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I. Climate Science
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #19 2026
Emerging low-cloud feedback and adjustment in global satellite observations, Ceppi et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics
From mid-2003 to mid-2024, a global decrease in low-cloud amount enhanced the absorption of solar radiation by 0.22±0.07 W m−2 per decade (±1σ range), accelerating the energy imbalance trend during that period (0.44 W m−2 per decade). Through controlling factor analysis, here we show that the low-cloud trend is due to a combination of cloud feedback and adjustments to greenhouse gases and aerosols (respectively 0.09±0.02, 0.05±0.03, and 0.03±0.03 W m−2 per decade), which jointly account for 74 % of the trend. The contribution of natural climate variability is weak but uncertain (0.01±0.08 W m−2 per decade), owing to a poorly constrained trend in boundary-layer inversion strength. Importantly, the observed low-cloud radiative trend lies well within the range of values simulated by contemporary global climate models under conditions close to present day. Any systematic model error in the representation of present-day global energy imbalance trends is thus likely to originate in processes unrelated to low clouds.
When Thunderstorms Reach the Stratosphere: Why Storm Structure May Matter for Climate, Cairo, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmosphere
Deep convection that overshoots the tropopause provides one of the fastest pathways for exchanging air between the troposphere and the stratosphere. Using extensive in situ observations from the dynamics and chemistry of the summer stratosphere (DCOTSS) campaign, Shepherd et al. (2026, https://doi.org/10.1029/2025JD045514) showed how storm-scale characteristics and environmental conditions shape the magnitude, depth, and pathways of stratosphere-troposphere exchange in the midlatitudes. Their analysis indicates that storms producing above-anvil cirrus plumes, as well as large mesoscale convective systems, are associated with disproportionately strong stratospheric perturbations, particularly in water vapor. This Commentary places these results in a broader context, highlights the main conceptual advances enabled by DCOTSS, and discusses remaining uncertainties while outlining priorities for future work. In particular, it argues that the main significance of these results lies not in resolving the large-scale stratospheric water vapor budget, which remains uncertain, but in helping identify which storm classes and physical pathways are most likely to matter if such impacts are to be quantified more robustly.
Record-Breaking Marine Heatwaves Across Global Coral Reefs in 2024, Yao & Wang, Geophysical Research Letters
The record-breaking annual mean global sea surface temperature in 2024 fueled extensive marine heatwaves (MHWs) across global coral reef zones, yet their spatiotemporal characteristics have not been comprehensively quantified. Here, we show that during the 2024 warm-season, MHW total days and cumulative intensity exceeded the historical mean by more than 3 standard deviations. Widespread and persistent MHWs occurred across major coral reef regions, particularly in the Red Sea, Coral Triangle, Fiji, the Caribbean, and Brazil. Most coral biogeographic provinces experienced significant increases in the frequency of Moderate, Strong, and Severe MHW categories relative to the 1985–2024 climatology. These extreme events were associated with substantial accumulation of ocean heat content in the Indo-Pacific warm pool and tropical Atlantic following the transition from the triple-dip La Niña (2020–2023) to the 2023–2024 El Niño. Regional oceanographic conditions further modulated the intensity and drivers of warm-season MHWs in 2024.
Beyond post-truth: Projecting the future trajectory of climate misinformation, Rice, PLOS Climate
Climate misinformation represents one of the most significant barriers to effective climate action in the 21st century. Building upon Yotam Ophir’s comprehensive framework in Misinformation & Society, this essay examines the evolving landscape of climate misinformation and projects its future trajectory. Ophir’s interdisciplinary approach, which integrates historical, psychological, and technological perspectives, provides crucial insights into how climate misinformation operates within broader systems of information disorder. This paper extends Ophir’s arguments by examining critical dimensions of his work, including the shift from outright denial to more sophisticated delay and deflection tactics, the role of emerging technologies including artificial intelligence in amplifying misinformation spread, and the political economy of climate misinformation characterized by asymmetric epistemic relationships. Drawing on recent research, I project that climate misinformation will increasingly manifest through narratives of technological futurism and transformation, the pretense of economic crisis through environmental catastrophe, and the social implications of international weaponized uncertainty inflamed by misinformation. The essay concludes by proposing an integrated intervention framework that reviews proposed solutions including psychological inoculation, systemic media literacy, and structural reforms to digital and online platform governance. Understanding these trajectories is essential for developing resilient communication strategies that can withstand the evolving tactics of climate action obstruction.
From this week's government/NGO section:European State of the Climate – Report 2025, Emerton et al., World Meteorological Organization and European Union, represented by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
Rapid warming in Europe is reducing snow and ice cover, while dangerously high air temperatures, drought, heatwaves and record ocean temperatures are affecting regions from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. Europe, along with many other regions of the globe, is exposed to increasing impacts – from record heatwaves on land and at sea, to devastating wildfires, and continuing biodiversity loss – with consequences for societies and ecosystems across Europe.Climate Change in Central Finland, Kühn et al., Finnish Meteorological Institute
Climate change is progressing in Finland faster than the global average, and its impacts are already clearly observable in Central Finland. The authors examines the current state of the climate in Central Finland and the Jyväskylä region, observed changes, and the projected development of the climate throughout the current century. The assessments are based on long?term observational datasets, the latest climate model simulations, and SSP emission scenarios.PwC’s Third Annual State of Decarbonization Report, PwC
The authors draw on AI-enabled insights of millions of data points from across thousands of corporate disclosures and related documents. Many companies changed how they talk about sustainability, but not what they do about it. Commitments were persistent even as the ground shifted beneath them. Eight in ten (82%) companies held steady or accelerated the timeline they needed for achieving their ambitions. More companies are increasing ambitions (23%) compared to those decreasing (18%). Progress held, with more organizations on track to meet their targets than in prior years. 87 articles in 49 journals by 717 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation slowdown modulates atmospheric rivers in a warmer climate, Mimi et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72555-w
Emerging low-cloud feedback and adjustment in global satellite observations, Ceppi et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-4153-2026
Stratospheric polar vortex shapes Arctic surface climate via a radiative pathway, Xia et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72698-w
When Thunderstorms Reach the Stratosphere: Why Storm Structure May Matter for Climate, Cairo, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046663
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Drivers and mechanisms of heatwaves in South West India, Climate Dynamics, 10.1007/s00382-024-07242-x 16 cites.
Observations of climate change, effects
Climate-driven upward spread of forest fires in European mountain regions, Beloiu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72551-0
Quantitative attribution of climate change effects on the 2023 North China heatwave, WAN et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.04.016
Spatial and temporal variability of snow in the Andes using MODIS snow product 2000–2025, Saavedra et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access 10.3389/feart.2026.1564035
Strengthening of the out-of-phase relationship between Eurasian winter and summer temperature anomalies since the early 1990s, Zhu et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109057
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Increasing Fire Activity in African Tropical Forests Is Associated With Deforestation and Climate Change, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl106240 36 cites.
Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
Dynamically-Informed Extreme Event Attribution Using Circulation Imprints, Dorrington & Messori, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl116869
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Towards Energy-Balance Closure with a Model of Dispersive Heat Fluxes, Boundary-Layer Meteorology, 10.1007/s10546-024-00868-8 13 cites.
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation slowdown modulates atmospheric rivers in a warmer climate, Mimi et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72555-w
Future heatwave hotspots in India from climate projections, Lakshman et al., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 10.1002/qj.70220
Increased shallower tropical cyclones under extreme warm climates, Zhang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72386-9
Robust Responses of Tropical and Post-tropical Cyclones to Climate Warming in WRF and CAM Storyline Ensembles, Li et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100909
Storyline-Based Climate Attribution Reveals Strong Intensification of 2018–2022 Multi-Year Droughts in Europe, Kettaren et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007547
The pace of meeting carbon emission targets alters regional climate risks, Park et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aec4566
The Role of Tropical Cyclone—Ocean Interactions in Future Changes in Hurricane Katrina, Forbis et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122126
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
High-resolution modelling identifies the Bering Strait’s role in amplified Arctic warming, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02008-z 17 cites.
Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
A Sea-Ice-Enhanced KPP Parameterization: Impacts on AMOC Simulation and Physical Pathways, Tseng & Wang, Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans 10.1029/2025jc023767
Attributing Upper-Tropospheric Warm Biases in CMIP6 Models to Ice Cloud-Radiation Interaction Deficiencies Over Tropical Oceans, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120130
Heavy precipitation simulation in non-hydrostatic CESM modeling over the Western US, Huang & Medeiros, Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109058
Sources of Uncertainty in Ocean Net Primary Productivity Projections Under Climate Change, Grix & Tagliabue, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119652
Uncertain dynamic response of mid-latitude winter precipitation, Gu et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10474-y
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Understanding the Cascade: Removing GCM Biases Improves Dynamically Downscaled Climate Projections, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2023gl106264 36 cites.
Cryosphere & climate change
Comprehensive Assessment of Six Snow Depth Products and Trends across the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau, Li et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0263.1
Global glacier-free topography reveals a large potential for future lakes in presently ice-covered terrain, Frank et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72548-9
Spatial and temporal variability of snow in the Andes using MODIS snow product 2000–2025, Saavedra et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access 10.3389/feart.2026.1564035
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
An Intercomparison of Snow Mass Budget over Arctic Sea Ice Simulated by CMIP6 Models, Journal of Climate, 10.1175/jcli-d-22-0539.1 2 cites.
Sea level & climate change
Climate-driven depopulation and adaptation realities in America’s coastal ground zero, Törnqvist et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01820-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Determining sea-level rise in the Caribbean: A shift from temperature to mass control, Scientific Reports, 10.1038/s41598-024-60201-8 7 cites.
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Mid-Holocene retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet indicated by subglacial methane release, Hatton et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01976-5
Temperature-Driven Silicate Weathering Feedbacks Terminated the Middle Eocene Climatic Optimum, Ma et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121765
Tight regulation of Earth’s long-term temperature over Phanerozoic time, Zheng et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72672-6
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
High-frequency climate forcing causes prolonged cold periods in the Holocene, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01380-0 26 cites.
Biology & climate change, related geochemistry
A few key species drive community thermophilization under experimental warming, Dobson et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences pdf 10.1073/pnas.2533434123
A Functional Trait-Based Approach to Mapping Climate-Driven Changes in Temperature-Dependent Feeding Suitability, Marchessaux et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73623
Climate Change Alters Elevational Distribution Patterns of Cormus domestica Habitat, Li et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73602
Climate Change Shapes Suitable Habitat and Ecological Niche Overlap Between Hyphantria cunea and Its Parasitoid Chouioia cunea in China, Ouyang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73469
Climate-Driven Habitat Suitability Modeling for the Vulnerable Species Euryops pinifolius A. Rich in Ethiopia: Implications for Conservation, Birhanu et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73566
Coral Reefs in the Indonesian Seas Threatened by Heat and Cold Stress, Watanabe et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121003
Geographical differences in marine heatwaves across global coral reef zones, YAO & WANG, Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.04.015
Hemisphere-Level Comparison of Climate-Driven Humpback Whale Breeding Migrations to the Eastern Pacific Off Costa Rica, Pelayo-González et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73594
PondNet – towards a global network of experiments on the effects of climate change on aquatic ecosystems, Matias et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.07450
Potential Geographic Distribution of the Rare and Endangered Plant Sauvagesia rhodoleuca in China Under Climate Change Scenarios, Wei et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73295
Prevalent Greening Conceals the Forgone Ecological Potential of Forest Loss in Southeast Asia, Zhao et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121593
Projected Future of African Marine Ecosystems Under Climate Change and Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Awo et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc022687
Record-Breaking Marine Heatwaves Across Global Coral Reefs in 2024, Yao & Wang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122086
Sources of Uncertainty in Ocean Net Primary Productivity Projections Under Climate Change, Grix & Tagliabue, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119652
Spatial Distribution of Topmouth Gudgeonis Pseudorasbora parva Under Climate Change by Ensemble Models, Li et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73612
Warming climate amplifies vapor pressure deficit limits on gross primary productivity, Xu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72549-8
Warming temperatures and shifting precipitation patterns may exacerbate pest damage in North American forests, Clipp et al., Nature Ecology & Evolution 10.1038/s41559-026-03039-9
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Coastal ecological disasters triggered by an extreme rainfall event thousands of kilometers inland, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01418-3 31 cites.
GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
A Global Comparison of Direct and Legacy Effects of Drought on Ecosystem Productivity, Liu et al., Ecology Letters Open Access 10.1111/ele.70390
Atmospheric oxygen constraints on Southern Ocean productivity and drivers of carbon uptake, Jin et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01944-z
Current understanding of viral contributions to soil carbon cycling, Mei & Balcázar, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00774-2
Ecosystem-Scale Methane Emissions From Peatlands of the Hudson Bay Lowlands, Bieniada & Humphreys, Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009439
Incorporating methane isotopologues alters tropical and subtropical methane emission estimates, Yu et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72668-2
Methane intensity and emissions across major oil and gas basins and individual jurisdictions using MethaneSAT observations, Williams et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-5961-2026
Mid-Holocene retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet indicated by subglacial methane release, Hatton et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-01976-5
Nitrogen Release From Permafrost Thaw May Partially Offset Future Soil Carbon Losses, Gaillard et al., PubMed pmid:42068065
Phytoplankton and Temperature Control Seasonal Dynamics of Greenhouse Gases in a Large River, Koschorreck et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009300
Soil microbes are the tiny bioengineers running Earth’s underground factory, Hassan-Dalléac et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03544-6
Soil pH Amelioration Fosters Persistent Carbon Sinks Through Mineral Stabilization and Aggregate Protection, Dong et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70896
Tree diversity reduces the temperature sensitivity of soil carbon release, Yan et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70333
Warming climate amplifies vapor pressure deficit limits on gross primary productivity, Xu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72549-8
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Total Carbon Column Observing Network's GGG2020 data version, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-2197-2024 94 cites.
CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Articulating conditions for geological carbon storage: Conditional acceptance in three European communities, Oltra et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104739
Managed rainforests support higher carbon density and sequestration in the Congo Basin, Sagang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72399-4
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The carbon dioxide removal gap, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-01984-6 75 cites.
Decarbonization
A multi-criteria assessment of decarbonization pathways for heavy-duty trucks, ?ahin & Özekinci, Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access 10.1088/2634-4505/ae62a1
A multi-dimensional framework for comparing zero-carbon energy sources in the energy transition, Park, Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104721
Integrated planning of net-zero power systems for all, Zhu et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-026-02054-1
Photovoltaic Modelling Within the Pan-European Climate Database v4.2: Capturing PV Diversity for a Climate-Resilient European Grid, Silva et al., Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research Open Access 10.1002/aesr.202500387
The electrifying moment? Electric vehicles and the rural-urban divide in Germany and the U.S., Gabehart & Stefes, Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115356
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Evaluating microgrid business models for rural electrification: A novel framework and three cases in Southeast Asia, Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development, 10.1016/j.esd.2024.101443 21 cites.
Geoengineering climate
Projected Future of African Marine Ecosystems Under Climate Change and Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Awo et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc022687
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Dependency of the impacts of geoengineering on the stratospheric sulfur injection strategy – Part 2: How changes in the hydrological cycle depend on the injection rate and model used, Earth System Dynamics, 10.5194/esd-15-405-2024 11 cites.
Aerosols
Atmospheric warming contributions from airborne microplastics and nanoplastics, Liu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02620-1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impacts of spatial heterogeneity of anthropogenic aerosol emissions in a regionally refined global aerosol–climate model, Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-3507-2024 2 cites.
Climate change communications & cognition
Beyond post-truth: Projecting the future trajectory of climate misinformation, Rice, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000916
Climate dissonance: Examining the relationship between climate beliefs and attitudes toward fossil fuel activities in Norway, Nadeau et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104750
Identifying Flawed Reasoning in Contrarian Claims about Climate Change, Flack et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2663476
Polarizing figures in polarized times: presidential involvement and public opinion on climate policy, Childree, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2666997
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Scientists’ identities shape engagement with environmental activism, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01412-9 22 cites.
Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Improved management reduces carbon losses in semi-arid grasslands: An analysis of upscaled CO? fluxes from portable chambers, Carrascosa et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111215
Locally led climate adaptation: Business unusual for agricultural research, Hellin et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000910
Low Climate Benefit of Nordic Coastal Marshes: Site Conditions Outweigh Grazing Effects and Shape Trade-Offs Between Carbon Storage and Its Stability, Leiva-Dueñas et al., PubMed pmid:42068073
Managed rainforests support higher carbon density and sequestration in the Congo Basin, Sagang et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72399-4
Rainfall Dynamics in Sri Lanka Over Five Decades (1970–2023): Implications for Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Change, Abeysingha et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70415
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Crop rotational diversity can mitigate climate?induced grain yield losses, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17298 41 cites.
Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Are Changes in Seasonal and Annual Precipitation in the Balkan Peninsula Driven by Increases in Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gases or by Teleconnection Variability?, Buri?, Journal of Hydrometeorology 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0184.1
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation slowdown modulates atmospheric rivers in a warmer climate, Mimi et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-72555-w
Projected runoff responses to climate and vegetation changes on the Tibetan Plateau, FENG et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109024
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Hidden delta degradation due to fluvial sediment decline and intensified marine storms, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adk1698 38 cites.
Climate change economics
Climate finance challenges and solutions for global climate change, Park, Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1007/s13412-021-00715-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Empirical testing of the environmental Kuznets curve: evidence from 182 countries of the world, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-024-04890-1 17 cites.
Climate change mitigation public policy research
Beyond technical and financial feasibility: The role of collaborative governance in renewable energy adoption at municipal wastewater treatment plants in the United States, Gupta et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104729
The politics and governance of phase-out: a framework for empirical research, Rinscheid et al., Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2666995
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The differential impact of climate interventions along the political divide in 60 countries, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48112-8 77 cites.
Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
Climate change-related migration and displacement: addressing the adaptation gap, Marcus, The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101462
Decision to stay in climate-risk areas: cognitive biases and preferences in coastal Bangladesh, Vollan et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32168527.v1
“Global significant trends and countermeasures pertaining to climate change adaptation: Translating ambition into action post-COP29”, Liu et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104391
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Wildfire risk management in the era of climate change, PNAS Nexus, 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae151 43 cites.
Climate change impacts on human health
Climate health: an emerging transdisciplinary field, Rifai, Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1837784
Future age-specific exposure to heavy rainfall disasters under climate and demographic change, Matsuura et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100817
Reclassifying lethal heat, Rouse et al., Apollo Open Access 10.17863/cam.128895
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Effects of climate vulnerability on household sanitation access, functionality, and practices in rural Cambodia, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-024-04881-2 6 cites.
Climate change & geopolitics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
China at COP27: CBDR, national sovereignty, and climate justice, Climate and Development, 10.1080/17565529.2024.2349652 1 citation.
