from TVP-VAR-SV and causal forest models, Aloui et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115531

The political feasibility of Degrowth and the Green New Deal: Swedish politicians on the relation between economic growth and climate policy, Sellbjer, Environmental Sociology Open Access 10.1080/23251042.2026.2712609

Climate change mitigation public policy research

Climate-friendly food advertising and procurement in English local authorities: A systematic scoping review of policy ambition, Sermin-Reed et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000971

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Advancing a justice-centred approach to climate (un)inhabitability through transformative adaptation, [] et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2714547

Assessing the integration of older adults’ vulnerability in climate adaptation policies in a developing country, Opoku et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2714549

Climate adaptation among transnationally connected households in Coastal Havana Province, Cuba, Bernasconi, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1812869

Climate adaptation investment planning: insights from applications in developing countries, Watkiss et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2689995

Climate change and efficiency losses in combined heat and power plants: Evidence from China, Xiao et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115546

Non-linear urban overheating increments under climate change: Evidence from UKCP18 nighttime temperatures, Zhang et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103082

Optimizing the Rainwater Harvesting and Roof Sprinkling System to Adapt to Urban Extreme Heat, Yu et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008876

Putting children at the heart of climate change adaptation policies via Allyship, Bias Recognition and Child Centeredness: A global qualitative interview study, Zangerl et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001025

Climate change impacts on human health

Aedes albopictus and Dengue Transmission Risk in France Over the 21st Century, Radici et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.21281650

Diurnal asymmetry in heat stress intensification across Bangladesh, 1985–2024: Accelerated nighttime warming and emerging urban risk, Kamruzzaman et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000848

Globally and intergenerationally unequal exposure to hourly heat extremes, Liao et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02724-8

Public perceptions of extreme heat: A review, Howarth & Bedenk-Smith, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104457

Spatial Heterogeneity in Heat-Related Mortality in the Valencian Region: Implications for Climate Adaptation Beyond Administrative Boundaries, Paredes-Fortuny et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2025gh001699

Climate change & geopolitics

The geopolitics of decarbonization: How changing international relations reshape the European Union's sustainability transition, Kiefer, Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104910

Other

Climate change may increase landslide frequency despite generally drier conditions in the Mediterranean area, Quintero et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/nhess-26-3723-2026

Landscape context constrains climate regulation recovery in Amazonian secondary forests, Oliveira et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2426400123

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Climate change means extreme fire seasons in Canada are here to stay, Keeping et al., World Weather Attribution

At the time of writing, Ontario and the Northwest Territories have been especially affected regions in Canada’s 2026 wildfire season, with hundreds of active fires, many of them out of control. Scientists from Canada, the U.S., the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom collaborated to assess to what extent human-induced climate change altered the likelihood and intensity of the weather conditions at the time of the fires, and how the conditions will be affected with further warming. To assess the role of human-induced climate change the authors combine the observation-based assessments with climate models. In both regions and for both event definitions the climate models show a much smaller increase in likelihood and intensity. Combining models and observations gives an increase in likelihood of about a factor of 5 in the Northwest Territories for DSR7 and a factor 2 for DSR30 and in Ontario of about 2 for both event definitions.

Most Americans have been affected by extreme heat this year, AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research

Adults are increasingly likely to say extreme heat in the past year has impacted their electricity bills, outdoor plans, and other routines. At the same time, the public has become slightly less inclined to believe that climate change is happening. About half of adults say extreme heat has had a major impact on their electricity bills, while 3 in 10 say the same about their outdoor activities. Fewer report major impacts on their exercise routines, sleep, pets, travel or vacation plans, the timing of events like weddings or reunions, or their job or commute. Ninety percent of adults say extreme heat has had at least a minor impact on their lives, up from 83% two years ago.

Built for backup, contracted to run: China’s coal support system risks crowding out clean power, Qin et al., The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and Global Energy Monitor

New coal power plants entering operation in China reached the highest first-half year level since 2016, with 10 GW entering operation for every 1 GW retired, despite a policy shift towards tighter control of new project approvals. China commissioned 30 GW of new coal power, up 43% from last year, while retiring only 2.7 GW. Another 25.4 GW started construction; Coal power generation rebounded 3.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, reversing the 2025 decline. The rapid expansion of coal power capacity led to worsening oversupply, reflected both in the increase of wasted wind and solar generation and in falling utilization of coal power plants; The rebound was not evidence of a broad return to coal following LNG shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. China’s combined domestic coal production and imports in fact fell by 1.4% year-on-year in H1 2026, rather than expanding in response to the external energy shock. Growth in clean energy supply and electrification helped offset the fall in oil supply and limit increases in fossil fuel consumption; Estimated wind and solar curtailment, including both reported and unreported curtailment, reached 360 TWh in H1 2026, up 49% year-on-year. Had this electricity been absorbed, the additional power supply could have met all demand growth and allowed coal power generation to fall.

State of the Climate in 2025, Blunden et al., American Meteorological Society

The authors provide a comprehensive, observation-based assessment of Earth’s climate system that not only documents what happened during a given year (e.g., 2025), but also how that year compares to previous years in the observational record. Thus, it is critical to have continuous, long-term observations of various components of the Earth system to document variability and change over time. Many of these observations, both current and historical, are also assimilated into various reanalysis products (e.g., ERA5 and MERRA-2), which are physically constrained representations of the Earth system and are used extensively throughout the State of the Climate report. Reanalyzes are particularly useful in regions where in situ and satellite observations are sparse.

2026 Progress report: National adaptation plan (New Zealand), He Pou a Rangi Climate Change Commission

The author's assessment of progress found that adaptation is not keeping pace with escalating climate risks in Aotearoa New Zealand, and in some cases is slipping further behind. This reflects their 2024 finding, that the work underway is not enough to make the country resilient to current pressures, let alone into future decades. The progress made since 2024 has been uneven and serious gaps remain. This matters, critically. As climate effects intensify, weaknesses in the country’s response increase in consequence – as harm and costs experienced by families, communities, workers and businesses across the motu. Aotearoa New Zealand is – too often – paying to react and recover after damage occurs, rather than preparing ahead of time.

Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania

The survey was conducted among a nationally representative sample of 1,320 U.S. adult citizens from June 16-July 19, 2026. The authors found that three in five Americans (61%) now somewhat or strongly oppose the construction of new data centers in their area, up from 49% in the survey ending in March; majorities of Democrats (69%), Republicans (54%) and independents (53%) oppose new local data centers. Opposition is highest among young adults under 30 (70%) and declines to 57% among those 65 and older, the inverse of what one might expect for a new technology; 39% expect AI’s effect on the United States to be negative over the next decade, against 18% who expect it to be positive, unchanged from the spring. Two-thirds (68%) say the government has done “too little” to regulate AI; and across 13 areas, only medical research and discoveries draws a net-positive assessment (+41 points) in which the anticipated benefits of AI outweigh the expected negatives. The most negative areas are personal privacy and data security (-63 points), children’s safety online (-50 points), and employment and jobs (-46 points). About New Research

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This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

AI energy use is a huge and controversial topic at the moment. Credible estimates have AI data centers accounting for around 12% US electricity use by 2030. But at the same time consumers have been given reassuringly small numbers about the impact of their own AI use, numbers that seem on their face somewhat inconsistent with the staggering size of their aggregate usage.

In 2025 Google published an article calculating that median Gemini text prompt used only 0.24 watt-hours (Wh), less energy than “watching nine seconds of television”. Around the same time, Sam Altman said that an average ChatGPT query uses about 0.34 Wh, and Epoch AI came out with similar numbers. Writers like Andy Masley and Hannah Ritchie have shown that at these rates an individual using chatbots has a pretty negligible impact, with one prompt only amounting to roughly 1/150,000th of an average American’s daily emissions.

Those numbers are basically right. They are also increasingly divorced from how AI is actually being used today.

The fastest-growing way that software engineers and scientists actually use AI is not typing questions into a chat box. Rather, we use AI agents through tools like Claude Code and Codex that plan, write code, run it, read the results, and iterate on their own. These agents make dozens of model calls per human prompt, and engage in complex reasoning chains that involve attempting and evaluating multiple answers to the same question.

I work for a company in Silicon Valley (Stripe) and admittedly use the latest AI tools more than most people. But I thought it would be instructive to take a deep dive into my own AI use over the past 8 weeks and calculate the actual energy use I was responsible for.

Over the past 8 weeks I typed 1,138 prompts into Claude Code. Those prompts triggered more than 14,000 model calls that processed 3.2 billion tokens. My best estimate is that this used around 170 kWh of data center electricity (with an uncertainty range of roughly 70 to 330 kWh across methods and assumptions). That works out to around 150 Wh per prompt (60 to 290 Wh), which is roughly 600 times (250 to 1,200) the energy of a median chat prompt. A “prompt” is ultimately not a unit of AI use any more than “trips” is a measurement of driving; it’s how far you go that matters.

Agents supercharge AI usage

Part of the impetus for this post is the publication of a new white paper from Watershed (Bistline et al. 2026) proposing a standardized framework for corporate AI emissions accounting. It is the most careful treatment I have seen of why published per-query numbers differ by orders of magnitude (system boundaries, mostly), and it contains a figure that should reframe the whole discussion: electricity per AI task spans more than five orders of magnitude, from thousandths of a watt-hour for text classification to 50-500 Wh for an agentic workflow making 5-50 frontier model calls. As they put it, emissions attributed to one “interaction” may understate the compute actually consumed “by an order of magnitude or more.”

Other researchers have found similar results. Bai et al. (2026) measured coding agents on real software tasks and found they consume roughly 1,000 times the tokens of an ordinary chatbot interaction. And these sort of agents tasks represent the most rapid driver of increased AI usage; Anthropic’s Economic Index found that 97% of their API usage now show “automation-dominant” patterns associated with agents.

To put these values in perspective, the figure below compares published per-prompt and task estimates (blue) with what I measured from my Claude Code use (orange) as well as common benchmarks for energy use (running a microwave, a fridge, or a whole home):

Electricity consumption per AI task, including published estimates (blue) and values computed from my own Claude Code session logs (orange). Measured token counts converted using Bistline (2026) activity-tier energy factors; orange ranges span cache-read energy assumptions of 1% to 25%.

My median Claude Code session uses around 0.6 kWh (0.25 to 1.2 kWh), which is at the top end of Watershed’s generic agentic usage estimate, and fifty times the energy used to charge a cellphone. My average day of Claude Code (3.0 kWh, range 1.2 to 5.9 kWh) uses more electricity than running two refrigerators.

Measuring my own footprint

Claude Code keeps complete local transcripts of every session, including the exact token counts the API reports for every model call.1 This lets me precisely know how much AI usage I was responsible for rather than simply extrapolating it from published benchmarks; its only the step to convert tokens used to energy that requires assumptions.

The first thing I found is that the gap between “prompts” and reality is massive: my 1,138 typed prompts resulted in just over 14,000 distinct model calls (12 per prompt), and each prompt consumed on average 2.9 million tokens. For comparison, typical web-based AI chat exchanges with no reasoning or web searches only use around a thousand tokens.

Over the past the 8 weeks, my Claude Code used 3.2 billion tokens. These overwhelmingly came from the agent re-reading its own working memory. Every time an agent takes a step (e.g. runs a command, reads a file, or calls a tool), the model re-processes its entire accumulated context. The figure below shows the breakdown of how tokens were used and their share of total electricity use.

Token and estimated electricity composition of my Claude Code usage, May 31 to July 25, 2026. “Cache reads” are previously processed context re-read from the key-value cache on each model call; “cache writes” are new context being processed and stored; “output” is text and code generated by the model. Electricity shares use Bistline (2026) factors with cache reads at 10% of the fresh-input energy rate.

The text I actually see (e.g. the model’s output) is only around 0.4% of total tokens processed. Some 96% of the tokens are cache reads where the agent re-reads its own context at each of those 14,000 steps. This matters enormously for the energy estimate, because a cached token is much cheaper to re-read than a fresh one is to process. AI companies charge about 10% of the price for cache reads compared with fresh content, and I use that ratio as my central energy assumption, with 1% and 25% as bounds.2

Since nobody outside of the labs actually knows the true per-token energy of a frontier model (Anthropic has published no per-prompt or per-token figures, something the Watershed paper politely but firmly flags as the field’s biggest data gap), I ran my measured token counts through three independent published methodologies: Watershed’s activity-tier factors, the per-token factors Simon Couch’s estimates derived from Epoch AI’s work, and the claude-carbon tool’s pricing-inferred coefficients.

Estimated electricity consumption for the 3.2 billion tokens I used under three published methodologies: Watershed activity-tier factors under three cache read assumptions, Couch (2026) per-token factors, and claude-carbon per-model coefficients.

Every one of these methodologies gives an answer between roughly 70 and 330 kilowatt-hours over 8 weeks. The estimate is genuinely uncertain, by a factor of ~2 in either direction. But the broader conclusion is not: counting my 1,138 prompts at published per-chat-prompt rates would have suggested about 0.3 kWh, while the reality is 150 to 1,200 times that.

My daily pattern of energy use is shown in the figure below. The day to day variability is huge: my heaviest day (11 kWh central estimate) involved multiple parallel agents churning through a large geospatial analysis, and used more than a third of the total daily electricity of an average US home. This reflects that fact that even within the category of agentic usage, the complexity of the task and the number of simultaneous sub-agents used will greatly influence the resulting energy use.

Estimated daily electricity consumption of my Claude Code usage(bars: cache reads at 10% of input energy; whiskers: 1% to 25%). Reference lines show typical daily electricity use of a refrigerator and of an average US household.

My numbers are a bit higher than some of the other published estimates of agentic use, and it is worth digging in a bit to determine why. Couch estimated that a median Claude Code session uses around 41 Wh, involving 24 model calls and 592k tokens. Andy Masley’s June 2026 calculator puts a 100k-token Claude Opus agent session at ~459 Wh. My median session is ~600 Wh, involving a hundred-plus calls and around ten million tokens including numerous subagents for large data analyses projects. Hannah Ritchie’s hypothetical heavy user (24 agentic queries a day) came out at 2.4 kWh/day, while I measured a central estimate of 3.0 kWh/day (1.2 to 5.9 kWh) for my actual usage.

None of these estimates are necessarily wrong, they just reflect a wide range of actual usage assumptions. Software engineers, researchers, and data analysts (e.g. folks like me) probably lie pretty far down the tail of the usage distribution. At the same time, usage will likely grow over time as more complex agentic tools increasingly become the norm.

What a year of this looks like

If we assume that these 8 weeks are fairly typical, we can estimate that a full year of my agentic Claude Code use would consume roughly 1.1 MWh of data center electricity (0.4 to 2.2 MWh), which is about a tenth of what an average US household uses. Applying the US-average grid intensity, that is roughly 370 kgCO2e per year (150 to 730 kgCO2e).3

Annual emissions of common activities compared with my annualized Claude Code usage. Car: EPA typical passenger vehicle (22.2 mpg, 11,500 mi/yr). EV: 11,500 mi/yr at 0.30 kWh/mi on the California grid. Flight: ICAO-method economy round trip, CO2 only. Home electricity: EIA average US household on the US-average grid. Dryer: typical electric clothes dryer at ~770 kWh/yr (DOE) on the US-average grid.

My personal and professional AI usage now emits a bit more per year than running an electric clothes dryer, and about half as much as driving an electric car 11,500 miles in California or taking one San Francisco to New York round-trip flight in economy.4 It is about 8% of the annual emissions of a typical American gasoline car, and roughly 2% of the average American’s ~18-ton annual greenhouse gas footprint.

This is simultaneously a large emissions source and a relatively modest part of my total carbon footprint. I typically take a round trip flight from San Francisco to the East Coast twice a year to visit my aging parents (not to mention work travel), and I generally don’t lose sleep over that choice. It is also fundamentally a much easier-to-decarbonize end-use than aviation (more on that below). But this also represents a net new source of emissions, at a time when global temperatures are skyrocketing and our emissions reduction goals are increasingly off track.

So what do we do about it?

Having spent most of this post arguing that agentic AI use is hundreds of times more energy intensive than the chatbot numbers suggest, let me be clear that I don’t think the answer is guilt or abstinence. But there are real levers here that we can use to shape the trajectory of AI energy use and emissions going forward.

On the personal side we can try and not be frivolous with agentic tools. There is a real difference between pointing five parallel agents at a hard research problem and doing the same to settle a bar bet (or, in my case, making axolotl-themed games with my daughter). What models you use matters too: sending simple tasks to smaller models uses perhaps 5 to 7 times less energy per token than defaulting to a frontier model,5 and it is what I increasingly do for searches and mechanical work. That said, I don’t want to oversell this. My entire annual AI footprint is a few hundred kilograms of CO2; personal restraint by the small population of heavy users is not going to bend any curves.

The technology lever is more powerful, and it is genuinely impressive. The figure below shows the energy efficiency of NVIDIA’s data center chips over the past decade. The amount of math an AI chip can do per joule of energy has grown roughly 150-fold since 2016, doubling about every two years, per Epoch AI. The latest B300 chips running at their lowest supported precision use about a quarter of the energy per operation of the 2022-era H100s that trained today’s frontier models. This represents a 3.8-fold improvement in energy efficiency in three years. Software gains can make this even faster: Google reports the energy of a median Gemini prompt fell 33-fold in a single year through a combination of better models, better tools, and better hardware.

Peak dense tensor throughput per watt of rated chip power for NVIDIA data center GPUs, by release year and numeric precision. Dashed line shows Epoch AI’s trend of energy efficiency doubling every two years for leading ML hardware.

But if 150-fold efficiency gains were going to reduce AI’s energy use, they would have done it by now. This is the Jevons paradox in action: making compute cheaper per token in turn tends to lead to greater levels of AI use. Efficiency is why my agentic habit costs 170 kWh rather than the 950 kWh it would have used with 2020-era hardware. But efficiency only determines how much intelligence we get per unit of energy, but so far it has so far shown no sign of determining AI’s total energy use.

Which is why the lever that actually matters most is the carbon intensity of the electricity. Every number in this post assumed the US-average grid; run the same workload on largely clean power and my footprint falls by roughly 90%. Unlike aviation, this is an end-use we already know how to decarbonize.

The problem is that we are moving in the wrong direction today: a sizable portion of planned US data center capacity intends to build its own behind-the-meter generation, and nearly three quarters of that is natural gas. AI companies with genuine climate commitments need to do better at finding alternatives: solar plus storage (which I helped lead a study about in 2024), next-generation nuclear and restarts of retired reactors, enhanced geothermal, and siting data centers in regions where both the average and the marginal generation is low-carbon).

There is also a silver linings version of this story where AI demand becomes an asset for decarbonization. Getting to net-zero emissions requires roughly tripling electricity generation by mid-century as we replace nearly all the current uses of fossil fuels with clean electricity. The barriers are mostly not technological, but rather things like interconnection queues, permitting, transmission. The AI buildout is a preview of that world of rapidly increasing electricity demand, backed by companies with enormous capital and unusual urgency. If that money and impatience gets spent speed-running the elimination of those barriers (buying firm clean power, funding transmission, absorbing the early costs of advanced nuclear and geothermal the way early corporate buyers did for wind and solar), the AI boom could leave the grid cleaner than it found it. If it gets spent on behind-the-meter gas turbines, it won’t. That choice is being made right now, and it will matter far more than how many prompts any of us type.

In the interest of full disclosure: the python code underlying the analysis and figures in this post were, naturally, built with the help of Claude Code, but the writing is all mine.6

1 Claude Code records API usage including the amount of uncached input tokens, cache-creation tokens, cache-read tokens, and output tokens, per model call, with model IDs and timestamps. One logging subtlety matters a lot: each API response is written to the log as one line per content block, with every line repeating the message’s full usage object, so a naive line-by-line sum double-counts tokens by a factor of ~2.2. All numbers here count each API message once, deduplicated by message ID.

2 A cache read retrieves already-computed attention states from memory rather than recomputing them, so it is much cheaper than inputting fresh data, but its not free. Cache reads context still makes each output token more expensive to generate at long context. Anthropic prices cache reads at 10% of fresh input, and the claude-carbon and Couch methodologies both adopt ~10% as an energy ratio. Watershed flags cache handling as a known gap in per-token accounting; my 1%-25% band is intended to span the plausible range.

3 Using the eGRID 2024 US-average 341 gCO2e/kWh, since Anthropic does not disclose where their data centers are located and what electricity sources they use. Market-based emissions (counting providers’ clean power purchases) would probably be lower, potentially much lower. This estimate excludes my laptop, which at ~50 W is negligible against 3.0 kWh/day of data center load.

4 Note that the flight estimate here only includes direct CO2 emissions from aviation; including contrails and other secondary factors would probably increase flight emissions by at least 50%.

5 Based on inferring energy use through token pricing, claude-carbon gives ~0.3 J/token for Haiku-class vs ~2 J/token for Opus-class models.

6 In a good example of why you always need to double check work done with AI coding tools, Claude accidentally doubled its original estimate of my token use as all the relevant files were stored twice and it simply added them all up. I only caught it because the numbers seemed too high!

 

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An upcoming UK government consultation on weakening targets for electric vehicles (EVs) could cost consumers as much as £3bn a year by 2030, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

It could require the UK to import an extra 17m barrels of oil in 2030, raising expected net imports by 8%, as well as adding 2.5% to national emissions that year, the analysis shows.

After years of fierce lobbying by parts of the car industry – and despite the significant savings on offer for EV drivers – media reports suggest that EV targets could be “watered down”.

Under current rules, battery EVs – BEVs, those which run only on electricity – must make up a rising share of new car sales in the UK.

This policy, known as the “zero-emission vehicles” (ZEV) mandate, was introduced by the previous Conservative government and sets a goal for 33% BEV sales in 2026, rising to 80% in 2030.

(Carmakers are able to use “flexibilities” to help meet their targets, which reduces the effective target under the ZEV mandate to an estimated 25% of sales in 2026.)

Now, the government under new Labour prime minister Andy Burnham is reported to be considering a cut in the BEV target for 2030 to just 50% of new car sales, alongside options for 60% or 70%.

Carbon Brief understands that a consultation on weakening the ZEV mandate is being reviewed by the prime minister’s office in Number 10, ahead of being formally released.

If the mandate is weakened to 50% by 2030 – and if carmakers make more use of “flexibilities” – there could be up to 3m fewer BEVs on UK roads by 2030, according to the NGO T&E.

Previous Carbon Brief analysis found that BEVs are around £1,100 cheaper to run per year than a petrol car, thanks to far lower fuel costs.

Overall, BEVs are more than £1,000 per year cheaper to own than either petrol cars or plug-in hybrids (PHEVs, which can run on petrol or electricity).

This is according to analysis of the “total cost of ownership” by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), including purchase price, fuel costs, insurance and proposed pay-per-mile charges.

In total, Carbon Brief analysis shows that UK drivers could be hit with an extra £3bn in annual ownership costs by 2030, if the ZEV mandate is weakened, as shown below.

A weaker ZEV mandate could “put billions of pounds of committed investments at risk”, reports BusinessGreen, including in the EV charging network and battery supply chains.

Industry group Energy UK says that the mandate is “working in the way it was designed to work” and that it is the “single biggest driver of emissions reductions” in government climate plans.

However, Carbon Brief analysis shows that a weaker ZEV mandate could result in an extra 7.4m tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions (MtCO2) in 2030. This would add the equivalent of 2.5% to national emissions in 2030, under the UK’s international climate goal for that year.

In addition, a weaker ZEV mandate could result in the UK needing to import an extra 17m barrels of oil in 2030, equivalent to 8% of projected net imports that year.

Energy UK says that shifting to EVs will help to reduce household energy bills “for everyone”. This is not only through direct cost-of-ownership savings for EV drivers, but also by spreading the costs of upgrading the electricity system across a wider user base.

Car industry group the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders claims that its members are spending “blilions…on discounts, finance incentives and marketing support” and that “natural” EV demand is below the level required to meet the current ZEV mandate. Its claims are disputed.

related Q&A: Does the world need ‘carbon capture and storage’ to reach net-zero? 03.08.2026 Technology UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature 28 quotes from new UK leader Andy Burnham on climate, net-zero and fossil fuels 14.07.2026 Policy Analysis: UK newspapers have already printed 63 editorials in 2026 backing North Sea drilling  01.07.2026 Oil and gas

The post Analysis: Weaker EV targets could cost UK consumers £3bn a year by 2030 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Are there enough minerals for solar power expansion to help mitigate climate change?

Global mineral supplies are large enough to support solar development for climate change mitigation.

A 2023 analysis of 75 emissions-reduction scenarios found that projected median mineral demand largely remains within known geological resources. Projected median demand for silver was about 68,000 metric tons, compared to 530,000 tons of estimated reserves; cadmium demand was 38,000 tons against 500,000 tons of reserves.

Tellurium may constrain cadmium-telluride panels, a minority of the global solar market, but research suggests improved refining and material efficiency could substantially reduce this strain.

Recycling can further reduce demand for newly mined minerals by recovering silver, copper, silicon, and other components for reuse in future panels. Recent innovations are improving recycling cost-effectiveness, while federal programs continue to support domestic mineral supply chains and recycling research. 

The main challenge lies in expanding production and supply chains, not mineral shortages.

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AP News Study: Enough rare earth minerals to fuel green energy shift

Joule Future demand for electricity generation materials under different climate mitigation scenarios

USGS Byproduct Mineral Commodities Used for the Production of Photovoltaic Cells

Yale School of the Environment As Millions of Solar Panels Age Out, Recyclers Hope to Cash In

Resources, Conservation and Recycling Innovating the recycling of silicon-based solar panels with an eco-friendly alkaline leaching process

MIT Climate Can solar panels be recycled?

U.S. Department of Energy End-of-Life Management for Solar Photovoltaics

The White House Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Delegates Defense Production Act Authority with Respect to Recoverable Critical Minerals and Materials That Are Essential to Our National Defense

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters

When a weak 45-mph tropical storm named Harvey moved through the Lesser Antilles Islands in August 2017 and then petered out in the central Caribbean Sea, no one could have suspected that the meager clump of clouds that remained would go on to become the second-costliest weather disaster in world history. But after crossing Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula into the Gulf of Mexico, Harvey was rejuvenated, rapidly intensifying into a ferocious Category 4 hurricane that hit Texas just north of Corpus Christi.

Harvey's true mischief came after it stalled inland as a tropical storm for two days, dumping at least 40 inches of rain across a gigantic area from Houston to Port Arthur — larger than the entire state of Delaware. The storm total of 60.58 inches (1,534 mm) at Nederland, Texas, was the heaviest single amount ever recorded from a tropical cyclone or its remnants in the U.S. With damages of $164 billion (2026 USD) — mostly from flooding, Harvey became a historical catastrophe exceeded only by Hurricane Katrina of 2005.

When all of Harvey’s rainfall runoff rushed toward the ocean, it encountered the blocking influence of seawater being pushed inland by the persistent onshore winds of the tropical storm, creating a significant compound flood event — coastal flooding that resulted from a combination of storm surge and river runoff unable to drain into the ocean because of the storm surge waters piled up against the coast.

A similar setup could cause an even worse catastrophe in the future. Climate change is causing more intense, slower-moving hurricanes, increased rainfall, and higher sea levels. But traditional risk assessment methods typically consider one hazard at a time — ignoring compound flood events — leading to an underestimation of the danger. If we include all the ways climate change will likely increase flooding, the future flood risk along significant portions of the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic coasts is nearly certain to make them unlivable by late this century, even under a moderate global warming scenario.

How climate change worsens the danger

A 2023 study looking at the flooding from Harvey near Port Arthur, Texas, found that 19% of the flood area occurred because of compound flooding. Under a global warming scenario where a repeat of Harvey hits with an additional sea level rise of 0.57 meters (1.9 feet), accompanied by 18% more total rainfall — plausible in 2050 — this area would increase to 33%. A potential sea level rise of 1.6 meters (5.2 feet) and an additional 50% in total rainfall, plausible by 2100, would cause the compound flooding area to rise to 46%, increasing the number of structures impacted by about a factor of 23 compared to 2017, causing tens of billions in additional damage.

Figure 1. Storm-total rainfall from Hurricane Harvey, August 24-31, 2017. Harvey dumped over 40 inches (yellow colors) in Houston, with isolated amounts over 50 inches (pink colors) south of Houston and northwest of Port Arthur. Image credit: NOAA.

There are three main ways climate change can increase flood risk along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts:

1. An increase in the frequency of more intense hurricanes and ones moving more slowly at landfall, which will dump more rain
2. Increased heavy rainfall because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor
3. Sea level rise

The relative importance of these three factors in a future warmer climate will vary depending upon the location, according to a 2022 study. This study found that across the Gulf of Mexico and Florida coastlines, the increase in rainfall was expected to be the largest driver. For parts of the Southeast and mid-Atlantic, the increase in the number of intense or slow-moving hurricanes would predominate. And along the upper mid-Atlantic and New England coastlines, sea level rise will dominate the future compound flood risk.

Figure 2. The main driver of compound flooding on the U.S. coast. Across the Gulf of Mexico and Florida coastlines, the increase in rainfall is the largest driver (yellow colors), while the increase in storm frequency (of more intense, slow-moving storms) has the largest impact for parts of the Southeast and mid-Atlantic (blue). Along the upper mid-Atlantic and New England coastlines, sea level rise causes the most impact (green). Locations with no clear main driver are labeled NA (gray). (Image credit: Gori et al., Tropical cyclone climatology change greatly exacerbates US extreme rainfall–surge hazard, Nat. Clim. Chang. 12, 171–178 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01272-7, open access)

Sea level rise has already led to a massive increase in flood risk

Sea level rise from all causes – for example, human-caused climate change, natural tectonic processes, and subsidence from groundwater pumping — has already led to a massive increase in the risk of damaging coastal flooding from storm surges alone, according to a 2026 study, Human-driven sea-level rise has quadrupled the frequency of coastal sea-level extremes since 1900. Relative sea level rise from all causes made a 100-year coastal flood in 1900 into a one-in-five-year flood or less by 2005 in Key West, Jacksonville, Atlantic City, and Maine. Because sea level rise is accelerating, the odds of coastal flooding will increase even faster than the increases already observed since 1900.

Flood risks are growing

Charleston, South Carolina: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1901 occurred 17 times in 2025.
Galveston, Texas: What was a one-in-10-year flood in 1904 occurred nine times in 2024.
Atlantic City, New Jersey: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1911 occurred 10 times in 2024.
Miami, Florida: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1931 occurred 14 consecutive days during the "king tides" of October 2025.
Key West, Florida: What was a one-in-10-year coastal flood in 1913 occurred an astonishing 26 out of 27 days during the "king tides" of October 2025; what was a one-in-100-year flood in 1913 has occurred three times in the past 10 years.

Data: NOAA

Dramatic rises in compound flood risk are coming

A return period refers to how often we can expect a weather event of a given severity to occur. For example, we use rainfall statistics from NOAA to compute how often a flood with a 1% chance of occurring in a given year will recur — which is defined as a one-in-100-year storm, with a return period of 100 years.

A 2022 paper, Tropical cyclone climatology change greatly exacerbates US extreme rainfall-surge hazard, studied the odds of a truly extreme compound flood event — a one-in-100-year storm surge occurring at the same time as a one-in-100-year rainfall event. Historically, the return period of such an event was about once every 200-500 years along the coastlines of the Gulf of Mexico and southeast Atlantic (up to the Chesapeake Bay), shifting to once every 1,000 years or even less frequently along the New England coastline.

But under an extreme global warming scenario for the year 2100, these odds would generally (with some exceptions, see Fig. 4) increase by seven- to 36-fold in the South and 30- to 195-fold to the north — a massive rise in extreme flood risk. Although this result was for an extreme global warming scenario, the strong signal found implies that a significant increase in extreme flood risk would occur even in a moderate global warming scenario.

Figure 3. The return period in years in 2005 for what was a one-in-100-year flood in 1900 because of relative sea level rise. Data is plotted from the 2026 paper, Human-driven sea-level rise has quadrupled the frequency of coastal sea-level extremes since 1900. For example, a 100-year coastal flood in 1900 in Jacksonville, Florida, and Atlantic City, New Jersey, was a one-in-two-year flood by 2005 (red circles with the number "2" in them). This change in flood risk is for sea level rise alone — additional increases in flood risk because of changes in precipitation are not included.

The greatest rises in risk were to the north, because climate change is expected to bring greater increases in extreme precipitation closer to the poles. This was also the finding of a 2020 study, More meteorological events that drive compound coastal flooding are projected under climate change, which predicted that the greatest increases in compound flood threat should occur north of 40°N latitude.

Figure 4. The change in return period for an extreme compound flood, defined as a one-in-100-year storm surge occurring at the same time as a one-in-100-year rainfall event, under an extreme global warming scenario. Left side of table: the return period in the historical climate (1980-2005). Right side: return period in the 2070-2100 period under an extreme global warming scenario, using the median value from eight different climate models. The return period increases by a factor of 14 to 265 for these nine cities. Data taken from the supplemental materials in: Gori et al., Tropical cyclone climatology change greatly exacerbates US extreme rainfall–surge hazard, Nat. Clim. Chang. 12, 171–178 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01272-7.

Main cause of future increased compound coastal flood risk: more intense and slower-moving hurricanes

The model used in the 2022 study projected that the top 10% of most intense hurricanes would, along the majority of the U.S. coast, increase in intensity by 15-30% and move 20-30% slower in the future compared to the historical period. “The increase in storm intensity coupled with the decrease in translation speed drives an increased likelihood to observe both extreme rainfall and extreme storm tide in the future,” the authors wrote. 

A substantial inland compound flood risk along the Gulf of Mexico coast

Rivers draining into the Gulf of Mexico have seen large increases in their maximum streamflow in recent decades (commonly 20-40% increases), making them susceptible to increased compound flooding. A 2021 paper found long-term increases in the frequency of compound storm surge and heavy rainfall flooding along the rivers of the northeastern Gulf of Mexico. Surprisingly, these compound flood events were largest a good distance inland, near the limit of where tidal influences stopped — not at the coast where compound events are usually expected. A 2026 study focused on North and South Carolina also found a considerable expansion of the threat of compound flooding inland in a future warmer climate.

A Hurricane Sandy-like compound flood event: five times more likely by 2100?

Hurricane Sandy in October 2012 caused devastating surge-driven flooding across heavily populated coastal areas in New York City, resulting in more than $91 billion (2026 USD) in damages. A 2024 paper, Climate Change Contributions to Increasing Compound Flooding Risk in New York City, found that a Sandy-like event can be expected about once every 150 years in the present climate. But climate change — through sea level rise and an increase in hurricane strength and rainfall — can be expected to make a similar storm about a one-in-65-year event by 2050, and a one-in-30-year event by 2100, under an emissions scenario slightly higher than the trajectory humanity is currently on.

Increased compound flood threat from hurricanes earlier in the season

A 2022 paper, Earlier onset of North Atlantic hurricane season with warming oceans, found that initial threshold dates of continental U.S. named storm landfalls have trended earlier by two days per decade since 1900. Modeling work suggests that the length of hurricane season will continue to increase because of climate change. A 2017 study found that a hurricane season that was two months longer (May-December) would increase the number of flood-risk days by 28-180% along rivers in four Southeast U.S river basins.

Figure 5. Predicted water levels at the Carrollton gage on the Mississippi River in New Orleans as of July 10, 2019. The river was running high, at 16 feet above sea level, and the city’s levees protect the city to a height of 20 feet. The storm surge from Hurricane Barry was predicted to reach that level on July 13. The last time water levels that high were observed at this point on the Mississippi was in the Great Flood of 1927. Image credit: NOAA.

As I wrote in a 2019 post, New Orleans’ Achilles Heel: A Hurricane Storm Surge During a Mississippi River Flood?, a trend toward earlier hurricanes increases the risk of storm surge moving up the Mississippi River that could overwhelm the levees in New Orleans, since the river tends to run high in late spring and early summer. This situation was feared in July 2019, when Hurricane Barry sent a storm surge up the river when the river was already running high from early-summer runoff (Fig. 5). Fortunately, Barry ended up delaying its intensification into a hurricane until after it passed the mouth of the Mississippi, resulting in a storm surge that was not as high as initially forecast.

Other compound hurricane threats

Climate change is likely to make two other types of compound hurricane threats more severe. One of these was covered in my previous post, The emerging danger of post-hurricane heat waves (2026). In addition, more intense hurricanes with higher winds and heavier rains have the potential to create a double-whammy of high-end wind damage and extreme inland flooding simultaneously, overwhelming infrastructure and emergency preparedness and response efforts that could have handled one of these hazards alone, but not both together.

A preprint of a 2026 paper that has not yet undergone peer review, Global Warming Amplifies Inland Compound Risks From Tropical Cyclones, found that when comparing the recent climate (1981-2020) with an extreme climate-change projection for later this century (2061-2100), the annual probability of compound wind and precipitation extreme hazards ranking in the 99th percentile globally increases by 61-115% within 100 kilometers of the coast, and further escalates by 92-204% in areas 100-500 kilometers inland. This inland amplification is driven by more intense landfalling hurricanes and the increased moisture available caused by the 7% increase in water vapor holding capacity of the air per degree Celsius of warming. Hurricane Helene’s impact in 2024 in western North Carolina can be regarded as a harbinger storm in this regard.

Coastal areas becoming unlivable

A 2020 paper, Sea-level rise exponentially increases coastal flood frequency, found that for the most susceptible sites around the U.S., the odds of a one-in-50-year coastal flood “are likely to double approximately every five years into the foreseeable future.” This finding took into account not just storm surges from hurricanes but also from more common coastal storms such as Nor'easters. According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, most coastal engineering works in the U.S. are designed for return periods of 50 to 100 years, so the increase in flood risk at so many sites represents a drastic increase in vulnerability. And if high-end sea-level rise projections of one meter (3.28 feet) by 2100 come true, sea-level rise will likely cause "once-in-a-lifetime" coastal flooding events to occur nearly every day before 2100. (NOAA's 2022 sea level rise forecast gives 50% odds that sea level rise along the contiguous U.S. coast by 2100 will exceed 0.7 meters.)

Figure 6. The return period in years in 2050 for what was a one-in-100-year flood in 2005 because of relative sea level rise. Data is plotted using data from the 2020 paper, Sea-level rise exponentially increases coastal flood frequency, in combination with observed and predicted sea level rise from The Virginia Institute of Marine Science annual Sea Level Rise Report Cards. For example, a one-in-100-year coastal flood in 2005 in Key West, Florida, is predicted to recur every 0.04 years (two weeks) by 2050 (red circle with the number "0.04" in it). This change in flood risk is for sea level rise alone — additional increases in flood risk because of changes in precipitation are not included. The forecasts out to 2050 are generated using the observed acceleration trend fitted with a quadratic curve (since sea level rise is increasing exponentially, and a straight-line linear fit is not appropriate). Note that these forecasts are not based on a climate model and may be underestimated.

If we now add in the massive additional increase in flood risk resulting from compound flooding, good luck trying to insure your home. The huge increase in climate change-induced flood risk from sea level rise, heavier rainfall, and stronger/slower-moving hurricanes is nearly certain to force abandonment of portions of the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic coasts by late this century, even under a moderate global warming scenario. A 2026 study, The Growth Effects of Natural Disasters: Evidence From A Novel Global Dataset Over 1970-2023, found that a one-in-100-year flood reduces GDP by about 0.5%, so it is easy to see how the coast could quickly become unlivable if once-in-a-lifetime floods are occurring nearly yearly in low-lying regions. Indeed, hurricane flooding has already led to the unofficial abandonment of several U.S. communities, and a number of others are already at significant risk, which I will detail in a series of future posts (spoiler alert: Barrier islands are high on the list).

https://bsky.app/profile/drjeffmasters.bsky.social/post/3mnhxhqjjtc2g

The only recourse we will have is to spend vast amounts of money to defend the most important places and retreat from or abandon the rest. A society-shaking mass migration of millions of Americans away from the coast is inevitable in future decades because of increased climate change-induced flood risk. The trigger for the beginning of this exodus may be only a few years away. To understand what’s coming, I recommend reading my 2024 post, When will climate change turn life in the U.S. upside down?

Related posts on sea level rise

• Book review: “On the Move” is a must-read account of U.S. climate migration (2024)
• Book review: “The Great Displacement” is a must-read (2023)
• Part one of my three-part sea level rise series: How fast are the seas rising? (2023)
• Part two of my three-part sea level rise series: Eight excellent books on sea level rise risk for U.S. cities (2023)
• Part three of my three-part sea level rise series: 30 great tools to determine your flood risk in the U.S. (2023)
• Bubble trouble: Climate change is creating a huge and growing U.S. real estate bubble (2023)
• How sea level rise contributes to billions in extra damage during hurricanes (2022)

Bob Henson contributed to this post.

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

//

by David Spratt, first published at Safe Climate Australia

The claim that four billion people could die in a 3°C warmer world has become a powerful climate narrative. But what does the science actually support, and where does evidence end and speculation begin?

The proposition that four billion people or more would be dead if — and more likely, when — global warming reaches 3 degrees Celsius (°C) has gained some currency, mainly due to the 4DB (four billion dead) website and associated activities.

Now, that is half the current global population, and on current warming trends of 0.3-0.35°C/decade, the world will hit 3°C around 50 years from now, perhaps earlier, in part because there is little prospect of a rapid decline in fossil fuel emissions.  So that’s a mind-blowing average of 80 million people a year dying due to climate impacts every year from now to 2075? Is that realistic?

The number of greater than four billion dead at 3°C first appeared in a 2025 report on Planetary Insolvency: Finding our balance with nature, published by the UK Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) and the University of Exeter.ing our balance with nature, published by the UK Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and the University of Exeter.

The number appears in Figure 12: Planetary solvency risk impact and likelihood definitions (illustrative) on page 32 of the report.  In this figure, the scale of impacts listed for 2°C of warming include mortality of “>2 billion deaths” and GDP losses of 25%, as well as “>4 billion deaths” and GDP of 50% for 3°C of warming (Figure 1).

Figure 1:  Planetary solvency risk impact and likelihood definitions   (Planetary Insolvency) 

The 2°C estimate is even more startling, because Earth has already hit 1.5°C for all practical purposes, with the average for 2023-25 above 1.5°C, and a strong El Nino likely on the way for later this year which could push annual warming towards 1.7°C for 2026-27. At the current, accelerated warming rate, the Earth will reach 2°C around 2040, just fifteen years from now.

So the figure of two billion dead at 2°C would mean an average of 130 million people a year dying every year from now till 2040 due to climate change?  To my mind, that is simply not credible, and nothing I have read tells me that is a remotely-likely estimate.

Likewise, the risk matrix gives a figure of 1-5% dead (80 to 400 million deaths) for 1.5°C, a level of warming Earth has already reached. Estimates of actual mortality are difficult due to the direct and second- and third-order impacts, such as: hotter-climate > drought > food-shortage > displacement > conflict > mortality, and so on. The 2025 report of the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change estimated heat-related mortality has increased to an average 546,000 deaths per year, though not all are specifically related to climate heating, and that is only one element of the story.

So it is important to understand what these numbers are, and are not, and where they came from.

There is no qualitative indication in the report as to their source. On page 27, the report acknowledges that “very limited research has been carried out on the potential for large-scale loss of life in relation to these interconnected risks on which to base an assessment”.

I asked a colleague in the UK who had worked with the authors of the report, and he was told that the figures came from the Climate Endgame paper. But its author, Luke Kemp, said this was not the case, and “he confirmed that he does not make any forecasts about mortality in the paper” (emphasis added).

As the caption to Figure 12 says, it is a risk assessment matrix that illustrates general levels of risk. I was told that the authors have now privately clarified that the mortality numbers “are absolutely NOT forecasts or predictions and we don’t use them as such” (emphasis added). But this is now the way that sites like 4BD are using it.

One interpretation would be that the risk matrix was simply indicating orders of magnitude rather than specific projections. So either it was too subtle in its distinctions, and/or it was a bit of a stuff-up in that it was assumed that the four billion figure came from somewhere, but it did not. So there is still a question of how the four billion figure was derived.

I understand there have been suggestions that a correction or clarification be issued, at least saying that the figures “are absolutely NOT forecasts or predictions”. And I had conversations with people working on the 4BD project outlining the story above and why some nuance was necessary in using such numbers, but the die had been cast.

So how can we think about this? One guess is the table was saying that at 3°C, an expert elicitation would find that mortality would likely be in the billions, rather than tens or hundreds of millions. Or alternatively, this was a plausible worst-case scenario, but not derived from models.  As discussed below, that is a reasonable proposition based on other literature. As for two billion dead at 2°C, I can see almost no credible evidence that is even in the ballpark, just half a degree warmer than at present.

Another, likely interpretation is that Figure 12 had used some numbers for GDP loss (in column 1) and had simply applied the same number for mortality (in column 2), so 50% loss in GDP equals 50% mortality. This in itself is a brave assumption: in one case, during the Great Depression — when, for example, US GDP fell 30% between 1929 and 1933 — mortality rates did not increase, and in some cases improved, though there were later adverse outcomes for children born at that time.

So there is no mortality analysis in the table at all, and no epidemiology; it simply flows from GDP impacts.

So where did the 50% decrease in GDP at 3°C come from? An earlier IFoA report in 2023, The Emperor’s New Climate Scenarios, whilst recognising that “climate change is complex, nuanced and characterised by deep uncertainty”, provided a chart of damage functions relating temperature and GDP loss (Figure 9, page 25), and asks “at what point do we expect 50% GDP destruction – somewhere between 2070 and 2090 depending on how you parameterise the distribution”, and that’s around 3°C. Depending on assumptions about when GDP hits zero (called the ruin parameter), the figures could be higher (80%) or lower (30%) because these are abstract models of possible damage functions. So it looks like a 50% loss of GDP was a figure of choice.

So what is the basis of the damage functions? The Emperor’s New Climate Scenarios says that  “Insurance leaders have unequivocally stated that if climate change raises average temperatures to 4˚C above pre-industrial levels most assets will be uninsurable”, and that “without insurance, investment, finance, business slow to a halt – we will no longer have an economy.” (page 27). I find this assumption highly problematic. As insurance premiums rise right now, in some cases dramatically due to extreme climate impacts, many households and small businesses are making decisions to continue to operate without asset insurance.

The only footnote to these statements is a view by one insurance CEO, Thomas Buberl of AXA at a Davos panel, reported by Bloomberg, that at 3-4°C “it’s not insurable anymore”, but what he said was much more specific: he was talking about basement retail premises in New York and Mumbai and that is what the headline said: “Climate change could make your basement uninsurable within a decade”. That is a very narrow and specific base on which to draw a global conclusion.

Now, how much of an economy would be left at 3, 4 or 5°C is a good question, but the method used here is far too narrow. I remember a long time ago James Lovelock saying at 4 or 5°C there may be 500 million people left eking out a miserable existence at the poles, or words to that effect.

To reiterate, it is almost impossible to put specific numbers on such future impacts, due to the radical uncertainty about the social impacts of a physical system that itself is non-linear in many important aspects, characterised by abrupt changes whose specific human consequences are somewhere between difficult and impossible to model, and where quantifying social impacts is of limited efficacy.

Vulnerability and adaptation

Even if future (non-linear) physical changes are well known, mapping their human impacts involves several more degrees of difficulty because the risk (potential damage) varies with exposure and vulnerability. There are three factors:

• Hazard: the physical changes in a climate system subject to abrupt change;
• Exposure: the presence of people, livelihoods and ecosystems in that physical space; and
• Vulnerability: the propensity of these human systems to be negatively impacted due to their sensitivity and/or limited adaptive capacity.

In the uber-rich, low-rainfall Gulf states, for example, whilst unlivable heat is becoming the norm, adaptation paid for by stupendous oil and gas revenue — desalination, 24/7 air conditioning, using flood-lit beaches at night rather than during the day, irrigating date palms, importing almost all the food and most of the labour — reduces vulnerability, even though the whole project seems a bit crazy.

So mortality in a hotter climate will be affected a great deal by adaptation capacities to reduce vulnerability, and that is largely a product of national income, and international assistance.

But there are also hard boundaries that cannot be easily adapted to, for example rice yields diminish once temperatures exceed 35°C at the time of flowering, and by 37°C the damage becomes critical.  By 2050, between one-quarter and two-thirds of rice production capacity will be subject to high or extreme heat stress risk (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Percentage of Rice production 
capacity exposed to heat stress risk 
(PWC: Climate risks to nine key commodities)

Smart adaptation would include moving to a plant-based diet to free a great deal of agricultural land now used to grow livestock and grow feed for livestock, and to reduce methane emissions. A well-planned and managed retreat from low-lying coastal land would also help, rather than just waiting for the inevitable to happen.  And it depends on the nature of international politics. A coordinated global mobilisation to face the coming crisis would yield a very different result from states pretending that climate collapse was simply not on the agenda. Will states cooperate in the face of unprecedented adversity, or close borders and go to war?

The timeline

Another unresolved issue is the time frame. Many impacts do not manifest immediately once a certain temperature level is reached. For example, climate history teaches us that every one degree of warming will likely result in 10-to-20 metres of sea-level rise in the longer term, over many centuries. The fastest rises in the paleoclimate record are three-to-five metres in a century, so the full sea-level rise from 3°C of warming could take a thousand years to manifest, perhaps less and perhaps a good deal more.

So when the figure of “4 billion dead” is raised, is that when the thermometer ticks past the figure “3°C” later this century, or over a thousand years as coastlines, agriculturally-rich deltas and low-lying states drown?  My hunch is that it would be the latter.

A similar issue is the collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation. Whilst a number of recent research papers conclude this tipping point is close at hand, models suggest the process is likely to take 100 years, so once again the exposure increases over that time, and so does the opportunity to reduce vulnerability with adaptive measures, though only up to a point.

Many other system-level changes have similar characteristics.

The world at 3°C

In a 3°C hotter world, large parts of the tropics will suffer “near-unlivable” extreme heat conditions, there will be less rainfall over significant parts of the dry subtropics, and this combined with increased evaporation rates will lead to drying out and desertification across the dry subtropics. New extremes — of rainfall and heat, flooding and drought — beyond human experience and beyond model expectations will occur. And a committed sea-level rise of many metres will be in the slow process of inundating coastal cities and deltas.

Some research, which is contested, suggests 3°C could cut global GDP by half. Last year, Australian researchers concluded that at 3°C, by the end of the century, the estimated harm to the global economy would be 40%, which “could devastate livelihoods in large parts of the world”.  Coral reef systems would be gone, and that alone means coastal ecosystems would only be able to provide 20–50% of the fish protein that they do today for half a billion people around the world.

In 2021, the Australian Academy of Science published a report co-authored by David Karoly on Risks to Australia of a 3-degree warmer world. Amongst other things, it said that at 3°C, heatwaves would happen as often as seven times a year, with events lasting 16 days on average, “fire risk (driven by record heat, dryness and fuel) will increase by 30 per cent or more in south-eastern Australia”, and yields of key crops would reduce “by between 5 and 50%, depending on crop and location”.  Other research estimates that “beyond 2°C warming, the declines in suitable areas for the 30 crops [analysed] become more pronounced – in some cases approaching and passing 50%”.  That in itself would cause global chaos.

A 2020 study on extreme heat found that at 2.7°C, up to 3.5 billion people will be exposed to temperatures outside the “human niche”, that is, the climate conditions that have served humanity well over the past 6000 years. Further research published in 2023 described a zone of near unlivable heat, “a situation found in the present climate only in 0.8% of the global land surface, mostly concentrated in the Sahara, but in 2070 projected to cover 19% of the global land” (Figure 3). Prof. Marten Scheffer said those pushed outside the climate niche might consider migrating to cooler places: “Not just migration of tens of millions of people but it might be a billion or so.” 

Figure 3: Projected zone of heat of “near-unliveable conditions” at 2.7°C global average warming (“Quantifying the human cost of global warming”)

And at 2.7°C, scientists say that  the Arctic would be “transformed beyond contemporary recognition: the Arctic Ocean would be essentially ice free for several months in summer, the area of Greenland that reaches melting temperatures for at least a month would roughly quadruple, and the area of permafrost would be roughly half of what it was in preindustrial times.”

Potsdam Institute Director Prof. Johan Rockstrom says that such a level of warming is “something that humanity has absolutely no evidence that we can cope with… Push ourselves to 2.5°C – we’re in unknown terrain. It would lead to a complete melting of the big ice sheets, which would be a 10-metre sea level rise… There would be a collapse of all the big biomes on planet Earth – the rainforest, many of the temperate forests – abrupt thawing of permafrost, we will have complete collapse of marine biology, we will have a shift of large parts of the habitability on Earth.”

Twenty years ago, a group of US security analysts constructed a 3°C scenario:

“Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario, nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos. In this scenario, climate change provokes a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature’ (emphasis added).”

So how many would die, and how many would survive in this 3°C world?

Displacement and mortality 

The “human niche” papers on near-unliveable heat found that these extremes are projected to envelop 1.2 billion people in India, 485 million in Nigeria and more than 100 million in each of Pakistan, Indonesia and Sudan. Many would be forced to move to a more liveable climate. Another study from the same year of 2020 concluded that warming of 2°C could provide more than 500 million people additional incentive to emigrate, whilst warming of 3°C could provide additional incentive-to-emigrate to well over a billion people.

The idea that a billion people may be displaced may seem fanciful, but the UN also agrees with this figure: “Unless we change the way we manage our land, in the next 30 years we may leave a billion or more vulnerable poor people with little choice but to fight or flee.”

The figures may be much, much higher than this, but there are so many variables, so many social unknowns, that any figure can only be a guesstimate by social scientists and security analysts, based on a scientifically-credible scenario.

Climate disruption kills people in many ways, including by direct physical impacts (heat stress, floods, cyclones and other extreme events), by severe food insecurity, through displacement and conflict, by increased disease and poorer health outcomes, and so on.

The 2025 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change reported a 63% increase in heat-related deaths since the 1990s, reaching an estimated 546,000 yearly deaths on average in 2012–21. The higher number of heatwave days and drought months in 2023 compared with 1981–2010 was associated with 123.7 million more people experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity in 124 countries analysed. As hotter and drier weather increases the risk of wildfires, 2024 had a record-high 154,000 deaths from wildfire smoke-derived small particulate matter (PM2·5) air pollution.

What about future mortality rates? Joshua Pearce of the University of Western Ontario says if warming reaches or exceeds 2°C, it is likely that mainly richer humans will be responsible for the death of roughly one billion mainly poorer humans over the next century. This is based on a review of the literature by Pearce and Parncutt, which found mortality costs of carbon emissions converged on the “1,000-ton rule”: an estimate that one future premature death is caused every time approximately 1,000 tons of fossil carbon are burned. Their best- and worst-case figures were 300 million and three billion for 2°C.

By this logic, the mortality range at 3°C would be in the range of 450 million to 4.5 billion.  Of course, this assumes a linear relationship between emissions and mortality, but that assumption is based on observed conditions that are far different from those humans will face in the second half of the century.

It should also be noted that in 2019, Rockström told The Guardian that in a 4°C-warmer world: “It’s difficult to see how we could accommodate eight billion people or maybe even half of that. There will be a rich minority of people who survive with modern lifestyles, no doubt, but it will be a turbulent, conflict-ridden world.”

So four billion dead at 3°C? Immediately or when the full physical and social impacts are realised over many centuries?  Depending on deeply uncertain adaptation and other political responses? Between expert estimates of degrees of magnitude and worse-case conjecture, it’s anybody’s educated guess.