Other
Evolving Fire Frequency in the Western United States and Its Links to Human Influence, Madakumbura et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007077
Transient tracer observations in the Gulf of St. Lawrence reveal shift from younger to older inflow waters, Gerke et al., Ocean science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-1391-2026
Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change2026 Value of Water Index, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz & Associates, and New Bridge Strategy
Half of voters say they have been impacted by a major weather event, e.g., wildfire, flooding, a hurricane, a deep freeze, or drought, in the last five years. Roughly one in five say that they lost water service after a major weather event.2030 Climate Action Plan, City of Boston, Environment Department, City of Boston
The plan is grounded in two core and interconnected areas of work: mitigation and resilience – which frame every strategy and action included. Mitigation efforts focus on rapidly reducing emissions from the sectors that contribute most to Boston’s carbon footprint, particularly buildings, transportation, and energy. Resilience strategies are designed to protect people, infrastructure including new, existing, and historic assets, open space, and neighborhoods from the growing impacts of climate change, while strengthening the City’s ability to adapt over time and creating pathways to good green jobs that support resilience and mitigation investments. In addition to tracking progress on mitigation and resilience, we acknowledge the broader impacts of climate work across three deeply interconnected areas: public health outcomes, climate justice, and the intersection of mitigation and resilience benefits. This approach recognizes that effective climate action must deliver healthier living and working environments, address historic inequities, and maximize co-benefits, ensuring that investments reduce emissions while also protecting communities most exposed to climate risks. Climate justice is embedded throughout the plan, recognizing that the impacts of climate change will not affect neighborhoods equally and that climate action presents an opportunity to correct past harms. Communities that have been and will be adversely affected by climate change must be prioritized in both decision-making and investment.Where rising climate risks and insurance costs will hit hardest, Manann Donoghoe, The Brookings Institution
One concept to help understand how climate-related risks could differentially affect households across the U.S. is adaptive capacity, or the ability of a household or community to plan for and respond to the impacts of climate change. By analyzing adaptive capacity in relation to instability in the homeowners insurance market, the author identifies which regions and demographic groups that instability is likely to adversely affect. Drawing on data from the U.S. Treasury Department on homeowners insurance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Risk Index, and Census Bureau demographic data on wealth, race, and ethnicity, the author shows the insurance premium increases and nonrenewal rates (the proportion of policies that an insurer decides not to extend at term’s end) that different demographic groups and regions faced between 2018 and 2022.Critical Minerals, Water Insecurity and Injustice, Nunbogu et al., United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment, and Health
The investigation finds that systemic global failures are allowing the costs of critical minerals extraction to fall disproportionately on some of the world's most vulnerable communities, while the benefits accumulate elsewhere in the form of electric vehicles (EVs), renewable energy systems, and artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure. The authors do not question the need for clean energy systems or the digital infrastructure underpinning them. Instead, it asks who is paying for and benefitting from humanity’s progress in those areas, and finds a deeply unjust answer.European State of the Climate – Report 2025, Emerton et al., World Meteorological Organization and European Union, represented by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
Rapid warming in Europe is reducing snow and ice cover, while dangerously high air temperatures, drought, heatwaves and record ocean temperatures are affecting regions from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. Europe, along with many other regions of the globe, is exposed to increasing impacts – from record heatwaves on land and at sea, to devastating wildfires, and continuing biodiversity loss – with consequences for societies and ecosystems across Europe.Climate Change in Central Finland, Kühn et al., Finnish Meteorological Institute
Climate change is progressing in Finland faster than the global average, and its impacts are already clearly observable in Central Finland. The authors examines the current state of the climate in Central Finland and the Jyväskylä region, observed changes, and the projected development of the climate throughout the current century. The assessments are based on long?term observational datasets, the latest climate model simulations, and SSP emission scenarios.PwC’s Third Annual State of Decarbonization Report, PwC
The authors draw on AI-enabled insights of millions of data points from across thousands of corporate disclosures and related documents. Many companies changed how they talk about sustainability, but not what they do about it. Commitments were persistent even as the ground shifted beneath them. Eight in ten (82%) companies held steady or accelerated the timeline they needed for achieving their ambitions. More companies are increasing ambitions (23%) compared to those decreasing (18%). Progress held, with more organizations on track to meet their targets than in prior years.France's Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, Climate Interminsterial Team, Government of France
Since 2017, France has committed to a gradual phase-out of fossil fuels, mobilizing a broad range of ecological planning tools. The 2017 Climate Plan introduced a legislation to phase out hydrocarbon production in France by 2040, notably by ending the granting of new exploration permits and by not renewing existing exploitation concessions. This plan has also led to a significant reduction in fossil fuel consumption in buildings which fell by 42% between 2017 and 2022. It further aimed at accelerate the electrification of the transport sector in order to reduce its dependence on oil, by setting a end-of-sale target for thermal passenger vehicles by 2040. France will also address five environmental challenges including mitigation of global warming, adaptation to the inevitable consequences of climate change, preservation and restoration of biodiversity, conservation of resources, and reduction of pollution that impacts health.How import rules can cut global methane emissions, Anna Kanduth and Claudio Forner, Climate Analytics
Methane is one of the quickest levers available to slow warming in the near term, yet current policies are nowhere near enough to deliver the cuts needed by 2030. As governments look for ways to narrow that gap, methane import standards are emerging as a powerful new tool. This briefing explores how the European Union’s new rules for imported oil, gas, and coal could drive emissions cuts far beyond its borders – and how, if other major importers follow, they could help close more than 40% of the gap to a 1.5°C-consistent methane pathway. At current trade levels, an EU standard of 0.2% methane intensity could reduce emissions by more than 3 Mt CH? annually from its imports alone. Wider adoption by six other major importers could cut global methane emissions by over 10 Mt CH?, driven in particular by Russia and the United States, which have the largest excess methane emissions relative to a 0.2% intensity standard.Water Supply Systems, Fire, and Finance: A Workshop Synthesis Report, Pierce et al., UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation
A new UCLA-led convening highlights how wildfire risk could reshape water system planning and finance. Water systems were designed to provide drinking water and fight structure fires — not urban wildfires. Expanding system capacity to fight extreme events creates tradeoffs with water quality and affordability. Fire-related water use is often not fully paid for, straining system finances. Coordination between water and fire agencies is inconsistent and often informal. Recovery of wildfire-related costs raises equity concerns for ratepayers.Massachusetts Carbon Dioxide Removal Study, Mittelman et al., Massachusetts Clean Energy Center
The authors build on Massachusetts’ prior planning to assess which carbon dioxide removal (CDR) pathways are most feasible and scalable in the state’s policy, economic, and natural resource context. The outcomes of this effort will inform future iterations of the state’s Clean Energy and Climate Plans (CECPs), which are the flagship climate planning documents, to provide an assessment of best practices and policy options that Massachusetts should consider when responsibly integrating CDR into its net-zero strategy. The authors describe and assess 23 CDR and storage pathways across several characteristics, analyzing their suitability for deployment and research and development (R&D) leadership in Massachusetts.Diesel Reduction Progress II, Bledsoe et al., Pembina Institute
Clean electricity projects in remote communities grew 20 times faster between 2016 and 2026 than the previous decade, with most of this progress (about 92%) occurring between 2020 and 2025. Roughly three quarters of community-scale clean electricity projects built in remote communities are wholly or majority Indigenous-owned. Altogether, remote communities have added more than 65 megawatts (MW) of clean electricity capacity over the past decade, and now produce over 126 GWh clean energy annually, with 35% from wind, 33% from hydro, and 30% from solar. Remote renewable electricity generating projects have reduced annual diesel consumption by more than 31 million liters, and now account for 7% of total electricity supply in remote communities. Since 2016 these projects have displaced over 142 million liters of diesel, more diesel than all three territories use to generate electricity in an entire year.Credit Where Credit is Due. Strengthening carbon markets to protect Ontario steel and mobilize low-carbon investment, Chloe McElhone and Richard Mullin, Clean Prosperity
In order to protect Ontario’s steel sector and signal to other industries that Ontario is open for business, the authors recommend strengthening Ontario’s carbon market in the following ways; recognize real emissions reductions from fuel-switching investments in the steel sector; award carbon credits to clearly signal that the Ontario carbon market recognizes and values real emissions reductions achieved through low-carbon investments; support predictable and stable credit values by redistributing credit revenues among all regulated emitters and opening the market to third-party investors; and publish market data frequently and create a centralized marketplace to build investor confidence and incentivize investment.2026 State of the Water Industry, American Water Works Association
The industry survey respondents reveal a sector facing growing pressure across infrastructure, financing, and long-term water supply reliability. While overall sector health remains stable, the five-year outlook has declined to its lowest level in nearly a decade, signaling growing concern about the future. Aging infrastructure remains the most pressing challenge, closely followed by the need for sustainable funding and long-term water supply reliability. Many utilities are struggling to fully recover costs through rates and fees, creating a widening gap between revenues and rising expenses. External pressures, including economic uncertainty, political dynamics, natural hazards, and supply chain disruptions, are compounding these financial challenges and complicating long-term planning.Oil Fund Vote Watch: Climate 2025. Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) voting at fossil fuel AGMs, Lucy Brooks, Framtiden i våre hender / Future in Our Hands
The author evaluates Norges Bank Investment Management's (NBIM) 2025 active ownership activities at 12 priority portfolio companies. These firms were selected because they are the world’s largest investor-owned upstream oil and gas developers currently expanding production in defiance of scientific pathways to net-zero. The author examines whether NBIM used its voting power and escalation tools to signal accountability for these firms' climate failings. Despite NBIM’s stated position that "climate risk is fundamental financial risk," the fund’s actions in 2025 at these high-priority firms reveal a significant implementation gap. Of the 23 priority votes analyzed across 12 companies, NBIM signaled disapproval of management in only three instances—with just one potentially linked to climate concerns.Stop Greed, Build Green. A Working Class Climate Agenda, Climate and Community Institute
The climate crisis is a core driver of the cost-of-living crisis and instability we see across the economy. Electricity and gas bills are the highest drivers of inflation, rent gouging and skyrocketing insurance premiums are making housing unaffordable, extreme weather is driving food prices up, and the last three summers have been the three hottest on record. And while prices go up, the quality of our health care, goods, and homes is getting worse. Amidst all of this, billionaires are becoming richer, Big Tech firms are spending trillions on energy-hungry data centers, and a majority of U.S. residents are profoundly disillusioned with the political system. A Working Class Climate Agenda would quickly relieve the cost-of-living crisis and transform the economy to stem future climate-fueled affordability crises. More importantly, it puts the majority of voters in the driver’s seat of economic and climate transformationThe Reuse Dividend: Unlocking Economic Growth from Britain's Existing Buildings, Nelson et al., Don't Waste Buildings
The authors analyzed financial incentives used across eight developed economies — including France, Germany, the United States and Ireland — and found a proven blueprint that Britain has failed to adopt. The authors recommends four complementary measures to address building reuse including levelling the value added tax playing field, tax credits or relief, such as introducing capital gains tax relief and stamp duty discounts for bringing vacant buildings back into use while meeting sustainability quality measures, creating targeted grants for struggling high streets and derelict buildings; and subsidized finance by establishing long-term low-interest loans with repayment grants for deep reuse projects through the National Wealth Fund, or a similar institution About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
SuggestionsPlease let us know if you're aware of an article you think may be of interest for Skeptical Science research news, or if we've missed something that may be important. Send your input to Skeptical Science via our contact form.
Previous editionThe previous edition of Skeptical Science New Research may be found here.
Cropped 6 May 2026: Forest loss falls | Deforestation regulations | Saving ‘India’s Galapagos’
We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter.
Subscribe for free here.
DRIVER DECLINE: Tropical primary forest loss fell by more than one-third from 2024-25, according to the latest edition of the Global Forest Review. (Primary forests are those that are intact or relatively undisturbed by humans.) The World Resources Institute, which co-produced the report, noted that the loss of these forests is “still 46% higher than [it was] a decade ago”. It attributed much of this year’s decline to a decrease from last year’s “record-breaking year of extreme fires”.
WIDESPREAD COLLABS: Although Brazil had the largest loss in terms of area, deforestation in the country fell by 42% compared to the previous year, reported Agência Brasil. It noted that this was made possible by a governmental task force, “with the participation of civil society, academia, local communities and the private sector”. In Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia, progress “reflected improved governance, recognition of Indigenous land rights and corporate commitments to deforestation-free production”, said EnviroNews Nigeria.
EXCEEDING THE LIMIT: Despite the decline, the amount of deforestation “still remains ‘far above’ the level required to put the world on track to meet international targets to halt and reverse forest loss by 2030”, said BusinessGreen. It added that “fires present a growing threat that could reverse recent gains”, despite the declines from 2024. Reuters noted: “Agricultural expansion continued to be the biggest driver of forest loss around the world.”
EU deforestation law watered downUNDER PRESSURE: Following industry pressure, the European Commission decided to “exclude imports of leather from its anti-deforestation law”, according to Reuters. The newswire said: “Leather industry groups have argued that as a by-product of the meat industry, with a relatively low value, leather’s production does not incentivise the cattle farming that drives deforestation.” It added that imported beef is still covered by the law.
‘LONG-OVERDUE’: Meanwhile, a group of UK Parliament members released an open letter calling for “long-overdue regulations to end UK imports linked to illegal deforestation”. Although the forest-risk regulation was introduced in 2021 as part of the Environment Act, “lawmakers have spent the last four years delaying the implementation” of the anti-deforestation rules, according to a Mongabay report from last year.
PROVISIONAL DEAL: The EU-Mercosur deal – a trade agreement between the European bloc and four South American countries – provisionally came into force on 1 May “after 25 years of negotiations”, said Euractiv. The application of the agreement is provisional because members of the European Parliament “referred the deal to the European Court of Justice for a legal review” in January, it added.
News and views- PACKAGING PLANTATION: Asia Symbol, a China-based pulp and paper company, cleared “vast tracts of Indonesian rainforest home to endangered orangutans…for plantations supplying a maker of ‘carbon-neutral’ packaging”, according to an investigation by Agence France-Presse and the Gecko Project. The company told AFP that it is “committed to its no-deforestation policy”, while the newswire noted that the plantations supplying the paper mill have permits from the Indonesian government.
- SODA MOUNTAIN SOLAR: The California Energy Commission approved a proposed $700m solar power plant in the Mojave Desert after “nearly 20 years” of challenges, reported the San Bernardino Sun. Last month, climate journalist Sammy Roth dove into the history of – and current debate over – the Soda Mountain project on his Substack, Climate Colored Goggles.
- POSITIVE TIPPING POINTS: In a Nature Sustainability perspective piece, Prof Tim Lenton at the University of Exeter argued for the existence of “positive tipping points” – ecological, social or socio-ecological states where feedback loops that “suppor[t] self-propelling nature-positive change can help” achieve nature-recovery goals.
- ‘ACUTE HUNGER’: Nearly eight million people in South Sudan are at risk of “acute food insecurity” in coming months, “fuelled by ethnic conflict, climate change and the spillover of fighting from neighbouring Sudan”, according to Al Jazeera coverage of a new Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis. Meanwhile, a UN-produced global food crises report showed that “acute hunger” has doubled over the past decade, with two famines declared last year for the first time since the reports began a decade ago.
- SUMMERTIME SADNESS: Production of India’s prized Devgad Alphonso mango “has dropped by 70-90%” this summer, due to both “climate shock” and “ineffective pesticides”, reported the Print. Rich mango farmers in western India staged a “rare protest” demanding compensation for their losses, the outlet added, while a Print comment called for a “shift from compensation to climate-adaptation policies”.
- SEED SUIT: A judge at the Kenyan High Court “declared unconstitutional parts of a law that prohibited farmers from sharing and selling Indigenous seeds” – although the government has appealed the decision, reported Devex. The lawyer who represented the farmers in the suit “said that the ruling could have ripple effects worldwide”, it added.
This week, Carbon Brief follows the uproar around the Great Nicobar project, after India’s opposition leader visited the biodiversity hotspot, which is at imminent risk of deforestation.
On 30 April, Rahul Gandhi – the head of India’s opposition and grandson of former prime minister Indira Gandhi – posted an Instagram video from the evergreen rainforest on Great Nicobar island, the southernmost point of India’s territory.
The island is the site of a proposed $10bn infrastructure project called the Great Nicobar Island Project, which includes a transhipment port in Galathea Bay, an international airport, a township and a gas and solar-based power plant.
Completion of the project would require the felling of more than a million trees – nearly 130 square kilometres of forest.
Speaking to the camera and dwarfed by gigantic tree trunks, Gandhi said:
“I’m in the middle of what is easily the most beautiful forest I’ve seen in my life.”
As drone footage showed viewers the lush forest canopy, Gandhi told viewers that the primary forest here is so dense, there was simply no way through. He continued by claiming:
“Now I understand why the government did not want me to come…because this is the largest theft of Indian ecological property in history.”
(In February, India’s National Green Tribunal upheld environmental clearances for the project, stating that the government had “considered all possible damage to the ecology and had taken efforts to compensate it”, according to the Hindu. A challenge is pending in the Calcutta High Court. In March, India announced it was raising its forest carbon target in its 2035 climate pledge.)
The provocative video calling for a halt to large-scale deforestation on “India’s Galapagos” has garnered more than 1.4m views and has sparked media debate, smear campaigns and government pushback, defending its strategic importance.
Paradise almost lost?Barely hours after Gandhi’s video was posted, the Indian government published a press release detailing how environmental and tribal welfare safeguards have been met, despite more evidence to the contrary emerging this week.
Several media outlets – particularly print and independent outlets – have gone to Great Nicobar since 2024 to investigate the project’s impacts on biodiversity, assess its economic viability and corroborate the government’s claims of receiving Indigenous consent.
However, many of the project’s details have been shrouded in secrecy and restrictive conditions, including “gag orders” on scientists, rebuffed right to information requests and missing maps of tribal lands and coral colonies, media investigations have alleged.
For many mainland Indians, Gandhi’s video was a first glimpse of the Great Nicobar Biosphere Reserve and its 1,800 species, many of them endemic to the islands.
Turtle walkerAmong the most charismatic and vulnerable are Great Nicobar’s sea turtles: leatherbacks, hawksbills and Olive Ridleys.
In an era before Instagram, biologist Satish Bhaskar surveyed over 4,000km of India’s coastline on foot from 1977-96 to document sea turtle nesting sites. Bhaskar laid the groundwork – and established the baseline – for Great Nicobar’s biodiversity and turtle conservation in India.
With only a transistor radio for company, Bhaskar would “maroon himself” on these islands for months at a time to measure tracks in the sand, count eggs and nests and wait for sightings of leatherback sea turtles, which can grow up to 2.7 metres long and weigh up to half a tonne.
From 1991-92, Bhaskar recorded more than 800 leatherback turtle nests on Great Nicobar Island alone. He identified Port Campbell Bay – where Gandhi met Nicobarese leaders last week – as a critical, irreplaceable turtle-nesting beach during his surveys.
“I’m glad I did what I did,” said the soft-spoken biologist in the 2025 documentary Turtle Walker, which recreates his early years on the island. Sadly, this new footage of Nicobar’s coastal reefs, mangroves and evergreen forests – is still only accessible to film festival audiences in India.
Can more visual, vocal and felt evidence shift the debate on deforestation in India? Experts told Carbon Brief that remains to be seen, but Gandhi’s video has brought “tremendous attention” back to the project, and brought in unlikely allies asking important questions.
Watch, read, listenGO FISH: BBC News explored how climate change is “threaten[ing] the economic backbone” of the Pacific island nation of Kiribati – its tuna fisheries.
LIFE AFTER COWS: The New York Times profiled Butter Ridge’s dairy farmers selling their generations-old Pennsylvania farm in the face of looming tariffs and “surging” input costs.
C FOR COMMODITY: On the Wilder podcast, Sue Pritchard – chief executive of the Food, Farming and Countryside Commission – explored the “invisible forces” shaping modern food systems.
WAR FALLOUT: From oil spills to contaminated soil, Wired took a closer look at how the war on Iran is impacting the environment in “unseen ways”.
New science- Commercial bottom-trawling fishing costs Europe nearly €16bn per year, mainly due to the release of carbon from ocean sediments | Ocean & Coastal Management
- A combination of global warming of 1.5-1.9C and deforestation of 22-28% could drive the Amazon to “system-wide changes” | Nature
- By 2050, 74% of the current habitats of all land mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians could be exposed to heatwaves under a high-emissions scenario | Nature Ecology & Evolution
- 11-15 May: 21st session of the UN Forum on Forests | New York City
- 11 to 15 May: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) regional conference for Europe | Dushanbe, Tajikistan
- 13 May: Webinar on the State of Forests report from the World Resources Institute | Online
- 22 May: International day for biological diversity
Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyerand Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org
Cropped 22 April 2026: Global food ‘catastrophe’ | BECCS emissions | UK solar farm controversy
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| jQuery(document).ready(function() { jQuery('.block-related-articles-slider-block_bf49f05c7377b1f99d09dee19f90fa78 .mh').matchHeight({ byRow: false }); });The post Cropped 6 May 2026: Forest loss falls | Deforestation regulations | Saving ‘India’s Galapagos’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate Adam - Climate Change is Destroying Lives... Now
This video includes personal musings and conclusions of the creator and climate scientist Dr. Adam Levy. It is presented to our readers as an informed perspective. Please see video description for references (if any).
Video descriptionClimate change isn't tomorrow's problem. It's devastating lives right now in every corner of the world. In this video I take a look at four experiences of climate change in different countries: air pollution in India, extreme heat's impact on the elderly in Japan, malnutrition's effects on the young in South Africa, and the mental health toll of the crisis in Brazil. These stories show how the crisis is already affecting us. And just how much we have to save if we choose to act to halt climate change.
Support ClimateAdam on patreon: https://patreon.com/climateadam
Vacancy: Three-week summer journalism internship at Carbon Brief
Carbon Brief is offering an exciting opportunity for students, or recent graduates, to work with the team for three weeks this summer. This journalism internship will be paid the London Living Wage, with an additional travel bursary.
Job descriptionCarbon Brief’s award-winning journalism and analysis is respected by scientists, journalists, policymakers and campaigners around the world. We write articles and create data visualisations, infographics and videos to explain the latest climate science and related policy issues.
You’ll spend time shadowing members of staff and helping out with the different tasks carried out by each part of the team. This includes journalists working on topics ranging from climate science through to China’s emissions, as well as specialists working on visuals and social media.
If you’re interested in whether carbon offsets are a viable climate solution, or how climate change is driving human migration, then this is the placement for you.
.innerArt>ol { font-family: 'PT Serif'; font-size: 18px !important; } What you will do- Have the opportunity to research, write and publish an article for Carbon Brief.
- Promote your article using visuals and social media.
- Assist with the research and writing of Carbon Brief’s award-winning newsletters.
- Help decide how Carbon Brief covers the latest developments in climate change, by helping to find stories in scientific papers and policy documents.
- Create and discuss content for social media.
- Experience how a small, independent but global journalism team works in practice.
- See how Carbon Brief puts together articles step by step.
- Learn how we interrogate news, data and reports.
- Pick up skills on how to make best use of visuals in your journalism.
- Interest in climate change.
- Some experience of writing on a technical topic for a general audience, which can include self-publishing.
- Interest in journalism and a commitment to the integrity of journalism.
- Competency in word processing and spreadsheet packages, such as MS Word/Excel or Google Docs/Sheets.
- Excellent spoken and written English.
- Experience with social media, such as Twitter/X and Instagram, would be a benefit.
Location: The internship will follow a hybrid format, involving time in person at our offices near London Bridge station in central London as well as remote working.
Reporting to: Our Associate Editor Daisy Dunne.
Hours/Duration: This is a three-week-long placement which will take place in the summer months from 13-31 July. Our office hours are 9am to 5pm Monday to Friday, with an hour for lunch.
Salary: London Living Wage (£14.80/hour), plus £100 towards travel expenses.
How to applyTo apply, please send:
- Your CV.
- A short covering letter of no more than 300 words, explaining why you would be a good fit for the internship and how you would benefit from it. Please include a paragraph explaining how Carbon Brief first caught your attention and pitch one idea for a Carbon Brief article. Any letter generated using AI will invalidate the application.
- A link or attachment for an article you have published. This can either be in traditional or student media, or on a personal blog.
To: jobs@carbonbrief.org (please use “Internship application” in the email’s subject line).
Applications must be submitted by 9am UK time on 1 June. Interviews will likely be held on the week beginning 8 June.
Applicants must already have the right to work permanently in the UK and be more than 18 years of age.
Carbon Brief is committed to encouraging equality, diversity and inclusion among our workforce. Our aim is to be truly representative of all sections of society and for each employee to feel respected and able to give their best. We strongly encourage applications from those who feel underrepresented in climate journalism, including ethnic and social minorities.
The post Vacancy: Three-week summer journalism internship at Carbon Brief appeared first on Carbon Brief.
EGU2026 - Presentation about the Skeptical Science Experiment
As mentioned in the recently published prolog to EGU2026 article, I submitted an abstract to talk about the results of the experiment we ran on Skeptical Science to gauge the effectiveness of our rebuttals. This blog post is a "companion article" to that presentation in session EOS4.1 Geoethics: Linking Geoscience Knowledge, Ethical Responsibility, and Action and will go into somewhat greater details than is possible in the 8 minutes available during the oral session for my presentation about Results of the Skeptical Science experiment and impacts on relaunched website.
IntroductionSkeptical Science (SkS) is a website and non-profit science education organization with international reach founded by John Cook in 2007. Our main purpose is to debunk misconceptions and misinformation about human-caused climate change and our website features a database that currently has more than 250 rebuttals based on peer-reviewed literature. SkS has evolved from a one-person operation to a team project with volunteers from around the globe.
Why set up an experiment?We wanted to find out how effective our rebuttals are at reducing belief in myths and how effective they are in increasing acceptance of facts. We hoped to find out if there was a need to improve our rebuttals, whether we could identify key features of effective rebuttals, learn who is interested in reading our rebuttals and even if we could measure real-world impact of them.
Users arriving via an organic Google search at an English language rebuttal were invited to participate in a short survey via a modal screen. If they provided informed consent they were shown a pre-rebuttal survey and after reading through the rebuttal and reaching its end they were shown the same survey again as the post-rebuttal part. We also tracked their start and end times to measure how much time they spent on the page.
Design of the experiment (2)For both the pre- and post-rebuttal survey participants were shown the same statement related to the rebuttal they accessed. They randomly either saw a fact or a myth statement. The full list of statements used in the experiment is available in Appendix A of our published paper.
Here is an example:
- Rebuttal: "How reliable are climate models"
- Fact statement: "Scientists' computer models have been successful at predicting global warming over long time periods."
- Myth statement. "Scientists' computer models are too unreliable to predict future climate."
Participants then selected their level of (dis)agreement with either of those statements on a 6-point Likert scale from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree".
Experiment by the numbersThe data analysed for our recently published paper spans the period from November 2021 to July 2025. During that time, 858,016 visitors were shown the initial invitation, 13,432 consented to participate and filled out the pre-survey. 6,261 of them also completed the post-rebuttal form. 3146 participants were shown a factual statement in the survey quiz while 3115 were shown a myth statement.
Results - incoming climate perceptionsThe majority of participants came to the website already convinced about climate change with nearly half of them (46.3 %) showing either full agreement with the climate fact or full disagreement with the climate myth. We may therefore either be just "chanting to the choir" or - what we hope is the case as it's a more constructive interpretation - our content is “teaching the choir to sing” by providing resources that empower people to respond to climate misinformation. Our survey also reached a significant number of undecided or dismissive users.
Results - change in accuracyWe also looked at the change in accuracy - the difference between the pre- and post-rebuttal surveys. And the results are a bit of a mixed bag:
The good news is that overall, the belief in myths decreased and that we saw improved climate perceptions even among "dismissive" readers, those who either agreed strongly with the myth or disagreed strongly with the fact in the pre-survey.
The not so good news is that for a small subset of visitors and specific rebuttals, percpetion actually decresased. Those who were already highly certain (strongly agreed with facts) sometimes saw a slight dip in accuracy after reading a rebuttal. Certainly, not what we had hoped to see!
A bit of a guessing gameWe had decided to keep the survey short with only one question asked to maximize participation, and therefore didn't include a question to learn why participants selected one of the options. Because of that we had to play a bit of a "guessing game" to find out what might have led to the decrease in perception for some rebuttals.
We decided to look at rebuttals which had received at least 50 completed surveys and devided them into two groups of top vs bottom performing rebuttals. We then compared the Top 3 (positive shift) to the Bottom 3 (negative shift) performers:
- Top performers: Always articulated a replacement fact and frequently identified the logical fallacy used in the myth.
- Bottom performers: Failed to provide a replacement fact and only rarely explained the underlying fallacy.
In parallel to running our experiment, we have been working on a complete relaunch of the Skeptical Science website (see related companion blog post for EOS1.1). One new feature will be the inclusion of the fallacy employed by the climate myth. The results of our experiment indicate that moving to the fact-myth-fallacy structure in our rebuttals is a pretty good idea to increase chances of a successful debunking.
Future plansWe plan to restart the experiment some time after the relaunch of the Skeptical Science website. When we do, we plan to improve the survey design based on what we learned during this first run. We will most likely also add a few targeted and potentially open-ended questions to avoid having to guess what brought people to our website or what influenced their rating.
The team setting up the experimentThe setup for the experiment was implemented by members from our volunteer team, bringing their respective experience and knowledge to the table:
- John Cook provided the research know-how and the fact/myth statements related to the rebuttals.
- Doug Bostrom setup the necessary technical underpinnings in the backend.
- Collin Maessen and Timo Lubitz did all of the needed programming and made sure that the current website worked together well with the server running the experiment.
Our full results were published open access in Geoscience Communication on April 2, 2026 in Quantifying the impact of Skeptical Science rebuttals in reducing climate misperceptions.
You can download the full presentation in PDF-format here (2.5MB).
Reference: Winkler, B. and Cook, J.: Results of the Skeptical Science experiment and impacts on relaunched website, EGU General Assembly 2026, Vienna, Austria, 3–8 May 2026, EGU26-4110, https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-egu26-4110, 2026.
Q&A: How countries got the global ‘net-zero’ shipping deal ‘back on track’
Nations are “back on track” to adopt a framework for curbing global shipping emissions, following the latest International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) meeting in London, UK.
The proposed “net-zero framework” had been expected to be approved by countries at the IMO towards the end of 2025.
Instead, the Trump administration was accused of “bully-boy” tactics as the US led a concerted effort to reject the framework, leading to its approval being delayed.
Since then, the US, other fossil-fuel producers and some industry groups have called for the framework to be stripped of its carbon-pricing mechanism, or abandoned entirely.
At the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC84) meeting in London, UK, last week, nations tried once again to reach an agreement on the framework.
Opponents said they were trying to seek consensus, but supporters, such as Brazil, the EU and Pacific islands, pointed out the framework was already a “careful balance of interests”.
Liberia and Panama – “flag states” for a third of the world’s commercial shipping – led a counter-proposal, alongside Argentina, which effectively cut carbon pricing from the framework.
Ultimately, however, the meeting ended with a reconfirmation that delegations are committed to rebuilding consensus on global shipping emissions.
The framework survived the negotiations and the committee will now try to adopt it at its December 2026 meeting.
Below, Carbon Brief explains why the framework has proved so contentious, who the major players have been and what the final outcome was at the latest IMO meeting.
- Why was the net-zero framework delayed last year?
- Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?
- What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?
- What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?
- What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?
In April 2025, nations at the IMO had agreed on a “net-zero framework” at their MEPC83 meeting in London, despite the US withdrawing halfway through.
Later that year, in October 2025, they failed to formally adopt the framework after a fraught “extraordinary session” that saw US negotiators accused of “bully-boy tactics”.
(The MEPC usually meets once a year, but additional meetings or intersessionals can be added to deal with an “extraordinary event or critical maritime environmental crisis”. The October session was organised specifically to consider the adoption of the framework and other draft amendments.)
The framework was meant to be a practical set of measures to achieve the global net-zero target for shipping, agreed at the IMO in 2023. The target is significant, as international shipping is responsible for more than 2% of emissions and is not covered by the Paris Agreement.
Following a week of negotiations at the April 2025 meeting, the remaining nations had voted on approving a compromise proposal for an emissions levy – effectively a carbon tax on global shipping – and a credit-trading system.
A majority of nations had agreed to this framework that would have set a lower emissions-intensity reduction target of 4% in 2028, rising to 30% in 2035. It had also included an upper target that would have increased from 17% in 2028 to 43% in 2035.
Ships that failed to lower their emissions intensity in line with these limits would have needed to purchase “remedial units” for $380 per “tier two” unit. This would have fed into a new IMO “net-zero fund”.
Those who met the lower target, but fell short of the more difficult upper target, would have had to pay into the IMO fund, but at the lower rate of $100 per “tier one” unit.
The number of compliant ships had been expected to grow under this framework, reducing the number of vessels reliant on buying units and helping to reduce emissions intensity by over 40%, as the chart below shows.
Reduction in emissions intensity of shipping fuel compared to 2008 reference year, showing percentage made up of tier two (red), tier one (pale red) and compliant emissions (grey). Source: IMO.The purchase of units to comply with the rules had been expected to raise $10-15bn annually in the initial years of the fund, as well as help with the development of zero and near-zero (ZNZ) greenhouse gas fuels and energy sources, according to thinktank IDDRI.
In turn, the fund would have been used to support developing countries to decarbonise shipping.
A clear majority of 80% of the eligible voters – not including those who abstained or the US – approved the framework at the April 2025 meeting.
The 63 countries that voted in favour included the EU, China, India and Brazil, while those that voted against included major fossil-fuel producers, such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Following this “landmark” agreement, countries had then been expected to formally adopt the framework at the next MEPC session in October 2025.
However, the meeting proved challenging. The US “unequivocally rejected” the proposal and lobbied extensively against adoption, including by threatening governments, individual diplomats and shipping companies with sanctions, visa restrictions, tariffs and port fees.
During the October meeting, the US and its allies pushed for a shift from a “tacit” approval system for the net-zero framework to one that would require explicit acceptance by governments. This would mean it would only come into force if, six months later, two-thirds of nations actively accepted the deal, Climate Home News explained at the time.
Negotiations continued throughout the week before Saudi Arabia called to adjourn the meeting, a move that was passed after it was backed by 57 countries.
As such, the decision on the adoption of the net-zero framework was pushed back by a year.
Among the 63 countries that supported the IMO net-zero framework at MEPC83 in April 2025, 15 supported the adjournment and 10 abstained – showing that some nations that had previously supported the framework had softened on the deal, following lobbying by the US, Saudi Arabia and their allies.
Going into the April 2026 MEPC84 meeting, it was clear that agreement on the framework would not be straightforward. A report ahead of the meeting from University College London (UCL) noted:
“The level of support is noticeably weaker than in April [2025] and likely reflects the effectiveness and efforts made by sides supporting or opposing the net-zero framework over the intervening period.”
In the week ahead of the MEPC84, US IMO delegation lead Wayne Arguin told a meeting that there was a “clear, strong and sizable bloc of countries opposed to the [net-zero framework]” and “no prospect of achieving consensus”, according to Politico.
As the meeting kicked off on 27 April 2026, IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez called on parties to engage in “engage in constructive and pragmatic exchanges”.
Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?A coalition of countries, including the US, Saudi Arabia and various fossil-fuel producers, strongly oppose the IMO net-zero framework that was agreed last year.
They were supported by a wider group of industry bodies and major flag states – countries where many ships are registered – which were instrumental in advancing “alternative frameworks” at the latest meeting. (See: What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?)
Documents submitted ahead of the April 2026 meeting laid out the basis for this opposition, with the US criticising the net-zero framework’s “significant shortcomings”, concluding:
“The most appropriate path forward is to end consideration of the IMO net-zero framework entirely.”
More nuance came in a statement from a group of primarily large fossil-fuel producers, including Saudi Arabia, Russia and Algeria, which was also backed by the US.
It stressed the need for “alternative” frameworks, with an emphasis on achieving consensus, as well as “practicability, equity and trust”. In practice, this meant a system without any carbon pricing, “top-down restrictions” or “international penalties”.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }Opposing countries said any outcome should be “technology-neutral”, meaning it should not disadvantage specific fuels, potentially including liquified natural gas (LNG) and other fossil fuels.
These nations also stressed what they claimed were the potential impact of additional net-zero costs on “food and energy security”.
Much of their criticism was based on supposed economic harm that the net-zero framework would cause, particularly in developing countries.
These arguments purported to be about fairness for these countries. Yet some opponents of the framework were also calling for the IMO fund to be abandoned.
If this IMO fund were lost, then developing countries could lose out on a potential source of support for their own maritime decarbonisation, as well as potentially their broader energy transitions.
As well as supporting the fossil-fuel producers’ call for “alternative frameworks”, the UAE filed its own submission questioning the legitimacy of the IMO in establishing a new fund.
The US submission to the IMO stated that the fund would provide “pennies on the dollar compared to the economic hardship” brought about by the framework overall.
US delegates distributed flyers at the IMO meeting, emphasising the financial burden they claimed the framework would place on developing countries. While low-carbon shipping will come with substantial costs, analysts said the US figures were “not credible”.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }Campaigners accused the US of “pretending to care about other countries’ economies”, pointing out that the energy crisis – triggered by the US-led war on Iran – is costing the shipping industry billions.
Moreover, they stated that the Trump administration’s new port entry fees would be a far greater financial burden for the global shipping industry than the mooted net-zero rules.
Analysis by UCL shipping researchers ahead of MEPC84 concluded that the Trump administration would potentially be less able to exert “soft power and influence” at the talks than last year. Additionally, it pointed to a Supreme Court ruling that limited the US’s capacity to impose punitive tariffs.
In practice, the US was less vocal at the talks, choosing to support alternative framework ideas proposed by other IMO members.
What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?There were two main alternatives to the net-zero framework considered at MEPC84.
Japan suggested some ideas as a “possible basis for discussion”, which included removing the need for ships to pay into an IMO fund when they fail to meet emissions targets.
It also suggested simply relaxing the emissions targets, in order to make them easier for shipping companies to meet.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }The second – and more significant – counter-proposal to the net-zero framework was not submitted by the US or its fossil-fuel producer allies.
Instead, it came from Liberia, Panama and Argentina, three countries that have strong political and historical ties with the US.
This was particularly notable given Liberia and Panama’s status as the top two “flags of convenience”, as shown in the chart below. A third of the world’s commercial shipping is registered in these small states, giving them disproportionate significance within the talks.
Deadweight tonnage of the ten largest merchant fleets in 2025 by flag of registration, million tonnes. Source: UNCTAD.Their proposal, offered in the spirit of “consensus‑building”, said that only fuels already considered “commercially viable” should be included in the IMO’s carbon-intensity targets.
The Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal was dismissed by observers as “business-as-usual”, as it removes incentives to develop clean fuels, any substantial means of enforcement and opportunities to raise funds to help developing countries.
Delaine McCullough, director of the shipping programme at the Ocean Conservancy, tells Carbon Brief:
“By removing the mandatory greenhouse gas price, you take away the ability to provide any kind of rewards or other incentives, and you also take away the regulatory incentive, so you just end up where we are today.”
This was the proposal that the net-zero framework’s most prominent opponents, including the US and the Gulf states, rallied around at MEPC84.
Among those also backing the idea during the talks were some developing countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, that also said they wanted the IMO outcome to provide them with financial support.
This came in spite of the proposal stating there should be “no establishment of an IMO fund”. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a small-island state delegate tells Carbon Brief:
“Many countries that support the Liberia-Panama-Argentina submission also seek support for transition, capacity-building and mitigation of negative impacts. This support will not be available if [that] approach is taken.”
Some delegates questioned the decision by Liberia and Panama to lead this pushback against the net-zero framework. Both nations had previously supported an emissions levy on shipping, which would have been far more ambitious than the framework they now oppose.
Observers noted ties between nations that opposed the framework and parts of the shipping sector – including US-based interests and LNG assets.
Among the industry voices arguing strongly against the net-zero framework have been the American Bureau of Shipping and a group of international shipping companies and registries – including the national registries of Liberia and Panama.
The latter group voiced “significant concerns” and called for “alternative proposals”. Rather than a domestic entity, the Liberian registry that issued this statement is a privately owned US company.
Reflecting on these issues, Prof Tristan Smith, an energy and transport expert at UCL, wrote on LinkedIn:
“Privately owned registries have leverage over their host governments because one angry shipowner’s personal wealth is more than the flag state’s GDP and governments of low-income countries can’t easily take risks with even small volume revenues.”
Major Greek shipowners, including some with US-linked LNG interests, also opposed the net-zero framework, citing the “absence of support from major and influential states representing a significant share of global tonnage”.
Greece itself had reportedly pushed back against the framework behind the scenes, despite the EU’s public, unified position of support.
What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?There were many vocal supporters of the net-zero framework at MEPC84, including a broad range of developed and developing countries.
Among them were the EU, Brazil, Mexico, Kenya, Pacific island states, Australia and the UK.
Having supported the net-zero framework last April, but voted to postpone its adoption in October, China expressed support for a carbon-pricing system and an IMO fund in a technical submission issued ahead of MEPC84.
The major shipping nation had remained quiet during the US-Saudi disruption in October last year, so its submission was viewed as a positive for backers of the framework.
Colombia, which was simultaneously hosting a global conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels, also emerged as a supporter of the net-zero framework.
There has also been support from some sections of the shipping industry, including a large coalition of ports, logistics companies and clean-fuel providers.
Supportive nations pointed out that the net-zero framework was the result of years of talks and already represented what Pacific island states called a “fragile compromise”. They framed it as the “only politically viable option” for hitting the IMO’s net-zero goal.
Pacific islands and around 50 other nations had originally called for a universal carbon levy on shipping. Ultimately, they were forced to accept the net-zero framework as a compromise, but Pacific islands said they would revert to their call for a levy if they felt the framework was being “watered down”.
The demand for a levy was strongly opposed by numerous countries, including some of the current framework’s supporters, such as Brazil and Australia.
In a bid to revive the net-zero framework, a submission by Brazil sought to “dispel any possible potential misunderstandings”, stressing that the approach is “flexible” and “should not be mistaken for a ‘global tax’”.
For example, Brazil notes that the framework “does not exclude any fuels” and that even existing “bunker” fuels and LNG could be used, as long as carbon intensity targets are met. (Ships could, for example, use carbon capture and storage to meet the goals.)
Michael Mbaru, a low-carbon shipping expert for the Kenya climate special envoy, told a briefing ahead of the conference that the net-zero framework was in developing countries’ interests:
“If the global package unravels, pressure grows for more regional and unilateral measures instead, and this is particularly difficult for African and other developing countries, because fragmented regulation raises compliance, complexity [and] transaction costs.”
In response to the Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal that opponents of the framework had coalesced around, the Solomon Islands pointed out that, in seeking “consensus”, this group was ignoring the numerous parties that wanted more ambition, rather than less. It stated in a submission:
“There is no reason to expect that a new proposal, that differs from the IMO net-zero framework, would find a majority, much less a consensus.”
Nevertheless, supporters of the net-zero framework also acknowledged that there were some areas where greater clarity might help countries to finalise the details.
These areas include clarifying technical considerations such as: how fuel intensity is calculated; addressing the potential impacts of net-zero rules on food security; the governance of the IMO fund; and regulation of sustainable fuel certification schemes.
Given this, there was broad support for more discussions at an extra “intersessional” meeting later this year, in order to hash out these final details before attempting to approve the net-zero framework once more.
What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?Ultimately, the IMO’s net-zero framework remains on the table and will now be negotiated further in the autumn, ahead of the next MEPC session in December 2026.
The decision, as well as the general willingness to move forward noted by numerous observers, was broadly welcomed. IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez said:
“We are back on track, but we have to rebuild trust. I encourage you to maintain this momentum through your intersessional work and to prepare submissions that can bring the membership together.”
MO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez speaking at the Marine Environment Protection Committee on 27 April 2026 at IMO Headquarters in London. Credit: IMO / FlickrOver the week of negotiations, nearly 100 delegations took to the floor to voice their opinions on the adoption of the net-zero framework.
As well as discussion of the previously proposed net-zero framework, Argentina and Japan put forward alternative proposals, although neither gathered significant support.
The Argentinian proposal was substantially different from the net-zero framework and did not include either a greenhouse gas price or a fund. It saw support from just 24 member states and, even when combined with the Japanese proposal to form a “technical-only” compromise, it was unable to gain a majority.
According to the UCL Shipping and Oceans Research group, despite numerous efforts to put forward options that would be more acceptable to the US and Saudi positions – such as technical-only proposals – these failed to find “viable ways forward”.
This is important, as normally within the IMO, when two proposals have similar levels of support such as this, they can be merged or a compromise found.
On the final day of negotiations, countries agreed to take forward the original net-zero framework, which was agreed in principle back in April 2025.
More than half of the nations at the IMO meeting were in favour of it, including members such the EU, Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Tuvalu and others. They accepted the framework, as originally agreed, as the basis for further work.
The countries that supported it remain largely unchanged from previous meetings, but there was additional support.
Most of the supporters had opposed the adjournment at the IMO session in October, which pushed the adoption of the net-zero framework back. But five additional countries that had supported adjournment switched sides, along with 10 countries that had not taken a side, now clearly supporting the framework, according to UCL.
Others pushed back against the net-zero framework and called for reopening it for substantial changes. This included the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Liberia and others, predominantly oil and gas exporters.
According to UCL, two countries flipped from opposing adjournment to opposing the framework. UCL notes that “this indicates the fluidity of a portion of the positions and the sustained uncertainty around adoption later this year”.
The figure below shows supporters of the net-zero framework or other options at the latest meeting, colour-coded according to their position on the adjournment vote in October 2025.
Position on the next steps for the net-zero framework at the IMO’s latest meeting in April 2026. Credit: UCLThe net-zero framework was, ultimately, the only option in the final outcome text. While it has “survived”, “survival is not a victory and we cannot end up in a cycle of open-ended negotiations”, Em Fenton, senior director of climate diplomacy at Opportunity Green, tells Carbon Brief. They add:
“We must now look forward to moving towards adoption of the framework later this year in a way that maintains urgency and ambition, and delivers justice and equity for countries on the frontlines of climate impacts.”
The IMO committee agreed to establish an intersessional working group to resolve a number of outstanding concerns and “drive broader convergence on a global measure” ahead of the next MEPC meeting.
Member states will be able to submit new amendments and adjustments to the draft net-zero framework, to complement those already approved.
The two intersessional meetings will take place in September and November, ahead of MEPC85 in December.
Christiaan De Beukelaer, senior lecturer in culture and climate at the University of Melbourne, tells Carbon Brief:
“The ship is mostly built, though it’s obvious that more work needs doing on its interior. Right now, some are trying to finish the build while others are trying to scuttle it.”
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Fact brief - Were the 2022 whale deaths off the US East Coast caused by offshore wind development?
Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.
Were the 2022 whale deaths off the US East Coast caused by offshore wind development?The 2022 whale deaths have not been linked to offshore wind surveys or construction. Research has found no evidence of wind farms driving whale deaths, and responsibly developed wind farms avert systemic harms of fossil fuels.