 

 

 

 

A listing of 29 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, August 2, 2026 thru Sat, August 8, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (11 articles)

• El Niño and climate change are affecting rice crops in weird ways Researchers explain how El Niño and global warming are combining to create "the haves and the have-nots." Grist, Tik Root & Frida Garza, July 31, 2026.
• Heatwaves and raging fires mark Europe’s ‘dystopian’ summer This article about the recent record-breaking heat and wildfires in Europe dives into the science about the causes, quoting several experts. ABC News, Romy Stephens, Alex Lim and Fran Rimrod, Aug 1, 2026.
• Climate shocks hit hydropower in Southern Africa, reviving interest in coal The Daily Climate, Chisapi Kumbutso, Aug 02, 2026.
• Climate change could dramatically reduce water flowing from the West's headwaters Phys.org, Northern Arizona University, Aug 02, 2026.
• Washington`s wildfires are a warning for the entire U.S. Dry conditions and climate change are putting forests across the country at risk for disaster Scientific American, Mary Randolph, Aug 03, 2026.
• Factcheck: How nuclear, gas, wind and solar power are affected during heatwaves Carbon Brief, Molly Lempriere, Aug 04, 2026.
• French wildfires are turning animals’ homes into ‘a desert of ashes’ The catastrophic fires have potential to do long-term damage to many wild animal populations, but a toad species could be the most affected. National Geographic, Melissa Hobson, Aug 4, 2026.
• Butterflies are on the move as the planet warms: new research A comprehensive survey indicates that one in ten known butterfly species have already shifted in range. The Conversation, Shawan Chowdhury, Aug 05, 2026.
• Summer of wildfires sees catastrophe bonds approach new record Wildfires raging across the U.S. and Europe this summer are pushing more and more insurers into slashing their risk by issuing catastrophe bonds to investors, and the so-called CAT bonds on the market are already nearing levels from all of last year. Callaway Climate Insights, David Callaway, Aug 06, 2026.
• Climate change created conditions for Canada fires, scientists say, as Trump blames mismanagement A new study calculates that human-caused climate change doubled the likelihood of the tinderbox weather conditions that sparked Canada’s massive summer wildfires. The Okaloosa Herald, EHN Curators, Aug 06, 2026.
• Heatwaves have killed millions. Here’s how scientists tally lives lost Two very different methods are used to estimate the human toll of heatwaves such as those now hitting parts of Asia and Europe. Nature, Kaia Glickman, Aug 6, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (6 articles)

• ECB official warns climate crisis poses growing threat to `core financial stability` Exclusive: As wildfires rage, Frank Elderson says more work needed to assess risk from collapse of ecosystem services The Guardian, Richard Partington, Aug 01, 2026.
• Climate Hushing Strategy May Cost Democrats At The Polls Argued from a foundation of ample research evidence, this colorfully written op-ed criticizing ''climate hushing'' suggests that tip-toeing around climate change isn't grounded in facts, and that addressing public concerns about climate change can be part of a winning electoral package. CleanTechnica, Steve Hanley, Aug 03, 2026.
• Opinion: Why local action is key to surviving America's climate crisis 'The current administration in Washington denies that climate change is even real,'' starkly reminding us that meaningful climate change mitigation is a political matter and begins with voting. Politico, William S Becker, Aug 03, 2026.
• Appeals Court Says E.P.A. Cannot Block Billions in Climate Grants The funds have been frozen since early in President Trump’s second term. New York Times, Claire Brown, Aug 04, 2026.
• Q&A: What is in China`s new five-year plan for climate change? The new plan does not include any major new targets, instead consolidating and reaffirming existing policies, but does include significant signals on key policy areas, such as non-carbon dioxide (CO2) greenhouse gases, global climate governance and carbon markets. Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief Staff, Aug 06, 2026.
• Trump Administration to Pay RWE to Cancel Wind Leases It was the fifth such deal struck by the administration to get companies to drop offshore wind projects. NYT, Brad Plumer, Aug 06, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (4 articles)

• Why is gaining citizen support for climate policies so difficult? Phys.org, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Jul 31, 2026.
• A majority of Americans don`t actually fit either climate camp An analysis of 20 years of polling data shows how age, education and income—in addition to political affiliation—shape views on climate policy Anthropocene, Sarah DeWeerdt, Aug 04, 2026.
• Climate Trunk - The Persuadable Majority Progress on climate depends on speaking to the movable middle. Climate Trunk, John Lang, Aug 5, 2026.
• Extreme heat impact on travel, family increasingly felt by Americans: poll Americans are increasingly feeling a personal impact from extreme heat, according to a new poll from The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. AP News, Alexa St. John and Linley Sanders, Aug 06, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 articles)

• Climate adaptation at its limits, says one scientist A climate scientist says Earth is "passing the limits of adaptation" when it comes to withstanding the effects of climate change. NPR, Michelle Aslam, Jul 31, 2026.
• Q&A: Does the world need `carbon capture and storage` to reach net-zero? Carbon capture and storage is an expedience for the fossil fuel industry and frequently the target of emotionally overheated and shallow criticism, but also stands as a poster child for ''nothing is simple," as illustrated in this excellent explanation. Carbon Brief, Josh Gabbatiss, Aug 03, 2026.
• `The obsession with endless growth can only end in tears`: your questions on extreme weather this summer answered 'Every fraction of a degree of warming that we can prevent will help millions of people and billions of other forms of life,'' which pretty much answers why Skeptical Science exists and what each of us can help to achieve; we can do better or worse by fractions of degrees, and we choose better. The Guardian, Jonathan Watts and Ajit Niranjan, Aug 03, 2026.

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• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #31 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 26, 2026 thru Sat, August 1, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Aug 02, 2026.
• 15 new books for five new takes on climate change Recent years have seen a boom in books on climate change. This collection spans from techno-optimism to philosophical pessimism. Yale Climate Connections, Michael Svoboda, Aug 06, 2026.

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• Supreme Court sets date for blockbuster climate case The case, Suncor v. Boulder, has spurred calls for two of the justices to recuse themselves as they weigh whether federal law or the Constitution bars local governments from suing fossil fuel companies over the costs of addressing climate change. Politico E&E News, Lesley Clark, Aug 05, 2026.

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• A Short History of Climate Science #17 of the ClimateTrunk graphics published ClimateTrunk, John Lang, July 15, 2026.

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• Fixing one of climate`s worst plots The 1930s were hot over the U.S. Midwest, but not that hot The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Aug 03, 2026.

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China has released a five-year plan dedicated to addressing climate change. 

The 15th five-year plan for a national response to climate change is the latest in a series to outline in-depth climate and energy targets for the 2026-2030 period. 

These include five-year plans for “building a Beautiful China”, developing a “new-type energy system” and developing renewable energy. 

There are also separate “action plans” for the 2026-2030 period, such as for peaking carbon emissions. 

China has pledged to peak its emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060.

The new plan does not include any major new targets, instead consolidating and reaffirming existing policies.

Nevertheless, it includes significant signals on key policy areas, such as non-carbon dioxide (CO2) greenhouse gases, global climate governance and carbon markets.  

Below, Carbon Brief examines some of the notable elements in the latest five-year plan and what it reveals about China’s policy direction through to 2030.

• What does the climate plan cover?
• What does the plan say about non-CO2 GHGs?
• What does the plan say about global climate governance?

What does the climate plan cover?

The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) released the plan in late July, in unison with 18 other government departments. These include the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration.

The document covers a range of topics, including CO2 emissions, other greenhouse gases (non-CO2 GHGs), carbon markets, carbon footprints, climate adaptation and international cooperation on climate change. 

For the first time at the five-year plan level, the plan creates a comprehensive target system covering all areas of climate policy, say officials in a MEE Q&A. 

They describe it as “the main policy instrument” for advancing China’s climate action during 2026-2030.

China rarely issues high-level multi-year policies dedicated to “responding to climate change”. In 2014, the NDRC published a plan on the topic running through to 2020, but this was not linked to a five-year plan period. 

Qin Yan, principal analyst at ClearBlue Markets, tells Carbon Brief that the plan  shows that China’s climate governance has reached “an unprecedented strategic level”.

She adds that the plan creates an “all-encompassing target system” to support China’s Paris Agreement climate pledges for 2030 and 2035.

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In its 2030 pledge, China aimed to peak emissions “before 2030” and reduce carbon intensity – its emissions per unit of GDP – by more than 65% from 2005 levels. 

Last year, president Xi Jinping personally announced China’s 2035 pledge to cut China’s greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035, while “striving to do better”. 

The five-year plan marks a new phase in China’s climate policy, according to researchers at CIB Research, an economic research body affiliated with the  Industrial Bank, whose largest shareholder is the Fujian provincial government.

Their analysis adds that the plan represents a broad effort to strengthen China’s climate-governance system, implementation mechanisms and underlying capacity. 

Nevertheless, several headline targets and policies in the document simply reiterate already established plans.

These include:

• Cutting carbon intensity by 17% across the five years
• Reducing carbon intensity per product in industries under China’s carbon market by 3%
• Substituting fossil fuels with renewables
• Strengthening climate adaptation
• Supporting the “free flow” of cleantech

What does the plan say about non-CO2 GHGs?

The plan also goes into detail on China’s approach to non-CO2 GHGs. This includes reaffirming a target of an emissions “reduction capacity” from these gases totalling 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) by 2030, although the baseline is unclear.

The target previously appeared in the overarching five-year plan, as well as the plan for building a “Beautiful China”.

The goal refers to emissions reductions, which can be realised through implementing current non-CO2 emissions reduction policies and projects, says Chen Meian, programme director and senior analyst at the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress (iGDP). 

She adds that it is “relatively achievable”, with sources including increasing the number of coal-mine methane utilisation projects. 

She points to an MEE explanatory note for a draft methodology under the China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme, China’s voluntary carbon-credit market. Chen says the note suggests that projects using ventilation air methane and coal-mine methane with concentrations below 8% alone could deliver around 20MtCO2e of reduction by 2030. 

The note states that, currently, such projects are estimated to be able to “generate annual emission reductions of approximately 4.5MtCO2e”. 

In addition, Chen says, measures targeting industrial nitrous oxide (N2O) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) could help make up the remainder needed to meet the target.

According to iGDP analysis of biennial reports submitted by China to the UNFCCC, China emitted around 14,000MtCO2e of GHGs in 2021, excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF).

Non-CO2 GHGs accounted for around 2,700MtCO2e, or 19%, of the total, the majority of which was methane, as shown in the figure below.

iGDP analysis of China’s first Biennial Transparency Report and fourth Biennial Update Report.

China’s plans to curb these super-pollutants in the five-year period include coal-mine methane utilisation projects, end-of-pipe destruction technologies for HFCs and guidance on the use of catalysts to reduce N2O emissions.

The plan also calls for the recovery and replacement of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in power equipment.

For Chen, the plan’s focus on SF6 control is particularly noteworthy. She says the gas is “finally receiving policy attention” and that proactive action is “timely and will help avoid future emissions growth” as China’s power system expands.

What does the plan say about global climate governance? 

One of the plan’s clearest objectives for international cooperation is for China to play a more active role in global climate governance.

By 2030, it says China should markedly increase its “influence, guiding power, shaping power and moral appeal” in this area. 

It says China’s climate action could also feed into the Global Governance Initiative, a policy initiative aimed at reforming the global governance system.

China will also aim to “build a new narrative on climate governance”, it adds.

Prof Thomas Hale, a professor in public policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, writes on LinkedIn that the plan “marks a major rhetorical shift” towards China being increasingly willing to “lead and shape” global climate action.

Another clear focal point for international cooperation is in carbon markets. 

The plan calls for China to expand the global influence of its carbon market, such as through international rule-setting, cooperation on standards and by hosting the China Carbon Market Conference.

Qin says China’s more active role in global carbon pricing is already evident in the launch of the open coalition on compliance carbon markets with the EU and Brazil. This coalition is expected to adopt a work plan at the China Carbon Market Conference in September.

Qin also notes that China “could become the world’s largest [carbon] offset buyer” as its energy transition progresses. 

The country would, therefore, “benefit from helping shape global rules under the Article 6 framework [for carbon trading under the Paris Agreement]”, she adds. 

Related Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’ 09.07.2026 China policy Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy Analysis: China’s new carbon metric leaves Germany-sized gap in its emissions 26.05.2026 China policy Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels 24.04.2026 China policy

The post Q&A: What is in China’s new five-year plan for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

‘Towards electric vehicle misinformation communities: Shared narratives, networked validation, and reassurance among Australian consumers, McEwen et al., Energy Research & Social Science

Electric vehicles (EVs) provide a pathway to sustainable transport systems. Yet public understanding of EVs is shaped by contested information environments in which misinformation circulates alongside facts. Existing EV misinformation research has largely focused on individual EV beliefs, attitudes, and information deficits. However, less is known about how EV misinformation becomes socially meaningful in everyday life. Drawing on qualitative ethnographic data from 122 Australian consumers, we introduce the concept of EV misinformation communities to help interpret how participants share narratives and engage in social interactions and everyday sense-making practices relating to misinformation about EVs across online and offline settings. Our analysis explores how EV misinformation becomes socially meaningful through symbolic framing, networked validation, and reassurance. We suggest that countering EV misinformation requires socio-cultural understanding of people's ideologies, dispositions and circumstances, and recognition of the value and sense of shared experiences that misinformation provides. Policy and programme interventions to accelerate the transition to EVs should seek to foster community through opportunities for creating positive value and shared experiences in addition to the provision of information.

Managing climate overshoot: a risk-based strategy for climate stabilisation, Taylor et al., Frontiers in Climate

Global warming is accelerating, yet current climate strategies centred on emissions reduction and carbon removal are unlikely to prevent temperatures from crossing dangerous tipping points. Although essential, these approaches operate too slowly to counter near-term warming driven by Earth’s growing energy imbalance, weakening carbon sinks, and amplifying climate feedbacks. This mismatch reflects systemic shortcomings in climate risk assessment that underestimate nonlinear risks and the escalating costs of delay. We argue that climate stabilisation should be treated as a risk-management challenge rather than an incremental policy process. This requires explicit comparison of intervention risks with those of continued warming. We outline a comparative risk–risk framework that integrates mitigation, carbon removal, and cooling interventions, and suggests that a viable strategy may require combining rapid decarbonisation and expanded carbon removal with carefully governed cooling interventions to limit near-term warming. Without aligning response timelines with accelerating climate threats, the likelihood of irreversible Earth-system disruption will continue to grow.

Ecological Transformations of Coastal Wetlands of the Conterminous United States in Response to Contemporaneous Sea-Level Rise, Neville et al., Earth s Future

Coastal wetlands are among the most important ecosystems on the planet but are increasingly imperiled by accelerating sea-level rise (SLR). In the past, biogeomorphic feedbacks have allowed coastal wetlands to adjust vertically and persist through periods of accelerated SLR. Recent rates of SLR are faster than any in recent geologic history, making the fate of coastal wetlands highly uncertain. Here, we synthesize surface elevation table marker-horizon data from 442 stations in coastal wetlands across the conterminous United States to evaluate if they are largely persisting in the face of accelerated SLR, or if they are undergoing ecological transformations of submergence and/or migration. Across the conterminous United States, 11% of coastal wetlands in this sample are on a trajectory of submergence whereas 73% of sites are lagging SLR, but may be able to migrate upslope, and 16% of sites are gaining elevation at rates which exceed SLR indicating persistence and an ability to migrate seaward. Vulnerability of these systems to ecological transformation varies across the three coasts of the conterminous United States which, span large biogeomorphic gradients. These results serve as one of the first national syntheses of coastal wetland elevation trends and may help focus conservation and restoration efforts in a rapidly changing future.

Long-Term Trends in the Ionospheric Equivalent Slab Thickness as a Proxy of Climate Change in the Ionosphere, Pignalberi & Alberti, Geophysical Research Letters

Anthropogenic greenhouse emissions do not affect all parts of Earth's atmosphere in the same way. While the lower atmosphere warms, the upper atmosphere is expected to cool and contract, and this may also change the ionosphere, the region containing charged particles (plasma). In this study, we analyzed nearly three decades of observations from three stations spanning equatorial to high latitudes. We focused on ionospheric equivalent slab thickness, a quantity that measures how broadly plasma is distributed around the main ionospheric peak. We found that slab thickness generally decreases over time, although the strength of the decrease is neither spatially uniform nor equally detectable at all latitudes. We then linked these changes to the plasma scale height, which controls how fast plasma density decreases with altitude. The results show that the ionospheric profile is becoming narrower with time, especially at middle and high latitudes. This suggests that long-term climate-related changes in the upper atmosphere are also affecting the vertical structure of ionospheric plasma. 

Disrupted Skies: How Offshore Wind Farms Alter Flight Behavior of Breeding Seabirds, Liang et al., Ecology and Evolution

Offshore wind farms are expanding rapidly as part of global climate mitigation efforts, but their effects on seabird movement behavior remain incompletely understood. While collision risk has received substantial attention, less is known about how turbines may alter flight routes through evasive behavior and meso-avoidance, particularly near breeding colonies where repeated commuting flights may accumulate energetic costs. We investigated flight responses of breeding Bridled Terns (Onychoprion anaethetus) to offshore wind turbines near their colony using high-resolution satellite tracking data collected at 1-s intervals and lower-resolution data collected at 1-h intervals. We quantified within-trajectory flight traits, including mean redirection, number of turns, flight speed, and flight altitude, in relation to turbine exposure. We assessed avoidance using both proximity-based and direction-sensitive metrics. At the near-colony scale, we tested whether flight behavior changed with increasing alignment between the trajectory bearing and turbine bearing from the colony. At the broader breeding-range scale, we tested whether behavior differed inside and outside wind farms or with distance to turbines, while accounting for colony distance, wind, and landscape variables. Bridled Terns showed increased mean redirection and lower flight altitude when trajectories were more closely aligned with turbine directions from the colony, suggesting localized route alteration in obstacle-facing directions. However, flight behavior was not significantly associated with turbine proximity, nor did it differ significantly inside and outside wind farms. These findings suggest that offshore wind farms may influence seabird movement through localized, direction-dependent route alteration rather than simple distance-dependent responses, highlighting the value of movement-context metrics and within-trajectory traits in wind farm impact assessments.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Interim heat mortality monitoring report, England: May and June 2026, UK Health Security Agency

During the May and June 2026 heat events there were an estimated total of 2,877 heat-associated deaths, an estimated 753 heat-associated deaths occurred during the May heat episode; an estimated 2,124 heat-associated deaths occurred during the June heat episode, and the mortality burden is already close to the highest annual totals previously recorded by UKHSA. Although these estimates remain provisional and are subject to revision as more complete mortality data becomes available, the magnitude of the impact is already comparable with some of the highest annual heat-associated mortality estimates previously reported through UKHSA’s heat mortality monitoring programme. For context, UKHSA estimated 2,295 heat-associated deaths during the whole of summer 2023, 1,311 during summer 2024 and 1,504 during summer 2025. The highest annual estimate recorded to date remains summer 2022, when 2,985 heat-associated deaths were observed across 5 heat episodes.

Climate change increases likelihood of compounding drivers of severe wildfire conditions in France and Spain, World Weather Attribution

The authors perform a super rapid analysis of trends in fire-conducive weather conditions in the two affected areas in France and Spain, analyzing observations only. In both study regions observations show strong trends of increasing likelihood and severity with global warming. 99 articles in 50 journals by 827 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Climate modes synergistically influence marine heatwaves in the North Sea, Lin et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-2287-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Uncertainties too large to predict tipping times of major Earth system components from historical data, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adl4841 40 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Climate warming and atmospheric deposition jointly accelerate the Antarctic Peninsula atmosphere–glacier–land–ocean mercury loop, Zhou et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2613472123

Climate warming preconditions Himalayan slopes for post-earthquake cascading hazards, Gao et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03885-2

Impact attribution of anthropogenic forcing on lake surface temperature, Wang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76221-z

Long-term observed changes in air temperature extremes over Romania (1901-2023), Amihesei et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100941

Long-Term Trends in the Ionospheric Equivalent Slab Thickness as a Proxy of Climate Change in the Ionosphere, Pignalberi & Alberti, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123868

Pan-tropical ocean warming drives record-breaking rainfall in South China in April 2024, Xing et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03894-1

Threefold increase in atmospheric–riverine compound heatwaves under climate change, Zhou et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02040-y

Understanding the Climatology and Characteristics of Arctic Moisture Intrusions, Woods et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd044159

Winter warm spells in the pyrenees: synoptic drivers and snowmelt impacts (1960–2024), Bonsoms & Serrano-Notivoli, Atmospheric Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109245

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Summer Monsoon Drying Accelerates India's Groundwater Depletion Under Climate Change, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004516 38 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

Enhanced detectability of forced signal in monthly precipitation changes, Duan et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03684-9

GLBD-FED: a global first-hand in-situ daily temperature dataset preferentially with a 00:00–24:00 UTC 24 h window (1981–2024), Yang et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-5739-2026

Post-Season Review of Rapid Attribution of 2025 Summer Extreme Heat in China, Sun et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.014

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The ERA5 global reanalysis from 1940 to 2022, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 10.1002/qj.4803 290 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Climatic Impacts of a Warmer Mediterranean Sea Simulated by the Fully Coupled Community Earth System Model, Version 2 (CESM2), Toker et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0540.1

Compound climate hazards revealed by global modeling of drought, heatwaves, and land degradation, Liu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105637

Intensifying Short-Interval Heatwave-To-Rainfall Compound Extremes and Associated Exposure in the Indus Basin, Wen et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70534

Multi-model ensemble mean shows accelerating global below-ground warming, Ju et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111382

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The radiative feedback continuum from Snowball Earth to an ice-free hothouse, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50406-w 14 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Advective, adiabatic and diabatic contributions to heat extremes simulated with the Community Earth System Model version 2, Röthlisberger et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/wcd-7-1363-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Accurate assessment of land–atmosphere coupling in climate models requires high-frequency data output, Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-1869-2024 32 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Delayed freeze-up in the western Arctic Ocean fueled by subsurface heat release, ZHOU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.018

The Modèle Atmosphérique Régional – Intelligence Artificielle (MAR-IA): surface meltwater over Greenland, Tedesco et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-4235-2026

The recent enhancement of the surface melt over the Antarctic Peninsula dictated by thermodynamics, Zhang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76310-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Recent tropical Andean glacier retreat is unprecedented in the Holocene, Science, 10.1126/science.adg7546 27 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Coastal Flood Risk Governance in Newfoundland, Canada: A Multidimensional Analysis of Assessment, Management, and Communication, Parvez & Akter, Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70327

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The influence of realistic 3D mantle viscosity on Antarctica’s contribution to future global sea levels, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adn1470 23 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Calcium isotopes link ocean acidification to Aptian–Albian foraminiferal extinctions, Chen et al., Science 10.1126/science.aed9359

New classes of climate model emulators to improve paleoclimate reconstructions, Gaudin & Khodri, Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-7135-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Plant, insect, and fungi fossils under the center of Greenland’s ice sheet are evidence of ice-free times, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2407465121 6 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Climate Change Predicted to Trigger an Upward Altitudinal Range Shift and Boost the Abundance of a Montane Rock Face Specialist, the Wallcreeper (Tichodroma muraria), Luisier et al., Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern Open Access 10.48620/99848

Declining coccolithophore blooms in the North Atlantic and Western Barents Sea, Yu et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adw5268

Distribution of suitable habitats and bloom risk assessment for Sargassum horneri in the China Seas under global climate change, Mo et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108325

Ecological Transformations of Coastal Wetlands of the Conterminous United States in Response to Contemporaneous Sea-Level Rise, Neville et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006836

Sustained transpiration masks weakened canopy cooling and emerging carbon constraints during heatwaves in a riparian poplar plantation, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111390

The synoptic meteorology of coral reef high water temperature events in the Gulf of Eilat (Aqaba), Israel, McGowan et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-65507-3

Underestimated climate contributions: Dynamic attribution of vegetation changes in China incorporating soil moisture and vapor pressure deficit, Zheng et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111395

Warming associated with forest integrity loss in global wildland-urban interfaces, Huang et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100569

Warming Drives Large-Scale Shifts in Post-Disturbance Vegetation Dynamics and Expansion of Deciduous Trees in the Boreal Forest in a Dynamic Vegetation Model, Layritz et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009176

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
High heat tolerance, evaporative cooling, and stomatal decoupling regulate canopy temperature and their safety margins in three European oak species, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17439 46 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Climate Constraints on the Methane-Carbon Efficiency of Global Wetlands: Spatiotemporal Drivers and Future Projections, Zhu et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef008003

Communicating Climate Change in Africa: Role Perception and Role Shifting among Environmental Journalists in Nigeria, Oduolowu et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2711229

Compound Effects of Warming and Wetting Enhance Soil Respiration on the Earth's Third Pole, Shen et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2026gb009376

Detection and quantification of agricultural methane plumes using MethaneAIR through targeted scene selection, wavelet denoising, and divergence-integral analysis, Smale et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-10661-2026

Drought stress on the global vegetation carbon sink: Capacity decline in nearly 70% of regions, LIU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.020

Ecological Transformations of Coastal Wetlands of the Conterminous United States in Response to Contemporaneous Sea-Level Rise, Neville et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006836

Elevated Spring Methane Emissions in a Sub-Arctic Peatland Fen, Montemayor et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg009699

Estimating carbon storage and flux in sea urchin barrens following kelp forest collapse, Rogers-Bennett et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108297

Quantifying Methane Emissions From a Rich Fen With Uncrewed Aircraft Systems in Boreal Alaska, Tomlin et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046424

Quantifying national, state, and oil/gas field methane emissions and trends in the US (2019–2024) through high resolution inversion of satellite observations, Estrada et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-10629-2026

Responses of Riverine Dissolved Organic Carbon to Global Warming and Permafrost Thaw on the Tibetan Plateau, Pan et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2026gb009157

Urban CO2 flux characteristics observed at an eddy-covariance tower in northeastern Seoul, An et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122252

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Towards an ecosystem capacity to stabilise organic carbon in soils, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17453 55 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The politics of carbon management in Austria: Emerging fault lines on carbon capture, storage, utilization and removal, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103697 6 cites.

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Decarbonization

Assessing strategies to decarbonise embodied carbon impacts of residential buildings in Indian cities: case of Ahmedabad, Trivedi et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1088/2634-4505/ae87c7

Disrupted Skies: How Offshore Wind Farms Alter Flight Behavior of Breeding Seabirds, Liang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74089

Hydrogen supply chains across Chinese provinces for production and transportation, Bi et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03869-2

Peak coal electricity under rapid electricity demand growth conditions: A case study of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, Dzikrurrokhim et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115532

Sceptical, pragmatic, and innovative teleworkers: Exploring commuting carbon footprints and subjective well-being, Vu et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104894

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Integration of Renewable Energy in Microgrids and Smart Grids in Deregulated Power Systems: A Comparative Exploration, Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research, 10.1002/aesr.202400088 88 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Climate benefit and ecological cost trade-offs for ocean iron fertilization, Yu et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10795-y

Aerosols

Heatwaves and particulate matter increases: An Italian case study, Faggi et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122246

Invisible Ship Tracks Produce Mean-State Cloud Microphysics Perturbation in Tropical Trade Cumulus, Wright, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20076712

Climate change communications & cognition

Challenges and next steps in climate disaster communication, Houston & First, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02714-w

Finding Gaia: exploring climate change through gamification, Gargiulo et al., Geoscience Communication Open Access pdf 10.5194/gc-9-331-2026

Local stories in climate change communication, Cheng, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02694-x

Psychological barriers to improving carbon competence, Herberz et al., Open MIND Open Access pmh:10.17605/osf.io/qp76t

Psychological inoculation against climate doom, O'Boyle et al., Open MIND pmh:10.17605/osf.io/74cgf

Social influence shapes climate attitudes and action, Hampton et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02711-z

Untrustworthy sources on Facebook and Instagram in 2020: Concentrated exposure but no attitudinal effects, Bergeron-Boutin et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz6502

‘Towards electric vehicle misinformation communities: Shared narratives, networked validation, and reassurance among Australian consumers, McEwen et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104902

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change engagement of scientists, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02091-2 45 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Climate Change Shows Inverse Effects on Grain Yield and Protein Concentration in West Africa, Abigaba et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008409

Discovery of a covalent FGFR2-selective inhibitor overcoming clinically-acquired resistance mutations, Huang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76339-0

Engaging farmers with climate projections: integrating long-term climate risk into farm business resilience planning, Malakar et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100859

Food system contributions to future planetary boundary transgressions: a multiscale modelling assessment of scenarios, Luchtenbelt et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101492

Halochromic modulation of amorphous calcium carbonate crystallization driven by pH-responsive bioinspired pigments, Sardhalia et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75888-8

Leveraging climate-smart agriculture for improved resource-use efficiency: evidence from rice farmers in Kwara State, Nigeria, Ajiboye et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1878309

Relearning with the Land: Intergenerational food literacy pathways for resilience in a changing climate, Adelodun et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104462

Vulnerability to high temperature shapes global warming impacts on rice yield, Jian et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed9226

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The centennial legacy of land-use change on organic carbon stocks of German agricultural soils, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17444 26 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Greenhouse warming exacerbates El Niño-induced Indian monsoon droughts, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76049-7

Improving Daily Streamflow Forecasting under Nonstationarity with a Physics-Informed, Decomposition-Enhanced Deep Learning Model, Jiang et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0166.1

Reservoir Drought Resilience Under Future Warming Scenarios: Regional Disparities Across Heavily Regulated US Basins, Eldardiry et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007984

Understanding the Climatology and Characteristics of Arctic Moisture Intrusions, Woods et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2025jd044159

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Understanding Climate Change and Anthropogenic Impacts on the Salinization of Low-Lying Coastal Groundwater Systems, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004737 20 cites.