Bad practices like construction during peak migration, high-speed vessels, or not monitoring whale presence can increase risk. However, established regulations such as seasonal construction limits, population monitoring, and vessel-speed rules reduce exposure. Once operating, turbine noise is significantly less disruptive than ships.
According to the NOAA, boat collisions and fishing gear entanglement account for most whale deaths, not wind turbines.
In contrast, fossil fuel drilling and burning routinely harm marine life. Oil and gas exploration uses highly disruptive sonar, oil spills kill marine animals, and emissions acidify oceans, weakening coral and shellfish. Warming causes population-level harms to marine mammals through altered migration routes and habitat loss.
Go to full rebuttal on Skeptical Science or to the fact brief on Gigafact
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Yale Climate Connections Wind opponents spread myth about dead whales
NOAA Frequent Questions—Offshore Wind and Whales
U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Vineyard Wind 1 Offshore Wind Energy Project Final Environmental Impact Statement
The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America How loud is the underwater noise from operating offshore wind turbines?
Save the Sound Clearing the Air on Offshore Wind
Biological Conservation Population consequences of disturbance by offshore oil and gas activity for endangered sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus)
National Audubon Society More Than One Million Birds Died During Deepwater Horizon Disaster
NOAA What is Ocean Acidification?
Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles
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Fact briefs are short, credibly sourced summaries that offer "yes/no" answers in response to claims found online. They rely on publicly available, often primary source data and documents. Fact briefs are created by contributors to Gigafact — a nonprofit project looking to expand participation in fact-checking and protect the democratic process. See all of our published fact briefs here.
2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #18
Climate Change Impacts (8 articles)
- Why delaying climate action now means higher seas by 2100 The Conversation, Helen Millman, Martin Siegert, Richard Alley, Apr 24, 2026.
- Next El Niño could be tipping point for a hotter climate Pacific heat pulse is temporary, but scientists warn that its climate impacts are not. Ars Technica, Bob Berwyn, Apr 27, 2026.
- The world is getting too hot to feed itself A new UN report maps how extreme heat is tearing through every layer of the global food system — and mostly overlooks the people at the heart of it. Grist, Ayurella Horn-Muller, Apr 27, 2026.
- Red Alert: India Heat Index Turns Dangerous As Viral Reddit Post Shows 42-44°C Glow Red Amidst Urban Heat Crisis Record-breaking heat and urban heat islands intensify India's heatwave crisis, posing severe health risks International Business Times, Rohit David, Apr 27, 2026.
- Europe is warming more than TWICE as fast as the global average, report reveals - as scientists warn 'climate change is not a future threat, it is our present reality' Experts say that Europe's rapid warming is driving a wave of extreme weather, heat-related deaths, and devastating wildfires. Daily Mail UK, editorial@mailonline.co.uk (Editor), Apr 29, 2026.
- Major hurricanes in the Northeast are rare. Could climate change make them common? Nuanced analysis of possible changes in hurricane behavior by expert Jeff Masters Yale Climate Connections, Jeff Masters, Apr 29, 2026.
- Surgeon warns that climate change can disrupt cancer care Wildfires, storms, and floods can lead to missed appointments and hospital closures – with life-and-death consequences. Yale Climate Connections, YCC Team, Apr 30, 2026.
- Climate Change is Destroying Lives... Now ClimateAdam on Youtube, Adam Levy, Apr 30. 2026.
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- 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #17 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, April 19, 2026 thru Sat, April 25, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler, John Hartz & Doug Bostrom, Apr 26, 2026.
- World `will not see significant return to coal` in 2026 - despite Iran crisis A much-discussed ''return to coal'' by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year. Carbon Brief, Josh Gabbatiss, Apr 28, 2026.
- What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war 'Governments are under pressure to respond to rising fuel and food costs and deepening energy poverty. It’s time for a power shift'' Climate Home News, Megan Rowling, Apr 29, 2026.
- `A study showed…` isn`t enough - scientific knowledge builds incrementally as researchers investigate and revisit questions A professor of geography offers tips on how to make skepticism genuine and useful. The Conversation, Jeffrey A. Lee, Apr 30, 2026.
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- Antarctica`s ice shelves are vulnerable to melting from below - knowing how far ocean heat reaches is crucial A rare dataset collected by instruments at the point where Antarctica’s largest ice shelf begins to float reveals ocean processes that drive melting at this critical part of the continent. The Conversation, Craig Stevens, Apr 28, 2026.
- Skeptical Science New Research for Week #18 2026 Skeptical Science's latest survey of climate research includes 114 academic research articles in 55 journals by 1150 contributing authors, and 14 government and NGO reports. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Apr 30, 2026.
- Higher warming predictions for 2026 and 2027 An update to my December estimates of global temperatures over the next two years The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Apr 30, 2026.
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- If it feels like the world is rejecting science and truth, here are five ways to fight back | Helen Pearson All of us can choose to consider facts, not vibes, in our next decision. One simple hack is go and look up some easily accessible peer-reviewed studies The Guardian, Helen Pearson, Apr 28, 2026.
- How an army of volunteers is fighting climate misinformation online Instead of arguing with trolls, they’re amplifying the truth. Yale Climate Connections, YCC Team, May 01, 2026.
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- Six nations at Santa Marta could shape fossil fuel futures A small but critical handful of countries attending the conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels remain deeply committed to expanding their fossil fuel output. Climate Home News, Megan Rowling, Apr 29, 2026.
- Santa Marta: Key outcomes from first summit on `transitioning away` from fossil fuels Countries attending a first-of-its-kind summit have walked away with plans to develop national roadmaps away from fossil fuels, along with new tools to address harmful subsidies and carbon-intensive trade. Carbon Brief, Daisy Dunne, Apr 30, 2026.
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- Peatlands are vital for tackling climate change, yet scientists still haven`t found them all English - The Conversation, Alice Milner, Apr 28, 2026.
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- Germany`s climate U-turn is the worst possible response to the oil shock 'Prices at the pump have leapt since the start of the conflict – but clinging to fossil fuels will only prolong the pain.'' The Guardian, Tania Roettger, May 01, 2026.
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DeBriefed 1 May 2026: Countries chart path away from fossil fuels | China’s clean-tech surge | Global forest loss slows
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
SANTA MARTA SUMMIT: Countries attending a first-of-its-kind summit have walked away with plans to develop national “roadmaps” to move away from fossil fuels, along with new tools to address subsidies and carbon-intensive trade. The first conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels, held in Santa Marta, Colombia, from 24-29 April, saw 57 countries – representing one-third of the world’s economy – debate practical ways to move away from coal, oil and gas. Carbon Brief has produced an in-depth summary of the talks.
‘REFRESHING’ APPROACH: Against the backdrop of a global oil and gas crisis, ministers and envoys from across the world sat side-by-side in small meeting rooms to have open and frank conversations about the barriers they face in transitioning from fossil fuels to clean energy. This new format – devised by co-hosts Colombia and the Netherlands – was described as “refreshing” (see below).
NEW SCIENCE PANEL: The event also featured a “science pre-conference” attended by 400 academics from around the world. This saw the launch of a new science panel that will aim to provide quick analysis to nations wanting to accelerate their transition away from fossil fuels. In addition, the academics gathered gave their backing to a new scientific report – first covered by Carbon Brief – advising nations to “halt all new fossil-fuel expansion”.
Around the worldUAE QUITS OPEC: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Tuesday said it was quitting OPEC, “dealing a blow to the oil producers’ group as an unprecedented energy crisis caused by the Iran war exposes discord among Gulf nations”, said Reuters.
IMO TENSIONS: With talks still ongoing today at the International Maritime Organization in London, the Guardian reported that “pressure” on the negotiations “appears to be linked to countries that have invested heavily in gas”.
OUTPOWERING TRUMP: US clean-energy installations are on track to hit “another record” this year and account for the vast majority of new power additions, despite facing policy opposition from the Trump administration, reported Bloomberg.
FOREST LOSS SLOWS: The loss of tropical forests slowed last year, “largely due to Brazil’s efforts to curb deforestation in the Amazon”, according to World Energy Institute and University of Maryland data covered by BBC News.
1.8%The proportion, at most, that global coal-power output is expected to increase this year – tempering claims made by some that the energy crisis could cause a “return to coal”, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.
Latest climate research- Mass incarceration can be viewed as a “climate justice issue”, as “incarcerated individuals are at a heightened risk of experiencing multiple climate-related events and “carceral infrastructure and policies worsen these impacts” | Environmental Research Letters
- Climate finance can promote stability in “conflict-affected” countries, through “the alleviation of water scarcity and the reduction of fossil-fuel dependence” | Climate Policy
- Land vertebrates will be increasingly exposed to heatwaves, wildfires, drought and river floods over the coming century due to climate change | Nature Ecology and Evolution
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
CapturedChina’s exports of the “new three” clean-energy technologies surged by 70% year-on-year in March 2026, reaching $21.6bn, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief’s China Briefing newsletter. Exports of the three technologies – solar cells and panels, electric vehicles (EVs) and lithium-ion batteries – were also up 37% from February, the month before the Iran war. The conflict is one explanation for the surge, as it has caused several countries to emphasise the need to increase non-fossil energy supplies. However, a domestic policy deadline and falling silver prices were also behind solar exports almost doubling, analysts told Carbon Brief.
Spotlight The inside story of how countries came together in ColombiaThis week, Carbon Brief reports on how a new “informal” approach helped countries to make progress on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels at talks in Santa Marta, Colombia.
Over the past few days, ministers and climate envoys from 57 countries have been gathering in Santa Marta, a city along the Caribbean coast of Colombia, in a beach hotel that would not look far out of place in HBO’s White Lotus.
For the first time, only one topic was up for conversation: how to “transition away” from fossil fuels, the main driver of human-caused climate change.
The end result – new plans for national fossil-fuel “roadmaps”, new tools to address subsidies and carbon-intensive trade, and a renewed commitment for countries to keep cooperating on energy transition – has been hailed as a “historic breakthrough”.
From the outset, the summit’s co-hosts – Colombia and the Netherlands – were keen to stress that the meeting would not be a space for more negotiations, but rather a forum for countries and other stakeholders to discuss practical steps to move away from fossil fuels.
This format was widely praised by countries in attendance, who described the conversational atmosphere at the conference as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and a “safe space for discussion”.
Closed-door discussionsThe “high-level segment” of the conference was held from 28-29 April.
Following the opening plenary, ministers and climate envoys spent much of the two days in closed-door “breakout sessions”, discussing issues ranging from “planned phase down and closure of fossil-fuel extraction” to “closing gaps in financial and investment systems”.
Carbon Brief understands that each session featured 12 ministers and envoys representing different countries sitting in an inner circle, with an outer circle made up of civil society members and other stakeholders. Each session was led by a different minister, appointed by the co-hosts.
In a departure from UN climate negotiations, the conversations that took place were free-flowing, with ministers and stakeholders given equal opportunities to contribute, observers told Carbon Brief.
All of the sessions were held under the Chatham House rule, meaning discussions were not attributable to individual speakers to encourage more open debate.
Ministers and climate envoys in a closed-door “break out session” in Santa Marta. Credit: Earth Negotiations BulletinUK special representative on climate, Rachel Kyte, was among policymakers praising the informal format, telling a huddle of journalists there was “real value” in speaking freely with other country officials. She added:
“I have to say that it is really nice to sit in a small circle…In a negotiation, it’s very, very fast-moving and transactional. But now we have had two days to think about [fossil-fuel transition issues] and this only.”
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Panama’s special representative on climate change, Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, said the format was “groundbreaking”, adding:
“I’m going to be honest. [At] first I was like: ‘What the f*ck am I doing here? I don’t know where this is going.’
“But then, as the workshop started, I realised there were ministers, envoys, civil society leaders and Indigenous people. They put us in a format where we could not open our computers, so we had to speak from our minds and our hearts. That completely flipped my perception. That kind of space I haven’t seen in my 10-year history with the UNFCCC.”
Road to COP31The findings of this conference are now due to be delivered to the Brazilian COP30 presidency, which is currently preparing a global fossil-fuel roadmap to present at COP31 in Turkey this November.
A large question mark remains over how the outcomes will affect proceedings at COP31, particularly among the more than 130 countries that were not in attendance in Santa Marta.
Co-hosts Colombia and the Netherlands deliberately chose not to invite some countries to Santa Marta, saying the aim of this was to try to keep conversations focused on transitioning away from fossil fuels. (This approach split opinions among country officials and observers.)
During the summit’s final plenary, Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven stated that, going forward, it was the co-chairs’ wish to create an “open coalition”, including by extending an “invitation for others to join us” in the future.
Watch, read, listenNATIONS TO WATCH: A comment piece in Climate Home News by decarbonisation analyst Christopher Wright named “six nations” present at the Santa Marta talks that could “shape fossil-fuel futures”.
REFORM’S FOSSIL LINKS: A new investigation by DeSmog detailed how more than two-thirds of the total income of the hard-right Reform UK party comes from fossil fuels.
ARCTIC REPORT: Climate journalist Alec Luhn has won a National Headliner Award for his piece on plans to “refreeze” the Arctic, during which his “right thumb got frostnip from hitting the record button”. Read Luhn’s original article in Scientific American.
Coming up- 2 May: Niue general elections
- 3-8 May: European Geosciences Union general assembly 2026, Vienna, Austria
- 4 May: International Energy Agency (IEA) global methane tracker report launch
- Lighthouse Reports, editor, climate and environment | Salary: €70,000-€80,000. Location: Amsterdam, Netherlands or remote
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Santa Marta: Key outcomes from first summit on ‘transitioning away’ from fossil fuels
Countries attending a first-of-its-kind summit have walked away with plans to develop national roadmaps away from fossil fuels, along with new tools to address harmful subsidies and carbon-intensive trade.
The first conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels held in Santa Marta, Colombia, from 24-29 April saw 57 countries – representing one-third of the world’s economy – debate practical ways to move away from coal, oil and gas.
Against a backdrop of war, a global oil crisis and worsening extreme weather events, ministers and envoys from across the world sat side-by-side in small meeting rooms to have open and frank conversations about the barriers they face in transitioning from fossil fuels to clean energy.
This new format – devised by co-hosts Colombia and the Netherlands – was described as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and “groundbreaking” by countries attending the talks.
The event also featured a “science pre-conference” attended by 400 global academics, which included the launch of a new science panel that will aim to provide agile and bespoke analysis to nations wanting to accelerate their transition away from fossil fuels.
At the summit’s conclusion, Tuvalu and Ireland were announced as the co-hosts of the second transitioning away from fossil fuels summit, which will take place in the Pacific island nation in 2027.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines all of the key takeaways from the talks.
- Colombia and Netherlands leadership
- High-level segment
- Academic meeting
- Indigenous and civil society participation
The idea for a specific fossil-fuel transition conference hosted in Colombia first emerged during tense end-game negotiations at the COP30 climate summit in Belém, Brazil.
Amid a push by a group of around 80 nations to refer to a “roadmap” away from fossil fuels in the formal COP30 outcome text, Colombia and the Netherlands jointly announced that they would co-host a summit in Santa Marta in April.
The calls for a fossil-fuel “roadmap” to be mentioned in COP30’s outcome text ultimately failed. However, the Brazilian COP30 presidency promised to bring forward an “informal” fossil-fuel roadmap, drawing on the discussions and debates in Santa Marta.
The Santa Marta conference took place from 24-29 April. It included a “science pre-conference” from 24-25, a day for subnational governments, parliamentarians and other stakeholders and a “high-level segment” with ministers and climate envoys from 28-29.
Colombian environment minister Irene Vélez Torres – herself a former academic – was particularly keen to emphasise the importance of science to the conference, telling journalists: “We need to go back to science and base our decisions on science.” (See: Academic meeting)
From the outset, the hosts stressed that the high-level segment was not a space for negotiations, but rather a forum for countries and other stakeholders to discuss practical steps to move away from fossil fuels.
This format was widely praised by ministers and climate envoys, who described the conversational atmosphere in break-out sessions as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and “groundbreaking”. (See: Closed-door discussions.)
A total of 57 countries participated in the conference, according to the Colombian government.
These countries were: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, the EU, the Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malawi, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, México, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, the Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, the UK, Uruguay, Vanuatu, the Vatican and Vietnam.
At the summit’s opening press conference on 24 April, Vélez Torres confirmed that Colombia and the Netherlands had decided to only invite a select group of countries to the conference.
Vélez Torres told journalists that countries including China, Russia and the US were not invited. She suggested that they had not shown the necessary spirit to be part of the “coalition of the willing” and that Colombia wanted to avoid a rehashing of the lengthy debates at COP30. (Carbon Brief understands that India was also not invited.)
In a later press huddle, Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven clarified that the two co-hosts had partially based their invitation criteria on who showed support for the fossil-fuel roadmap at COP30, saying:
“It was a combination of what happened in Belém and all the existing initiatives that have been driving this agenda for a long time already.”
However, it is worth noting that some countries that had opposed a formal reference to a fossil-fuel roadmap in the COP30 outcome were invited to Santa Marta, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis of the “informal list” of those against the idea in Belém.
For example, Tanzania was invited to take part in the Santa Marta talks, despite appearing on the list of countries opposed to the roadmap in Belém.
On the other hand, neither China nor India were invited, despite having rejected media coverage portraying them as the “blockers” of the fossil-fuel roadmap at COP30.
Country officials and observers expressed a range of views on whether excluding certain countries from the conference was the right approach.
Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, Panama’s special representative on climate change, told a small group of journalists that he thought it was the “right decision”, adding:
“This first meeting had to be done with those that wanted something to be done. Otherwise, it would have been a repeat of a UNFCCC meeting.”
UK special representative for climate, Rachel Kyte, told a press huddle that China should feel “welcome to be here”, adding:
“China has to be part of this equation for multiple reasons.”
One veteran observer told Carbon Brief that their impression was that Colombia and the Netherlands had been “overly cautious” about who would have caused disruption if invited to the conference, saying:
“Yes, maybe there is an argument for not inviting countries that have a long history of blocking progress, such as the Gulf states. But, if we look at what countries are really doing on the ground – including JETP [Just Energy Transition Partnerships] initiatives – then more countries should have been here, including Indonesia, for example.”
However, they also urged caution on reading too much into which countries were and were not present, adding that this could also partially be explained by “scheduling and countries’ availability”.
During the summit’s final plenary, van Veldhoven stated that, going forward, it was the Netherlands and Colombia’s wish to create an “open coalition”, including by extending an “invitation for others to join us”.
Dr Maina Talia, the climate minister of Tuvalu, who will co-host the second transitioning away from fossil fuels summit alongside Ireland, told journalists that the island nations would “revisit” and “improve” the criteria used for inviting countries to the conference.
High-level segment[anchor]3"> National statements and pledges
The two-day high-level segment began with an opening plenary, which saw more than 20 countries put forward their views on the need to transition away from fossil fuels.
Developed and developing nations alike spoke of the need to transition away from fossil fuels not only to tackle worsening climate change, but also the high prices, insecurity and volatility associated with continued reliance on coal, oil and gas.
Opening the plenary alongside Colombia, Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven told countries:
“Price volatility and dependence on imports are structurally and unacceptably impacting our economies. We need to move away from fossil fuels not only because it is good for the climate, but because it strengthens our energy security. Investment in clean energy also lays the foundation for a more resilient and sustainable economy, capable of mitigating these shocks.”
First to speak in plenary was Nigerian minister, Abubakar Momoh, who said:
“Nigeria is actively diversifying its economy away from extracting oil, which accounts for around 80% of our exports. Nigeria strongly believes that it is not whether extraction should decline, but how to organise it so it is manageable, fair and politically viable across countries.”
Also speaking during the session, UK special representative for climate Rachel Kyte said it “would be irresponsible to ignore the second fossil-fuel crisis in five years”.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }Several nations also used their interventions to lament a lack of progress in addressing fossil-fuel use during the last 30 years of annual UN climate negotiations.
Dr Maina Talia, climate minister for Tuvalu, said that “for years, international climate negotiations have circled around fossil fuels without directly confronting the core issues”.
Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, Panama’s special representative on climate change, told countries:
“For 34 years, we have negotiated the symptoms of the climate crisis and bulletproofed its cause. Thirty-four years of pledges. And where are we now?
“Economies built on fossil fuels are unravelling in real time. Fossil fuels are not just dirty. They are unreliable, they are dangerous and they must end.”
A small number of nations from the Pacific and Africa used their interventions to show their support for the Fossil Fuel Treaty initiative, an idea to negotiate a new legally binding agreement to control fossil-fuel use, currently supported by 18 countries. (The treaty did not feature in the summit’s final outcome.)
France’s special climate envoy, Benoît Faraco, used his intervention to announce that the nation has produced a new roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels.
Later on, on the first day, Colombian president Gustavo Petro also gave a speech at the summit, telling countries:
“What I see is resistance and inertia within the power structures and the economy of this archaic energy system. Today, fossil fuels bring death; undoubtedly, that form of capital could commit suicide, taking humanity and life itself. Humanity cannot allow that.”
Closed-door discussionsFollowing the opening plenary, ministers and climate envoys spent much of the two-day high-level segment in closed-door “breakout sessions”, discussing issues ranging from “planned phase down and closure of fossil-fuel extraction” to “closing gaps in financial and investment systems”.
Carbon Brief understands that each session featured 12 ministers and envoys representing different countries sitting in an inner circle, with an outer circle made up of civil society members and other stakeholders. Each session was led by a different minister, appointed by the co-hosts.
In a departure from UN climate negotiations, the conversations that took place were free-flowing, with ministers and stakeholders given equal opportunities to contribute, observers told Carbon Brief.
Country representatives, including Panama’s special representative on climate change, Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez; the climate envoy for the Marshall Islands, Tina Stege; COP30 CEO, Ana Toni; UK special representative on climate, Rachel Kyte; and Tuvalu climate minister, Dr Maina Talia, participating in a closed-door breakout session. Credit: Earth Negotiations BulletinMany countries were highly complimentary of this informal format, describing it in the closing plenary as “refreshing”, “highly successful” and a “safe space for discussion”.