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Climate change economics

Global trade-offs between consumption, carbon prices and equity, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75815-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Estimating economic losses from perceived heat stress in a global south country, Bangladesh, Urban Climate, 10.1016/j.uclim.2024.102072 11 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Environmental taxation and biofuel production in the EU: Heterogeneous effects across producer scales, Auteri, Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115525

From corporate net-zero pledges to credible climate action, Gudipudi et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01908-6

From project participants to policy shapers: How communities influence renewable energy governance, Eitan, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104906

Pathways towards social license for offshore wind energy: Modelling strategies to reduce conflict and increase acceptability, Condie et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115523

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Renewable energy transition and regional integration: Energizing the pathway to sustainable development, Energy Policy, 10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114270 65 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Aspirations in a warming world: Modeling migration and education decisions under climate risk in Senegal, Choquette-Levy et al., Global Environmental Change 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103215

Back to the future: A mixed-methods approach for developing event-based participatory storylines to advance climate risk assessments, Casartelli et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100865

Climate-resilient infrastructure and the future of the SDGs, Zaqout et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1088/2634-4505/ae900b

Coastal Flood Risk Governance in Newfoundland, Canada: A Multidimensional Analysis of Assessment, Management, and Communication, Parvez & Akter, Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70327

Global vulnerability assessment of mobile telecommunications infrastructure to climate hazards using crowdsourced open data, Oughton et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76197-w

Traditional, indigenous and local knowledge for climate adaptation: trends, themes and governance implications (2000–2025), Zhang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.019

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rare and highly destructive wildfires drive human migration in the U.S., Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50630-4 28 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Rapid Increase in Tropical Humid Heat Stress and Its Predictability in a Warming World, Saha et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046437

The GHEMMS checklist: design, conduct, and reporting guidance for studies modelling climate mitigation actions and their health cobenefits, Reynolds et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101474

The past and future impact of climate change on childhood malaria in Africa, Carlson et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10840-w

Welcome to the Calentón: How Puerto Rican Community Leaders Respond to Extreme Heat, López et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2711233

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change could fuel urinary schistosomiasis transmission in Africa and Europe, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17434 19 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Energy transition and climate vulnerability: Energy policy in an era of geopolitical fragmentation, Chen et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115536

The immediate impact of crises on energy transitions: Policy responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in Finland, Germany, and Poland, Haukkala et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104881

 

Other

Coupled air–sea interactions drove and sustained the 2013–2016 North Pacific marine heatwave, Jiang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76096-0

Mid-2000s reversal of North Atlantic warming pattern reshapes hemispheric circulation and Eurasian cold extremes, Wu et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01492-8

The cooling paradox: Rising air conditioner adoption in Bangladesh as a driver of energy insecurity and compounding climate risk, Rahman et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104886

Unveiling Future Individual and Compound Heat and Air Pollution Extremes in China: Insights for Mitigation, Zhang & Gao, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0333.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Expansive learning of climate scientists towards transdisciplinarity, Climate Risk Management, 10.1016/j.crm.2024.100642 3 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Managing climate overshoot: a risk-based strategy for climate stabilisation, Taylor et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1872846

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions critical to limit climate tipping risks, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49863-0 71 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Groundwater Supply East of Interstate 95 (Virginia), Virginia Department of Environmental Quality

As directed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 25, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) completed a study of the groundwater supply in the Commonwealth east of Interstate 95 (I-95). This area generally encompasses the Virginia Coastal Plain (VCP) aquifer system. Under current conditions, the VCP aquifer system has limited capacity for significant new withdrawals. The estimated capacity for new withdrawals varies by region, from a maximum of 360,000 gallons per day in the eastern Northern Neck to less than 30,000 gallons per day in some western regions near I-95. Only the upper end of this range would support a significant new withdrawal for industrial use. The confined Potomac aquifer is the largest and deepest in the VCP, accounting for 70% of total reported and estimated groundwater withdrawals in the Eastern Virginia Groundwater Management Area. The confined Yorktown-Eastover aquifer system accounts for 95% of total reported and estimated groundwater withdrawals in the Eastern Shore Groundwater Management Area. Combining the two regulated areas, the major uses of groundwater are industrial (35% of total), private domestic (34%), and public water supply (26%).

California New Car Dealers Association Releases Q2 2026 Auto Outlook. Q2 2026 CA Auto Outlook: Hybrid Market Share Climbs to Highest Level on Record in California, California New Car Dealers Association

Hybrid vehicles accounted for 22.1 percent of California’s new vehicle market through June, the highest share in the report’s data series and up from 19.5 percent for all of 2025. Hybrid share has now increased in each of the past four years. Quarterly share climbed from 20.9 percent in the first quarter to 23.2 percent in the second. Hybrid registrations totaled 191,000 units in the first half of the year, and every one of those vehicles was sold through a franchised new car dealership. Franchised dealerships accounted for 75.7 percent of combined hybrid, ZEV, and plug-in hybrid registrations statewide. Gas powered vehicles remained the largest single segment of the market at 57.6 percent of registrations, up from 54.0 percent in 2025.

Characterization and Screening-Level Risk Evaluation Report. Vicinity of Moss Landing Power Plant, Moss Landing, California, Terraphase Engineering, Vistra Corporation

On January 16, 2025, a lithium-ion battery fire occurred within ML300 at the Moss Landing Power Plant (MLPP). The fire was confined to the ML300 structure and did not spread to other on-site facilities. Emergency response actions were implemented promptly, including precautionary evacuations that were lifted the following day based on air monitoring results. The authors evaluate whether releases associated with the fire event pose a potential threat to human health or the environment and whether additional investigation or response actions are warranted. Chemicals measured in the sampled off-site soil, sediment, and surface water do not indicate lasting conditions expected to pose an unacceptable risk to people or ecological receptors. For purposes of the risk evaluation, health-protective assumptions and treated measured chemical concentrations are considered as if they were related to the fire. Some nickel concentrations in sediment exceeded ecological screening levels in Hester Marsh and the Mosquito Abatement Observation Area. The authors attributed these results to natural variability and marsh conditions rather than lasting fire-related impacts. No further human-health or ecological-risk evaluation, off-site investigation, or response action is warranted at this time for the sampled locations and environmental media.

Colorado River Basin Water Security Survey, Morning Consult, Walton Family Foundation

Nearly 9-in-10 voters across key states are very concerned about wildfire risks, threats to clean drinking water, and lowering water levels in the Colorado River Basin. Four-in-five voters across all seven states and in the Colorado River Basin counties say addressing the drought effects from the Colorado River is an important priority to them personally and the majority say it is important for the federal government or their state government to make addressing water security a priority this year. Nine-in-ten voters support restoring wetlands to help protect communities from fires, increasing agricultural efficiency to reduce water use, boosting municipal water conservation, and managing forests to limit wildfire damage. Support is broad across the political spectrum, ranging from more than eight-in-ten Republicans and Independents to more than nine-in-ten Democrats. Similar shares say each approach is an important priority, with more than half saying forest management and boosting municipal conservation should be a top priority. About half of voters across the seven states prefer strategies to address water conservation that are both long-term and short-term, to help manage the drought into the future. Ensuring reliable water supply is a top priority for voters.

Thirsty Power. Coal and gas will leave us high and dry, Sonoda et al., Sierra Club, Wisconsin Chapter

Wisconsin’s current dirty energy power fleet– including coal, gas, and nuclear plants– withdraws 1.34 trillion gallons of water annually. This is more than 7 times all of the municipalities in Wisconsin combined, and 18 times more than agricultural irrigation. Meanwhile, solar and wind use so little water that the U.S. Energy Information Administration does not even track their use. Five new gas plants, known or assumed to be proposed for data centers, would use 142 million gallons of water a year on average– the equivalent of the annual drinking water for 284 million people– and the majority of which would be needed during summer months when energy and water use has been strained by drought and heat.

The 50 States of Solar: Q2 2026 Quarterly Report, North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center

This report series focuses on cataloging and describing important proposed and adopted policy changes affecting solar customer-generators of investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and large publicly owned or nonprofit utilities, i.e., those serving at least 100,000 customers. In the second quarter of 2026, 45 states plus Washington, DC and Puerto Rico took a total of 284 actions related to distributed solar policy and rate design. Of the 284 actions cataloged, the most common were related to distributed generation compensation rules (53), followed by community solar (48), and residential fixed charge or minimum bill increases (45).

Interim heat mortality monitoring report, England: May and June 2026, UK Health Security Agency

Suring the May and June 2026 heat events there were an estimated total of 2,877 heat-associated deaths, an estimated 753 heat-associated deaths occurred during the May heat episode; an estimated 2,124 heat-associated deaths occurred during the June heat episode, and the mortality burden is already close to the highest annual totals previously recorded by UKHSA. Although these estimates remain provisional and are subject to revision as more complete mortality data becomes available, the magnitude of the impact is already comparable with some of the highest annual heat-associated mortality estimates previously reported through UKHSA’s heat mortality monitoring programme. For context, UKHSA estimated 2,295 heat-associated deaths during the whole of summer 2023, 1,311 during summer 2024 and 1,504 during summer 2025. The highest annual estimate recorded to date remains summer 2022, when 2,985 heat-associated deaths were observed across 5 heat episodes.

Climate change increases likelihood of compounding drivers of severe wildfire conditions in France and Spain, World Weather Attribution

The authors perform a super rapid analysis of trends in fire-conducive weather conditions in the two affected areas in France and Spain, analyzing observations only. In both study regions observations show strong trends of increasing likelihood and severity with global warming.

Risks of Lithium-ion Battery Facilities to Workers and Communities in Reno, Nevada - A Case Study Supporting Community Right-to-Know, Moon et al., GAIA

The authors report examines the environmental and health implications of lithium-ion battery recycling in Nevada’s rapidly expanding “Lithium Loop” and is designed not only to document current conditions but to equip communities, policymakers, and other stakeholders with the information and frameworks needed to strengthen transparency and accountability across the sector. This case study marks the launch of GAIA’s Community Right-to-Know Initiative for Battery Recycling, a multi-year effort to establish industry-wide transparency and accountability benchmarks among battery recyclers regarding transition mineral claims; support frontline communities in accessing, interpreting, and acting on environmental data; and align battery supply chain stakeholders, policymakers, researchers, and advocates, in Nevada and throughout the US, around enforceable disclosure standards.

The Pace of Solar Progress: How Preexisting Land Use Shapes Permitting Timelines for Utility-Scale Solar in California, Johnson et al., The Nature Conservancy

California’s future hinges on its ability to rapidly and responsibly develop significant amounts of utility-scale solar. Yet the pace of deployment is increasingly constrained by permitting complexity. In a first-of-its-kind analysis, the authors examine over 15 years of permitting data and includes interviews with county officials, a state agency, and solar developers to understand the drivers of permitting timelines and to identify how California can accelerate clean energy deployment while protecting important landscapes.

Annual Report to the Legislature on California Climate Investments Using Cap-and-Invest Auction Proceeds, California Air Resources Board

The California Air Resources Board released a new report showing the state’s Cap-and-Invest program has generated $36.2 billion for climate investments, $15.5 billion of which have been implemented through over 600,000 projects. With billions yet to be implemented and $8 billion in additional proceeds estimated through 2030, these funds are expected to continue reducing emissions and supporting jobs across the state for years to come. 36.2 billion generated by Cap-and-Invest auctions. $15.5 billion implemented across 122 programs into over 600,000 projects delivering cleaner air, stronger communities, and more affordable options for Californians. Of that money, $11.4 billion, or 76%, is benefiting disadvantaged and low-income communities. 130.5 million metric tons of carbon-dioxide equivalent of estimated greenhouse gas reductions over project lifetimes, equivalent to avoiding the consumption of over 12.6 billion gallons of gasoline. 16,386 affordable homes under contract, helping address California’s housing needs. $44.4 billion in expected cost savings from reduced fuel use, lower transportation costs, and lower household energy bills. 143,000+ jobs supported across the economy through project spending, supply chain activity, and induced economic activity over project lifetimes.

How Important is Clean Energy to Utahns?, Elizabeth Brunner and Stacia Ryder, Utah State University

Data from the 2024/25 Utah People and Environment Poll estimates that a majority of Utahns support carbon-free energy. Over half of Utahns are willing to pay more for clean energy. Nuclear and geothermal energy sources draw the most consistent support across rural, transitioning, and urban communities Rural, transitioning, and urban communities are most divided on support for natural gas, coal, solar, and wind energy sources. The Utah Office of Energy’s Strategic Energy Plan may not prioritize clean energy in the same way its residents do. Future research should explore the links between Utahns’ views of energy and data center development.

Energy Transition Monitor: Momentum Is Still Insufficient for the Expansion of Renewables, Electrification, and Storage, Von Wolf-Peter Schill, DIW Weekly Report

The expansion of solar and wind energy is progressing, but it is not fast enough to meet the 2030 statutory targets. The heating transition is stalling: Heat pumps make up half of all newly sold heating systems, yet many fossil-fuel heaters are still being installed. Electric vehicles are gaining ground in all categories, but internal combustion engines continue to dominate new registrations. Electricity price trends show that the flexibility of the power system is growing more slowly than electricity generation from renewables. The expansion of large-scale battery storage is gaining momentum, nearly doubling in the first half of 2026.

China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2026 H1, Christoph Nedopil, The University of Queensland Business School, Brisbane, Australia in collaboration with the Green Finance & Development Center (GFDC) at FISF, PR. China

China’s energy related engagement in 2026 H1 reached record levels with about USD36.3 billion – almost double the energy engagement in any first half year since 2013 except 2025. 56% of China’s energy engagement was green – a new record both in absolute and in relative terms. More than USD20 billion in H1 2026, same level as green energy engagement in all 2025. More than 20 GW of green electricity projects confirmed through investment and construction – more than in all of 2025.

Organizations and Climate Action. Accelerating Climate Solutions Through Organizational Change, Amel et al., American Psychological Association & ecoAmerica

The escalating effects of climate change are already reshaping lives, livelihoods, and communities. A large majority of people recognize this reality and express concern. Yet awareness alone has not translated into the scale of action the moment demands. The authors address that gap by examining one of the most powerful and underutilized levers for climate action: organizations. Drawing on peer-reviewed research from organizational psychology, behavioral science, and sustainability studies, this report presents an evidence-based case for why organizations — understood as structured collectives of people — are uniquely positioned to accelerate climate solutions. Although much of the research reviewed in this report is based on workplace settings, the principles it identifies are broadly applicable across diverse organizational contexts, from corporations, associations, and nonprofits to educational institutions and places of worship. At its core, any collective is shaped by universal human dynamics: culture, leadership, and motivation. The authors examine the cultural and behavioral foundations of organizational change and offer practical, role-specific recommendations for advancing climate action.

Communities Centered: Frontline Perspectives on Hyperscale Data Centers in Washington State, Mengal et al., Front and Centered

Hyperscale data centers represent an emerging threat to climate and environmental justice. New articles or reports are constantly being released detailing the negative health, environmental, energy and economic effects of data centers on communities across the nation, and too often it is frontline communities who bear the brunt of these effects. As a coalition of frontline community-based organizations advancing climate and environmental justice in Washington State, we know that our communities are continually overlooked in conversations about how to address data centers and their impacts, despite holding distinct and multiple forms of expertise and lived experiences. The authors provide the first statewide report to combine original geographic analysis with interviews from frontline organizations to examine how the growth of AI data centers is affecting communities across Washington. In addition to documenting community concerns, the authors outline a series of policy recommendations, including passing a statewide moratorium on new data centers and the expansion of existing hyperscale facilities. About New Research

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This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Karin Kirk

It’s hot. Fans and air conditioners are humming in homes, offices, commercial buildings, and factories. July is the most electricity-intensive time of year in the U.S., and the grid is working hard to keep up.

In many places, high electricity demand equals high pollution. That used to be true in New Mexico, but the state’s electricity supply flipped from majority climate-warming fossil fuels to majority renewables in just five years. Spurred by an ambitious clean energy law called the Energy Transition Act, utilities have been busy building solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and transmission lines. A major coal plant was retired and demolished. Solar panels proliferated on homes, schools, and businesses.

And even while New Mexico was building out its clean energy future, electricity prices remained cheaper than average.

A case study in cleaner electricity

New Mexico’s largest utility is the Public Service Company of New Mexico, or PNM. Only five years ago, most of PNM’s cooling needs were met by coal and gas, which made up 83% of its electricity generation in July 2021.

But the state’s abundant sunshine now provides much of the region’s electricity.

The golden line on the graph below shows grid-scale solar energy production in PNM’s territory every day for a week. The sun generated 41% of the total electricity the week of July 6, when I did this analysis.

Batteries deliver stored sunshine in the evening

The next graph shows electricity stored and generated by utility-scale batteries. During the daytime, the line dips below zero when the batteries are pulling electricity off the grid to charge up.

In the Southwestern U.S., electricity is cheap during sunny days because everyone’s solar panels are cranking out electrons at the same time. The utility could try to sell excess solar energy to other regions, but it’s not worth much. It’s far better to store it for later.

Summer evenings are hot, even as the sun eases toward the horizon and solar production wanes. That’s when PNM’s battery fleet comes to life, delivering the solar energy stored a few hours earlier. The green line spikes upward as the batteries kick into gear.

By around midnight, the batteries are discharged. But metaphorically speaking, so are most people. Electricity demand drops off as everyone heads to bed and temperatures cool off for the night.

Bring on the wind

Sunshine and batteries aren’t quite enough to power everything 24/7. The next big player is wind, shown with the blue line on the graph below. Note how the wind blows strongest in the evening – it’s the perfect complement to solar in this region. Wind accounted for 20% of electricity generation during the week shown below.

New Mexico’s evening wind is also helping out Arizona and California as a result of the recently completed SunZia project. Located in central New Mexico, the project’s 916 wind turbines generate electricity and a 550-mile, high-voltage transmission line carries it westward.

Still some fossil fuels – but a lot less

Only five years ago, fossil fuels were the main characters in PNM’s electricity generation. Now they’re the supporting cast.

The brown line on the graph below shows electricity generated from natural gas, a fossil fuel composed primarily of climate-warming methane. Little gas is needed during the day, thanks to solar energy. In the evening, gas generation picks up, though it’s still generating less than batteries and wind.

The steady black line shows coal generation. Coal plants run best when operated at a constant pace, because frequent ramping up and down causes them to run less efficiently and can lead to more fatigue on aging equipment.

All told, coal and gas made up 38% of the electricity supply the week of July 6, with renewables generating 62%.

It’s worth noting that July’s heat drives the highest rates of fossil fuel use for PNM. About half the days in the past year saw renewables generating 70% or more of the daily electricity need, and in late spring of this year, renewables routinely met more than 80% of demand.

A transformation in just five years

Compare the chart above to the one below from 2021, when coal and gas power plants generated nearly 80% of the total electricity. Every day, the utility ramped up gas power plants to meet the evening peak in electricity demand. Solar and wind were relatively small contributors, totaling just over 20% between them.

So how did this transformation happen? The answer is in part two of this story, coming Monday.

A note on data

The data comes from the Energy Information Administration’s Hourly Grid Monitor. Note that not all of the electricity shown in these graphs is used by PNM. Some of it is exported to other regions, and PNM also imports some electricity into its service territory. Nevertheless, the data paints a picture of how different sources of electricity generation blend together to provide power through the day and night.

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

//

This is a re-post from By the Numbers by Hannah Ritchie

Over the last week, this chart of wildfire burn in Europe has been doing the rounds on social media and traditional media outlets. Carbon Brief goes through some of this coverage here.

The underlying narrative is that Europe is having its lowest wildfire year on record, which is quite at odds with the huge wildfires we see from France and Spain on the news.

But this data and the media headlines are not as contradictory as they first appear.

The wildfire data we present on Our World in Data comes from the Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS). This uses satellite imagery, which doesn’t distinguish, for example, between forest fires and large-scale burning of agricultural land, grasslands, or savannah.

Its aggregate category “Europe” includes Russia. On OWID, we also have predefined regions across our datasets, and Russia falls under “Europe”.

Russia, as a country, is split between Europe and Asia. Most of its landmass lies in Asia, but most of its population is on the European side. Since most of our datasets, from poverty and inequality, to health, education, energy consumption and access to resources, are about human activity and outcomes, assigning Russia to Europe usually makes more sense. That’s not so much the case for the few metrics — like wildfires — that concern land mass.

As Russia is big, the European numbers are heavily influenced by what’s happening there. This is something that’s true of aggregate wildfire data more broadly. The global numbers are heavily influenced by what’s happening in Africa, for example.

It can be true that the world is having a low wildfire year, while Europe is having a high one. Or that Europe is having a low wildfire year, and particular countries within Europe are battling huge outbreaks. There is no inconsistency there.

To provide more regional insight, we added an entity called “Europe (excluding Russia)” and already had one for the “European Union (27)”.

What does the European data look like if we remove Russia?

It’s no longer the lowest wildfire year on record, but still fairly quiet for this time of year. Russia is not the only explanation.

What if we look at the European Union?

It is higher again, with a particular uptick in the last week. It’s around 40% higher than the median year since 2012, and the 5th highest in that record.

At Our World in Data we use GWIS as our main source, since we want the global picture. But Europe also has the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS). It stretches back to 2006, and tries to filter out agricultural burning to focus on forest fires.

Its data has the EU running at its 2nd highest level for this time of year.

Underneath this trend from either source is a stark regional split. Many countries in Western Europe are having a bad wildfire year. Those in the Balkans and Southern Europe, a comparatively quiet one.1

The bar chart below shows how wildfire burn at this stage of the year compares to the median over the past 15 years. A figure of 2 means it’s twice as high as the median; 0.3 means wildfire burn is around one-third.

Countries such as France, Spain, Germany, and Portugal are well above the average for this time of year. But countries such as Romania, Greece, and Croatia are well below.

For France, it’s not just that wildfire burn is higher than usual. It’s seeing record-breaking fires for this time of the year. You can see this in the panel chart below.

Compare that to Greece, where wildfires are tracking for their lowest levels since 2012.

This matters for the aggregate European, or EU, figures.

Let’s take that same chart, but make the y-axis scale the same across all countries. Some countries simply contribute far more to the total than others. France is breaking records — which obviously matters a lot for its national figures — but it doesn’t have a huge impact on the region’s overall numbers. A really big year in Portugal, Italy, Romania or Spain does make a big difference. But the relatively high year in Spain is “offset” by a low year for Romania.

That’s really the point: some countries are having really severe wildfire outbreaks, affecting huge population centres and landscapes. That France is struggling this summer is not a lie or just media hype. It can also be true that others offset this with quiet years in the regional totals.

The anomaly in France this year is even clearer when we look at the weekly wildfire burn. The spike you see in the chart below was far higher than any other week in France’s record since 2012. The speed and intensity of wildfire outbreaks is arguably more important for the impact on communities than just the total area burned.

What about global wildfires this year?

What if we zoom out to look at data across all regions?

Here they are, with the y-axis scales the same. It really is a low year for wildfires globally. Most of that is explained by low wildfire burn in Africa. A lot of Africa’s wildfires are about agricultural burning, and fires on grasslands and savannahs. South America is also having a quiet year, so far.

Europe and North America, in particular, have little bearing on the global total, simply because they’re so small. Europe without Russia has even less so.

 

1 Much of the burning in the Balkans is related to agricultural land practices, which differ from how people think about forest fires.

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Heatwaves are becoming more likely and more intense due to climate change, impacting sources of power generation around the world as they work to meet increased demand.

When temperatures soared past 40C in parts of Europe in June and July 2026, nuclear reactors shuttered, gas plants’ efficiency fell, wind speeds dropped and electricity networks sagged.

Yet, while all types of electricity generation are affected variously by extreme heat, some commentators are quick to point the finger at “intermittent” wind and solar, while downplaying the impact on sources such as gas or nuclear power.

Extreme heat also drives up electricity demand, as people turn on air conditioning and fridges work harder. 

For example, in France, daily electricity demand rose by almost 20% during a two-week heatwave in June 2026. 

This often leads to an increase in power prices, as generation strains and demand rises, putting a premium on electricity. 

Below, Carbon Brief – amid a slew of misleading claims – explains how key power sources cope with extreme heat. 

• Nuclear
• Gas
• Wind
• Solar
• Storage

Nuclear

The impact of heatwaves on nuclear power generation is well documented, with a plethora of headlines often accompanying record temperatures in nations that rely on the technology. 

For example, around 70% of electricity is generated by nuclear power in France, leaving it vulnerable to the impacts of heatwaves. 

During the July 2026 heatwave, three of France’s 57 nuclear reactors had to shut down. Generation was reduced at another seven, causing an almost 9% dip in power production. 

(This is a well-known phenomenon – France has seen reductions in nuclear generation due to heatwaves in 2003, 2006, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2025.)

A similar story is true across various countries in Europe. Low river levels on the Danube have hit nuclear reactors in Romania and Hungary this summer, while a Swiss nuclear reactor shuttered due to high river temperatures.

It is nuclear plants using river water to cool their reactors that are most significantly affected by heatwaves and droughts. These make up 14% of the global fleet. Around 60 of the world’s 440 reactors use once-through river cooling, of which eight are in France.

Nuclear power plants use fission to generate heat, which is used to create steam. This steam spins the blades of a turbine that is connected to a generator to create electricity. 

Following this process, the water is cooled to allow it to be recycled back through the system as steam again. Nuclear power plants generally use water from rivers or the sea to help cool and condense this steam. 

As such, when water temperatures rise due to a heatwave, their cooling capacity is reduced and the overall efficiency of the nuclear power station is affected. Similarly, if there is less water available due to drought, they cannot be cooled as effectively. 

Michael Tadrous, a researcher at McMaster University’s DeGroote School of Business in Canada, tells Carbon Brief that the “impact [of heatwaves] is real, but it is far smaller than many headlines suggest” and that the “effect [of heat] is gradual”. He adds: 

“Warmer intake water makes a reactor slightly less efficient. [But] even an extreme 15C rise in cooling-water temperature would cost a large reactor only about 6% of its output. 

“The real pressure point during a heatwave is usually legal rather than technical. Plants return their cooling water to the river a few degrees warmer than they drew it and the law limits how warm that water may be in order to protect aquatic life.” 

Henry Preston, a spokesperson for the industry body the World Nuclear Association, adds that reactor shutdowns due to high river temperatures are “typically an automatic response to comply with regulations to protect local ecosystems, rather than a technological fault”.

He notes that in some extreme heatwaves, these regulations are waived given the “essential need for electricity and taking a proportional approach to climate risks”. 

While nuclear power plants can generally return to standard operation quickly if they have been affected by high water temperatures, drought can cause a more significant impact. 

Preston tells Carbon Brief: 

“In contrast to high river temperatures, which can quickly return to acceptable levels once a heatwave passes, low river levels can persist for much longer, if drought conditions continue. As a result, low water levels may have a more prolonged impact on plant operations than elevated water temperatures.”

This is set to be the case in the current European drought, where multiple reactors in Hungary and Romania have shut down or reduced their output due to low water levels.

The Danube is not expected to return to normal water levels for “days or even weeks as no significant rainfall is forecast”, reported the Associated Press on 3 August 2026. It said this was “push[ing] some countries in eastern Europe to the brink of energy emergency”.

According to data company Montel, on Monday 3 August, around 2.44GW or 40% of south-east Europe’s nuclear capacity was offline due to drought in the Danube.

Similarly, on Monday, as much as 12% of the French nuclear fleet was offline due to heat-related reasons, although that had been expected to drop to 7% by Tuesday. 

While heatwaves and drought can produce significant short-term effects, their impact on the availability of nuclear power across a full year is generally minimal. 

On average, heatwaves cut annual nuclear generation by 0.6% between 2003 and 2022, according to a recent study that Tadrous co-authored.

He adds that, across the whole period studied, the only time a national nuclear fleet lost more than 1% of its nuclear power over a year to heat- and drought-related curtailments was France in 2003, which lost 1.3%. 