UK special representative on climate, Rachel Kyte, told a huddle of journalists that there was “real value” to having informal conversations with other country officials, saying:
“I have to say that it is really nice to sit in a small circle…In a negotiation, it’s very, very fast-moving and transactional. But now we have had two days to think about [fossil-fuel transition issues] and this only.”
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Panama’s special representative on climate change, Juan Carlos Monterrey Gómez, said the format was “groundbreaking”, adding:
“I’m going to be honest. [At] first I was like: ‘What the f*ck am I doing here? I don’t know where this is going’.
“But then, as the workshop started, I realised there were ministers, envoys, civil society leaders and Indigenous people. They put us in a format where we could not open our computers, so we had to speak from our minds and our hearts. That completely flipped my perception. That kind of space I haven’t seen in my 10-year history with the UNFCCC.”
All of the sessions were held under the Chatham House rule, meaning discussions were not attributable to individual speakers to encourage more open debate.
Co-host nations Colombia and the Netherlands gave a broad overview of the topics and themes discussed during the sessions in a takeaways report. (See: Final outcomes.)
Final outcomesAt the conference’s final plenary session on 29 April, co-host nations Colombia and the Netherlands presented a range of “key outcomes” from the summit.
The first outcome was confirmation of the news that Tuvalu and Ireland will co-host a second transitioning away from fossil fuels conference in the Pacific island nation in 2027.
The co-hosts also announced the establishment of three “workstreams” on issues to bring forward to the second summit.
The first of these workstreams will focus on developing national and regional roadmaps away from fossil fuels.
Speaking in plenary, Vélez Torres said that the roadmaps should be “connected” to countries’ UN climate plans, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs). She added that it would be important for the roadmaps to be “very clear and honest” about “emissions exported from producing countries”.
The development of the roadmaps will be supported by the newly established science panel for global energy transition and the NDC Partnership, a global initiative helping nations prepare their NDCs, she added.
(At the final press conference, it was clarified that countries are not obligated to produce a new fossil-fuel roadmap and that participation in all of the work streams is voluntary.)
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }The second workstream will be focused on changing the financial system to better facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels.
This will include work to identify fossil-fuel subsidies and find solutions to “debt traps”. It will be supported by the International Institute for Sustainable Development thinktank, the co-hosts said.
Separately, Dutch climate minister van Veldhoven said that all countries would be invited via “email” to begin a process for identifying and reporting their fossil-fuel subsidies. (The Netherlands is the co-chair of COFFIS, a group of 17 nations that have pledged to remove fossil-fuel subsidies.)
The final workstream will address fossil-fuel-intensive trade, with the aim of “advancing progress towards a fossil fuel-free trade system”, Vélez Torres said. This workstream will be supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) group of wealthy nations.
A document summing up the co-chair’s takeaways from the summit says that other key outcomes include the establishment of a “coordination group [to] ensure continuity towards the second and subsequent conferences”, adding:
“It will consist of countries leading different alliances and initiatives that are implementing elements of the transition away from fossil fuels, and of the co-hosts of the first and second conferences, Colombia, the Netherlands, Tuvalu and Ireland.”
The document adds that a key task will be delivering the findings of this conference to the COP30 presidency, which is currently preparing a global fossil-fuel roadmap to present at COP31 in November.
Academic meetingThe summit kicked off with a “science pre-conference” attended by around 400 academics from across the globe from 24-25 April, held at the University of Magdalena in Santa Marta.
At the behest of the Colombian government, these scientists split into 11 different “workstreams” to debate a vast array of topics related to transitioning away from fossil fuels.
These ranged from “fossil-fuel phaseout policies” and the role of methane, to “just transitions and economic diversity” and the role of multilateralism.
Speaking on the summit’s first day, Colombian environment minister Irene Vélez Torres – herself a former academic – stressed the importance of science in political decision-making. She told a press conference:
“There has been a growing gap between science and governments, and governmental decisions, and it happens because there is a lot of denialism. There is a lot of economic and political lobbying as well. That is actually deviating [from] scientific rationale.
“The true belief of the countries that are here is that we need to go back to science and base our decisions on science, and back up our decision-making, processes and pathways with science.”
Science panel for global energy transitionThe pre-conference saw the announcement of three new scientific initiatives.
The first was a new global science panel, calling itself the “science panel for global energy transition”, which was launched by Dr Johan Rockström, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany and Dr Carlos Nobre, an eminent researcher on the Amazon rainforest from the University of São Paulo in Brazil.
They announced at a public event in Santa Marta that the panel will involve “50-100 scientists” from around the world and will be based at the University of São Paulo.
The scientists on the panel will aim to provide rapid analysis on how to transition away from fossil fuels for countries and multilateral talks, including bespoke information for nations that request it, they said.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }Speaking at its launch, Rockström said the panel will be split into four working groups, focusing on “transition pathways”, “technology solutions”, “policy design and evaluation” and “finance instruments and governments”.
It will have three co-chairs: Dr Vera Songwe, an economist and climate finance expert from Cameroon; Prof Ottmar Edenhofer, chief economist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; and Prof Gilberto M Jannuzzi, professor of energy systems at Universidade Estadual de Campinas in Brazil.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Nobre said that he and Rockström were first approached with the idea for a new panel by Ana Toni, Brazilian economist and CEO of the COP30 climate summit, while the negotiations were taking place in Belém. He said:
“Johan and myself, we’re not energy transition scientists, but we were the creators of the planetary science pavilion at COP30, that’s why Ana Toni came to us. And we have already invited three top energy transition experts to join us.”
At the launch, Rockström said the panel would be different in several ways from the world’s existing global climate science panel, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
He said that, in comparison to the “seven-year cycle” for IPCC reports, this panel will “be able to come up with annual updates” and “be able to scale down to the national level”.
Nobre told Carbon Brief that he was among scientists who have grown “frustrated” with some aspects of the IPCC’s process, including the line-by-line approval of summaries for policymakers by all of the world’s governments. He said:
“A long time ago, when I was working as a scientist studying the Amazon, I wanted to include some information about the risks the Amazon faces in one of the summaries. But a representative from my own country [Brazil] said no.
“This panel is totally independent. There is no way for somebody to say ‘you can’t say that’ or ‘you can’t do that’.”
Action insights reportThe second new science initiative to emerge from the academic conference was a new “synthesis report”, offering “12 action insights” for how countries can transition away from fossil fuels.
First covered by Carbon Brief, the report contains some explicit “action recommendations” for countries, such as “halt all new fossil-fuel expansion” and “prohibit fossil fuel advertising…recognising fossil fuels as health-harming products”.
The report was first put together by an “ad-hoc” group of 24 scientists at the request of the Colombian government. It was then further debated and refined by many of the 400 scientists gathered at the academic pre-conference in Santa Marta.
A preliminary version of the report was circulated to governments attending the talks.
In addition, one of the report’s coordinating authors, Prof Andrea Cardoso Diaz, from the University of Magdalena, was given a two-minute slot in the opening plenary of the “high-level segment” to highlight its findings to gathered ministers.
Colombia’s fossil-fuel roadmapThe final scientific initiative unveiled at the academic segment was a new roadmap for how Colombia can transition away from fossil fuels. This was drafted by a team led by Prof Piers Forster, head of the Priestley Centre for Climate Futures at the University of Leeds.
The roadmap says that Colombia can cut its emissions from energy use to 90% below 2015 levels by 2050, through ambitious policies to move away from fossil fuels and electrify its transport sector.
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }This would require “considerable” upfront investment, with the roadmap estimating the cost to be an average annual investment of around $10bn above a business-as-usual scenario.
However, by the 2040s, Colombia could see net economy-wide savings from transitioning away from fossil fuels, says the analysis, which could reach $23bn annually by 2050.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Forster said his experience as interim chair of the UK’s Climate Change Committee highlighted to him the importance of presenting national roadmaps in economic terms. He said:
“The biggest issues facing countries are economic and to do with the cost of living. To convince our own government back in the UK to sign up to our recommended carbon budget, we put a lot of work into the economic aspect. So that was also the focus of this work for Colombia.”
Indigenous and civil society participationIn addition to holding a dedicated meeting for scientists, the Colombian government also organised a “People’s Assembly”. This brought together hundreds of Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendent peoples, peasant farmers, trade representatives, women and children and other civil society members.
The goal was to gather the thoughts from these groups on the summit’s main “pillars” of addressing fossil-fuel production, economic constraints and global governance and multilateralism.
According to Climate Lens News, Óscar Daza, the secretary general of the Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon, Karebaju people, told the gathering:
“The Indigenous peoples of the world have made historic demands, such as the non-extraction of natural resources from our territories, so that our resources that are there in the territory remain intact, remain still.
“As Indigenous peoples, we want those historic struggles to somehow be reflected and taken up here by the different states.”
Participants at the People’s Assembly during the first conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels in Santa Marta. Credit: Ministerio de Ambiente de ColombiaFollowing on from the meetings, the Colombian government summarised the main talking points discussed by each of these groups in a series of “contributions” documents.
Indigenous peoples and civil society groups were also allocated opportunities to speak during the summit’s high-level segment.
In a departure from UN climate summits – where inputs from civil society are usually heard after countries have finished speaking – the Santa Marta summit invited a range of representatives to speak alongside ministers in the opening and closing plenary sessions.
This included an intervention in the opening plenary by Larissa Baldwin-Roberts, a climate leader from the Bundjalung Nations, who told countries:
“This is the last time we will be a token. You want our pictures, not our voices. You want our stories, not our struggles…True solidarity with each other is the prerequisite to a just transition.”
Indigenous peoples and civil society members were also free to speak in closed-door discussions with ministers, Carbon Brief understands.
Separately from the events organised by the Colombian government, civil society also organised its own “people’s summit”, involving 900 organisations and networks, held in the city of Santa Marta from 24-26 April.
This summit also organised sessions for representatives from different groups to offer their thoughts and insights into the transition away from fossil fuels, ending in a joint “declaration”.
In a statement, Tasneem Essop, the executive director of Climate Action International, said:
“Movements from across the globe and the region – Afro-descendants, feminists, youth, peasants and fisherfolk, social movements and Indigenous peoples converged in a three-day peoples summit in Santa Marta to build a collective consensus on our demands and solutions for the just transition away from fossil fuels.
“[We saw] the adoption of a powerful declaration that spells out our positions on ensuring that the transition has to be rights-based, funded and results in the dismantling of the systems that have caused harm and destruction driven by fossil fuel dependency.”
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China Briefing 30 April 2026: Fossil fuel ‘strict controls’ | El Niño approaches | Why cleantech exports have surged
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments New documents ramp up pressure on coal‘STRICTLY CONTROL’ FOSSIL FUELS: On 22 April, China issued a set of “guiding opinions” on energy conservation and carbon reduction that urged local governments to “strictly control fossil-fuel consumption”, according to the text published by state news agency Xinhua. Hu Min, director and co-founder of the the Beijing-based Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, said in comments to Carbon Brief that the document was a clear signal of China’s political leaders’ desire to reduce the country’s coal usage and a “way to move things forward” until more specific policies are published. Government officials noted that the opinions are of “great significance for building broader and stronger consensus across society”, reported information platform Tanpaifang.
INCREASED OVERSIGHT: The next day, the government announced new evaluation criteria for judging provinces on their efforts to meet China’s climate goals, including on raising “clean-energy consumption” and limiting “use of coal and oil”, reported Bloomberg. The 14 indicators underscore China’s “key priorities” and encourage broader carbon reduction efforts, said energy news outlet China Energy Net. They build on China’s existing inspection system to create a “much stronger accountability and compliance system”, Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told Carbon Brief. For more detail see Carbon Brief’s Q&A on what the two policies mean for China’s energy transition.
‘RARE’ SIGNAL: Both documents were issued by the highest levels of the nation’s political system, which is “extremely rare” and “reflects the strategic importance” of China’s climate goals, Wu Hongjie, deputy secretary-general of the China Carbon Neutrality 50 Forum, told Jiemian News. In a comment article for finance news outlet Caixin, Chen Lihao – a member of the Jiusan Society, environment minister Huang’s political party – said the two documents “form the institutional foundation” for China’s “full-scale transition” to a “dual control of carbon” system.
Downpours in south China‘RECORD-BREAKING’ RAIN: Heavy rainfall is hitting central and southern China, with Hunan, Guizhou and Jiangxi provinces reporting record-breaking levels of precipitation last week, reported the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily. It added that the government is ramping up “flood control” measures in response. On 26-27 April, one part of Guangxi province received as much as 14cm of rain per hour, reported the state-supporting newspaper Global Times. Meanwhile, Chinese vice-premier Liu Guozhong met with the World Meteorological Organization secretary-general Celeste Saulo to discuss cooperation on global “meteorological governance”, said state news agency Xinhua, with the discussion touching on early warning systems and disaster relief.
上微信关注《碳简报》EL NIÑO RISK: Officials at China’s National Climate Center (NCC) have said that an El Niño weather pattern is “likely to set in around May” and “intensify during the summer and autumn”, said China Daily. The state-run newspaper also quoted NCC chief forecaster Chen Lijuan saying it was “premature” to conclude that the El Niño could be at its strongest in 140 years, or that it could lead to record-breaking heat, although he added that the risks of such weather are “clearly increasing”. Wang Yaqi, a senior engineer at NCC, noted that the phenomenon “could hit hydropower-dependent regions hard, pushing them to burn more fossil fuels”, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.
Solar capacity growth slowsCLEAN CAPACITY: China’s clean-energy grid capacity now exceeds 2,400 gigawatts (GW), as of March 2026, or 60% of the total power mix, said state broadcaster CGTN in coverage of comments from energy officials at a press conference. It added that, within this, total wind and solar capacity reached 1,900GW. Energy news outlet International Energy Net cited the officials saying that China’s operational capacity for “green hydrogen” stands at 250,000 tonnes, with another 900,000 tonnes under construction.
SOLAR SLOWS: However, a data release showed that China added 41GW of new solar capacity in the first three months of 2026, reported BJX News, down from 60GW of new capacity in January-March 2025. Bloomberg noted that new solar capacity additions “slowed sharply to hit a four-year low” in March, adding that wind and thermal capacity growth also both slowed.
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‘MOST AMBITIOUS GOAL’: In a separate press conference, Chinese officials confirmed to Bloomberg that a pledge in the 15th five-year plan to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years referred to energy capacity – not generation or consumption – and would run from 2025-2035. These details were “unclear” in the five-year plan itself, the outlet added. The economic news outlet Economic Daily said that the doubling goal was “one of the most ambitious goals in China’s energy transition history”, adding that “accelerating” the energy transition would allow the country to both reduce its reliance on the international energy market and “seize the high ground in the global race” to develop low-carbon industries.
More China news- NEW BLEND: China has begun a project to blend gas supplies with 10% hydrogen in a part of Shandong province, reported the South China Morning Post, which added that the shift could cut China’s annual carbon emissions by “roughly 30m tonnes”.
- SKY-HIGH: China launched a “high-precision” satellite to monitor greenhouse gas emissions, said Xinhua.
- SUNNY SPAIN: Chinese automaker SAIC plans to build an electric vehicle (EV) factory in Spain, reported Bloomberg.
- MING YANG: Bloomberg also said that wind turbine maker Ming Yang is considering Spain after plans for a factory in the UK were blocked.
- FORMAL COMPLAINT: China has “formally submitted a complaint” to the EU about its Industrial Accelerator Act, said China Daily.
- EU TARIFFS: China’s commerce minister said he reached a “soft landing” with EU officials on EU tariffs on imports of Chinese-made EVs, according to Reuters.
China’s export of clean-energy technologies surged in March, driven by a doubling in solar shipments, according to analysis by Carbon Brief of Chinese customs data.
The spike can be explained in part by the impact of the conflict in the Middle East, but analysts argue that a newly enacted solar export policy is also behind the figures.
In this issue, Carbon Brief explores the factors behind the export spike and whether or not it will be sustained.
China’s exports of the “new three” clean-energy technology surged by 70% year-on-year in March 2026, reaching $21.6bn, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Exports of the three technologies – solar cells and panels, electric vehicles (EVs) and lithium-ion batteries – were also up 37% from February, the month before the Iran war.
The conflict in the Middle East is one explanation for the surge, as it has caused several countries to emphasise the need to increase non-fossil energy supplies.
However, there are also other important drivers, revealed by Carbon Brief analysis of customs data showing differences in exports between solar, EVs and batteries.
Solar exports were notably higher in March 2026 than in the previous two months, jumping 99.2% compared to February.
By contrast, neither batteries’ nor EVs’ March figures came close to the surge in solar cells.
China’s March exports of batteries rose 37% compared with the previous month, while month-on-month EV shipments increased just 1.4%.
(Figures from the China Passenger Car Association suggest a larger rise in percentage terms, but this is based on a narrower scope that does not capture all exports.)
This may be because both technologies saw strong export performance throughout the first quarter of 2026. According to the customs data, more than one million EVs were exported from China between January and March, up 73% compared with the same period last year.
These quarterly exports may have helped meet growing interest in EVs due to the conflict, with BloombergNEF estimating that sales of EVs rose to 1.1m – up 2% year-on-year – in March. (Bloomberg said, within this total, sales “cooled” in China and the US but “surged” in Europe and parts of Asia.)
Solar surgeThe chart below shows the export volumes of solar cells, EVs and batteries in March 2025, plus the first three months of 2026.
March’s solar exports were capable of generating 68 gigawatts (GW), equivalent to Spain’s entire installed solar capacity, according to energy thinktank Ember.
Exports of solar cells, EVs and batteries in March 2025 and January-March 2026. “Electric vehicles” includes hybrid and battery electric buses with 10 seats or more; plug-in and non-plug-in hybrid electric passenger cars; and battery electric passenger cars. Source: General Administration of Customs China.The Ember analysis showed that 50 countries set all-time records for Chinese solar imports in March, with another 60 reaching their highest levels in six months.
Exports to Asia doubled to 39GW, while shipments to Africa surged 176% to 10GW. Combined, these two regions accounted for three-quarters of the overall increase in exports.
The Middle East conflict has boosted demand, but a domestic policy deadline was a more immediate driver, analysts told Carbon Brief.
The Chinese government removed export tax rebates for solar products on 1 April, prompting manufacturers to rush out shipments before the change took effect.
Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told Carbon Brief that such policy deadlines “can create a very sharp one-month jump in shipments”.
Batteries and EVs currently continue to receive export rebates.
Falling silver prices are another potential factor, as silver paste is used to make a key component in solar panels. The reversal of a recent price rally that had raised costs helped manufacturers make more panels ahead of the export switch, Marius Mordal Bakke, head of solar research at consultancy Rystad Energy told Reuters.
Temporary spikeAnalysts predict that China’s April solar exports are unlikely to repeat March’s surge. Moreover, February exports were depressed by the Chinese New Year public holiday, making the March comparison unusually unfavourable.
“A month-on-month drop in April would not be surprising,” said Qin.
But she remains optimistic that global solar capacity additions outside China will continue to grow in 2026 due to energy supply concerns sparked by the Middle East conflict.
Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, said the removal of the export rebate will not “dramatically change demand”, especially as the conflict continues.
He argued that the policy could be positive, telling Carbon Brief: “This is what the global market needs: a more level playing field with China.”
This spotlight is by freelance China analyst Lekai Liu for Carbon Brief.
Watch, read, listenTARGET ‘DIFFICULTIES’: Two researchers at the Energy Research Institute, a state thinktank, wrote in Economic Daily that China faces several “difficulties” in meeting its new carbon-intensity targets, including already-high renewable capacity installations and high levels of energy efficiency.
COMPARE AND CONTRAST: The US-China Podcast interviewed Prof Alex Wang on China’s approach to environmentalism and his view on the country’s energy transition.
GOVERNMENT CALLOUT: State broadcaster CCTV published a segment critiquing the massive investments and special treatment that local governments gave to their EV industries, fuelling intense competition.
‘THIN ARGUMENT’: A comment in Lawfare argued that the US should focus more on the “genuine geopolitical risks of climate change and [geoengineering] development”, rather than “thin” arguments around China weaponising weather modification technologies.
22.6%The rate of “environmental health literacy” – or “recognition of the value of the ecological environment and its impact on health” – among China’s citizens, according to a government survey covered by Xinhua.
New science- China will need to build more pipelines and push its carbon price above $100/tonne to make “green” ammonia a cost-competitive option for marine fuel | One Earth
- Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from China’s lakes increased from 41m tonnes to 51m tonnes of CO2 per year between 2000 and 2021, coinciding with “rapid lake expansion” across the country | Science Advances
China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu, and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
China Briefing 16 April 2026: Billions for grid | Petrochemical plan | China’s high-seas bid
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Disruption on the horizon: consent, capital and clean-up in the oil and gas sector
24 June | London
Join ClientEarth, Carbon Tracker and a panel of experts for an energising morning discussion during London Climate Action Week.
From the Strait of Hormuz to the North Sea, oil and gas markets are shaped by chokepoints. Some are physical; others are legal, regulatory and financial.
Amid shifting market dynamics and significant legal developments, this event will explore the complex and changing path through which oil and gas projects are approved, financed, and retired in the UK.
As policymakers balance energy security with a commitment not to issue new exploration licences in the declining North Sea basin, and as legal requirements tighten around project consent and asset retirement, the discussion will examine whether current capital raising rules are fit for purpose.
ClientEarth and Carbon Tracker will also launch a pivotal new report, testing whether fossil reserves valuations are matching changes in the legal landscape, or leaving investors blind to climate-related risk.
Bringing together leading voices from law, finance, academia and civil society, the expert panel will explore structural pressure points across the oil and gas lifecycle. And lay out the context for further action.
This is an in-person event at the Inner Temple in London. If you are unable to attend in person and would like to join remotely please email events@clientearth.org to request a Zoom link. Thank you!