According to an article in Forbes, for every additional degree Celsius in temperature, a nuclear power plant loses around 0.6-1% in cycle efficiency. 

However, nuclear power’s exposure to heatwaves can prove particularly challenging given the large capacity of individual plants and the central role it plays in certain nations’ energy systems. 

For example, Romania’s only nuclear power plant, at Cernavodă, is responsible for 20% of the nation’s electricity generation. Therefore, the impact of low river levels in the Danube is having a particularly acute impact on Romania’s energy security.

To minimise the impact on both energy security and costs, governments and nuclear companies are looking at a range of solutions to adapt to heatwaves.

For example, French nuclear-plant operator EDF is looking at additional cooling towers for its sites that are the most exposed to the impacts of a warming climate, reported Bloomberg recently.

Tadrous says the nuclear power industry is already adapting to heatwaves that are “more frequent and more intense”, adding:  

“France’s river-cooled fleet lost 5.5 terawatt hours (TWh) of output to the 2003 heatwave. By 2022, one of the most severe heat-and-drought summers on record, losses had fallen to 0.5TWh, a reduction of roughly 90%, as utilities upgraded cooling systems, refined operating practices and scheduled maintenance around periods of extreme heat.” 

There remain challenges for adapting nuclear power – and the wider electricity systems in which it sits – to heatwaves. However, Tadrous notes that this is less about “technical feasibility than of economic prioritisation and timely implementation”. 

Gas

Gas power plants have a reputation for being reliable and able to switch on at any moment, sometimes referred to as “firm, dispatchable” capacity.

Yet, as a type of thermal generation, they are subject to many of the same stresses during heatwaves as nuclear power. 

An article by the science advocacy organisation Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) notes that the “purported ability of gas plants to be available at all times to generate electricity, particularly when the grid needs it most, is increasingly under scrutiny” due to heatwaves.

As a matter of physics, the efficiency of gas power plants drops as temperatures rise. At 40C, a gas-fired power station can expect its capacity to be reduced by 13% and its efficiency by 7% compared to when running at 20C, according to Electric Insights. 

Dr Iain Staffell, associate professor in sustainable energy at Imperial College London, tells Carbon Brief: 

“Simple gas turbines (the kind which turn on rapidly to meet peak demand) are hit harder [than solar, for example], with their power output falling by about 10% per 10C.”

(He adds that the transmission system struggles more than electricity generation during high temperature. Power line capacity can fall by up to 16% for a 10C rise in temperature, according to a report for the UK government.)

Several types of gas power plants require cooling as part of their process, including gas steam and combined cycle turbines (CCGTs). They usually rely on nearby bodies of water for this. 

Additionally, as the UCS article notes, hot air has a lower density than cool air. As gas CCGTs rely on burning a mix of gas and air, this lower density means air takes up more space, leaving less room for gas. 

Ultimately, this means that when the air is hot, gas power plants cannot generate as much electricity as normal. 

These effects are not just theoretical. For example, across two nights in August 2020, there were rolling blackouts in California, US, as demand exceeded supply amid a heatwave.

While a number of factors contributed to the blackouts, gas plants made up around 79% of the capacity that dropped off the system on 14 August and a similar share the following day.

Amid record-breaking heat in summer 2026, gas power plants have also seen their capacity cut in the UK, France and other countries.

Dr Staffell adds that gas power stations are thought of as “reliable, because of the way we use them” in the UK. 

Whereas  wind and solar are usually used to the maximum extent possible, he says that on average, only around 40% of the gas fleet is in use at any one time. As such, even if the efficiency of one gas power plant is affected by high temperatures, “we have a lot of slack to call on more of them to run”. He adds: 

“The issue is less that they can’t deliver, but we have to pay through the nose to persuade more to turn on at critical times, adding to sky-high energy bills.”

Wind

The impact of heatwaves on wind generation is less direct than for other technologies. 

However, wind speeds often drop during heatwaves, which tend to build during periods of sustained high pressure into extreme events such as “heat domes”. 

Dr Staffell, explains to Carbon Brief: 

“The very hottest days tend to create heat domes with very low wind speeds, which directly reduces the output that windfarms can produce. Air is also less dense the hotter it is, so it carries less energy within it, so there is a double impact on wind turbines.”

High temperatures are linked to low wind speeds across three-quarters of the globe, according to one recent study, looking at data from 1980 to 2023. 

The study found that, as a result, across Australia, northern Asia and Europe, wind power decreased by an average of 30-50% during heatwaves. 

This is inconsistent globally, however, with the Amazon, the Great Plains in North America and central Africa actually seeing a slight increase in wind during high temperatures.

As such, while the effect of heatwaves on wind generation is less direct than other generation technologies, it can have a significant impact. 

In the UK in June 2026, wind generation fell to around 15% of the electricity mix due to low wind speeds, from an average for the month of about 30%, according to Octopus. 

Low wind generation during this period was a key feature of the strain on the grid experienced during this time – in particular, as demand rose amid record-high temperatures. 

On Wednesday 24 June, for example, the National Electricity System Operator (Neso) had to pay high prices to balance supply and demand. This included paying as much as £1,400 a megawatt-hour to secure around 1.7 gigawatts (GW) of imported power, nearly 20 times the average price for electricity in June 2025. 

A Neso spokesperson said in a statement: “This is due to the impact of extremely high temperatures affecting Great Britain and the continent, and low wind.”

While reduced wind generation is common during a heatwave, it is not generally viewed as a concern for energy system operators. This is due to wind following well-established seasonal patterns – it generates less power in summer than in winter – as well as being complementary to other renewable technologies, such as solar. 

Dr Chris Rosslowe, senior energy analyst for Europe at Ember, tells Carbon Brief: 

“Power systems are less reliant on wind power in the summer months and its lower-than-average output is already expected and planned for. Heatwaves often bring still, but clear conditions, highlighting the benefit of wind and solar as a duo – poor conditions for one often mean good conditions for the other.”

As such, wind power remains one of very few technologies considered “resilient” to heatwaves by the UK government.

However, this did not stop the anti-renewables Daily Mail from attempting to blame the technology for strain on the UK grid on 24 June 2026, despite its own article acknowledging that gas plants had also been forced to cut their output by 2.5GW on the day.

Solar

Another common claim seen in the media is that solar “struggles” during heatwaves, with high temperatures pushing down the technology’s efficiency. 

Yet heatwaves tend to coincide with long, cloudless days, when solar generation is reliably above average – despite the impact of high temperatures.

While hot weather does reduce the efficiency of solar cells, the effect is relatively modest – and widely understood. Each 1C of temperature rise reduces output by around 0.4-0.5%, according to a recent study. 

This is in line with an evidence review for the UK government, which suggests the performance of solar panels falls by 0.2-0.5% for every degree of heat above 25C.

Generally, however, this effect is easily outweighed by high sunlight hours during hot spells. For example, across a four-day heatwave in the UK in June 2026, solar generated 484 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity – a 46% increase over the same period a week earlier.  

Similar generation highs were seen across Europe, amid record temperatures and dangerous heat that was pushing people towards the use of air conditioning. 

Solar generated a record 52TWh across the EU in June 2026, beating the high set just the month before of 47TWh. 

In fact, solar – especially when combined with battery storage – is a complementary technology to air conditioning, given their similar seasonal patterns. Over the course of the day, demand from air conditioning and generation from solar also marry up well. 

Dr Rosslowe says: 

“Solar, battery storage and air conditioning are a highly complementary trio of technologies during heatwaves. There’s a high overlap between solar output and demand from AC.”

For example, on the hottest day of the year so far in Great Britain (the island grid serving England, Wales and Scotland), on 26 June 2026, solar surged to 13.9GW in the middle of the afternoon, as demand also hit its highest point, as shown in the chart below. 

Generation on the 26 June in Great Britain, highlighting the match between solar power (yellow) and the demand profile for electricity (blue line). Source: Neso.

Across June 2026, homes with solar panels generated the equivalent of five hours of “free” self-supplied air conditioning, according to recent analysis.  

Despite the impact of heat on solar efficiency, the technology is, therefore, well placed to bolster energy systems during heatwaves. 

Indeed, as Dr Rosslowe tells Carbon Brief, solar suppresses power prices during daylight hours. But, even though it is predictable, there are still challenges around managing the dip in solar generation as the evening sets in. This is often compounded because it coincides with the usual evening increase in demand. 

Dr Rosslowe explains: 

“Problems arise when the sun goes down, but demand for cooling remains high. In the early evening hours, when gas power typically ramps up to replace solar, we have seen prices spike to extreme levels, made worse by high international gas prices.”

Storage

Energy storage systems are increasingly key to managing the impact of heatwaves on electricity systems. 

The category of technologies is dominated by batteries, with more than 108GW of battery storage added in 2025 alone, according to the International Energy Agency. 

Already, batteries have been used to take advantage of surges in solar generation during the daytime, amid high summer temperatures. 

This is particularly useful to meet evening peaks in electricity demand, as well as the need for air conditioning overnight when temperatures do not fall. 

In a statement, Pawel Czyzak , Europe programme director at Ember, said: 

“Heatwaves will not go away – they will only get more severe in the future. Solutions that can help mitigate their impacts, such as battery storage, interconnection, demand flexibility and dynamic tariffs, should become a key part of grid planning and power market design.”

However, batteries are not without their challenges during heatwaves. Battery performance also decreases as temperatures exceed their optimal level. 

Additionally, high temperatures can accelerate the degradation of components in lithium-ion batteries, which dominate the sector. 

Analysis for the UK government found that prolonged operation at very high temperatures could – at least in theory – “overwhelm” the cooling systems built into batteries, “posing risks such as thermal runaway and explosions”. However, it noted that in practice, these cooling systems are “routinely” designed to handle temperatures of up to 45C.

(The analysis added that “developers and manufacturers have a strong understanding of risk to [battery storage systems] from high temperature and mitigate risks through regular maintenance, design improvements, and passive cooling strategies”.)

Other storage technologies also face challenges during heatwaves. For example, pumped hydro storage can be significantly impacted by drought.

Australia – which now has 4.3GW of large-scale battery storage capacity – saw its fleet of batteries and pumped hydro storage tested at the beginning of 2026, amid the most severe heatwave in years. 

Temperatures above 40C posed “challenges” to storage technologies, reported Energy Storage News, which explained that their output and operating times were reduced by the increased need for their cooling systems to operate. 

Despite these challenges, the use of battery storage is helping to spread the ability of renewables to meet electricity demand during heatwaves. For example, a combination of solar and battery energy storage “kept the lights on” in California amid a heatwave in 2024. 

By storing abundant power during the day, it can be discharged during evening peaks, helping to minimise generation constraints and thereby keep power prices down. 

Dr Rosslowe says: 

“The extreme price spikes that we witness during heatwaves are a blaring signal for more power system flexibility. That could come from battery storage, demand response, or increased interconnection between countries or regions.”

Related Chart: The rise, fall and rise of UK nuclear power over eight decades 13.06.2025 Energy UK spending review 2025: Key climate and energy announcements 11.06.2025 Nuclear Q&A: How China is using nuclear power to reduce its carbon emissions 14.08.2023 China policy The Carbon Brief Profile: Russia 22.09.2022 Coal

The post Factcheck: How nuclear, gas, wind and solar power are affected during heatwaves appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Jim Hansen and I have spent much of this year making seemingly opposite predictions about where 2026 will end up in the global temperature record books. He has argued since the spring that 2026 will be the warmest year on record; I have made the case that it is more likely than not to end up in second place. And in a recent post he framed our disagreement in memorably equine terms:

Based on this scientific evidence, we expect that when the horse race comes down the stretch, in November and December of this year, we will be riding a thoroughbred, a strong young horse, and Zeke will be atop a fading old nag.

For the record, I am the fading old nag in this metaphor. I have been called worse.

But here is the fun part: when the race comes down the final stretch at the end of 2026, there is a good chance we will both be declared winners. Hansen’s prediction is about NASA’s GISTEMP record specifically. Mine is about the average across the major surface temperature datasets. And when I run my own forecast model separately on each of six datasets, it gives GISTEMP a ~65% chance of a new 2026 record even as the multi-dataset average only has a ~32% chance and is likely to come in second place.

First, where my forecast stands. Back in December I projected 2026 at 1.41C (1.27C to 1.55C) above preindustrial levels, and in early June I revised that up to 1.46C (1.36C to 1.59C) as forecast models converged on a doozy of an El Niño developing in the latter half of the year. Hansen, via the Washington Post, cited my June estimate of a 26.6% chance that 2026 sets a new record.

That number has continued to creep up. With observations through June and the latest El Niño forecast ensemble, my current central estimate for 2026 is 1.50C (1.44C to 1.57C) above the 1850-1900 baseline in the average of six surface temperature datasets.1 That translates into a ~32% chance that 2026 beats 2024’s record, a ~66% chance it comes in second, and almost no chance (<2%) it falls to third or below. The figure below shows where those projections sit against the observational record.

Observed annual global mean surface temperature (average of GISTEMP, HadCRUT5, NOAA GlobalTemp, Berkeley Earth, JRA-3Q, and ERA5; °C relative to 1850–1900) and the 2026 and 2027 forecast medians with 25–75% and 5–95% Monte Carlo ranges, alongside the 2024 record (dashed) and the 1.5C level (dotted). Forecast updated 30 July 2026 with observations through June and the July-initialized multi-model El Niño ensemble.

Here we see 2026 sitting just below the 2024 record line, with 2027 well above it. So the horse race (to continue the metaphor) is drifting in Hansen’s direction, though still short of the finish line. In the average of all the groups reporting global surface temperatures, second warmest remains my central call for 2026.

It is worth being clear about why my odds keep rising, because it is not that 2026 has been running unexpectedly hot. Year-to-date temperatures have actually drifted slightly down since March (a January-June mean of 1.39C, versus 1.41C for January-March). What changed is the El Niño forecast. To show this, I reran my forecast as it would have looked with each month’s information: that month’s multi-model El Niño plume plus observations through that month.

Left: probability that 2026 exceeds the 2024 record in the six-dataset composite, recomputed at each monthly forecast vintage (that month’s multi-model El Niño forecast plume plus year-to-date observations through that month). Right: additive decomposition of the March-to-now rise into an observations step (March plume held fixed, observations updated through June) and an El Niño forecast step (July plume swapped in). Updated 30 July 2026.

The odds of a 2026 record in the composite have risen from ~7% at the March vintage to ~35% now,2 and the decomposition on the right shows that the strengthening El Niño forecast accounts for ~84% of that rise; incoming observations contributed just over 4 points. In other words, my drift toward Hansen’s position is not the 2026 observations through June being particularly extraordinary. It is the ENSO models converging on an unprecedentedly large event. If that El Niño underdelivers, these odds will sag back down. If it holds, the odds will likely hold as well. But it seems unlikely (I hope!) that we see continued strengthening of the El Niño forecast beyond what already would blow past the prior record by a “truly mind-numbing margin”.

But “the warmest year on record” is not a single number that nature hands us; it depends on whose record you check. Hansen’s prediction is specifically about GISTEMP. So a natural question is: what does my model say if I fit it to each dataset individually, using each dataset’s own 2024 record as the bar to clear? The figure below shows the result for six datasets: the four traditional surface station products (GISTEMP, HadCRUT5, NOAA GlobalTemp, and Berkeley Earth) and two reanalysis products (Copernicus/ERA5 and JRA-3Q).

Probability that 2026 exceeds each dataset’s own 2024 record, from the same statistical forecast model (trend, ENSO, and observed 2026 months) fit to each of six datasets separately, with 10,000 Monte Carlo draws sampling a 14-model El Niño forecast ensemble. Observations through June 2026 (May for HadCRUT5). Updated 30 July 2026.

The same model, fed the same El Niño forecast, gives 2026 a ~65% chance of a record in GISTEMP and a ~66% chance in Berkeley Earth,3 but only ~35% in HadCRUT5, ~24% in NOAA, ~13% in ERA5, and ~9% in JRA-3Q. Conveniently, the average across the six (~35%) lands nearly on the blended estimate (32%), which is a reassuring consistency check.

Why the spread? It is not that the datasets disagree much about how warm 2026 will be; the projections are quite similar. They disagree about how high the bar is. The reanalysis products (ERA5 and JRA-3Q) ran exceptionally hot during the 2023-2024 event, so their 2024 records sit further above their long-term trend lines and are harder to beat. GISTEMP’s 2026 median projection sits ~0.02C above its 2024 record, while ERA5’s sits ~0.05C below its own and JRA-3Q’s ~0.07C below. When the margin is a few hundredths of a degree, structural differences between datasets could end up deciding the race.

So Hansen predicting a GISTEMP record and me predicting second warmest in the multi-dataset average are, oddly, compatible bets. If 2026 sets a record in GISTEMP but not in the dataset average (or in ERA5), expect a flurry of confused headlines in January as people try and explain how its the warmest or second warmest year depending on what dataset you look at.

I should concede the larger point plainly: Hansen made this call earlier and more confidently than I did, and the odds have moved steadily his way since. If 2026 ends up warmest across the board, he won outright, and a 32% chance is the kind of thing that happens all the time. I’d also gently note that a probabilistic forecast of “second warmest, with a one-in-three chance of a record” is a difficult thing to lose spectacularly.

What our agreement on 2026 does not settle is the more consequential disagreement about why. Hansen’s forecast rests on a specific physical story: his argument for a climate sensitivity of 4-5C per doubled CO2, a large forcing boost from falling aerosols, and a warming rate that has roughly doubled.4 My forecast is simpler: it just relies on the long-term trend, the state of ENSO, and the year-to-date observations and ends up in more or less the same place. When a statistical model based on the historical trend and an El Niño forecast lands on essentially the same 2027 number as Hansen (more on that in a moment), it tells you that a single warm year, or even two, cannot distinguish between “very rapid acceleration driven by aerosols and high sensitivity” and “the trend and more modest acceleration plus a very strong El Niño.” That debate will be settled by energy balance observations and the post-El-Niño years, not by whether 2026 clears 2024 by 0.03C in one dataset.

And on 2027 there will be no horse race at all: my model puts the odds of a new record next year at ~91%. Here I should give Hansen his due on a second count. Back in December he was already predicting a ~1.7C 2027, at a time when my own central estimate was 1.57C. Seven months and many rounds of strengthening El Niño forecasts later, my regression has drifted up to 1.70C (1.48C to 1.93C): essentially the number he wrote down at the start.

Ultimately both probabilistic forecasts and confident predictions can be validated by the same outcome, and the interesting scientific disagreement (how fast is warming accelerating, and why) will outlive whatever the December photo finish shows. Either way we are in for quite a wild climate ride in both the latter half of 2026 and 2027 due to a combination of accelerating warming and a super El Niño event.

1 The blended forecast uses the average of GISTEMP, HadCRUT5, NOAA GlobalTemp, Berkeley Earth, JRA-3Q, and ERA5, each rebaselined to 1850-1900 using its own pre-1900 offset. The model regresses annual temperature on the year, the prior year’s anomaly, observed and forecast ENSO conditions, the year-to-date anomaly, and the latest monthly value, trained on 1950-2025 excluding major volcanic years, with 10,000 Monte Carlo draws sampling both regression uncertainty and a ~650-member multi-model El Niño forecast ensemble. The headline numbers use a relative (RONI-style) ENSO index; using the raw ONI instead gives a slightly warmer 1.51C and a 37% record chance, because the forecast El Niño is strong enough to sit beyond the range of the historical ONI training data.

2 This figure only uses 13 of the 14 El Niño models in the live ensemble as the 14th (SINTEX-F) was only added to the tracker in June and cannot be used for the retrospective calculations, which is why it puts today’s odds at ~35% rather than the headline ~32%.

3 It's worth noting that my odds for Berkeley Earth are notably higher than those provided (~12%) in the official Berkeley Earth update. This is largely due to my statistical model including the ENSO predictions for the remainder of the year which does not improve the fit much for most years (start-of-year ENSO conditions tend to be a much stronger predictor) but does matter in the rare years where strong El Nino events are forming like 1997, 2015, 2023, and 2026.

4 It's worth noting that Hansen’s estimate of ECS is well within our very likely uncertainty range of 2C to 5C per doubling CO2 in the IPCC AR6. And there has been some compelling evidence in recent years that ECS might be higher, though I’d personally give a central estimate closer to 3.5C than Hansen’s ~4.5C, as well as a new preprint suggesting forcing from the 2020 IMO low sulfur shipping fuel regulations may end up somewhere between Hansen’s high and my low-end estimate.

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When carbon dioxide (CO2) is released from a factory or power plant, the gas can be captured and permanently stored underground, preventing it from driving climate change.

This is the idea underpinning carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology that is at the heart of many nations’ net-zero plans.

Influential organisations, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), describe CCS as “critical” for cutting emissions from key sectors – and for helping to avoid dangerous global warming.

In particular, capturing CO2 is seen as one of the only viable options for decarbonising some of the world’s highest-emitting industries, such as cement production.

The UK, for example, has committed to investing as much as £21.7bn over the coming decades in its nascent CCS industry, as part of the nation’s net-zero strategy.

Yet, in the UK and elsewhere, there has been a backlash against plans for CCS.

Citing high costs, ties to the fossil-fuel industry and a “history of poor performance”, critics describe CCS as a “dangerous distraction” or a “false climate solution”. 

Time and again, the outlook for the roll-out of CCS has been scaled back, as the technology has failed to deliver as quickly as expected – and as policy support has wavered.

Furthermore, critics state that the technology remains “unproven” on the scale required to make a meaningful impact on global emissions.

In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explores the role CCS is expected to play in achieving net-zero, its record to date and the reasons it has been criticised, using the UK as an example.

• What is CCS?
• How much CCS capacity has been built so far?
• What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?
• Why is CCS controversial?
• What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?

Article Contents Expand menu

• What is CCS?
• How much CCS capacity has been built so far?
• What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?
• Why is CCS controversial?
• What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?

What is CCS?

CCS involves capturing CO2 emissions released from a large source, such as a gas power plant or a cement factory.

The CO2 is separated from the facility’s exhaust stream, generally using a chemical solvent, before being compressed into a liquid and transported via pipeline or vehicle. The CO2 is then stored by injecting it into underground reservoirs, such as depleted oil fields or saline aquifers.

The term “CCUS” is sometimes also used, referring to the “utilisation” of CO2 to make products, including fertilisers, fuels or building materials. Such uses do not necessarily lead to permanent emissions cuts, as the CO2 can end up later being released back into the atmosphere. 

(“CCS” is used in this Q&A, unless quoting another organisation that specifically refers to “CCUS”.)

The infographic below shows the stages of capturing CO2 and transporting it to be either stored or used in other applications.

Infographic adapted by Carbon Brief from the IEA.

Carbon capture technology was originally rolled out at US and Canadian oil wells in the early 1970s as a way to achieve “enhanced oil recovery”. This involves injecting captured CO2 into depleted wells – a process that stores CO2, but also helps to extract more oil.

This remains, by far, the most significant end use for captured CO2 worldwide, with around three-quarters of it used for this purpose. 

Moreover, most of the CO2 currently captured is a by-product of gas purification – the process by which fossil fuels such as methane are separated from other, unwanted substances. Selling this CO2 can make such gas projects more economically viable.

Therefore, as shown in the chart below, which is based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, the majority of CO2 that is both captured and used today helps the fossil-fuel industry to extract and sell more oil and gas.

CCS was first proposed as a way to deal with CO2 emissions in a 1976 academic article, which imagined injecting the captured gas into the ocean.

It is only since the early 2000s that CCS has gained traction as a proposed climate solution, with a 2005 “special report” by the IPCC exploring the topic. At that time, the authors note there were just three small-scale projects trying to capture and permanently store CO2.

Installing CCS at factories or power plants and permanently storing the CO2 would mean that, in theory, such facilities could continue using fossil fuels without contributing to climate change. 

Such applications are often mentioned alongside two related technologies, both of which could be used to “suck” CO2 out of the atmosphere and, thus, deliver “negative emissions”.

One is bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Crops absorb CO2 as they grow and BECCS  involves a power plant burning these crops, then storing the resulting CO2. 

The other technology is direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS). 

These technologies are classed as “CO2 removal”, as they involve absorbing CO2 from the atmosphere using plants or machines and then storing it permanently.

By contrast, CCS installed at a factory is considered a way to avoid CO2 emitted by that specific facility from entering the atmosphere. This Q&A focuses on such applications, which account for the vast majority of existing and planned CCS.

First mention in the academic literature of capturing and storing CO2 for climate change mitigation. Source: Marchetti, C. (1977). How much CCS capacity has been built so far?

As of February 2026, there were a total of 75 operational CCS projects around the world. As noted above, almost all of them are at fossil-fuel extraction and processing sites, according to the IEA’s database. 

Together, these projects capture 62.5m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) each year. This is equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions of Ecuador.

(This compares with the 22 CCS projects, promising to capture 40MtCO2 annually, that were operational or under construction as of 2014.)

As the chart below shows, the amount of CO2 currently being captured and stored is a tiny fraction of the total emissions from fossil-fuel use.

“CO2 captured and stored” includes all projects that capture CO2 and use it for enhanced oil recovery, store it permanently underground or use it “with significant climate benefits”, according to the IEA.

In a 2020 report, the IEA explained that the “story of CCUS has largely been one of unmet expectations: its potential to mitigate climate change has been recognised for decades, but deployment has been slow”.

A wave of interest in CCS in the 2000s, largely from countries in Europe and North America, focused on enabling coal power plants to continue operating with lower emissions. 

This interest largely petered out, as plummeting renewable energy costs weakened the case for coal plants with CCS. Today, there are only seven operating CCS-coal plants worldwide – five in China, one in the US and one in Canada.

Yet the Paris Agreement in 2015 – and the national net-zero targets that followed – highlighted the need for deep emissions cuts in sectors that previously expected to continue emitting for decades. This, once again, has fuelled interest in the use of CCS.

In recent years, there has also been growing interest in producing low-carbon “blue” hydrogen from gas with CCS. 

Hydrogen is widely seen as key for decarbonising certain sectors – particularly in industry – but analyses suggest that it may be difficult to make sufficient “green” hydrogen using renewable power on the timescales required.

As the map below shows, most CCS capacity is based in the US and Canada, with other major fossil-fuel producers such as Norway, Brazil and the Gulf states also contributing.

Projects listed in the IEA CCUS database as split between two countries are divided equally between them. This includes projects that only store CO2, but it excludes projects that only transport CO2. DACCS projects are excluded.

A surge of projects have entered the global CCS pipeline in recent years. According to the IEA, 93.7MtCO2 of capture or storage capacity is under construction as of February 2026 and another 1,279.6MtCO2 is in the “planning” stages.

“Planned” projects include any initiative at early concept, feasibility or engineering study stages and the industry has a long history of projects being cancelled or delayed. 

Nevertheless, this pipeline of projects could lead to a large expansion of facilities dedicated to permanent CO2 storage that does not involve extracting more oil.

The planned projects – if they are realised – would also include significant growth in sectors where CCS is virtually non-existent, such as steel, hydrogen and cement production, as shown in the chart below.

A project is considered “under construction” by the IEA if a final investment decision has been announced and construction is on-going or imminent. A project is considered “planned” if it is at concept, feasibility or engineering study stage. What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?

It will be impossible to stop dangerous climate change unless the world reaches net-zero emissions, according to the IPCC. The amount of global warming – and whether the Paris Agreement temperature target can be met – depends on when net-zero is reached.

Many global pathways that have been set out for achieving net-zero, including a majority of the IPCC-assessed pathways where global warming is limited to 1.5C, rely on the use of CCS at fossil-fuel plants and industrial sites.

“These models have been quite instrumental in bringing CCS back onto the agenda,” Lina Lefstad, an ecological economist at Lund University, tells Carbon Brief. 

Influential organisations relying on CCS in their net-zero scenarios range from the  International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) through to the oil company Shell. The IEA has stated that net-zero would be “virtually impossible” without CCS.

These scenarios often include 10s to 100s of times more CCS capacity being built in the coming decades. The IEA includes 1.7GtCO2 being captured by 2035 in its net-zero scenario – nearly 30 times more than is captured today.

(Some of the much higher numbers in scenarios assessed by the IPCC have been dismissed by experts as implausible, especially given the slow rollout of CCS to date.)