The post Disruption on the horizon: consent, capital and clean-up in the oil and gas sector appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #18 2026
Unprecedented 2024 East Antarctic winter heatwave driven by polar vortex weakening and amplified by anthropogenic warming, Tang et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science
During July–August 2024, East Antarctica experienced the most intense winter heatwave in the 46-year satellite era, with regional mean surface air temperatures across Dronning Maud Land exceeding the climatological mean by more than 9°C for 17 consecutive days. To explore the physical drivers and quantify the anthropogenic contribution to this unprecedented event, we propose a multi-model, multi-method attribution framework integrating regional climate model-based storyline attribution, circulation analogues, and large-ensemble probabilistic attribution. The results show that a pronounced weakening of the stratospheric polar vortex initiated a quasi-barotropic high-pressure anomaly, which enhanced meridional heat and moisture transport and accounted for approximately 50% of the observed surface warming. Across different models and attribution methods, synthesis of the attribution results indicates that anthropogenic warming intensified the event by approximately 0.7°C and more than doubled the likelihood of such exceptional winter heatwaves in the current climate. Probabilistic attribution further indicates that, compared to a natural climate without human influence, the likelihood of such events increases from 2–3 times today to ~6 times under moderate emissions and up to 26 times under high emissions by 2100. These findings reveal how human-induced warming is transforming even the coldest regions, with implications for ice shelf stability and predictability of future Antarctic extremes.
A recent stabilization in the lengthening of the Arctic sea ice melt season into a highly variable regime, Boisvert et al., Communications Earth & Environment
The melt season length of the Arctic sea ice is an important indicator and driver of large changes occurring in the climate system. Since 1979 the melt season has lengthened by ~40 days, driven mostly by delayed freeze onset (~ 34 days) compared to earlier melt onset (~ 7 days). However, since 2010 the melt season length has stabilized (~ 108 days), showing no consistent change over the years, instead becoming highly variable (+/− 11 days), largely driven by a loss of multi-year ice in 2000–2009 and a small change in the freeze onset (~ 2 days). There is a stark difference between the decades, where the largest changes in the melt season occurred between 2000–2009 (+ 25 days) and the smallest occurred between 2010–2023 (−2 days). This leads us to believe that, while there might be some periodicity in the processes that control the decadal variations in the melt season length, anthropogenic forcing has altered the Arctic background state and led to a new Arctic melt season that is much longer with a much thinner ice pack that is more susceptible to external forcings.
Field Observations of Sea Ice Thickening by Artificial Flooding, Hammer et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans
Arctic sea ice is retreating at a high rate, also due to the positive ice-albedo feedback loop: as ice melts and disappears, it reflects less sunlight, further accelerating ocean warming. One proposed way to slow the retreat is by thickening sea ice in winter, increasing its chances of surviving summer melt. This could be achieved by artificially flooding existing sea ice with seawater pumped from below, allowing it to freeze at the surface through exposure to cold air and thicken the ice layer. However, the effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain, as numerical models show contrasting results and few field experiments have been conducted. This study examines the growth and melt of ice through spring and summer after artificial flooding covering , resulting in thickened (+26 cm) snow-covered first-year sea ice. Observations were carried out in Vallunden Lagoon (Van Mijenfjord), Svalbard, from 20 March to 24 June 2024, with flooding and intensive in situ measurements from 11–15 April. Artificial flooding significantly heated the upper two-thirds of the original 90 cm thick ice, increasing salinity. Surface albedo evolution was influenced by specific events such as slush formation, snow drift, and a major meltwater drainage event in spring. Artificial flooding resulted in thicker ice and delayed rotten ice formation by 6 days, but did not delay the disappearance of ice in summer compared to a non-flooded reference site. Experiments at other scales and locations could help reveal how local conditions and flooded area size influence results and the potential of this method.
The achievability of low-emission IPCC sea-level rise scenarios, Millman et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) AR6 report (2021) provides a range of projections on greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, and the consequential impact on global sea level through thermal expansion of sea water and by glacier and ice-sheet mass loss. This paper assesses the likelihood of lower IPCC sea-level rise scenarios (SSP1–1.9 and SSP1–2.6) in light of current ice-sheet observations and model limitations, alongside today’s emissions trends and current shortfall of climate commitments. We conclude that ‘low-end’ projections may underestimate the true pace and magnitude of future sea-level rise and, if we continue on today’s mid-higher emissions pathway (SSP3–7.0), sea-level outcomes of more than 1 m by 2100 should be planned for. The worst can still be avoided through rapid deep emissions reductions, but it is essential that the IPCC continues to reflect these true risks for decision-makers, with rises of more than 2 m this century and several metres thereafter a real possibility.
Audience engagement with climate change content on YouTube: an analysis of video attributes and user interactions, Aharonson et al., Frontiers in Climate
Results indicate that videos presented by scientists are significantly more likely to elicit positive audience attitudes than those presented by politicians or other public figures. Solution-focused framing is strongly associated with positive engagement, while blame-oriented framing is associated with negative responses. Additionally, threaded comment discussions show a higher proportion of positive attitudes than independent comments, suggesting that conversational interaction enhances constructive engagement. These findings highlight the importance of expertise-based communication, solution-oriented narratives, and interactive discourse in digital sustainability communication. The study contributes both methodological tools and practical insights for designing climate change communication strategies that foster informed and constructive public engagement.
From this week's government/NGO section:Trust, Media Habits, and Misperceptions Shape Public Understanding of Climate Change, Marryam Ishaq and M. Speiser, ecoAmerica
A hidden climate majority exists. Most Americans are concerned about climate change, but they do not realize how widely that concern is shared. This perception gap (pluralistic ignorance) masks a strong hidden consensus on climate concern. Trust in information and personal concern about climate change reinforce each other. Americans who trust the information they see or hear are far more likely to be concerned about climate change (79%) — and those who are climate-concerned report higher trust. This creates a reinforcing loop between trust and concern. Media ecosystems shape climate beliefs. Where Americans get their news influences what they believe about climate and energy. While mainstream national media, local news, and social media remain the most widely used sources overall, partisan and age differences shape which sources are most relied on, which in turn shapes climate beliefs. Americans trust the information they encounter but doubt others’ ability to recognize climate misinformation. While many Americans trust the information they personally consume, they are far less confident in others’ ability to distinguish climate fact from fiction — especially when they perceive others as less concerned about climate change. Mistrust of others and misperceptions are core barriers to climate action. Rather than a lack of concern, some of the biggest barriers include eroded trust and misperceptions. Misperceptions about energy sources and others’ climate beliefs, combined with low confidence in the public’s ability to navigate climate misinformation, suppress visible engagement and slow individual and collective action.People and Climate Change, Ipsos
As temperatures rise, the individual responsibility to act has fallen. The past 11 years have been the warmest in the modern era, but people increasingly place less responsibility in needing to act. In the last five years, all countries surveyed in the report in both 2021 and 2026 have seen falls in the proportion who agree that individuals would be failing future generations by not acting against climate change. Short-term fear is countering long-term preparation. While climate concern remains present – 59% on average across 31 countries say they country should be doing more in the fight against climate change - more immediate risks are seen as greater priorities. Our What Worries the World survey finds concern about climate change in 11th place, behind more tangible, immediate worries issues like crime, unemployment, and inflation. The energy transition is at a crossroads. Public support for transitioning to clean energy is increasingly conditional, contingent on affordability, reliability, and security trade-offs. The Ipsos Energy Transition Barometer finds one in two (50% across 31 countries) support governments prioritizing low energy prices even if emissions increase.Climate Change and Migration from Central America: Insights from Migrants in Mexico, Kerwin et al., UC Berkeley School of Law
The authors examine how climate-related harms intersect with and exacerbate violence, exclusion, discrimination, and weak state protection to drive migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Drawing on interviews, desk research, and surveys with people on the move in Mexico, the authors show that climate change rarely operates as a single cause of displacement. Instead, migrants consistently describe how environmental shocks—such as droughts that destroy crops, storms that damage homes and livelihoods, and deforestation and extreme heat that undermine health and economic stability—exacerbate existing insecurity and hardship. The authors focus on Mexico as both a transit and destination country for Central American migrants impacted by these dynamics. The findings demonstrate that better understanding how climate change intensifies vulnerabilities to violence, insecurity, and loss of livelihood—and integrating that analysis into refugee and immigration representation and adjudication— can improve access to protection and to regular migration status under Mexico’s existing legal framework. The authors also offer specific recommendations to strengthen institutional responses to climate migration by the Mexican government and civil society actors to climate migration. 114 articles in 55 journals by 1150 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
Climate feedback of forest fires amplified by atmospheric chemistry, Chen et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-01926-1
Differences in actual evapotranspiration and responses of pure and mixed forests to climate change on the Chinese Loess Plateau, Wu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111210
Imbalance Trajectories of GPP–TER Coupling Under Global Warming, Yang et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70857
Influence of Sea Surface Temperature Patterns and Mean Warming on Past and Future Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Activity, Levin et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0635.1
Mechanisms for Decadal Variability of Ocean Heat Uptake Inferred From Adjoint Sensitivities, Köhl & Fernández, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119283
Meteorological drivers of the low-cloud radiative feedback pattern effect and its uncertainty, Tam et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-4289-2026
Ocean Meridional Heat Transport Estimated from Energy Budget Constraint, Pan et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0522.1
Poleward migration of warm Circumpolar Deep Water towards Antarctica, Lanham et al., Apollo (University of Cambridge) Open Access pmh:oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/400387
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asymmetric impacts of forest gain and loss on tropical land surface temperature, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01423-3 53 cites.
Observations of climate change, effects
Climatology and Trends in Spatial Scales of Extreme Precipitation Over Land in the Contiguous US, Chatterjee et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120662
Indicators of Global Climate Change 2022: Annual update of large-scale indicators of the state of the climate system and the human influence, Forster et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-15-2295-2023
Persistent 2023–2025 Wildfire Extremes in Canada Produced Unprecedented Emissions and Air-Quality Impacts, Chen et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70891
Rising atmospheric carbon dioxide ignites metal mobilization in acid mine drainage, Wang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03551-7
Spatiotemporal Trends and Urban-Climate Interactions of Land Surface Temperature Dynamics Across Bangladesh, Haque et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100547
Unprecedented 2024 East Antarctic winter heatwave driven by polar vortex weakening and amplified by anthropogenic warming, Tang et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01392-x
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Increasing Risk of a “Hot Eastern?Pluvial Western” Asia, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004333 14 cites.
Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
An observational record of global gridded near surface air temperature change over land and ocean from 1781, Morice et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-17-7079-2025
ENSO contribution to the assessment of long-term cloud feedback on global warming, Liu et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-5589-2026
Global open-ocean daily turbulent heat flux dataset (1992–2020) from SSM/I via deep learning, Wang et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-2929-2026
Mapping sea ice concentration using Nimbus-5 ESMR and local dynamical tie points, Tellefsen et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-2891-2026
Reanalyses in the Age of Machine Learning: Why Dataset Curation Matters Now More than Ever, Abel et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0149.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Russian collaboration loss risks permafrost carbon emissions network, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02001-6 15 cites.
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Identifying atmospheric rivers and their poleward latent heat transport with generalizable neural networks: ARCNNv1, Mahesh et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-17-3533-2024
Large and projected increases in compound heatwaves-extreme precipitation events driven by anthropogenic emissions, Liu et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100908
Projected Future Changes of Atmospheric Rivers by a High- and Low-Resolution CESM, Wang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0377.1
Rising Temperatures Will Amplify the Risk of Future Compound Dry–Hot Events over the Mongolian Plateau, Kang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0592.1
Seasonality and scenario dependence of rapid Arctic sea ice loss events in CMIP6 simulations, Sticker et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-19-3259-2025
The burden of El Niño–Southern Oscillation-related dengue attributable to anthropogenic climate change: a multicountry modelling study, Li et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101454
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Emergent Constraints on Future Projections of Tibetan Plateau Warming in Winter, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl108728 16 cites.
Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
A Signal-to-Noise Problem in Model Simulation of Decadal Climate Modes, Clement et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0190.1
CMIP7 Data Request: atmosphere priorities and opportunities, Dingley et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2945-2026
Comments on “Mediterranean Drying by a Positive North Atlantic Oscillation Trend over the Last 65 Years Is an Extreme Outlier in the CMIP6 Multimodel Ensemble”, Vicente-Serrano et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0055.1
Development of the global chemistry-climate coupled model BCC-GEOS-Chem v2.0: improved atmospheric chemistry performance and new capability of chemistry-climate interactions, Sun et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-2111-2026
Enhancing Urban Near-Surface Temperature Simulations through Anthropogenic Heat Parameters Adapted to Local Climate Zones, LV et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0224.1
Physics-based models outperform AI weather forecasts of record-breaking extremes, Zhang et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.18929001
Reply to “Comments on ‘Mediterranean Drying by a Positive North Atlantic Oscillation Trend over the Last 65 Years Is an Extreme Outlier in the CMIP6 Multimodel Ensemble’”, Seager et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0138.1
Successes and Failures of Current AI Climate Models, Scaife, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122615
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global 1 km land surface parameters for kilometer-scale Earth system modeling, Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-2007-2024 27 cites.
Cryosphere & climate change
A recent stabilization in the lengthening of the Arctic sea ice melt season into a highly variable regime, Boisvert et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03534-8
Antarctic grounding zone and bedrock: the interplay shaping Antarctic sea-level contribution, Nowicki & Seroussi, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2024.0544
Assessment of snow model uncertainty in relation to the effect of a 1 °C warming using the snow modelling framework openAMUNDSEN, Rottler et al., SHILAP Revista de lepidopterología Open Access pmh:oai:doaj.org/article:6ac18b8f1acb47c891ce634ea62de79e
Far-reaching effects of Tibetan warming amplification on polar sea?ice retreat, M et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03542-8
Field Observations of Sea Ice Thickening by Artificial Flooding, Hammer et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc022738
Glacier-level and gridded mass change in the rivers' sources in the eastern Tibetan Plateau (ETPR) from 1970s to 2000, Zhu et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-17-1851-2025
Hard rocks and deep wetlands beneath Thwaites Glacier in Antarctica, Zeising et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03502-2
Results of the second Ice Shelf–Ocean Model Intercomparison Project (ISOMIP+), Jordan, Cronfa (Swansea University) pmh:oai:cronfa.swan.ac.uk:cronfa71766
The impact of ice structures and ocean warming in Milne Fiord, Bonneau et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-19-2615-2025
Uncertain ground: impact of bed topography on Antarctic Ice Sheet projections, Caillet et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2024.0543
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate projections of the Adriatic Sea: role of river release, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1368413 31 cites.
Sea level & climate change
The achievability of low-emission IPCC sea-level rise scenarios, Millman et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2024.0565
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Assessing coastal flood risk under extreme events and sea level rise in the Casablanca-Mohammedia coastline (Morocco), Natural Hazards, 10.1007/s11069-024-06624-y 6 cites.
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
East Antarctic Ice Sheet Variability In The Central Transantarctic Mountains Since The Mid Miocene, Bromley et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-21-145-2025
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Stable isotope evidence for long-term stability of large-scale hydroclimate in the Neogene North American Great Plains, Climate of the past, 10.5194/cp-20-1039-2024 7 cites.
Biology & climate change, related geochemistry
A Modern Ghost Story: Increased Selective Mortality of Salmon Under Climate Extremes, Sturrock et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70854
Adapting Species Risk Assessments to a Changing Climate: The Underestimated Vulnerability of Foundational Trees, McLaughlin et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70866
Amazonian understory forests change phosphorus acquisition strategies under elevated CO2, Martins et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-72098-0
Estimating the total mortality of seabirds following a marine heat wave, Lavers et al., Conservation Biology Open Access 10.1111/cobi.70273
Evolutionary conservation hotspots: key areas for threatened Neotropical glassfrogs under climate change scenarios, Vega-Yánez et al., PeerJ Open Access 10.7717/peerj.21165
Global Conservation Status of Key Areas for Climate Diversity, Junjun, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.17744471
Imbalance Trajectories of GPP–TER Coupling Under Global Warming, Yang et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70857
Interacting Effects of Sea-Level Rise and Ocean Warming Reshape Thermal Environments on a Coral Reef, Rogers et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120406
Phragmites australis and Argyrogramma albostriata Suppress the Invasion of Solidago canadensis in China Under Future Climate Change, Zhang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73573
Predators Can Reverse the Effects of Warming on a Marine Ecosystem Engineer, Malakooti et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70846
Relationships Between Water-Use Efficiency and Climatic Factors in Conifers From Different Genera in China, Qin et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009734
Shifting snake ranges in a warming world, Wan et al., Conservation Biology 10.1111/cobi.70293
Warming advanced leaf senescence in alpine plants through advancing leaf emergence and increasing soil drought, Chen et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70325
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Interactions between climate change and urbanization will shape the future of biodiversity, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-01996-2 69 cites.
GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
A top-down evaluation of bottom-up estimates to reduce uncertainty in methane emissions from Arctic wetlands, Basso et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2815-2026
Canadian net forest CO2 uptake enhanced by heat drought via reduced respiration, Dong et al., MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) pmh:oai:pure.mpg.de:item_3686498
Carbon dioxide release driven by organic carbon in minerogenic salt marshes, Kainz et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-2865-2026
Climate benefits of lake nutrient management in China, Zhao et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-01971-w
Designing National Forest Inventories for Accurate Estimation of Soil Carbon Change, Buchkowski et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70868
Disproportionate Belowground Carbon Loss and Ecotone Sensitivity in Boreal Peatland Wildland Fires: Insights From LiDAR and Field Data, Nelson et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008982
Diurnal versus spatial variability of greenhouse gas emissions from an anthropogenic modified German lowland river, Koschorreck et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-21-1613-2024
First global carbon dynamics from an observational and process-informed hybrid perspective: Oversimplified respiration representation likely drives divergence in terrestrial carbon sequestration across models, Zhu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111197
Global blue carbon losses from salt marshes exceed restoration gains, Zheng et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-70158-z
Global CO emissions and drivers of atmospheric CO trends constrained by MOPITT satellite measurements, Tang et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-5531-2026
Greenhouse gas accounting in urban digital twins, Lylykangas et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access 10.1088/2634-4505/ae5a57
Methane leakage thresholds for net climate benefits of wastewater biogas recovery, Li et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41893-026-01818-7
Microbial Responses to Warming Reduce Deep Blue Carbon Storage, Xiao et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70883
Phosphate scarcity governs methane production in the global open ocean, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2521235123
Priority research questions in global peatland science, Milner et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03321-5
Seasonal Drought Reduces Carbon Sequestration in Coastal Wetlands, Jia et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70865
Tracing carbon dynamics during vegetation succession in a subtropical forest, Chen et al., Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70319
Why both trees and technology are important in the race to mitigate carbon emissions, Walker, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-01300-6
Wintertime production and storage of methane in thermokarst ponds of subarctic Norway, Pismeniuk et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-1497-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
High-resolution US methane emissions inferred from an inversion of 2019 TROPOMI satellite data: contributions from individual states, urban areas, and landfills, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-5069-2024 56 cites.
CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Hemispheric contrast in summer season duration responses to CO2 removal, Park et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.31898308
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The performance of solvent-based direct air capture across geospatial and temporal climate regimes, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1394728 18 cites.
Decarbonization
A straightforward trajectory strengthens support for the transition away from natural gas: a population-based survey experiment in the Netherlands, Noordzij et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104699
End of life electric vehicle batteries in China to 2060 and related resource management implications, Li et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03555-3
Life cycle assessment across three generations of photovoltaic systems: Insights from net-zero perspective, Tan et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102012
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impact of electric vehicle charging demand on power distribution grid congestion, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2317599121 84 cites.
Aerosols
Desert dust exerts twice the longwave radiative heating estimated by climate models, Kok et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-70952-9
Size-resolved condensation sink as an approach to understand pathways how gaseous emissions affect health and climate, Lepistö et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-4215-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Aerosol forcing regulating recent decadal change of summer water vapor budget over the Tibetan Plateau, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-46635-8 25 cites.
Climate change communications & cognition
Audience engagement with climate change content on YouTube: an analysis of video attributes and user interactions, Aharonson et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1803829
Beyond broken homes: Why climate resilience must start with the human psyche, Sahu & Basu, PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000908
Beyond Memory and Experimenter Demand: Scientific Consensus Messages Correct Misperceptions, Geiger et al., Open Science Framework Open Access 10.17605/osf.io/s8zgh
Narratives of youth climate activism: exploring the diversity of meaning-making on climate change and citizenship, Fonseca & Castro, Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103044
Obstructing change: political inertia and the maintenance of climate inaction in Australia, Bowden et al., Environmental Politics Open Access 10.1080/09644016.2026.2664291
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Generative AI tools can enhance climate literacy but must be checked for biases and inaccuracies, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01392-w 48 cites.
Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Agrivoltaic System Potential to Mitigate Effects of Climate Change in Viticulture, Meier et al., JuSER (Forschungszentrum Jülich) pmh:oai:juser.fz-juelich.de:1050469
Deep learning model anticipates climate change induced reduction in major commodity crop yields for Canada in 2050, Bhullar et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1748516
Escalating Compound Drought-Heatwaves and Demographic Shifts Threaten Simultaneous Global Breadbasket Failures, Sabut & Mishra, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118650
Fast Net Carbon Balance Recovery After Clear-Cutting but Uncertain Long-Term Carbon Accumulation in Eucalyptus Plantations, Guillemot et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70881
Harmonized European Union subnational crop statistics reveal climate impacts and crop cultivation shifts, Ronchetti et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-16-1623-2024
Integration of SEBAL-Derived Evapotranspiration With Climate Change Projections to Assess Basin-Scale Water Resources and Crops Yield, Mikaeili & Shourian, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70398
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate-smart agriculture: adoption, impacts, and implications for sustainable development, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 10.1007/s11027-024-10139-z 114 cites.
Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
A tale of two coasts: Unveiling US Gulf and Atlantic coastal cities at high flood risk, Dey & Shao, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aec2079
Climatology and Trends in Spatial Scales of Extreme Precipitation Over Land in the Contiguous US, Chatterjee et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120662
Future Changes in the Atmospheric Water Cycle Over the Tibetan Plateau, Zou et al., Climate Dynamics 10.1007/s00382-026-08094-3
Impact of climate change on future flood susceptibility using different climatic parameters and deep learning algorithms in eastern Himalayan region, Paramanik et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1729457
Impacts of climate change on groundwater resources: a comprehensive review, Kunwar et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1606354
Projected Future Changes of Atmospheric Rivers by a High- and Low-Resolution CESM, Wang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0377.1
Rising Temperatures Will Amplify the Risk of Future Compound Dry–Hot Events over the Mongolian Plateau, Kang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0592.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impact of Soil Moisture Dynamics and Precipitation Pattern on UK Urban Pluvial Flood Hazards Under Climate Change, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004073 10 cites.
Climate change economics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Higher education’s impact on CO2 mitigation: MENA insights with consideration for unemployment, economic growth, and globalization, Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1325598 11 cites.
Climate change mitigation public policy research
Promising climate progress from net-zero ambitions to the Paris Agreement goal, Tagomori et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02615-y
Strategic retrenchment in the energy transition: Shell Pernis and the emergence of second-order carbon lock-in, Unruh et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104718
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Catalysts for sustainable energy transitions: the interplay between financial development, green technological innovations, and environmental taxes in European nations, Environment Development and Sustainability, 10.1007/s10668-023-04081-4 34 cites.
Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
Disentangling urban vulnerability to rising temperatures, Achebak et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101451
Weave framework: harnessing local knowledge in donor-funded climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction projects, Yukich et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2661681
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Governance, institutions, and climate change resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: assessing the threshold effects, Frontiers in Environmental Science, 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1352344 23 cites.
Climate change impacts on human health
Heatwaves Constrain the Future Persistence of Mosquito Vectors in Europe, Kramer et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70876
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Analysing health system capacity and preparedness for climate change, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-01994-4 31 cites.
Climate change & geopolitics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The challenges of the increasing institutionalization of climate security, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000402 7 cites.
Other
Artificial intelligence to support cross-disciplinary climate change research, Ou et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02624-x
Iron and Manganese Cycling in the Atlantifying Barents Sea: Concentrated Inputs and Emerging Limitations, Hawley et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb009031
Research on the impact of climate risk attention on enterprise energy efficiency, Song, Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115325
Strengthening Climate Action through Career Aspirations: A Life-Course Perspective on Circular Citizenship Behaviours, Pribadi, Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103055
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Extreme hydrometeorological events induce abrupt and widespread freshwater temperature changes across the Pacific Northwest of North America, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01407-6 14 cites.
Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
Avoid Sacrificing Nature to Truly Achieve Net Zero, Rigolot et al., Conservation Letters Open Access 10.1111/con4.70046
Potential futures for the IPCC’s approach to artificial intelligence, Buck et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03514-y
Scientific coherence in climate change research: a meta-research perspective to accelerate scientific progress and climate justice, Acosta-Monterrosa et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1766738
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Earth Virtualization Engines (EVE), Earth system science data, 10.5194/essd-16-2113-2024 36 cites.
Managing Natural Hazards and Climate Risks in Elections, Asplund et al., International IDEA
Elections are the cornerstone of democracy, but like all public functions they are vulnerable to disruption by events in the natural world, including earthquakes, floods, wildfires and heatwaves. As the climate changes, many natural hazards are increasing in frequency and severity, prompting electoral practitioners to seek ways to protect the vote from such phenomena. The authors survey the risk that meteorological and geological events pose to elections and offers an analysis of the strategies that electoral management bodies (EMBs) around the world have put in place to safeguard electoral processes. The authors draw on a rich database of more than 100 cases of disaster-disrupted elections between 2006 and 2025 to document the various effects that events in the natural world can have on all aspects of the electoral cycle and to delineate the range of strategies that are available to electoral administrators to minimize their adverse consequences.Solar Permitting Scorecard. Grading all 50 states on removing obstacles to rooftop solar and home batteries, Elizabeth Ridlington and Johanna Neumann, Frontier Group and Environment America Research & Policy Center
The authors reviewed policies relating to the permitting and inspection of residential solar energy systems and battery storage in all 50 states. They found that a majority of states have done little to adopt common-sense practices that reduce the costs and delays that permitting and inspection requirements impose on families wishing to install solar panels and batteries. Only two states – California and Texas – received a “B” in the scorecard, two received a “C,” 24 received a “D” and the remaining 22 received an “F.”People and Climate Change, Ipsos
As temperatures rise, the individual responsibility to act has fallen. The past 11 years have been the warmest in the modern era, but people increasingly place less responsibility in needing to act. In the last five years, all countries surveyed in the report in both 2021 and 2026 have seen falls in the proportion who agree that individuals would be failing future generations by not acting against climate change. Short-term fear is countering long-term preparation. While climate concern remains present – 59% on average across 31 countries say they country should be doing more in the fight against climate change - more immediate risks are seen as greater priorities. Our What Worries the World survey finds concern about climate change in 11th place, behind more tangible, immediate worries issues like crime, unemployment, and inflation. The energy transition is at a crossroads. Public support for transitioning to clean energy is increasingly conditional, contingent on affordability, reliability, and security trade-offs. The Ipsos Energy Transition Barometer finds one in two (50% across 31 countries) support governments prioritizing low energy prices even if emissions increase.Extreme Heat and Agriculture, Simpson et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization
Extreme heat refers to situations where daytime and nighttime temperatures rise above their usual ranges for a protracted period, leading to physiological stress and direct physical damages to food crops, livestock, fish, trees and human beings. The authors examine how extreme heat ripples through agricultural systems and how heatwaves can interact with other climatological variables, including rain, solar radiation, humidity, wind and drought – to trigger compound effects that wreak havoc on individuals and entire ecosystems.The 2026 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: narrowing window for decisive health action, Kriit et al., The Lancet Public Health
This third iteration of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change in Europe report systematically tracks the health effects of climate change adaptation and mitigation action, economics and finance, and the engagement of various societal actors with the climate change and health nexus, drawing on data up to 2025. The report features seven new indicators, methodological updates, extended time series for existing indicators, and highlights inequalities in health risks and impacts where possible.Global Electricity Review 2026, Fulghum et al., Ember
75%=Share of global electricity demand growth met by solar power in 2025. 33.8%=Share of renewables in global power generation in 2025 – above a third for the first time, overtaking coal. -0.2%=Year-on-year change in fossil generation.Climate Change and Migration from Central America: Insights from Migrants in Mexico, Kerwin et al., UC Berkeley School of Law
The authors examine how climate-related harms intersect with and exacerbate violence, exclusion, discrimination, and weak state protection to drive migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Drawing on interviews, desk research, and surveys with people on the move in Mexico, the authors show that climate change rarely operates as a single cause of displacement. Instead, migrants consistently describe how environmental shocks—such as droughts that destroy crops, storms that damage homes and livelihoods, and deforestation and extreme heat that undermine health and economic stability—exacerbate existing insecurity and hardship. The authors focus on Mexico as both a transit and destination country for Central American migrants impacted by these dynamics. The findings demonstrate that better understanding how climate change intensifies vulnerabilities to violence, insecurity, and loss of livelihood—and integrating that analysis into refugee and immigration representation and adjudication— can improve access to protection and to regular migration status under Mexico’s existing legal framework. The authors also offer specific recommendations to strengthen institutional responses to climate migration by the Mexican government and civil society actors to climate migration.High Voltage. The global potential for industrial electrification, Cassandra Etter-Wenzel and Jan Rosenow, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford
Industrial electrification is becoming a matter of economic security as well as decarbonization. The authors argue that continued reliance on fossil fuels leaves 75% of global industry exposed to recurring price shocks, while electrification offers a pathway to stable and resilient energy costs.Trust, Media Habits, and Misperceptions Shape Public Understanding of Climate Change, Marryam Ishaq and M. Speiser, ecoAmerica
A hidden climate majority exists. Most Americans are concerned about climate change, but they do not realize how widely that concern is shared. This perception gap (pluralistic ignorance) masks a strong hidden consensus on climate concern. Trust in information and personal concern about climate change reinforce each other. Americans who trust the information they see or hear are far more likely to be concerned about climate change (79%) — and those who are climate-concerned report higher trust. This creates a reinforcing loop between trust and concern. Media ecosystems shape climate beliefs. Where Americans get their news influences what they believe about climate and energy. While mainstream national media, local news, and social media remain the most widely used sources overall, partisan and age differences shape which sources are most relied on, which in turn shapes climate beliefs. Americans trust the information they encounter but doubt others’ ability to recognize climate misinformation. While many Americans trust the information they personally consume, they are far less confident in others’ ability to distinguish climate fact from fiction — especially when they perceive others as less concerned about climate change. Mistrust of others and misperceptions are core barriers to climate action. Rather than a lack of concern, some of the biggest barriers include eroded trust and misperceptions. Misperceptions about energy sources and others’ climate beliefs, combined with low confidence in the public’s ability to navigate climate misinformation, suppress visible engagement and slow individual and collective action.Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Analysis for the United States 1990-2024, Desai et al., Center for Global Sustainability, University of Maryland
The authors present a comprehensive picture of greenhouse gas (GHG) sources and sinks covering the geographical region of the United States. The data are presented for each year from 1990 through 2024, the latter being the most recent year when comprehensive data are available for the entire economy. Along with detailed results for single years and analyses of trends over time, the authors present methodological descriptions, data inputs, a characterization of uncertainties, recalculations, and improvements. The report was developed to supports comparability and continuity with past official U.S. inventories prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.From energy crisis to energy security: Actions for policy makers, Walker et al., The International Renewable Energy Agency
The current energy crisis stemming from the conflict in the Middle East re-iterates the inherent structural weakness and vulnerability of national energy systems that remain reliant upon fossil fuels, and markets where the costs of oil and gas are highly influential on electricity prices. There is an immediate opportunity, however, to urgently reassess these fundamentals and prioritize reactions that enhance long-term energy stability. The authors provide key short- medium- and long-term actions for policy makers responding to the present crisis. Policy makers must urgently consider intervening to direct investment and emergency responses to accelerate the deployment of renewable power generation capacity, and the electrification of energy-consuming processes and sectors.State of Energy Policy 2026, Cozzi et al., International Energy Agency
The authors provide a unique review of policy progress made in 2025 across all energy sectors and instruments, with a special focus on government spending, energy efficiency regulations, and the contribution of the energy sector to nationally determined contributions and long-term net zero pledges. This year’s report brings an extensive examination of energy security policies to the period 1973-2025, from oil and natural gas to clean energy technology supply chains and critical minerals. It also spotlights the policy momentum around energy access, most particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, taking stock of the policy progress since the IEA Summit on Clean Cooking in Africa in 2024.2025 State of the Heat Pump Water Heater Market Report, New Buildings Institute and the Advanced Water Heating Initiative
The authors discuss how residential and commercial manufacturers released more new and updated products in 2025 than any other year in the heat pump water heater's (HPWH) history. Five new residential manufacturers brought HPWHs to market, and many other established manufacturers brought updated and increasingly innovative products to market. New configurations and form factors also emerged, from flexible voltage (120-volt and 240-volt in the same unit) products, to split systems (where the compressor and tank are separated), to high temperature commercial and industrial HPWHs, to HPWHs with thermal storage.Climate Change & Adaptation. Rethinking climate risk integration across business, finance and policy, Holloway et al., FTI Consulting
Financial institutions, corporate executives and investors are operating with climate risk models that systematically underestimate exposure by a factor of two to four times. This is not a compliance issue, instead it represents one of the most significant mispricing phenomena in modern capital markets, materializing today across credit spreads, equity valuations and capital allocation decisions. The authors analyzed 148 global companies representing $31.4 trillion in market capitalization to test whether current climate risk models provide decision-useful intelligence. The findings are stark: conventional platforms project approximately 2.0% portfolio losses, while the author's integrated analysis reveals 7.7% average exposure – a four-fold gap that stems from systematically underweighting transition risks relative to physical climate impacts. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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Wildfires used to ‘go to sleep’ at night. Climate change has them burning overtime
WASHINGTON (AP) — Burning time for North American wildfires is going into overtime. Flames are lasting later into the night and starting earlier in the morning because human-caused climate change is extending the hotter and drier conditions that feed fires, a new study found.
Fires used to die down or even die out at night as temperatures dropped and humidity increased, but that’s happening less often. The number of hours in North America when the weather is favorable for wildfires is 36% higher than 50 years ago, according to a study published earlier this month in Science Advances.
Places such as California have 550 more potential burning hours than in the mid-1970s. Parts of southwestern New Mexico and central Arizona are seeing as many as 2,000 more hours a year when the weather is prone to burning fires, the highest increase seen in the study, which looked at Canada and the United States. The research looked at times when conditions were ripe for fire, but that didn’t mean fires occurred during all that time.
Recent big fires in LA and Hawaii burned at nightFires that surge at night are tougher to fight and included the Lahaina, Hawaii fire in 2023, the Jasper fire in Alberta in 2024, and the Los Angeles fires in 2025, the study said. Maui’s fire ignited at 12:22 a.m.
It’s not just the clock that is getting extended. The calendar is too. The number of days with fire-prone weather increased by 44%, which effectively added 26 days over the past half-century.
It’s mostly from warmer, drier nighttime weather, with a bit of extra wind, the study authors said.
“Fires normally slow down during the night, or they just stop,” said study co-author Xianli Wang, a fire scientist with the Canadian Forest Service. “But under extreme fire hazard conditions, fire actually burns through the night or later into the night.”
And Wang said Earth’s warming atmosphere means it’s like to get worse.
Tougher to fight fires at nightFires that don’t “go to sleep” get a running start the next day, making it harder to knock them down, University of California, Merced fire scientist John Abatzoglou, who wasn’t part of the study, said in an email.
“Nights aren’t what they used to be — that is, more reliable breaks for wildfire,” he added. “Widespread warming and lack of humidity is keeping fires up at night.”
Wildland firefighter Nicholai Allen, who also founded a firm that makes home fire prevention tools, said it’s very difficult to fight fires at night.
“You have to understand that you have snakes and bears and mountain lions and all the stuff you have in daytime,” Allen said, noting a colleague was bitten by a bear. “But at night, they’re really scared, and they’re running away from the fire.”
The Canadian researchers analyzed nearly 9,000 larger fires from 2017 to 2023 using a weather satellite and other tools to get hour-by-hour data on atmospheric conditions during the fires, such as humidity, temperature, wind, rain, and fuel moisture levels. They created a computer model that correlated weather conditions and fire status and applied to historical data in Canada and the United States from 1975 to 2106.
Nights are warming faster than daysScientists have long said heat-trapping gases from the burning of coal, oil, and natural gas make nights warm faster than days because of increased cloud cover that absorbs and re-emits heat down to Earth at night like a blanket. Since 1975, summers in the contiguous U.S. have seen nighttime lowest temperatures warm by 2.6 degrees Fahrenheit (1.4 degrees Celsius), while daytime highest temperatures have gone up 2.2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.2 degrees Celsius), according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Humidity at night “doesn’t rebound” from its daytime dryness like it used to, said study lead author Kaiwei Luo, a fire science researcher at the University of Alberta.
Wildfires often coincide with drought, especially extreme drought, which means not only drier air, but hotter, drier air that sucks up more moisture from the ground and plants, making fuels for fire more flammable, Wang said. In a drought, there’s often a vicious circle of drying and when it is quite dry, a warmer atmosphere has more power to suck moisture out of fuels.
Just as warmer nights, especially in heat waves, don’t let the body recover, the warmer nights are not allowing forests to recover, Wang said. It can take weeks for dead fuel to recover its lost moisture and be less fire-prone, he said.
“It’s just a stress to the plants,” Wang said. “That also increases fuel load.”
From 2016 to 2025, wildfires in the United States on average burned an area the size of Massachusetts each year, slightly more than 11,000 square miles (28,500 square kilometers). That’s 2.6 times the average burn area of the 1980s, according to the National Interagency Fire Center. Canada’s land burned on average for the last 10 years is 2.8 times more than during the 1980s, according to the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre.
Syracuse University fire scientist Jacob Bendix, who wasn’t part of the research, called the study a sobering reminder of climate change’s role in driving “increased fire potential across almost all of the fire-prone environments of North America.”
Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts
Computer models that use artificial intelligence (AI) cannot forecast record-breaking weather as well as traditional climate models, according to a new study.
It is well established that AI climate models have surpassed traditional, physics-based climate models for some aspects of weather forecasting.
However, new research published in Science Advances finds that AI models still “underperform” in forecasting record-breaking extreme weather events.
The authors tested how well both AI and traditional weather models could simulate thousands of record-breaking hot, cold and windy events that were recorded in 2018 and 2020.
They find that AI models underestimate both the frequency and intensity of record-breaking events.
A study author tells Carbon Brief that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
AI weather forecastsExtreme weather events, such as floods, heatwaves and storms, drive hundreds of billions of dollars in damages every year through the destruction of cropland, impacts on infrastructure and the loss of human life.
Many governments have developed early warning systems to prepare the general public and mobilise disaster response teams for imminent extreme weather events. These systems have been shown to minimise damages and save lives.
For decades, scientists have used numerical weather prediction models to simulate the weather days, or weeks, in advance.
These models rely on a series of complex equations that reproduce processes in the atmosphere and ocean. The equations are rooted in fundamental laws of physics, based on decades of research by climate scientists. As a result, these models are referred to as “physics-based” models.
However, AI-based climate models are gaining popularity as an alternative for weather forecasting.
Instead of using physics, these models use a statistical approach. Scientists present AI models with a large batch of historical weather data, known as training data, which teaches the model to recognise patterns and make predictions.
To produce a new forecast, the AI model draws on this bank of knowledge and follows the patterns that it knows.
There are many advantages to AI weather forecasts. For example, they use less computing power than physics-based models, because they do not have to run thousands of mathematical equations.
Furthermore, many AI models have been found to perform better than traditional physics-based models at weather forecasts.
However, these models also have drawbacks.
Study author Prof Sebastian Engelke, a professor at the research institute for statistics and information science at the University of Geneva, tells Carbon Brief that AI models “depend strongly on the training data” and are “relatively constrained to the range of this dataset”.
In other words, AI models struggle to simulate brand new weather patterns, instead tending forecast events of a similar strength to those seen before. As a result, it is unclear whether AI models can simulate unprecedented, record-breaking extreme events that, by definition, have never been seen before.
Record-breaking extremesExtreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent as the climate warms. Record-shattering extremes – those that break existing records by large margins – are also becoming more regular.
For example, during a 2021 heatwave in north-western US and Canada, local temperature records were broken by up to 5C. According to one study, the heatwave would have been “impossible” without human-caused climate change.
The new study explores how accurately AI and physics-based models can forecast such record-breaking extremes.
First, the authors identified every heat, cold and wind event in 2018 and 2020 that broke a record previously set between 1979 and 2017. (They chose these years due to data availability.) The authors use ERA5 reanalysis data to identify these records.
This produced a large sample size of record-breaking events. For the year 2020, the authors identified around 160,000 heat, 33,000 cold and 53,000 wind records, spread across different seasons and world regions.
For their traditional, physics-based model, the authors selected the High RESolution forecast model from the Integrated Forecasting System of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. This is “widely considered as the leading physics-based numerical weather prediction model”, according to the paper.
They also selected three “leading” AI weather models – the GraphCast model from Google Deepmind, Pangu-Weather developed by Huawei Cloud and the Fuxi model, developed by a team from Shanghai.
The authors then assessed how accurately each model could forecast the extremes observed in the year 2020.
Dr Zhongwei Zhang is the lead author on the study and a researcher at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. He tells Carbon Brief that many AI weather forecast models were built for “general weather conditions”, as they use all historical weather data to train the models. Meanwhile, forecasting extremes is considered a “secondary task” by the models.
The authors explored a range of different “lead times” – in other words, how far into the future the model is forecasting. For example, a lead time of two days could mean the model uses the weather conditions at midnight on 1 January to simulate weather conditions at midnight on 3 January.
The plot below shows how accurately the models forecasted all extreme events (left) and heat extremes (right) under different lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy.
The chart on the left shows how two of the AI models (blue and green) performed better than the physics-based model (black) when forecasting all weather across the year 2020.
However, the chart on the right illustrates how the physics-based model (black) performed better than all three AI models (blue, red and green) when it came to forecasting heat extremes.
Accuracy of the AI models (blue, red and green) and the physics-based model (black) at forecasting all weather over 2020 (left) and heat extremes (right) over a range of lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” (RMSE) – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy. Source: Zhang et al (2026).The authors note that the performance gap between AI and physics-based models is widest for lower lead times, indicating that AI models have greater difficulty making predictions in the near future.
They find similar results for cold and wind records.
In addition, the authors find that AI models generally “underpredict” temperature during heat records and “overpredict” during cold records.
The study finds that the larger the margin that the record is broken by, the less well the AI model predicts the intensity of the event.
‘Warning shot’Study author Prof Erich Fischer is a climate scientist at ETH Zurich and a Carbon Brief contributing editor. He tells Carbon Brief that the result is “not unexpected”.
He adds that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
AI models are likely to continue to improve, but scientists should “not yet” fully replace traditional forecasting models with AI ones, according to Fischer.
He explains that accurate forecasts are “most needed” in the runup to potential record-breaking extremes, because they are the trigger for early warning systems that help minimise damages caused by extreme weather.
Leonardo Olivetti is a PhD student at Uppsala University, who has published work on AI weather forecasting and was not involved in the study.
He tells Carbon Brief that “many other studies” have identified issues with using AI models for “extremes”, but this paper is novel for its specific focus on extremes.
Olivetti notes that AI models are already used alongside physics-based models at “some of the major weather forecasting centres around the world”. However, the study results suggest “caution against relying too heavily on these [AI] models”, he says.
Prof Martin Schultz, a professor in computational earth system science at the University of Cologne who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the results of the analysis are “very interesting, but not too surprising”.
He adds that the study “justifies the continued use of classical numerical weather models in operational forecasts, in spite of their tremendous computational costs”.
Advances in forecastingThe field of AI weather forecasting is evolving rapidly.
Olivetti notes that the three AI models tested in the study are an “older generation” of AI models. In the last two years, newer “probabilistic” forecast models have emerged that “claim to better capture extremes”, he explains.
The three AI models used in the analysis are “deterministic”, meaning that they only simulate one possible future outcome.