When considering CCS for both emissions cuts and removals, Dr Jennifer Roberts, a researcher at the University of Strathclyde and deputy director at the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Research Centre (UKCCSRC), tells Carbon Brief the situation is clear:

“From an IPCC climate modelling perspective…reaching net-zero without CCS is far more expensive, disruptive and potentially out of reach.”

This does not mean that it would be impossible to reach net-zero without using CCS. However, net-zero scenarios that use little or no CCS rely on dramatic changes elsewhere, such as much lower global energy demand.

Net-zero scenarios often include a crucial role for CCS in “hard-to-abate” sectors, referring to activities that lack available, low-cost options to fully decarbonise. In particular, CCS is widely seen as vital for decarbonising parts of heavy industry. 

The IPCC sixth assessment report (AR6) summary for policymakers calls CCS a “critical mitigation option” for some sectors, including cement and chemicals. The technical summary of the AR6 Working Group III report says that “CCS will be required to mitigate remaining CO2” in industrial sectors.

The IEA describes CCS as “virtually the only technology” that can significantly cut cement emissions, which account for around 7% of the global total. (Much of this CO2 comes from chemical processes, meaning it would still be released if the industry was electrified.)

Yet, the understanding of “hard-to-abate” emissions is changing, as alternatives to CCS become cheaper and increasingly available. As a result, CCS has become a less attractive option in some sectors, as well as being seen as less vital in some others.

Carbon Brief analysis shows that the IEA has reduced its outlook for CCS in the power sector by a third, compared to its expectations in 2021, as the chart below shows. 

This reflects both slow progress in deploying CCS and rapid cost reductions in renewables, which make running gas or coal power plants less attractive.

Data comes from IEA world energy outlooks between 2021-2025.

(Even prior to this adjustment, the IEA’s net-zero scenario was already at the lower end of CCS use, compared to those assessed by the IPCC.)

This declining role for CCS in the power sector would mean its use is more concentrated in industry. 

Industrial sectors – particularly cement, steel and chemicals – account for 60% of the CO2 captured in 2050 under the IEA’s net-zero scenario, as shown in the figure below. The remaining 40% is roughly split between electricity generation and blue hydrogen production.

Climate NGOs Bellona and E3G have stressed that with “limited public funding, infrastructure constraints and political attention, prioritisation is essential” for CCS. Their “CCS ladder” places CCS in cement and lime production at the top – with the highest “climate value” – while power CCS has “low and decreasing value”.

Despite this, the focus of the CCS sector so far has not been in heavy industry, which represents less than 10% of announced capacity.

Another key consideration is the role governments are assigning to CCS in their national net-zero strategies. 

One study found that 33 of the 67 long-term net-zero strategies submitted to the UN by governments, with a further 10 indicating some potential use. 

It concluded that high-income countries that produce a lot of oil and gas, such as Canada and Norway, showed the “firmest commitment” to capturing and storing CO2.

Nations have agreed at UN climate talks to “phase down” coal power that is “unabated”. This is generally understood to mean coal power without CCS – leaving space to develop “abated” coal plants. This could allow China, for example, to continue using its sizable coal fleet with CCS to reduce emissions.

Why is CCS controversial?

Despite its role in many net-zero scenarios, CCS remains a highly contested technology. 

It has long been framed in some circles as a “false solution” to climate change, that is backed and lobbied for by fossil-fuel companies to “delay” the clean-energy transition. 

Critics argue that CCS is expensive – especially compared to increasingly cheap wind and solar power – in part because it significantly increases the energy requirements of a facility. 

A University of Oxford working paper published in 2023 concluded that a “low-CCS” pathway to net-zero emissions would cost around $1tn less a year compared to a “high-CCS” pathway. The researchers stated that “no evidence is found for technological learning or associated cost reductions” in the development of CCS to date. 

(They added that CCS is “still likely necessary” for cement and chemical production.)

Pointing to the limited progress in scaling up the technology so far, some question whether CCS can play the role envisaged in many net-zero scenarios.

Responding to the IPCC’s most recent report, for example, the Centre for International Environmental Law stated that “abated fossil fuels only exist in models”. 

Proponents of CCS contest the notion that CCS is “untested” or “unreliable”, pointing to some projects that have been operating for many years. Moreover, most of the component parts that make up a working CCS project are in wide use for other purposes.

Yet, another key criticism levelled at CCS projects is that they simply do not capture enough CO2, diminishing their role as a climate solution.

There is a widespread view that CCS projects should aim to capture at least 90% of the CO2 being emitted. UK guidelines are among those targeting a higher capture rate of 95%.

The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) has assessed the performance of existing projects. Its 2023 analysis is shown in the chart below.

The thinktank concluded that, in reality, most existing CCS projects are far below such capture rates, meaning they continue to emit significant amounts of CO2. (Capture is the most expensive part of the CCS process.)

Based on data analysed by IEEFA from the following projects: Petra Nova and Boundary Dam coal plants, US and Canada; Terrell, Lost Cabin, Shute Creek and Century Plant gas processing facilities, US, and Gorgon, Australia; Quest, Air Liquide and Air Products hydrogen production projects, US and Canada; Great Plains Synfuel and Coffeyville gasification projects, US; Enid and PCS Nitrogen fertiliser projects, US; Bonanza Bio Energy ethanol production, US; and Emirates Steel/Al Reyadah steel project, United Arab Emirates. 

Once the CO2 is captured, it must be stored. The IPCC says there is ample global geological storage available for CO2. It also says that, as long as sites are “appropriately selected and managed”, CO2 “can be permanently isolated from the atmosphere”.

Nevertheless, critics have noted that even relatively low rates of leakage along the transportation and storage chain could have a big climate impact when deployed at scale.

The continued use of gas in gas-CCS or blue hydrogen projects also brings risks of upstream emissions more broadly, such as methane leaks. (See: What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?)

Considering these factors, in 2023 Climate Analytics assessed a “high CCS pathway” from the IPCC database. It concluded that if CO2 was captured at rates seen in existing facilities – around 50% – and upstream emissions remain high, CCS use could see an extra 86GtCO2e emitted by 2050. 

The report found that even the IEA’s net-zero scenario, which relies on “more limited fossil CCS use”, could result in an additional 16GtCO2e due to “underperforming fossil CCS”.

All of this calls into question many uses of CCS, according to Andrew Reid, energy finance analyst at IEEFA: “Is there really any point in trying to decarbonise fossil fuels, which comes with significant technical, timing and additional cost risk?” Reid tells Carbon Brief:

“As for cement and chemicals, again, there are alternatives, but these are nascent and expensive. CCS may be a solution here and if investment is going to be made in any area, it most likely should be these.”

On the other hand, CCS advocates argue that gas, for example, is likely to be an important, “dispatchable” part of many electricity systems as nations transition to clean energy.

Prof Stuart Haszeldine, a CCS researcher at the University of Edinburgh, explains this position to Carbon Brief:

“If we’re going to burn gas, then we should be fitting CCS on that…Otherwise we’re just going to say it’s OK for us to burn lots of gas and carry on emitting.”

There is also a line of argument referred to – sometimes pejoratively – as “techno-optimism”, which often stresses CCS as a core climate solution. This was exemplified by a controversial report on climate action in 2025 by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI), in which the former UK prime minister wrote that CCS should be “at the centre of the battle”.

This diverges from the IPCC’s conclusion that, while CCS will likely have a role in achieving net-zero emissions, its contribution will be dwarfed by that of renewables.

CCS also attracts criticism due to its connection to the fossil-fuel industry. Dr Jen Roberts at the UKCCSRC tells Carbon Brief that she agrees these links make for complicated messaging:

“CCS is critical for net-zero, but is intrinsically tied with an industry sector that is climate polluting and historically anti-climate lobbying.”

Roberts says careful policymaking, including the development of business models and standards, can support CCS in hard-to-abate sectors where it is most needed. 

Some experts suggest that governments should require companies to capture and store their emissions under the “polluter pays” principle.

Roberts also notes that fossil-fuel companies have the experience and the workforce needed to scale up CCS. “Oil and gas companies can evidence a track record in multi-million or billion-dollar subsurface engineering projects,” Roberts adds.

Despite the fossil-fuel industry’s apparent support for CCS, one 2021 study co-authored by Haszeldine noted that they had, in fact, invested relatively small amounts in the technology, compared to renewables and nature-based solutions.

Lina Lefstad at Lund University questions whether the fossil-fuel industry stands to benefit financially through the deployment of CCS as much as some critics imply:

“People seem really worried that the fossil-fuel industry is going to come out the winner again, but if that was the case I think we would have large-scale CCS by now.”

What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?

The UK government has committed “up to” £21.7bn of funding over 25 years to support the nation’s first five CCS projects and to make the nation an “early leader” in the sector.

This package, supported by both the former Conservative and current Labour governments, is intended to help create “clusters” of connected facilities across industrial areas of the UK.

Some have suggested that this represents a large pot of government spending, which could be raided to support more pressing priorities. Indeed, media coverage often points to CCS funding as a potential target for government cuts, or as a way to boost, say, military spending.

This is in spite of the fact that three quarters of the funding is expected to come from levies on consumers, rather than government budgets.

The first two CCS clusters, which are currently set to be deployed in the late-2020s, are the East Coast Cluster in north-east England and HyNet in north-west England and north Wales. The second two, scheduled for around 2030, are Acorn in north-east Scotland and Viking in the Humber.

The projects are expected to include blue-hydrogen production, gas power with CCS and industrial uses. The CO2 captured would be pumped into offshore saline aquifers and depleted gas fields.

Former UK energy secretary Ed Miliband has stated that CCS will “unlock” hard-to-abate sectors and play an “important role” in achieving clean power by 2030.

This position is supported by the UK government’s climate advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC), who have consistently stressed that CCS is “essential” for net-zero. 

In the CCC’s most recent net-zero pathway, released as part of its seventh carbon budget advice, CCS contributes 2% of emissions cuts in 2030 and 8% in 2050, as shown in the chart below. (If CO2 removals using BECCS are included, this increases to 15% in 2050.)

The CCC maintains that it “cannot see a route to net-zero that does not include CCS”. Nevertheless, the committee has downgraded its expectations for CCS in recent years. 

Between the CCC’s sixth and seventh carbon budget advice, its recommendations for power and industry CCS capacity dropped from 46MtCO2 to 41MtCO2. 

Dr Jamie Tarlton, the committee’s CCS lead, addressed this at a conference in March 2025, stating that it was “partly because we see more opportunities for decarbonising the other sectors and reducing those residual emissions than we saw five years ago”.

More recently, the UK government also scaled back its expectations for industrial CCS in its latest carbon budget delivery plan for 2035, bringing it more in line with the CCC’s net-zero pathway. It still describes CCS as “part of the most cost-effective route to net-zero”.

The UK’s CCS plans have drawn criticism. A September 2024 letter to Miliband signed by 22 scientists and activists expressed concern about “locking the UK into a fossil-fuel based pathway”. 

They note that the gas-CCS power plants and blue hydrogen facilities initially backed by the government would leave the UK reliant on gas imports, as North Sea production declines. This could be expensive and result in “upstream” emissions due to methane leaks.

(At the end of 2025, BP withdrew its involvement in one of the blue hydrogen facilities at the Teesside site. A data centre is planned for the site instead.)

Net Zero Teesside, a gas-CCS power plant in the East Coast Cluster run by BP and Equinor, has been unsuccessfully challenged in court over its emissions savings. The challenge was based on the idea that potential upstream emissions could significantly exceed any emissions cuts from CCS use.

According to a report by Carbon Tracker, the lifecycle emissions of Net Zero Teesside gas-CCS power plant would depend heavily on where it sources its fuel.

The project could cut emissions by around three-quarters, relative to an unabated gas plant, says the report. But it adds that if the plant relies on imported gas with high upstream emissions, then it might only cut emissions by a quarter.

(Most of the upstream emissions from imported gas would be released overseas, meaning they would not be counted in the UK’s official emissions inventory.)

Besides driving “gas dependence” in the UK, the government’s approach has drawn criticism for failing to ensure that CCS is prioritised in the industries that are hardest to decarbonise.

A report by the Public Accounts Committee in early 2025 took aim at the government’s cluster-based approach. It said this “does not ensure that financial support for CCUS is directed at the sectors which will need it most” – highlighting cement production.

(Of the CO2 captured in the CCC’s net-zero pathway in 2050, around 40% is in the industrial and waste sectors, while the remaining 60% is from gas power plants and the production of fuels such as hydrogen.)

Dr Andrew Boswell, the energy analyst who challenged Net Zero Teesside in court, says he is “more nuanced” when it comes to applications of CCS that do not involve gas. “There may be a case for cement, lime and waste…However, the case is unproven,” he tells Carbon Brief.

The Public Accounts Committee report also criticised the “high-risk” approach of using public funds for CCS projects, as well as slow progress in developing the technology. 

Enrique Cornejo, head of energy policy at fossil-fuel trade body Offshore Energies UK, tells Carbon Brief that the UK needs to maintain momentum and deploy CCS in order to “achieve economies of scale” and to reduce the cost of the technology more broadly:

“It is indeed necessary to streamline the cluster sequencing process to ensure that emitters in sectors such as cement have a clear route to the CCS market.”

related Q&A: What do China’s provincial five-year plans say about climate and energy? 18.06.2026 China policy Analysis: China’s CO2 climbs 2% in early 2026 due to ‘wasted’ wind and solar 04.06.2026 Coal Q&A: What does India’s new Paris Agreement pledge mean for climate action? 27.03.2026 Emissions Analysis: India’s CO2 emissions in 2025 grew at slowest rate in two decades 26.03.2026 Emissions

The post Q&A: Does the world need ‘carbon capture and storage’ to reach net-zero? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 26, 2026 thru Sat, August 1, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (7 articles)

• State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026 Chances of a record setting 2026 El Niño rapidly increase, taking us closer to an important warming threshold. Carbon Brief, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 24, 2026.
• Why is Germany building roads for yesterday's climate? As the Autobahn buckles under heat waves, Germany is still paving roads for a past climate. Engineers know how to fix that — so what's the holdup? DW, Tim Schauenberg, Jul 28, 2026.
• Summer of Heat, Fires and Storms Is a Reckoning for Europe on Climate Europe is experiencing some of its biggest fires and highest temperatures ever; residents are fleeing, leaders are struggling to respond and “it will get worse,” one climate expert said. NYT, Mark Landler and Chico Harlan, Jul 29, 2026.
• `The heat took him from me`: India`s death toll rises amid escalating heat crisis As extreme heat claims the lives of workers in India’s poorest areas, many fear the true mortality rate is being dangerously undercounted. The Guardian, Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Aakash Hassan, Jul 29, 2026.
• 4 things to know about cyclospora and climate change A fragile food system, uneven public health messaging, and global warming are all working to supercharge the parasite’s spread. Grist, Frida Garza, Jul 30, 2026.
• `Was this heatwave caused by climate change?` - we`re asking the wrong question The question is not whether climate change caused the heatwave, but how much hotter and more dangerous heatwaves have become because greenhouse gases, primarily from burning fossil fuels, have accumulated in the atmosphere. The Conversation, Prof. Haley J. Fowler & Prof. Ed Hawkins, Jul 31, 2026.
• Everything on fire DrGilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, July 31, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (6 articles)

• Human-driven climate change largely responsible for last 50 years of worsening fire weather in Western North America, new study shows Just as detectives can find literal fingerprints at a crime scene, scientists can detect human and natural ‘fingerprints’ in climate and meteorological data like temperature, precipitation, and relative humidity— all factors that can influence fire behavior. Science Feedback, Science Feedback team, May 8, 2025.
• How do scientists know if climate change made a heat wave, extreme storm or wildfire worse? When a devastating heat wave, hurricane, flood or wildfire strikes, people often want to know: How much did human-caused climate change influence this event, if at all? The Conversation, Kevin T. Smiley, Deepti Singh, Jennifer Marlon, Jim Hurrell, Jul 24, 2026.
• Low-Level Cloud Loss Amplifies Global Warming A new study adds weight to concerns over the positive feedback effects of clouds on global warming. CalTech, Katie Neith, Jul 24, 2026.
• Canopy-mediated climate feedbacks in the boreal continuous permafrost zone A vast amount of carbon locked up in permafrost is protected by a thin and increasingly threatened layer of vegetation. Nature Climate Change, M. Langer, Jul 27, 2026.
• Rising CO2 Alters Upper Atmosphere Response to Stratosphere Sudden Warming A whole-atmosphere model simulation shows that rising CO2 changes how the upper atmosphere and ionosphere respond to a sudden stratospheric warming (SSW), with implications for future space weather.? Eos, Huixin Liu, Jul 29, 2026.
• Why Hansen may end up being right about 2026 Whether 2026 sets a new record is increasingly likely to be a split decision between different groups The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 30, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (3 articles)

• American Nero: Why Trump is trying to burn down the National Academy of Sciences The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Benjamin Santer, July 26, 2026.
• Trump administration eyes massive coal reserves under federal lands Despite vast contrary scientific evidence, the US executive branch sees vast reserves of coal as a resource desirable to burn. Inside Climate News, Lisa Sorg, Jul 27, 2026.
• Do small climate habits help or hurt the bigger cause? Researchers tracked nearly 2,800 people's habits, protests, and policy views to test whether small green acts help or hurt the bigger fight. Neither, it turns out. Anthropocene, Sarah DeWeerdt, Jul 28, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (3 articles)

•  2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #30 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, July 19, 2026 thru Sat, July 25, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, July 26, 2026.
• Fact brief - Do solar plants require backup from fossil fuels? Solar plants require backup, but it doesn’t have to be from fossil fuels. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Jul 28, 2026.
• The influencer teaching millions to fear solar Alexandra Fasulo says she’s protecting farms and wildlife. How much of her rhetoric is actually true? HEATED, Alex Hannaford, Jul 30, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

• `I can`t work in the farce of climate change cruise tourism anymore`: why Antarctic guides quit their dream jobs 'You’d see massive glacier calvings, and you’d just want to cry. But all the guests would be cheering. And you’d be like … ‘can you not put two and two together?’'' The Conversation, Zdenka Sokolickova, Christy Hehir, Elizabeth Cooper, Jul 21, 2026.
• Scientists decry Trump`s `blame game` after he claims Canada `poisoning` US air Trump told Mark Carney ‘you got to stop these fires from coming in’ as experts say wildfires symptom of climate crisis The Guardian, Oliver Milman, Jul 24, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (2 articles)

• Factcheck: No, Europe`s heatwaves are not being `caused` by declining air pollution Scientists tell Carbon Brief that the framing of heatwaves being “caused” by declining air pollution is “wrong”. Carbon Brief, Robert McSweeney, Jul 24, 2026.
• Hot days, cold thermometers A graph popular with climate change deniers is desconstructed by Zeke Hausfather, exposing its economy of truth. Skeptical Science, Zeke Hausfather, Jul 27, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)

• Can we alter ocean chemistry to absorb carbon? Here are the pros and cons Procrastination on arresting fossil fuels leads to extreme measures; here are pros and cons of "ocean alkalinity enhancement" and pitfalls in public perceptions this technology will encounter should it require deployment. The Conversation, Harris Anderson, Andrew Lenton, Mathieu Mongin, Jul 23, 2026.
• U.S. Raises Threat of Steep Water Cuts in Lower Colorado River Basin A federal plan would impose drastic water cuts on Arizona, California and Nevada in dry years over the next decade. A legal battle could follow. NYT, Scott Dance, Jul 31, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (1 article)

• Wildfires: why media coverage doesn`t always make the climate connection Exploring how contradictory press coverage can sit on the same front page tells us a lot about how climate change is narrated in the UK, and why climate reporting differs so much from country to country. The Conversation, Doug Specht,, Jul 28, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

• Shell`s hidden climate knowledge under scrutiny as court battle looms As the company faces a landmark climate lawsuit, confidential documents show how British scientist James Lovelock warned executives of the risks of burning fossil fuels in the 1960s. DeSmog, Rebecca John, Jul 30, 2026.

Health Aspects of Climate Change (1 article)

• Trump Administration Is Undoing Plans to Boost Workplace Heat Protections The Biden administration took steps to shield workers from extreme temperatures. The Trump administration is taking a gentler approach with employers. NYT, Scott Dance, Aug 01, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Open access notables

Observed Multi-Decadal Acceleration of Globally Averaged Abyssal Ocean Warming, Johnson, Geophysical Research Letters

Given sparse historical data in the deep and abyssal ocean, previously only multi-decadal temperature trends have been estimated from observations there on a global scale. Full-depth CTD sampling started circa 1970, with the first decadal global ship-based survey occupied in the 1990s, and the first regional pilot array of Deep Argo floats started circa 2016. Here we fit second-order polynomial functions versus time to all available full-depth CTD profile temperature data in local spatial bins to estimate changes in the rates of these multi-decadal temperature trends. We find a statistically significant increase of the heating rate of the abyssal (4,000–6,000 dbar) ocean, from 5.4 (±4.9) TW in 1988 to 20.2 (±3.9) TW in 2018. In contrast, we find no statistically significant change in the heating rate of the deep ocean, estimated at 29.4 (±22.1) TW in 1988 and 25.0 (±17.5) TW in 2018.

High-resolution simulations reveal positive global warming feedback from Pacific low clouds, Chammas et al., Science Advances

Uncertainty in marine low-level cloud feedbacks limits accurate climate projections. Using 7083 high-resolution simulations of tropical Pacific low clouds, we separated the impacts of sea surface warming from direct carbon dioxide (CO2) effects. Surface warming alone drives a positive low-cloud feedback of 0.14Wm-2K-1. While this changes little with doubled CO2, the total cloud radiative response strengthens markedly to 0.43Wm-2K-1 under quadrupled CO2, revealing a strong nonlinear interaction. Surface warming alone modifies the boundary layer through increased inversion strength and weakened subsidence, which buffers clouds by promoting higher liquid water content while cloud fraction decreases. Rapid adjustments to high CO2 concentrations counteract this protective cloud thickening. Consequently, a pronounced reduction in cloud fraction is no longer offset by an increase in cloud brightness, markedly strengthening the total radiative response under quadrupled CO2. Ultimately, our results suggest that climate sensitivity is more state-dependent than often assumed.

Canopy-mediated climate feedbacks in the boreal continuous permafrost zone, Stuenzi et al., Nature Climate Change

Boreal forests, covering approximately a quarter of the continuous permafrost zone, store relatively modest aboveground carbon, but thermally protect vast soil organic carbon (SOC) pools. Here, using a process-based model to compare seasonal thaw depths under forested and bare-ground scenarios, we quantify distinct canopy thermal insulation capacities of deciduous needleleaf, evergreen needleleaf and deciduous broadleaf canopies on permafrost thermal dynamics. Canopy buffering maintains approximately 59 Pg of carbon in a frozen state, which equals 32% of the total forested permafrost carbon pool and far exceeds boreal biomass stocks (7–19 Pg). Canopy changes could mobilize this frozen SOC through gradual thaw (40 Pg) and rapid thermokarst collapse (19 Pg). While forest loss sacrifices biomass carbon stocks, resulting thaw would expose orders of magnitude more SOC from previously frozen reservoirs, revealing a critical asymmetry. Forest conservation strategies in continuous permafrost zones must account for canopy-mediated thermal protection of frozen SOC, which far exceeds its biomass carbon sequestration capacity.

The 2026 western US snow drought was about four times more likely due to climate change, Marshall et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 

In the spring of 2026, anomalously low snow conditions in the western United States threatened winter recreation and water supplies. Here, we investigate: to what extent was this snow drought attributable to the climate change that has occurred since the pre-industrial period? We find that a snow drought this severe across the western United States was approximately 4.4 [95% CI: 2.6, 9.4] times more likely in the current climate than in the preindustrial period. In the Upper Colorado River Basin, the snow drought was approximately 14 times more likely [0.09, 4,300]. Given a projected increase in the frequency of snow droughts at least this severe in a moderately high emissions warming scenario, the lived experience of this event may help scientists, resource managers, and the public consider what western US snow might look like if greenhouse gas emissions are not aggressively reduced.

Feasibility of CO2 pipeline construction to enable gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removals: evidence from historical precedent, Roberts et al., Frontiers in Climate

In this analysis, we use the history of fossil fuel pipeline networks to assess the feasibility of rapidly building enough CO2 pipelines to enable gigaton-scale removals of CO2 from the Earth's atmosphere. We collect data on scenarios of CO2 pipeline construction, historical fossil fuel pipeline construction, and the historical context of this construction to answer four questions: (1) What length of pipeline network will be required to achieve the benchmarks of 1 Gt or 100 Mt of CO2 in 2050? (2) What have been the largest national and international fossil fuel pipeline buildouts achieved in a 25-year period? (3) Is it feasible to build enough CO2 pipelines to enable gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removals given these historical precedents? (4) Under what political, economic, and social circumstances have rapid pipeline build-outs occurred? We find that a pipeline network of roughly 8,000 km will be necessary to enable 100 Mt of carbon dioxide removal, and that roughly 100,000 km will be necessary for 1 Gt. There are 15 cases in the historical record of a country building 8,000 km of fossil fuel pipelines in 25 years, and only three cases of a country building 100,000km or more of pipelines in the same timescale. Rapid construction of fossil fuel pipelines has benefited from strong economic and institutional drivers, which may not apply to CO2 pipelines in the same way. Our findings are reason for caution about the likelihood of CO2 pipeline build outs keeping pace with CO2 removal targets.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Pay, Baby, Pay. Why Trump's Energy & AI Dominance Agenda Means Higher Bills For Everyone, Lorne Stockman, Oil Change International

U.S. wholesale fossil gas prices will likely double by the late 2030s relative to the 2020 to 2025 average if the Trump administration’s energy and AI policies succeed in pushing gas demand to levels that can only be met by more expensive gas production. Significant energy price volatility from 2020 to 2025 caused hardship in the U.S. and in LNG-importing countries, particularly in Asia and Europe. Costlier U.S. gas risks exacerbating the energy affordability crisis for U.S. and international consumers alike. The surge in gas demand – and gas prices – is being driven primarily by the Trump administration’s support for massive increases in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Trump’s hostility toward renewables and support for the poorly regulated AI data center boom aggravate the impending crunch. Lower-cost gas from the two biggest U.S. gas-producing regions, the Permian and Appalachian basins, will not be able to meet rising demand alone. To fill the gap between demand and production, gas producers will have to increase drilling in the significantly more expensive Haynesville shale play in Louisiana and Texas.

Interfacing science and policy: Exploring the role of scientific knowledge in the design of Voluntary Sustainability Standards, Loconto et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Through the concept of scientific cherry-picking, the authors analyze how Voluntary Sustainability Standards selectively incorporate particular strands of scientific knowledge that align with operational models and governance structures. This selective integration often leads to the promotion of interpretations of sustainability that are compatible with weak sustainability paradigms –emphasizing incremental improvements within existing systems – rather than fostering more systemic and transformative approaches. 181 articles in 66 journals by 1509 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Climate Coupling in the Western Hemisphere and 2023 El Niño Onset, Jury, ATMOSPHERE-OCEAN 10.1080/07055900.2026.2698635

Fast expansion and slow contraction of the ITCZ in response to CO2 forcing, Zhang, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18164506

High-resolution simulations reveal positive global warming feedback from Pacific low clouds, Chammas et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aec8488

Key role of continental inorganic halogens in the evolution of global air quality, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75932-7

Multi-century cooling after net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, Tarshish et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02700-2

Subtropical gyre expansion causes Southern Ocean salinification contrary to freshening predictions, Yu & Toole, Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75775-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A more quiescent deep ocean under global warming, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02075-2 20 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

Accelerating and Intensifying Dry-to-Wet Hydroclimate Whiplash Across the Contiguous United States, Yang & Li, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008646

Anthropogenic Warming Increases Extreme Precipitation in Huaihe River Basin, China in 1961–2020, Guo et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70525

Asymmetric Warming and Climate Regime Shift in Bhubaneswar: Evidence from a Rapidly Growing Tropical City (1950-2025), Beuria et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106922

Attribution of the Record-Breaking June 2024 Eastern Mediterranean Heatwave: Contrasting Roles of Soil Moisture in Anthropogenic Forcing and Natural Variability, Ma et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121002

Escalating heat waves and human thermal stress over semi-arid Bundelkhand region, India, Singh et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103035

Lengthening Summer in the Northern Hemisphere with the Declining Arctic Sea Ice, Cui et al., ATMOSPHERE-OCEAN 10.1080/07055900.2026.2695602

Observed Multi-Decadal Acceleration of Globally Averaged Abyssal Ocean Warming, Johnson, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124104

Opposite changes in comfortable days over tropical and mid-latitude lands due to anthropogenic warming, 1980-2020 and 2060-2100, Wang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.010

The 2026 western US snow drought was about four times more likely due to climate change, Marshall et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2612961123

Warming-Induced Increase in Flooding in the Taklimakan Desert, Su et al., Journal of Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.1007/s12583-025-2033-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Anthropogenic amplification of precipitation variability over the past century, Science, 10.1126/science.adp0212 218 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A multi-method Antarctic atmospheric blocking dataset (1979–2024), Bozkurt et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-5399-2026

A simplified method to calculate atmospheric CO2 equivalency for changing surface albedo, Akbari, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102795

Climate scientists sharpen tools for linking global warming to extreme weather, Vaz, Science 10.1126/science.aek8030

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Causes of extreme events revealed by Rényi information transfer, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adn1721 9 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

European summer drying largely driven by atmospheric circulation changes since the 1980s, Dunkl et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02050-w

Future tropical cyclone rainfall constrained by increased atmospheric dryness, Chen et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02047-5

Identifying the Timing of Regional Summertime Minimum Temperature Threshold Crossings and the Potential Subsequent Climate Evolutions, Arcodia & Barnes, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008520

Imbalances in climate outcomes in net-zero pathways with fossil fuel CO2 emissions and reforestation-based CO2 removals, MacIsaac et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03329-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Indian Ocean Dipole in a warming world, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00573-7 52 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Added value of a priori bias correction for dynamical downscaling - A case study of Coastal British Columbia, Hingmire et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000717

Added value of a priori bias correction for dynamical downscaling - A case study of Coastal British Columbia, Hingmire et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000717

The Big Data paradox: how climate model authority becomes institutional mandates for climate extremes in the Anthropocene, Vijayakumar, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 10.1016/j.cosust.2026.101698

The TIPMIP Earth system model experiment protocol: phase 1, C. et al., Publication Database PIK (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)) Open Access pmh:oai:publications.pik-potsdam.de:item_32889

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
On the suitability of a convolutional neural network based RCM-emulator for fine spatio-temporal precipitation, Climate Dynamics, 10.1007/s00382-024-07350-8 16 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Century-long data reveals complex trends in ice cover in the Laurentian Great Lakes, Cannon et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03866-5

Climate-driven tree failures: how extreme rainfall threatens the survival of monumental Araucaria angustifolia trees, Scipioni et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111168

Glacier loss in Central Caucasus from ICESat-2, using the SRTM baseline and crossover analysis, Mehrishi et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.012

Mass Loss From Thwaites Glacier Continues Even Without Ocean Melting, Williams et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122843

Observed responses of sea ice formation and decay in a mid-latitude marginal sea under dual-mode global warming, Qiu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105631

Rapid acceleration of ice-cover loss from Northern Hemisphere lakes above critical air temperature thresholds, Zhou et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2610752123

The 2026 western US snow drought was about four times more likely due to climate change, Marshall et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2612961123

The dynamic response of Pine Island Glacier to two decades of intermittent ice shelf regrounding, Stepney et al., White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) pmh:oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:243583

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Ships are projected to navigate whole year-round along the North Sea route by 2100, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01557-7 24 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Observed thresholds in sea-level rise driving global tidal wetland loss, Luo et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76031-3

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Probabilistic reconstruction of sea-level changes and their causes since 1900, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-3471-2024 31 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Broadly stable atmospheric CO2 and CH4 levels over the past 3 million years, Marks-Peterson et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-025-10032-y

Interplay of North Atlantic freshening and deep convection during the last deglaciation constrained by Iberian speleothems, Endres et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-797-2026

Wildfires rampaged across Europe in the dying days of the Triassic, [authors did not process], Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02333-7

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Response of coastal California hydroclimate to the Paleocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum, Climate of the past, 10.5194/cp-20-1615-2024 2 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Larix gmelinii growth limitation shifts from nitrogen availability to drought under warming and permafrost degradation, Chen et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105395

Aftermath of marine heatwaves on the growth and physiological performance of Sargassum fusiforme and Sargassum thunbergii, Chu et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107945

An integrated assessment of climate change on landscape adaptive capacity, vulnerability, and divergence in Avicennia species, Sheidai et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-42720-8

Analysis of the mechanism of MKK4 participating in heat stress response in Mytilus coruscus, Wei et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107956

Aragonite Saturation Horizon Variability Along North Pacific Seamounts and Implications for Deep-Sea Coral Reefs, Kassem et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023926

Assessing impacts of extreme climate and weather events on endangered pearl oysters Pinctada maxima, He et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107821

Biogeochemical signal from marine heatwaves, cold spells, and transient warming events in a coastal upwelling system, Valdés et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-62941-1

Climate change alters biogeochemical cycles in oxygen-depleted and dead zones, Bourbonnais et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03756-w

Climate Change Enhances the Success of Marine Invasive Species, Smith & Cheung, Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71020

Climate-Driven Population Dynamics, Growth, and Phenology of the Moon Jellyfish Aurelia coerulea in the Mediterranean Thau Lagoon, Pigeon et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107977

Climate-Driven Restructuring of Phytoplankton Productivity and Community Composition in the South-eastern Black Sea: Insights from Seasonal CO2-Temperature Manipulation Experiments, A??rba? et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108029

Disentangling the effects of FPAR, CO2, and climate on terrestrial vegetation productivity trends over two decades (2001–2023), Pu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111122

Ecological novelty induced by climate change, Wright et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02697-8

Ecosystem services can persist in drowning macrotidal salt marshes, Mason et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108260

Establishing ring width and cell chronologies for predicting future growth of Thuja koraiensis under climate change, Park et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2025.126423

First evidence of climate-driven modulation of octinoxate toxicity in the sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus, Costa et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107847

Global Change Reshapes Northern Lakes Towards Browner, More Nutrient-Depleted and Nitrogen-Limited Conditions With Contrasting Impacts on Phytoplankton Biomass, Bergström et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71008

Iceberg-driven constraints on colony–foraging connectivity result in severe decline in chick counts for the Coulman Island emperor penguin colony, Park et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03764-w

In-situ experimental evidence revealing how ocean warming promotes Aurelia coerulea polyps mediated by benthic ecosystem change, Zang et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107853

Landscapes heavily impacted by human activities amplify climate sensitivity of Aleppo pine growth, Cappelluti et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111364

Marine heatwaves disrupt germination and seedling physiology in Zostera marina, Pieraccini et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107789

Microbial drought resistance is achieved at the expense of soil carbon loss, Pang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76033-1

Modelling and geospatial mapping of whitefly Bemisia tabaci population dynamics in cassava-growing areas of Sub-Saharan Africa in response to climate change, Ndjomatchoua & Gilligan, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111059

Moisture limitation superseding thermal forcing: Elevational divergence in growth and physiological responses of Picea crassifolia to accelerated warming and drying on the Northeastern Tibetan Plateau, Wang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111377

Ocean acidification effects on growth, survival and physiological immunity of farmed Larimichthys crocea, Zhang et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107869

Penguins on the Move: Mapping Priority Penguin Habitat Areas Under Climate Change, Ramirez et al., Diversity and Distributions Open Access 10.1111/ddi.70233

Physiology and behaviour of eastern oysters (Crassostrea virginica) and soft-shell clams (Mya arenaria) under hypoxic and heatwave conditions, Talevi et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107902

Predicting the water temperature effects and climate change impacts on gametogenesis of the sea urchin Mesocentrotus nudus using a DVI model, Takagi et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107941

Projected declines in zooplankton energy supporting Northwest European Shelf ecosystems, Tyldesley et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03840-1

Relationships Between Climatic Variation and Population Dynamics of the Threatened Mohave Ground Squirrel, Poessel et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.73952

Resilience of the macroalgae Gongolaria barbata under ocean acidification: physiological responses and restoration perspective, Ilaria et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107887

Responses of plant biomass to rising atmospheric CO2 concentration in the Yellow River Basin, Luan & Ma, Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105480

Strengthened resource limitation driven by accelerated microbial growth dampens response to elevated CO2 in a mature forest, Yuan et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03365-7

The Impact of Subglacial Drainage System Evolution and Glacier Lake Outburst on Arctic Fjord Macronutrient Dynamics, Alexander et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2023jg007969

Thermal responses and climate change implications of spring and autumn spawning Patagonian squid (Doryteuthis gahi) embryos, Grient et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107856

Tracing the imprints of dual stressors: eco-physiological and genotoxic insights from Mystus gulio under acidification and warming scenario, Mahapatra & Mandal, Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108290

Tree-Ring Based Precipitation Reconstructions Reveal Hydroclimatic Variability and a Recent Drying Trend in Northeastern Iran, Mazaherifar et al., Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126587

Understanding the resilience of Halophila ovalis to warming and nutrient enrichment for improved seagrass conservation policy, Yuxin et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107824

Warming overwhelms CO2-driven drought mitigation in alpine vegetation on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, Lyu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03308-2

Widespread Increase in Global Plant Water Stress Obscured by Greening, Chang et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025av002243

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Large potential impacts of marine heatwaves on ecosystem functioning, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17437 29 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Applying satellite observations to improve bottom-up national emission inventories for methane: application to Colombia, Hancock et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-10455-2026

Canopy-mediated climate feedbacks in the boreal continuous permafrost zone, Stuenzi et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02692-z

Carbohydrate-active enzymes of soil prophages enhance global carbon cycling potential, Liao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75907-8

Carbon sink-source dynamics across ecuadorian coastal tropical dry forests: unraveling the seasonal balance of soil carbon inputs and CO2 efflux, Jarre-Castro et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.3389/fevo.2026.1824696

COVID-19 induced reduction of fossil-fuel emissions in 2020 altered the seasonal cycle of atmospheric CO2 at high latitudes, Gui et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111071

Extreme precipitation during the warm growing season amplifies methane emissions and reduces non-growing season contributions in a Tibetan alpine peatland, Lin et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111378

Floods Enhanced the Terrestrial and Marine Organic Carbon Burial in the East China Sea, Xu et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20278779

Global vessel carbon dioxide emission from navigable rivers, Lü et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02718-6

High-resolution land surface modeling of climate and CO2 effects on ecosystem carbon-water coupling across the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Xi et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111195

Higher, but more variable, annual CO2 emissions from lakes in drier Arctic landscapes, Hazuková et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03275-8

Hydrological Threshold for Optimizing Wetland Climate Mitigation, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123743

Leveraging wide snapshot XCO2 pre-training to estimate urban fossil fuel CO2 emissions from space, Wang et al., Remote Sensing of Environment 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115260

Long-Term Urban Emission Trends in Salt Lake City: Examining CO, CO2, and NOX Enhancements, Humble et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.121883

Microbial Functional Gene Abundance-Integrated Modeling of Global Methane Sinks in Upland Soils Under Future Climate Change, Xiao et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71026

Migratory bird aggregation drives seasonal greenhouse gas hotspots in restored wetlands, Zhang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03853-w

Modeling the impact of drainage on peatland CO2 and CH4 fluxes and its underlying drivers, Liu, HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) pmh:oai:HAL:hal-05574304v1

Multi-Year Continuous Lateral Fluxes of Dissolved Carbon From a Microtidal Saltmarsh, He et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009760

Rapid microbial production of long-lived dissolved organic carbon in the global ocean, Cai et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2601044123

Soil moisture-induced changes in land carbon sink projections in CMIP6, Gabele et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2729-2026

Spatio-temporal patterns and environmental controls of soil organic carbon stocks in global tidal wetlands since 2009, Yang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-76092-4

Tall-tower isotope measurements to infer urban CO2 sources: a case study of Vienna, Austria, Meeran et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122245

The added value of new ground-based observations in improving China's methane emission quantification, Zhong et al., Atmospheric measurement techniques Open Access pdf 10.5194/amt-19-4759-2026

The Evidence for Linearly Scaling Ocean Gas Exchange With Sea Ice Needs Strengthening, Watts et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009346

The timing of warming matters as much as its intensity for the annual carbon balance of a degraded raised bog, Behrens et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5071-2026

Thermogenic methane beneath the North Greenland Ice Sheet revealed by isotopic and geological evidence, Ketzer et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75951-4

Three-Fourths of Carbon Emissions From 2023 Record-Breaking Wildfires in Canada Traced to Soil and Peat Combustion, Zhong et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl123393

Transition of coastal marsh to mangrove forest: implications for Everglades CO2 and CH4 fluxes, Yannick et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.3389/fevo.2026.1890986

VOCs Impact Soil Carbon Transformations and Sequestration, Zhang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg010104

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Dual roles of microbes in mediating soil carbon dynamics in response to warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50800-4 92 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Bioinspired charge reservoir enables efficient CO2 photoreduction with H2O via tungsten valence oscillation, Huang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-68991-3

CO2 subsurface mineral storage by its co-injection with recirculating water, Oelkers et al., Nature Open Access 10.1038/s41586-026-10130-5

Electrified reversible surface mineralization of CO2 for direct air capture, Liu et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-026-01989-9

Feasibility of CO2 pipeline construction to enable gigaton-scale carbon dioxide removals: evidence from historical precedent, Roberts et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1807933

Nanoscale greenhouse effect for promoting solar-driven CO2 reduction with water to CH4, Kang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-70960-9

Observationally constrained global warming hysteresis under CO2 removal, Song et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03484-1

Potential evaluation and favorable zone optimization of CO2 geological sequestration in deep coal reservoirs, Xue et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-42680-z

Reducing Uncertainties in Net Carbon Capture to Advance Wetlands as Natural Climate Solutions, Mistry et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009136

Reflecting on the politics and power dynamics of contested climate technologies, Fritz et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104448

Rethinking expertise on climate cooling technologies, Carabajal et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104446

The renaissance of carbon capture and storage in Germany and the politics of conditionality, Haas et al., Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2700726

Translating insights from progress in photovoltaics to accelerate industrial-scale CO2 electroreduction, Choi et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-025-01953-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Deployment expectations of multi-gigatonne scale carbon removal could have adverse impacts on Asia’s energy-water-land nexus, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50594-5 27 cites.

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Decarbonization

An Analysis of Future Wind Energy Resources and Cost Uncertainties Across the United States, Buster et al., Wind Energy Open Access 10.1002/we.70144

Assessing potential impacts of offshore wind development on U.S. marine ecosystems using food web modeling, Lato et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-63407-0

Carbon-aware resource allocation and task offloading in EH-assisted edge-cloud systems, Fu et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-62950-0

Solar-driven co-production of C2H4 and H2O2 from CO2 and H2O, Xie et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-69277-4

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Geothermal energy in Kenya: Evaluating health impacts and environmental challenges, Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development, 10.1016/j.esd.2024.101522 23 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Robust Solar Radiation Modification Strategy for Achieving Temperature Targets, Zheng et al., Risk Analysis 10.1111/risa.70312

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Effects of grain size and seawater salinity on magnesium hydroxide dissolution and secondary calcium carbonate precipitation kinetics: implications for ocean alkalinity enhancement, Biogeosciences, 10.5194/bg-21-3463-2024 13 cites.

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 Aerosols

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A model study investigating the sensitivity of aerosol forcing to the volatilities of semi-volatile organic compounds, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-8489-2024 6 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

Misperception of Extreme Weather Event Mortality Risk in the United States, Manware et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2025gh001782

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Communicating the Links between Climate Change and Heat Waves with the Climate Shift Index, Weather Climate and Society, 10.1175/wcas-d-23-0147.1 13 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

A data-driven method for identifying climate drivers of agricultural yield failure from daily weather data, Sweet et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-6687-2026

Agroforestry protects arable crops from climate shock during critical early-season phenological stages, Tosh et al., Agronomy for Sustainable Development Open Access pdf 10.1007/s13593-026-01129-3

Attribution analysis of historical and future global staple crop yield shocks to climate stressors, Xiao et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111340

Balancing growth, resource efficiency and soil greenhouse gas emissions: optimal water-fertilizer coupling for Chukrasia tabularis seedlings, Quan et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1914270

Carbon fluxes and partitioning in Eucalyptus and Pinus plantations across a climatic gradient in Brazil, Cunha et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2025.110977

Designing agrivoltaic systems for plant protection, Vernier et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111361

Exposure risk of maize cropland under compound high-temperature and drought events over Northeast China in response to future warming, Yan et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.015

Ocean acidification effects on growth, survival and physiological immunity of farmed Larimichthys crocea, Zhang et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.107869

Quantifying the impact of extreme heat events on net ecosystem exchange in a wheat-maize cropping system in North China, Pei et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111379

Reduced phosphorus bioavailability in rice paddies intensified by elevated CO2-driven warming, Wang et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01917-2

The economic dimension of climate-smart agriculture: bibliometric review of trends, challenges, and opportunities from an economic perspective, Jing et al., Environment Development and Sustainability 10.1007/s10668-026-07995-x

The occurrence of extreme heat events offset CO2 fertilization and deteriorate grain quality in double cropping rice systems under projected climate change, Liu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111184

Warmer growing seasons improve cereal yields in Northern Europe only with increasing precipitation, Tootoonchi et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2583-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global assessment of production benefits and risk reduction in agroforestry during extreme weather events under climate change scenarios, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1379741 31 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Accelerating and Intensifying Dry-to-Wet Hydroclimate Whiplash Across the Contiguous United States, Yang & Li, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008646

Amazon Dry Season Will Lengthen Under Future Climate, Ferreira et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71018

Anthropogenic Warming Increases Extreme Precipitation in Huaihe River Basin, China in 1961–2020, Guo et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70525

Asynchronous Emergence of Water Scarcity Risks Amid Shifting Hydrological Regimes in High Mountain Asia, Zhao & Yang, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008373

Dominant Controls on Preferential Flow and Their Implications for Future Soil Water Fluxes, Li et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008296

Future tropical cyclone rainfall constrained by increased atmospheric dryness, Chen et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02047-5

Global Terrestrial Water Storage Projections and Uncertainty Decomposition Under Multiple Warming Levels, Kim et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007835

Integrating climate projections and hydrological modeling for sustainable water management in a major indian peninsular basin, Thakur et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1835963

Intensifying Sub-Daily Rainfall Extremes in Tropical Cities: Projections From Downscaled Baselines in a Warming Climate, Blagojevi? et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007703

Marine heatwaves in the Northeast Pacific intensify landfalling atmospheric rivers on the west coast of North America, Renkl et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-62522-2

Nature-based solutions in arid and semi-arid countries: A review of best practices and lessons learned, Chiarelli et al., Urban Climate Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103060

Seasonal Asymmetry in Extreme Precipitation Intensification Across China's Drylands, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046518

U.S. rivers are transporting more suspended sediment, often in less time, Sigdel & Husic, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03847-8

Warming-Induced Increase in Flooding in the Taklimakan Desert, Su et al., Journal of Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.1007/s12583-025-2033-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Critical Effects of Precipitation on Future Colorado River Flow, Journal of Climate, 10.1175/jcli-d-23-0617.1 25 cites.

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Climate change economics

Climate change and high-quality economic development: Insights from the perspective of extreme temperatures, Li & Feng, Environment Development and Sustainability 10.1007/s10668-026-07996-w 

 

Climate change mitigation public policy research

2040 greenhouse gas reduction targets and energy transitions in line with the EU Green Deal, Rodrigues et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-71159-8

A simplified method to calculate atmospheric CO2 equivalency for changing surface albedo, Akbari, Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102795

Bricolage as an early-niche mechanism: Expectations and carbon lock-in in two Polish energy clusters, Stasik & Da?kowska, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104861

California's plan to decarbonize electricity omits key greenhouse gas emissions, Fortier et al., Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115509

Cost-effective abatement of industrial sources of nitrous oxide with methane for urgent climate mitigation, Wu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75982-x

Eligibility interpreted as assurance and trust inflation in carbon credit markets, Kuwae, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001001

Optimizing residential energy management through an integrated techno-economic evaluation of PV-battery systems, Kumar et al., Electrical Engineering 10.1007/s00202-026-03614-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Public acceptability of carbon pricing: unravelling the impact of revenue recycling, Climate Policy, 10.1080/14693062.2024.2376747 29 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

A systematic global stocktake of evidence on human adaptation to climate change, Berrang?Ford et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-021-01170-y

Beyond adaptive capacity: Assessing how power relations shape household responses to climate impacts on water and sanitation, Dickin et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000906

Building climate-resilient development pathways in China: Evaluating environmental policy impacts, Zhou et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104456

Deep uncertainty analysis to characterise regional climate for building stock transition: A Nordic empirical study, Feng et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103057

Europe's transport infrastructure is not ready to face climate change, Deidda et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access 10.5194/nhess-26-3345-2026

From devolution to distortion: political and fiscal constraints on locally led adaptation in Kenya, Mulwa & Gravesen, Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2703375

How urban system structure and land use dynamics jointly shape climate vulnerability in Northwestern China over the 21st century, Zhou et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103066

In search of climate migrants: a journey from crisis to opportunity, Ahmed et al., Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2026.2694724

Scenario Planning for Transformative Climate Adaptation, Mach et al., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change 10.1002/wcc.70084

Strategic streams of evolving climate policy and governance in Vietnam: Challenges and potentials for resilience, Doi et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104451

Unequal protection and sacrificial territories: climate governance and infrastructural exposure in Southern Italy, Terenzi & Paone, Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2704993

Unraveling the nuances of climate change maladaptation: A call for more verstehen perspectives, Ofosu, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000784

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Nature-based solutions in spatial planning and policies for climate change adaptation: A literature review, AMBIO, 10.1007/s13280-024-02052-1 28 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Climate change and health in the rural context: Vulnerability, capacity and outlook, Rose & Birchall, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000974

Climate regulation as cardiovascular prevention: Heart failure risks after the Endangerment Finding rollback, Nguyen et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001006

Divergent Heat Assessments Across Thermal Stress and Sensation Metrics, Huang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008395

Drought amplifies the psychological burden of war, Döring et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41893-026-01882-z

On the compound effect of humidity and temperature on mortality in the Eastern Mediterranean, Tzyrkalli et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000821

Survival First: How Citizens Prioritize Competing Climate-Health Risk Countermeasures Under Fiscal Constraints, Tanaka & ??, Risk Analysis Open Access 10.1111/risa.70315

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Framework of street grid-based urban heat vulnerability assessment: Integrating entropy weight method and BPNN model, Urban Climate, 10.1016/j.uclim.2024.102067 40 cites.

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 Other

Fire weather waves drive extreme fires globally, Yin et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03858-5

Implementing a National Framework for Climate Services: Understanding Progress, Challenges, and Future Opportunities, Golding et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0281.1

Navigating optimal solar-wind trade-offs under climate change, Li et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75879-9

Projecting climate change impacts on Scottish River pollution, Corrochano-Fraile et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100856

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Evolution of the Climate Forcing During the Two Years After the Hunga Tonga=Hunga Ha'apai Eruption, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd041296 32 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Four years of PLOS Climate: Past, present and future, Boers et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000866

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
State of the UK Climate 2023, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8553 39 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

The Environmental Footprint of Emerging Technology and Artificial Intelligence. Data Centers, Community Health and Policy Responses, Emma Uridge and Jasmin Kamruddi, Kansas Health Institute

The rapid growth and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming many sectors, but it also has environmental implications that are complex and multifaceted. AI infrastructure drives increased demand for significant water use, greater energy consumption and expanded grid infrastructure, all of which require careful management to avoid environmental and community harm.

How Local Governments Can Use Communication to Drive Climate Action, Dwight et al., Yale University

The majority of constituents want local government climate action - 56% of registered voters want local government officials to do more to address climate change. With a duty to serve the public, local governments are well positioned to listen and respond — and the Yale Climate Opinion Maps include city- and county-level public opinion data to support your efforts. Know your audience and foster trust - To motivate climate action, governments must understand their communities and become trusted partners. Short surveys, message testing, and in-person engagement can help local governments understand what messages resonate and what issues are a priority for their audience. To build and retain trust, partnerships with community-based organizations, transparency, and frequent engagement are essential. Make climate action local - Many perceive climate change as a problem that is distant in time and space. Local governments can communicate local stories and social norms to help community members understand how climate change is impacting their community now — and that their neighbors are worried about it and taking action, even if they aren’t talking about it.

Protecting the nature of Texas, powering our clean energy future, Quentin Good and Luke Metzger, Frontier Group

Renewable energy developers in Texas have demonstrated many ways their siting practices and operations can minimize harm and even create new benefits from renewable energy projects. Texas should take steps to encourage the adoption of “best practices” by renewable energy developers that protect wildlife and landscapes while continuing the beneficial transition to clean energy. Operational changes and smart siting decisions can reduce the environmental impact of wind energy. The most serious environmental challenge posed by wind energy is its impact on birds and bats, but smart strategies – including those currently in use by Texas wind farm operators – have been proven to reduce collisions.

U.S. Can Cost-Effectively Supply One Third of Industrial Heat Demand Using Off-Grid Electric Thermal Storage and Heat Pumps, Dominguez et al., India Energy and Climate Center, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley

Industrial heat is a major source of U.S. emissions and is challenging to decarbonize due to the availability of low-cost natural gas keeping fossil fuel heating highly competitive. Emerging low cost and efficient options such as thermal electric storage and industrial heat pumps offer a promising alternative when combined with local low-cost solar and wind power. Using facility-level emissions data and a geospatial assessment of nearby buildable land, the authors evaluate 3,559 industrial sites and three temperature ranges: low (0–200°C), medium (200–850°C), and high (above 850°C). For each site, the authors estimate how much heat could be supplied using off=grid renewable systems, its' cost, and how their potential grows as clean energy costs fall. By 2035, the authors found that renewable-powered heat systems could economically supply up to one third of U.S. industrial heat demand—3,255 trillion BTU out of 9,530 trillion BTU in total. This includes more than half of temperature heat needs above 200°C, particularly in states with higher natural gas prices and strong renewable resources, such as California and parts of the northern and eastern U.S. Local off-grid systems also avoid multiyear grid interconnection delays while reducing integration costs for many facilities.

Coal Beneath Federal Lands in the United States— Mines, Reserves, and Resources, Shaffer et al., US. Geological Survey

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) compiled a list of coal mines and tabulated the coal reserves and available coal resources beneath Federal lands in the conterminous United States. Coal resources beneath Federal lands in Alaska are also discussed in this report. In 2024, the 34 coal mines on Federal lands produced more than 261 million short tons of coal. Surface mining is used at 23 of the coal mines, and underground mining is used at 11. These 34 coal mines control more than 4.2 billion short tons of reported coal reserves. Most of the coal mines (31) and more than 98 percent of the reported coal reserves are on Federal lands west of the Mississippi River. Of all the States, Wyoming has the most coal mines on Federal lands (14) and produces the most coal from Federal lands. The Powder River Basin has the most coal mines per basin or coal field operating on Federal lands (12 in Wyoming, 2 in Montana). Most of the available coal resources in the conterminous United States are also west of the Mississippi River. There are five basins or coal fields in the West that each contain available coal resources of more than 25 billion short tons. The USGS estimates that more than 355 billion short tons of available coal resources remain beneath Federal lands in the conterminous United States. Alaska contains substantial quantities of coal resources. The USGS estimates that Alaska has at least 140 billion short tons of identified available coal resources but may ultimately have as much as 5.5 trillion short tons of coal resources.

Americans with disabilities are more likely than those without disabilities to say global warming is harming their health, Ettinger et al., Yale Program on Climate Change Communication

Americans with disabilities are more likely to think global warming is harming their own health than Americans without disabilities. Americans with and without disabilities have similar views on whether some groups of people are more likely to experience the health harms of global warming. Americans with disabilities have lower trust in several information sources about the health harms of global warming.

Paying for Resilience in New York State, Rebuild by Design and The New York State Adaptation Practitioners Network

Climate change has catalyzed new and opportunities and risks within nearly every dimension of New York State’s economy – with the costs being passed onto New Yorkers in the form of tax increases, medical bills, insurance hikes, damages, home repairs, and business losses. The authors present a first-of-its-kind inventory of the cost to adapt to climate effects. New York State will need to spend over $519 billion to build, upgrade, or adapt infrastructure to prepare for climate impacts. This accounts for costs of proposed, in-progress, and completed adaptation investments. The per capita cost of adapting New York State’s infrastructure is approximately $26,000. The highest regional adaptation cost, $387 billion, is in New York City, where the approximate per capita need is $50,000. The most substantial costs include culvert replacements, sewer and stormwater upgrades, and coastal defense on Long Island and in New York City.

Transmission Planning with Large Loads: Current Practices and Recommendations, Large Loads Task Force, Energy Systems Integration Group

The authors trace the structural reasons why the growth in data centers, AI facilities, and other large loads is outpacing existing transmission planning processes, which were designed for slower and more dispersed demand growth. They lay out what planners, utilities, and regulators can start doing now and over the longer term, as large load and associated generator interconnection requests continue to arrive faster than current planning processes can accommodate. The authors identify three structural reasons current planning processes struggle to keep pace including planning functions are siloed by jurisdiction, time horizon, and study method; there is a fundamental timing mismatch between how fast large loads want to connect and how long transmission takes to plan and build; and planners face a radically different level of demand uncertainty that current planning methods were not designed to handle. The authors distinguish between actions planners can take now with immediate payoff, such as studies that make visible where the grid can serve new load, tools that quickly expand available grid capacity, and coordinating assumptions across planning functions and structural shifts in the planning process, including moving from project-by-project upgrades toward proactive, scenario-based, multi-value planning with longer-term benefits.

Electricity Mid-Year Update 2026, Çam et al., The International Energy Agency

Amid the energy shock triggered by the war in the Middle East, the world’s electricity consumption is set to increase strongly in 2026, driven by rising demand from industry, appliances, cooling needs, data centers and electrification. This mid-year update builds on the comprehensive Electricity 2026 report published in February, providing an assessment of recent market developments and updated outlooks through 2027. It incorporates updated data for 2025 and new forecasts for 2026 and 2027, covering global electricity demand, generation by fuel, and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from electricity generation, among other trends. The report also reviews the latest developments in major economies such as China, the European Union, India and the United States and provides updated tracking of wholesale electricity prices across markets worldwide.

Interfacing science and policy: Exploring the role of scientific knowledge in the design of Voluntary Sustainability Standards, Loconto et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Through the concept of scientific cherry-picking, the authors analyze how Voluntary Sustainability Standards selectively incorporate particular strands of scientific knowledge that align with operational models and governance structures. This selective integration often leads to the promotion of interpretations of sustainability that are compatible with weak sustainability paradigms –emphasizing incremental improvements within existing systems – rather than fostering more systemic and transformative approaches.

Food Security Green Bonds. Scaling finance for sustainable and climate-resilient agrifood systems, Mikell O’Mealy, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

The authors examine the growing pressures on global agrifood systems, where hunger and food insecurity remain widespread and are expected to intensify under climate change and population growth. They highlight the dual challenge of expanding production to meet rising demand while addressing the sector’s significant contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and increasing climate risks that threaten agricultural land and livelihoods. Despite strong recognition by countries of the need for climate-smart agriculture and agrifood systems transformation, progress is constrained by a large financing gap. Current investment levels fall far short of the estimated USD 1.1 trillion required annually by 2030, with particularly acute shortfalls affecting smallholder farmers and agri-Subject Matter Experts. Public finance continues to dominate, reflecting both its catalytic role and the barriers limiting private sector engagement. The authors identify public-led green bonds as a practical avenue to mobilize private and institutional capital at scale.

Pay, Baby, Pay. Why Trump's Energy & AI Dominance Agenda Means Higher Bills For Everyone, Lorne Stockman, Oil Change International

U.S. wholesale fossil gas prices will likely double by the late 2030s relative to the 2020 to 2025 average if the Trump administration’s energy and AI policies succeed in pushing gas demand to levels that can only be met by more expensive gas production. Significant energy price volatility from 2020 to 2025 caused hardship in the U.S. and in LNG-importing countries, particularly in Asia and Europe. Costlier U.S. gas risks exacerbating the energy affordability crisis for U.S. and international consumers alike. The surge in gas demand – and gas prices – is being driven primarily by the Trump administration’s support for massive increases in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Trump’s hostility toward renewables and support for the poorly regulated AI data center boom aggravate the impending crunch. Lower-cost gas from the two biggest U.S. gas-producing regions, the Permian and Appalachian basins, will not be able to meet rising demand alone. To fill the gap between demand and production, gas producers will have to increase drilling in the significantly more expensive Haynesville shale play in Louisiana and Texas. About New Research

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The general public often underestimate support for climate action, while overestimating the real-world actions taken by other people to address the problem, according to new research.

The study, published in Nature Climate Change, explores the differences between people’s support for climate change, their behaviour and their assumptions about other people’s behaviour.

It is based on multiple surveys of more than 5,000 people across Germany and the US.

The study expands on previous research on how the general public systematically underestimate the climate commitment of their peers.

The difference between actual and perceived support for climate action among the public is sometimes known as a “perception gap”. 

The surveys tested how people’s perceptions of climate attitudes and behaviours relate to their own willingness to contribute and undertake “climate-friendly” actions.

One of the authors tells Carbon Brief that this perception gap is not due to “ignorance or bias”, but because “people are just not good at making good estimations”.

The research also reveals that people’s opinions and behaviours are more “nuanced than previously assumed” and suggests that simply “correcting misperceptions” does not automatically lead to greater climate action.

Measuring climate actions

The study notes that correcting the perception gap is often seen as a “cost-effective” way to promote public engagement and drive action to reduce the intensification and impacts of climate change. 

Most studies that explore the perception gap have primarily focused on surveys that have asked people to report their willingness to support climate change. 

In other words, researchers have relied upon people saying they would support efforts to tackle climate change, rather than measuring people’s real-world actions, such as financial donations, attending protests or changing their behaviour.

To fill this gap, the researchers behind the new study surveyed a total of more than 5,000 people in Germany and the US over 2024-25. Surveys were split across five different experiments, each focused on public perceptions of climate attitudes and how they relate to individuals’ actual behaviour:

.cb-table tr td{ word-wrap: break-word; word-break: normal; font-size: 0.9em; } ExperimentWhat they didSurvey oneParticipants were asked if they were willing to donate 1% of their household income to WWF – and then were given the chance to do so. Follow-up questions asked participants to predict how many of their peers said “yes” and how many actually donated to the charity.Survey twoParticipants read a constitutional complaint against the German government, led by Greenpeace, which demands for stricter climate policies. They were asked if they were willing to participate as a claimant and/or donate to the cause – and then were given the chance to do so. Follow-up questions asked participants to predict how many of their peers said “yes” and how many went on to support the complaint.Survey threeParticipants were requested to complete an online “work for environmental protection task” where the more “pages” they completed  resulted in more donations to WWF. They then predicted how many pages their peers completed. Participants also rated their individual behaviours and support for eight climate policies and then estimated the same for other people.Surveys four and fiveParticipants were split into three groups that were either informed that 4% of participants had donated 1% of their household income to WWF, that “68% were willing to contribute” or given no information. They then had to state whether they were willing to support WWF and then were given the opportunity to do so. 

The authors note that Germany and the US are two of the “top 10 CO2 emitters” and are places where climate action is “especially necessary”. However, they add that the two countries are not reflective of “diverse cultural contexts” and further research is needed across the world.

The perception gap

The researchers find that most of their participants supported climate action, but much fewer actually performed verifiable behaviours. 

For example, survey one finds that 37% of participants said they were willing to donate to WWF, yet just 4% did when given the opportunity.

Participants generally overestimated the climate actions of their peers, predicting that 23% of other people donated. Willingness, on the other hand, was slightly underestimated with respondents averaging around 34%. 

The results from survey three suggest that this perception gap is likely due to general cognitive processes within the human brain that make accurate estimations about large groups difficult, say the authors. 

The chart below shows the actual percentage of people who supported different environmental policies and performed climate-friendly behaviours (blue dots) compared to average predictions from the surveys (red dots). 

They reveal a “consistent pattern” where “small proportions were overestimated and large ones were underestimated”, the authors say, driving predictions towards the middle. This phenomenon is known as “regression to the mean”.

In other words, where public support for a policy was high, participants in the survey estimated it was lower than it was. When the support was lower, estimates would be higher.

Comparison of actual percentage (blue dots) with the mean estimated percentage (red dots) across two main categories: policy support and individual behaviours. Source: Tiede, et al (2026).

The study finds that individual and environmental factors played a role in shaping people’s perceptions of their peers’ climate actions, which were distinct from general misestimations. 

For example, people who were already involved in climate action, had more frequent climate discussions and consumed more climate-focused news and media predicted a higher proportion of climate support “across the board”.  

The results from the fourth and fifth surveys show that knowing the context of other people’s beliefs and behaviour in surveys can impact the attitudes of participants.

Participants that were told that 68% of people were willing to donate 1% of their household income to the WWF were more willing to donate. 

In contrast, participants that were told that 4% of people actually donated did not report more willingness to “discuss climate change, sign petitions or donate” than the control group. 

However, there was no obvious impact on actual donations for any of the three groups, the study notes.

Lead study author Dr Kevin Tiede, scientific managing director of the Institute for Planetary Health Behaviour at the University of Erfurt, tells Carbon Brief that the findings suggest that “just telling people how many people support climate action is likely not enough to really change something”. 

However, Tiede adds that “direct comparability” between people saying they would donate and actually donating is “limited” and that giving people more time to answer and autonomy over where to donate might result in more people taking action. 

‘Pluralistic ignorance’ 

Tiede explains that the study findings demonstrate the existence of “pluralistic ignorance”, where a person believes their own views differ from the majority.

For climate change, this means that the “vast majority of people around the world support climate action, but people considerably underestimate the extent of this support”, the study says. 

However, the surveys reveal that pluralistic ignorance “in the climate domain” is more nuanced than previously thought, say the authors. 

Prof Madalina Vascleanu, an assistant professor at Stanford University’s Doerr School of Sustainability, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that encouraging climate action is complex. 

It may take multiple and repeated “attempts” at effective communication, or for people to directly “experience” the “norm” that climate change is widely supported, she says, rather than simply being told.

“Observable” behaviours, such as “identity signalling” – which could involve anything from protesting to vegetarianism – might have more of an impact on encouraging climate action among peers than “private behaviours like donations”, she adds. 

The study is a “great addition to the literature”, Vascleanu says, because “correcting” the perception gap did not have an effect on climate-friendly behaviour, as “scholars had previously assumed”. She adds that it has “sparked several new hypotheses” that her “lab is now working on”.

Prof Mauro Bertolotti, associate professor of social psychology at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, explains that the “attitude-behaviour gap” revealed by the research is a “rather common finding”. 

However, he is “sceptical” of the “simplified and abstract” measures, warning that experiment environments often come with “assumptions and expectations” that are different from real life. 

As a result, they might not “replicate” the process people go through when choosing to “make a donation to an environmental cause”, he says.

‘Targeted’ communication strategies

The researchers argue that it is more effective to focus on “targeted” communication strategies – encouraging climate-friendly behaviours that aim to reach the majority who already support climate action, rather than trying to convert climate sceptics.

They call for attention to be paid to the attitude-behaviour gap between people saying they support efforts to tackle climate change and following up with real-world climate actions. 

The study suggests strategies for decision-makers to reduce the attitude-behaviour gap, such as “facilitating climate-friendly behaviour” with “convenience and subsidies”. They also recommend ensuring environmental policy prioritises fairness to gain visible and widespread public support. 

They add that the public would benefit from understanding the “effectiveness and co-benefits” of climate action.

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Tiede, K.E. et al. (2026) People systematically under- and overestimate public engagement in climate action, Nature Climate Change, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-026-02668-z

Related Scientists are ‘most trusted’ source of climate information in global-south survey 22.08.2025 Public opinion Survey: ‘Very few’ Africans place responsibility for climate action on ‘rich nations’ 10.04.2025 Public opinion Guest post: How public attitudes towards ‘CO2 removal’ differ in the UK and US 07.07.2020 Geoengineering Guest post: How ‘discourses of delay’ are used to slow climate action 06.07.2020 Public opinion

The post Correcting climate ‘misperceptions’ may not boost climate action appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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In recent days, prominent climate sceptics and rightwing commentators have shared charts on social media incorrectly implying that Europe is having its “quietest” year for wildfires in 2026.

These include Dr Matthew Wielicki, a former University of Alabama geochemist and self-described “professor in exile”, who was recently appointed by the Trump administration to lead the US Global Change Research Program.

However, these charts paint a misleading picture as they are skewed by encompassing the entirety of Russia in the data – including the vast plains of Siberia.

These charts also use data that include fires that are deliberately lit to manage cropland, which is a declining practice across much of Europe.

In this factcheck, Carbon Brief shows that the area burned by wildfires across the European Union in 2026 is second only to 2022 for this time of year.

The latest data from the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) also shows that France has set a new modern record for area burned and Spain’s wildfire season is among the worst on record.

The fires have displaced more than a third of a million people across south-western Europe, while an impending heatwave has also raised fears of the fires worsening in the coming days. 

‘Quietest year’

On 27 July, as wildfires raged across multiple European countries, former Conservative peer and climate-sceptic commentator Matt Ridley posted on Twitter that “2026 is the quietest year for wildfires in Europe by some distance”.

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Ridley, who sits on the academic advisory council of the Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF), a UK-based climate-sceptic lobby group that refuses to reveal the sources of its funding, was responding to an article by Daily Telegraph columnist Tim Stanley.

Stanley’s column, headlined: “Climate change is real – and the right needs to get serious about it”, warned:

“This is no longer a matter of speculation: the wildfires of Europe, pitiless and persistent, are the way we live now.”

Ridley included a chart from Our World In Data, showing the cumulative area burned by wildfires by week for Europe. The chart puts 2026 as having the smallest area for this time of year in a dataset going back to 2012.

Ridley’s post was widely shared by prominent rightwing figures – including Richard Tice, deputy leader of the hard-right, climate-sceptic Reform UK party, former Conservative cabinet minister Jacob Rees-Mogg and multiple commentators.

Ridley repeated the claim of Europe having a “quiet” year for wildfires in an article for the Spectator, which was reprinted in the Daily Mail.

Separately, Wielicki also shared a chart on Twitter to imply that wildfires in Europe are declining. Wielicki has previously claimed that the “science is not settled on climate change”.

Author and self-styled “sceptical environmentalist” Bjorn Lomborg has also shared similar charts on Twitter. 

These charts all use data from the Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS). The GWIS category for “Europe” encompasses all the countries on the continent and includes the whole of Russia.

As a result, Russia accounts for about 74% of the area included in the GWIS definition of “Europe”.

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Wildfires in Russia typically account for 80-90% of the burned area in the GWIS Europe dataset. In 2026, fires in Russia are substantially below average. Therefore, including Russia in this comparison creates the false impression that wildfire activity across Europe is unusually low.

Dr Calum Cunningham, a research fellow at the University of Tasmania’s Fire Centre, says that such claims are “highly misleading”, noting that “they rely on aggregating fire activity across an enormous and climatically diverse region”. He tells Carbon Brief:

“A relatively quiet season in Russia can easily mask an exceptionally active season in France or Spain. If the analysis is focused on the regions actually experiencing the current fires, the picture is very different.

“The reality is that western Europe has experienced an extraordinary sequence of climate conditions this year.”

In contrast, the EFFIS provides a subset of wildfire data specifically for the area covered by the 27 nations of the EU, which, therefore, excludes Russia. 

Another difference between the two datasets is that GWIS monitors all fires – including those on agricultural land that are intentionally set alight. The burned area as measured by GWIS contains significant cropland area. 

By contrast, EFFIS uses land-cover data and other information to filter specifically for forest fires. 

Looking at the EU-only data from EFFIS reveals that Europe is far from having its “quietest” year. The bloc’s burned area, as of 29 July, is almost 435,000 hectares (ha) – second only to 2022 for this time of year.

Notably, Wielicki has actually continued to post charts based on GWIS data, even after acknowledging that “includ[ing] all of Russia, including vast areas of Siberia…isn’t a good proxy for Europe”.

French fires

Even looking at EU-wide data misses the scale of this year’s wildfires for some individual countries.

The chart below shows the surge in burned area in France since mid-July.

For much of the first half of the year, the country was having a wildfire season that was only slightly above average in terms of total burned area. However, a notable uptick began in the first week of July.

The third week of the month saw France break its previous cumulative annual record by more than 19,000ha. That gap has widened as the fires continue to burn; as of 29 July, the cumulative burned area in France during 2026 was nearly 24,700ha above the previous record. 

The fires in France follow a record-breaking June heatwave that “dried out vegetation across the region, allowing fires to spread quickly”, wrote the New York Times. 

On 27 July, French president Emmanuel Macron called a “crisis cabinet meeting” in order to address the fires “ravaging several areas of south-west France”, said France 24.

More than 220,000 people have been evacuated due to the Gironde fire, west of Bordeaux, in “what may be France’s largest peacetime evacuation”, reported the Associated Press.

In the Conversation, Cunningham and two other University of Tasmania researchers write that evacuation orders “protec[t] human lives, but makes it more likely houses and other structures will burn if there’s no one to defend them”. They add:

“There is little doubt climate change has made France and Spain’s wildfires worse. They represent yet another reason to redouble our efforts to tackle climate change and stabilise our climate.”

Central Spain scorched

While Spain’s fire season has not broken records in the same way that France’s has, it is on track to be among the worst since EFFIS began reporting data in 2006. 

The chart below shows the rapid increase in burned area in Spain since 8 July. The latest data from EFFIS reveal that, as of 29 July, Spain has almost matched its previous record at this point in the year. It is also nearly five times the average area burned for this time of year.

In Spain, the wildfires have been concentrated in the central part of the country, near Madrid. 

BBC News reported that the fires outside the capital have burned “an area more than twice as large as the city itself”.

Nearly 90,000 people were forced from their homes in central Spain by the fires, said the Associated Press. 

Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s prime minister, called the fires a “painful expression” of climate change.

Meanwhile, the UK, French and Spanish governments have issued joint statements this week in response to the fires. The UK/Spain statement begins:

“This summer’s wildfires demonstrated that climate change was now a national security emergency facing Europe and threatening our way of life.”

updated

This article was updated on 31/07/2026 to include Matt Ridley’s Spectator and Daily Mail articles.

Related Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world 19.03.2026 Attribution Climate change made ‘fire weather’ in Chile and Argentina three times more likely 11.02.2026 Attribution Global wildfires burned an area of land larger than India in 2024 16.10.2025 Land and soils Analysis: Record UK wildfires have burned an area twice the size of Glasgow in 2025 08.08.2025 Extreme weather

The post Factcheck: No, Europe is not having its ‘quietest’ year for wildfires appeared first on Carbon Brief.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Neha Pathak

Most of us sense it without being told why: A walk in the woods or an hour in the park leaves us calmer, clearer, and restored. Increasingly, modern science agrees. A growing body of evidence links time in nature to better physical and mental health – and a major new effort is working to document exactly what that evidence shows.

That effort is called the Nature Record, and its survival is a story in itself. It began as the National Nature Assessment, a federal undertaking modeled on the long-running National Climate Assessment and mandated by a Biden-era executive order. Roughly 180 scientists volunteered to develop about a dozen chapters. The project had reached an early public-comment draft when the Trump administration canceled it. Rather than abandon the work, the authors decided to finish it independently under a new name, with foundation funding and National Academy of Sciences review.

Howard Frumkin, a physician-epidemiologist and a professor emeritus at the University of Washington, led the assessment’s chapter on human health. Yale Climate Connections spoke with him about how the report survived, what the science says about nature’s health benefits, why those benefits aren’t shared equally, and what it all means for communities and the healthcare system.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Yale Climate Connections: The connection between nature, health, and climate change pulls together fields that don’t usually sit at the same table. How do you frame that intersection?

Howard Frumkin: This intersection of the natural world and human health – in the context of climate change – draws on three different lineages intellectually.

The first is the scientific evidence on the health benefits of nature contact, which is what the Nature Record is focusing on. So if you or I take a walk in a forest or in a park, we have nature contact, and something about that is good for us. We don’t fully understand. It might be the visual appreciation of beautiful nature; it might be phytoncides – biogenic chemicals that we’re inhaling. It could be the quiet, could be the physical activity. But nature also delivers benefits without direct contact: The upstream ecosystem in the watershed that delivers clean water is good for health. We may never go up there, but we still benefit from it.

The second is the whole literature on climate solutions, indicating that coastal mangrove forests and sponge cities and tree canopy deliver benefits both in terms of climate mitigation and adaptation: We can store carbon, reduce temperatures of neighborhoods, we can manage storm water.

Then there’s a third line of thinking, which has to do with the human relationship with the natural world. In Indigenous and tribal wisdom, there’s talk of reciprocity, the shared relationship that we have as part of nature, the obligations for stewardship, the legal concepts of the rights of nature. All of that is related to, but different than, the climate benefits piece because it’s explicitly not instrumental; it’s not transactional; it’s relational. You come into that thinking about the right relationship that we as humans should have with the natural world – not because of what it gets us.

Yale Climate Connections: So how did the Nature Record come to be, and how did the project survive after the federal government withdrew its support?

Frumkin: It was a pretty simple concept: the idea that you can’t take good care of what you don’t know. There was a perception that if we were to be good stewards of our natural heritage in this country, we needed an inventory. We needed to take stock of what we had, and not just at a fixed moment in time but over time to understand the trends that were affecting nature and the benefits it delivers. The model for doing that was the National Climate Assessment, which is the every-four-year assessment of climate change in the U.S. – how it’s unfolding, what the impacts are on humans – mandated by federal legislation back in the 1990s. It comes with lots of federal procedures, in terms of scientific rigor, transparency, public review, and so on. Out of that conceptual commitment to taking stock of what we have, and using the model of the National Climate Assessment, an executive order in the Biden administration mandated the creation of the National Nature [Assessment].

It got as far as a “zero order draft,” – what regular people call an outline – that was published in the Federal Record and made available for public comment. And no sooner did that happen than the Trump inauguration happened, and the Trump administration killed the National Nature Assessment.

By then we had rostered around 12 chapters with around 15 authors each, so we had 180 authors all volunteering time, representing academic institutions and agencies and NGOs across the country. And pretty much in the blink of an eye, everybody said, “Let’s do it anyway … This work is so important, and the value is so clear that we don’t need to be a federal undertaking.”

There were some legal issues, like we couldn’t use the same name; federal employees could no longer participate because of potential risks to them and to the project. We found foundation support in early 2025, and by mid-2025 [it was] clear that we had enough money, energy, and commitment that we could continue. We landed on the Nature Record, and we’re proceeding almost in some ways as if it were a federal document – with transparency, National Academy of Sciences review, very careful documentation of all factual claims – partly because rigor will give a lot of credibility to the report, and partly because it would be a good thing for this to return to being a federal effort. If we have followed all the rules, dotted all the i’s, and crossed all the t’s, this can be reimported into government.

That said, being nonfederal offers some advantages. We can be more flexible and nimble, more creative in the ways we undertake outreach and build partnerships, and publicize and disseminate what we find. In some ways, this is a blessing in disguise. We have, for example, a national poetry effort running alongside the Nature Record, and we’ve published a book of poetry. We’ve engaged young people in graphic arts related to the benefits of nature. Bringing that creativity to bear has been a really nice part of the project.

Yale Climate Connections: When you dug into the evidence for the health chapter, what were the biggest takeaways or trends you saw?

Frumkin: The first key message is that, in general, nature contact is good for people; it’s health-promoting. The second is that those benefits are unequally distributed across society. Some of us have much better or easier access to nature than others. It’s an equity issue, because poor people and people of color disproportionately tend to have less access to parks and high-quality park programming, through the legacies of redlining and other historical trends.

But it’s not just that conventional form of equity that’s important. People with disabilities have difficulty accessing natural places. Older people have difficulty because too many parks lack accessible trails and shade, and children often lack access because safe, easy access to green space is rare in many communities.

Another trend is more screen time and less green time. People are spending less time outdoors. On the other hand, there are some emerging technologies that may facilitate nature contact, such as Merlin [the birdsong identification app], which may help deepen people’s appreciation of nature, and there’s reason to think that being more familiar with it deepens nature connectedness.

Four takeaways about health and nature from the Nature Record

• Nature contact is broadly good for human health.
• Those benefits are unequally distributed – by race, income, age, and disability.
• Long-term trends, such as rising screen time and falling green time, are reshaping how people benefit – for better and worse.
• Evidence-based interventions, like well-designed park programming, can reliably strengthen nature’s health benefits.

Yale Climate Connections: If the evidence that nature helps is solid, how much do we actually know about why – and about how much nature is enough?

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Frumkin: One of the most interesting parts of this is that although we have pretty solid evidence that nature contact benefits health, we know precious little about how it works. So you may walk through a forest and benefit from seeing the natural beauty of the forest. We have lab evidence that T cells do better after contact with natural compounds than they otherwise would. It may be that the benefit comes from the fact that you’re walking through the forest with friends, and social contacts in natural settings are soothing and restorative. It may be that natural settings call on us just to get out there and take a walk, and the physical activity is a really effective promoter of good health.

Not knowing the pathways and mechanisms of benefits makes it a little difficult to prescribe. And we don’t know a lot about the varieties of nature and which ones are more or less effective. Do you need trees, or do shrubs do the trick? Do you need immersion, or viewing nature out the window? Do you need the real thing, or might virtual nature provide some of the same benefits? Do you need to get out every day, or does a few times a week suffice? So these are a lot of questions we still need to try to answer.

The potential benefits of nature contact are strong, much less expensive than pharmaceuticals, free of side effects, and don’t need to be prescribed by a licensed healthcare provider. The cost-benefit implications are potentially enormous if we get it right and understand best how to optimize those benefits.

Yale Climate Connections: As a physician, I hear a real fear of nature from patients: ticks and mosquito-borne disease, allergies, wildfire smoke, and extreme weather – and climate change is heightening those risks. How do you balance nature’s benefits against these threats?

Frumkin: Rarely in life can you eliminate risk altogether, but you can manage risk.

The risks of being outside: Well, there’s a risk of sunburn – but we can manage that risk with sunblock and with protective clothing. The risk of ticks – that’s a real risk. But we can manage that risk: inspecting ourselves after we’ve been in tick-infested areas and using bug repellent to keep the ticks away. So for each risk, we can reduce the risk by managing it well.

Yale Climate Connections: How do you hope communities will use the Nature Record?

Frumkin: So for communities, here’s an example. Almost every community in the country now has a housing shortage, and there is a need to build more housing. And to do that in economically and environmentally efficient ways generally means density. Density can collide with protecting nature. This report will make it clear that balancing the protection of nature with fulfillment of other human needs – like housing – is a key set of trade-offs we need to tackle and be explicit about.

Using the insights from this report, design strategies that both protect nature and provide nearby nature contact and also provide housing and transportation – which means in many cases nonmotorized transportation, active transport, cycling, and walking. The design of communities needs to take into account all these needs: environment, human, and equity.

Yale Climate Connections: Hospitals and health systems have a natural connection to health, not only through the care they provide but also through the spaces they create. As they consider land use decisions, including parking needs and opportunities for green space, what should they keep in mind?

Frumkin: Two thoughts. One is that we know a lot about how to build green, and that means the buildings themselves, with biophilic principles. It means the environmental performance of the buildings – what are called green buildings – and it means the situation of buildings in lots, protecting nearby nature. That’s a good way to build; it’s economical. There may be increased up-front costs, but they’re generally recoverable in a short number of years, and they deliver health benefits to patients and staff.

The second message is that nonprofit hospitals are required to carry out community health needs assessments and to invest in community health based on the findings of those assessments.

Nature deficit is a community health need, and in my view ought to be a part of every community health needs assessment. To the extent that it’s documented, hospitals can consider investing funds in local parks, either for developing parks or planning programming in parks that we know improve community health.

I would urge hospitals to think about nature deficit as one of those community health needs and then consider investments in nature contact for people in their catchment areas as a means of promoting public health.

Yale Climate Connections: Finally, what makes you most hopeful?

Frumkin: For me, one of the biggest potential sources of despair is the polarization and ideological hysteria that seems to be sweeping our country and many others as well. But this topic offers a counterbalance, because across the political spectrum people love the natural world and appreciate it.

Hunters and anglers and campers may be far right politically, but they have common cause with environmentalists who may be on the political left. There aren’t too many domains that can unite us across the ideological divide that bedevils the country now, but this is one.

I think the fact that we’re approaching this entire Nature Record in an apolitical way, and framing it in terms of benefits that all Americans can enjoy, gives me hope that we may be able to help overcome one of the biggest challenges we face.