In contrast, study author Engelke tells Carbon Brief that probabilistic models “create several possible future states of the weather” and are therefore more likely to capture record-breaking extremes.
Engelke says it is “important” to evaluate the newer generation of models for their ability to forecast weather extremes.
He adds that this paper has set out a “protocol” for testing the ability of AI models to predict unprecedented extreme events, which he hopes other researchers will go on to use.
The study says that another “promising direction” for future research is to develop models that combine aspects of traditional, physics-based weather forecasts with AI models.
Engelke says this approach would be “best of both worlds”, as it would combine the ability of physics-based models to simulate record-breaking weather with the computational efficiency of AI models.
Dr Kyle Hilburn, a research scientist at Colorado State University, notes that the study does not address extreme rainfall, which he says “presents challenges for both modelling and observing”. This, he says, is an “important” area for future research.
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Fuel Disclosure
As geopolitical shocks drive jet fuel price volatility and emissions rebound, alternative aviation fuels are increasingly presented as the solution. But can they realistically hedge fuel risk and deliver decarbonisation—or do they introduce new financial and policy vulnerabilities?
This webinar cuts through the hype, using market data, policy analysis, and lifecycle evidence to assess the true scale, cost, and sustainability of alternative jet fuels. The goal is not to dismiss them, but to recalibrate expectations, challenge overreliance, and position alternative fuels as one tool among many in aviation’s transition.
What you’ll leave with:- A clear understanding of why truly sustainable fuels face structural limits.
- Insight into where alternative fuel investment makes sense—and where it doesn’t.
- A stronger basis for allocating capital and policy across aviation decarbonisation options.
The post Fuel Disclosure appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.
Transition risk: The human cost of net zero
This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler
I am finalizing a textbook on climate risk and am posting chapters as I finish them. I’d previously posted chapters about embedded energy and physical climate risk; this post is a chapter on transition risk, the economic and social risks of the transition to a clean-energy economy.
IntroductionIn the context of climate risk, transition risk encompasses the economic and social risks associated with a shift towards a low-carbon economy. Such an effort would fundamentally reshape our world and create critical financial uncertainty for assets and industries tied to the old, carbon-intensive system.
Net zeroReaching “net zero” is the ultimate goal of most climate policy. This means reducing greenhouse gas emissions as much as possible, with any remaining emissions that are too difficult or costly to eliminate are canceled out by an equivalent amount of “negative emissions” — processes that actively pull carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. These negative emissions are the “net” part of net zero and it acknowledges the practical reality that some sectors, like long-distance air travel or ocean shipping, may be incredibly difficult to decarbonize in the near future.
What are these negative emissions technologies? The two primary methods discussed are Direct Air Capture (DAC), which uses machines to filter carbon dioxide directly from the air, and Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Sequestration (BECCS), which involves growing crops, burning them for energy, and capturing and burying the resulting carbon dioxide. However, both technologies face significant hurdles, including high costs, large energy requirements, and, in the case of BECCS, immense land use needs that could compete with food production and biodiversity.
Once we reach net zero, global temperatures will stabilize — although they won’t recover to pre-industrial levels for tens of thousands of years. Getting the climate to actually cool on time scales we care about (decades to centuries) would would require pulling even more carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, or deploying some type of climate engineering approach like injecting aerosols into the stratosphere.
The scale of the net zero transformation means that reaching net zero will fundamentally overhaul vast parts of the global economy. Many big sectors of our economy — energy, transportation, industry, agriculture — must be reshaped, and that reshaping will create enormous opportunities as well as painful dislocations. The transition to a low-carbon economy is not simply a matter of swapping one energy source for another; it requires rebuilding infrastructure, retraining workers, and redirecting trillions of dollars in investment.
Some industries are poised to prosper. Renewable energy is the most obvious example: in 2025, the world added over 700 GW of new capacity, and sustaining that pace for decades will require ongoing investment in manufacturing, installation, and maintenance of wind turbines and solar panels. The profits for those well positioned will be enormous.
The electric vehicle industry and its supply chains — from battery manufacturers to mining operations for lithium and cobalt — also stand to grow dramatically. Companies that build and manage electrical grid infrastructure, including new transmission lines and energy storage systems, will see surging demand. So too will firms specializing in energy efficiency, building retrofits, and emerging technologies like green hydrogen and sustainable aviation fuels. Even agriculture could see new revenue streams as farmers are paid to adopt practices that sequester carbon in soil.
Other industries, however, face serious decline. Fossil fuel producers (coal, oil, and natural gas) confront the prospect of their core product becoming obsolete, stranding assets worth trillions of dollars. Workers in these industries, from coal miners to oil rig operators, risk losing their livelihoods.
The effects extend well beyond extraction: refineries, pipelines, and petrochemical plants all face an uncertain future. The automotive sector will also see significant disruption, as the shift to electric vehicles renders the internal combustion engine and its complex supply chain of transmissions, exhaust systems, and fuel injection components irrelevant. Communities built around these industries may face economic devastation if the transition is not carefully managed.
This uneven distribution of winners and losers will create difficult economic and political challenges, particularly during the transition period. The enormous capital investment required — in renewable generation, grid modernization, EV charging infrastructure, industrial retooling, and carbon removal — must be mobilized quickly, creating the risk of supply chain bottlenecks, inflation in key materials, and financial instability. Managing this transition in a way that is both fast enough to meet climate targets and equitable enough to maintain broad public support is one of the defining policy challenges of our time.
Stranded assetsA core concept in transition risk is the “stranded asset”. A stranded asset is defined as an asset that loses significant value well before the end of its expected economic life. This loss is often sudden and unexpected, driven by changes in market conditions, technology, or policy. While this can happen for many reasons, it is a particularly potent risk in the context of climate change, arising from both direct physical impacts and the economic shifts of the energy transition.
For example, here is a house that literally fell into the ocean in North Carolina in Sept. 2025:
linkFrom Zillow.com, this was a pricey house:
link
This house could have stood for another few decades, but it collapsed into the ocean due to coastal erosion that was certainly made worse by sea level rise. When that happened, its value instantly dropped to zero, a stark, nonlinear impact that produced a stranded asset.
While physical risks can strand assets, the concept first gained prominence in discussions about transition risk and the fossil fuel industry. Oil and gas companies are valued in the trillions of dollars, with much of that valuation based on their proven reserves—oil and gas that is in the ground and ready to be produced. The transition to a net-zero economy, however, requires that a significant portion of these reserves be “left in the ground” and never burned. Once the market fully accepts that these assets cannot be produced due to climate policies, their value could drop to zero rapidly.
The danger of these fossil fuel assets becoming stranded extends far beyond the energy companies themselves. It poses a systemic risk to the broader economy because large swaths of the general public have financial exposure to these companies through their investments, including 401k programs, pensions, and mutual funds. The sudden devaluation of these energy assets could negatively affect many people’s investment and retirement funds, which in turn could have a widespread and devastating impact on the financial security of the general public.
This same principle applies to the real estate sector. Consider a commercial office building with a low energy efficiency rating located in a city that passes a new ordinance mandating high-performance standards for all buildings. The owner is suddenly faced with a difficult choice: either undertake a costly, large-scale retrofit to meet the new legal requirements or risk being unable to legally rent the space. If the retrofit is too expensive, the building’s value is stranded, as its primary function — generating rental income — has been eliminated by a policy change aimed at reducing emissions.
Another often-overlooked category of risk lies in intangible assets. For companies in the S&P 500, these assets — such as brand value, reputation, and intellectual property (IP) — can represent up to 90% of their total market value. Their non-physical nature makes them vulnerable to rapid devaluation. For example, imagine a company that holds a highly valuable portfolio of patents for a new, efficient diesel engine technology. If a major country or region, aiming to meet climate targets, decides to ban the sale of all new diesel cars, the market for that technology disappears. The intellectual property, once a significant asset, has its value evaporate almost overnight. This is a direct parallel to the risk facing fossil fuel companies, whose reserves — a tangible asset on paper — could become worthless if they cannot be produced.
A final critical category that is often overlooked is human capital. Human capital represents the skills, knowledge, and expertise that workers have developed over their careers — assets that can suddenly lose their value in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Consider a mechanic who has spent 30 years perfecting the art of repairing internal combustion engines. This individual has accumulated expertise in diagnosing problems, understanding the mechanical systems, and maintaining gasoline-powered vehicles. As the world shifts to electric vehicles — which require fundamentally different maintenance skills — this expertise becomes obsolete. The mechanic’s human capital, built over decades, is stranded.
The scale of this challenge is enormous. Huge numbers of workers have built their careers in fossil fuel industries. Coal miners possess specialized knowledge about underground operations, safety protocols, and extraction techniques. Oil field workers understand drilling technologies, reservoir management, and petroleum systems. Pipeline operators and refinery technicians have invested years developing skills specific to a carbon-intensive economy. As these industries contract or disappear entirely, these workers face the prospect of their expertise becoming rapidly becoming worthless.
This creates both an economic and social crisis. Unlike a stranded power plant that can be written off a company’s books, stranded human capital represents real people with families, mortgages, and communities that depend on their income. A 50-year-old coal miner cannot simply retrain as a software developer overnight. The geographical concentration of these industries compounds the problem — entire regions have been built around fossil fuel extraction, creating communities where the primary source of skilled employment may disappear.
The human dimension of stranded assets also creates political risk for the climate transition itself. Workers facing the loss of their livelihoods can become powerful opponents of climate action, slowing the transition for everyone. The fear and anger generated by the transition can translate into political movements that resist or reverse climate policies, as workers vote to protect their immediate economic interests over longer-term economic reality.
The TCFD Framework: Four Key Drivers of Transition RiskTo better understand and manage transition risks, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) developed a framework that organizes these risks into four distinct categories. This framework has become the global standard for how companies and investors think about and report climate-related financial risks.
1. Policy and Legal RisksPolicy and legal risks emerge when governments and courts take action to address climate change. These interventions can fundamentally alter the economic landscape, often with little warning.
Carbon pricing represents one of the most direct policy tools. When governments implement a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, they make it more expensive to emit CO2. For instance, a carbon price of $50 per ton of carbon dioxide would add around $20 to the cost of a barrel of oil, fundamentally changing the economics of oil production and consumption. Companies that built their business models around cheap fossil fuels suddenly face dramatically higher operating costs.
Efficiency standards create another layer of policy risk. The UK’s Minimum Energy Efficiency Standard (MEES) provides a clear example: it prohibits landlords from renting properties with poor energy efficiency ratings. A landlord who owns an older, inefficient building faces a stark choice — invest heavily in retrofits or watch the property become unrentable, thereby creating a stranded asset.
The legal dimension adds another layer of risk through climate litigation. There are many lawsuits winding through the courts where people are taking fossil fuel companies to court because they have been or expect to be harmed by climate-change-driven extreme weather. This potential climate liability could expose fossil fuel companies to enormous financial risk, much like tobacco companies faced when the health impacts of their products became legally actionable.
2. Technology RisksTechnology risk represents the classic story of disruption — when a new, cheaper, or better technology makes existing technologies obsolete. In the climate context, this risk is accelerating as clean technologies have reached critical tipping points.
The most dramatic example is the drop in renewable energy costs. Solar power costs have fallen nearly 90% over the past 15 years. In most parts of the world, building a new solar or wind farm is now cheaper and faster than building a new coal or gas plant — even without subsidies. This is rapidly reordering energy economics and energy markets. Coal plants that were expected to operate profitably for 40 years are being shut down early not because of regulation, but because they simply can’t compete economically with cheaper energy sources. Natural gas plants will be next.
Electric vehicles present another technological disruption. As battery costs decline and performance improves, EVs are becoming not just environmentally preferable but superior products — they accelerate faster, require less maintenance, and increasingly cost less to own and operate than internal combustion engines. This technological shift threatens not just automakers who are slow to adapt, but entire ecosystems built around gasoline vehicles: gas stations, oil change shops, parts suppliers, and even dealerships whose business models depend heavily on service revenue from complex internal combustion engines.
3. Market RisksMarket risks encompass the shifts in supply, demand, and investor sentiment that can rapidly revalue assets and companies.
As an example, demand for transition minerals like lithium, cobalt, and copper is soaring as the world builds batteries and renewable energy infrastructure. Companies that secured supply chains for these materials early have gained significant competitive advantages, while those arriving late face production bottlenecks and inflated costs. Conversely, demand for thermal coal is collapsing in many regions, leaving coal mining companies with reserves that may never be extracted.
Perhaps more significant is the shift in investor perceptions. For decades, oil companies were valued based on their proven reserves — the oil and gas they had rights to extract. Now, many investors view these same reserves as worthless, unburnable carbon that will never generate revenue. This shift in perception led BP to write down its assets by $17.5 billion in 2020, with Shell following with a $22 billion write down. These companies acknowledged that much of their oil would likely remain in the ground forever.
The power of changing investor sentiment was dramatically demonstrated in 2021 when Engine No. 1, a tiny activist hedge fund, successfully won three board seats at ExxonMobil. Their argument wasn’t environmental but purely financial: Exxon’s failure to plan for the energy transition was destroying long-term shareholder value. This showed that transition risk has moved from the margins to the center of corporate governance.
4. Reputational RisksReputational risk reflects the changing expectations of consumers, employees, and society at large. As public concern about climate change grows, companies associated with high emissions face damage to their brands and their social license to operate.
The financial sector illustrates how reputational concerns translate into business decisions. In 2019, Goldman Sachs announced it would no longer finance new thermal coal mines or Arctic oil exploration. While framed partly in risk management terms, the bank explicitly cited reputational considerations and changing client expectations as key drivers. They recognized that being associated with these projects was becoming bad for business, potentially costing them clients and talented employees who increasingly consider environmental factors in their career choices.
Consumer pressure is also reshaping entire industries. The rapid growth of plant-based milk alternatives like Oatly directly responds to, among other things, consumer concerns about dairy’s environmental impact. Traditional dairy companies, seeing their market share erode, are scrambling to launch their own non-dairy alternatives. This shift isn’t driven by regulation or technology costs but by changing consumer preferences that make high-emission products less desirable, regardless of price or quality.
5. Putting it togetherThese four categories of risk — policy and legal, technology, market, and reputation — don’t operate in isolation. They interact and amplify each other, creating feedback loops that can accelerate the transition and magnify risks for unprepared economies.
Consider how technological advances in renewable energy trigger cascading effects across all risk categories. As solar and wind become cheaper than fossil fuels (technology risk), governments gain political cover to implement stricter emissions standards and carbon pricing (policy risk), knowing these policies won’t dramatically increase energy costs for voters. These policies, in turn, shift investor capital away from fossil fuels and toward renewables (market risk), further driving down clean energy costs through economies of scale. Companies slow to adapt find themselves not just technologically obsolete but facing reputational damage for clinging to outdated, polluting technologies (reputational risk), which makes it even harder to attract capital, customers, and talent.
The automotive industry provides another vivid example of these interconnected risks. As electric vehicles improve and battery costs fall (technology risk), governments implement EV mandates and phase out internal combustion engines — Norway by 2025, the UK by 2030 (policy risk). These policies signal to investors that traditional automakers without credible EV strategies are poor long-term investments, triggering capital flight (market risk). Meanwhile, young consumers increasingly view gas-powered vehicles as environmentally irresponsible, especially luxury gas vehicles (reputational risk). Each risk reinforces the others: technological improvements justify stricter policies, which shift market dynamics, which shape public perception, which in turn creates pressure for even more aggressive policies and faster technological development.
Understanding these interconnections is essential for understanding transition risk. A company cannot address one type of transition risk while ignoring the others — they must recognize that these risks compound and prepare for the systemic changes that result from their interaction.
The “Just Transition”The recognition that the shift to a low-carbon economy will create winners and losers, particularly among workers and communities reliant on fossil fuel industries, has given rise to the concept of a just transition. A just transition is an effort to ensure that the benefits of a green economy are shared broadly and that the costs do not fall unfairly on those who can least afford them.
The core idea is to provide support, retraining, and new economic opportunities for workers and communities whose livelihoods are threatened by the phase-out of carbon-intensive industries. This is not merely an ethical consideration; it is a pragmatic one. The threat of widespread job losses can create powerful political opposition to climate action, potentially slowing down or even derailing the transition for everyone. Therefore, managing the human side of the transition is critical to its success.
In a just transition, we would repurpose skills: For example, the skills required to build an offshore oil rig are similar to those needed for constructing an offshore wind platform. A just transition would facilitate this shift through targeted programs.
The private market is unlikely to manage this process efficiently or equitably. Government action is therefore needed to fund retraining programs and help workers seamlessly switch to new jobs in the growing green economy.
Germany’s approach to phasing out coal mining in its Lausitz region serves as a prominent example. The German government is investing €40 billion to manage the process by funding new infrastructure, research institutes, and extensive retraining programs. The goal is not just to compensate for lost jobs but to actively build a new, sustainable economic future for the region.
ConclusionTransition risk represents a fundamental restructuring of the global financial and social order. As this chapter has detailed, the journey toward a net-zero economy is far more than a simple technological swap. It is a complex, multi-dimensional shift driven by the interplay of policy, technology, and market and social dynamics. While this transition offers immense opportunities for innovation and growth in green sectors, it simultaneously creates the systemic threat of stranded assets — devaluing not just physical infrastructure and fossil fuel reserves, but also intangible intellectual property and the human capital of millions of workers.
Ultimately, the success of this overhaul hinges on the ability to manage these risks. Because the private market is not naturally equipped to solve the social dislocations caused by such rapid change, proactive governance and strategic investment are essential to ensure a just transition, so that the shift to sustainability does not leave vulnerable communities behind. Balancing the urgent need for decarbonization with the economic security of the workforce is not just a moral imperative, but a practical necessity to maintain the political and social stability required to reach our climate goals.
This is a draft of a section of my climate risk textbook (slightly edited & reformatted to make it appropriate for Substack). I’d very much like to identify errors now, so if you see any, please let me know in the comments.
World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis
A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.
The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.
Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.
While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.
In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”.
Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.
‘Return to coal’The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.
A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.
(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)
With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.
These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.
Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.
This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia.
In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.
Gas to coalSo far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.
Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.
However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.
To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.
For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.
It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.
Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.
(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)
Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.
Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.
window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}});Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:
“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”
Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:
“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”
‘Structural decline’Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.
Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.
Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:
“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”
In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power.
Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.
Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:
“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”
With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia.
Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:
“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”
Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:
“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”
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How strong can a hurricane get in a warming world?
This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Jeff Masters
October 28, 2025, was a very bad day to be in Jamaica. That morning, Category 5 Hurricane Melissa intensified into the strongest hurricane ever observed in the Atlantic: 190 mph (305 km/h) winds, a tie with Hurricane Allen of 1980. That afternoon Melissa powered ashore in Jamaica, causing a catastrophic $8.8 billion in damage, equivalent to 41% of Jamaica’s GDP.
Melissa came close to its maximum potential intensityThe maximum potential intensity of a tropical cyclone is the maximum strength a storm can achieve based on the existing atmospheric and oceanic conditions. Potential intensity theory was pioneered in 1987 by MIT hurricane scientist Kerry Emanuel, who showed that human-caused global warming will increase the maximum strength that a hurricane can achieve. Hurricanes are heat engines that take heat energy out of the ocean and convert it to the kinetic energy of wind, so it makes sense that the winds of the strongest hurricanes will get stronger as the oceans heat up.
Melissa’s 190-mph winds were very close to its maximum potential intensity: The hurricane’s maximum potential intensity was about 197 mph (317 km/h), according to the SHIPS model, and about 200 mph (320 km/h), according to a graphic available at the University of Wisconsin’s CIMSS (Fig. 1). It is quite rare for a hurricane to come this close to its maximum potential intensity — all conditions have to be perfect, and the atmosphere and ocean make up a complex system where perfection is rarely achieved.
Figure 1. The maximum potential intensity (MPI) of Hurricane Melissa on Oct. 28, 2025, was about 175 knots (200 mph). (Image credit: University of Wisconsin’s CIMSS)
Given the less-than-ideal conditions for intensification – light to moderate wind shear of 5-15 knots, a very slow forward speed of less than 5 mph that allowed upwelling of cooler water from the depths to affect it, and interaction with the rugged terrain of Jamaica – Melissa came remarkably close to its maximum potential intensity. (The formula for maximum potential intensity does not include wind shear and slow hurricane motion.)
So how strong could Melissa have gotten if everything were going its way? Melissa formed in late October, when ocean temperatures were about 30 degrees Celsius (86°F). Six weeks earlier, during the early- to mid- September peak of sea surface temperatures, ocean temperatures in the central Caribbean were near 31 degrees Celsius (88°F). According to a 2023 paper, the maximum potential intensity increases 5-7% per degree Celsius of sea surface temperature increase. Thus, Melissa’s maximum potential intensity would have increased by about 11-15 mph (18-25 km/h) had it formed during the September peak in sea surface temperatures. If we assume the other factors limiting its intensification were not present, Melissa could have peaked with 215 mph (345 km/h) winds.
This is the same intensity achieved by the strongest known hurricane in world history, 2015’s Hurricane Patricia. Patricia formed off the Pacific coast of Mexico over record-warm waters of 30.5-31 degrees Celsius (87-88°F). And though the difference between 180 mph and 215 mph may not seem like much, it would actually represent about a fourfold increase in damage potential, according to NOAA.
Figure 2. The strongest tropical cyclones observed globally, 1972-2025, using windspeed ratings from the National Hurricane Center for the Atlantic and Eastern Pacific and from the Joint Typhoon Warning Center elsewhere.
How strong can a hurricane get?The global list of tropical cyclones during the satellite era (1972-present) with winds as strong or stronger than Melissa is a short one: just 11 storms (Fig. 2). (There were 19 Western Pacific typhoons from 1955-1966 that “officially” have winds of 195 mph or higher, but hurricane experts agree that the intensities assigned to typhoons during that pre-satellite period suffered from a high bias and are not reliable.)
For most of the Northern Hemisphere’s tropical cyclone-prone areas, September will be the month with the highest possible maximum potential intensity, since that is when sea surface temperatures peak. Emanuel, the MIT hurricane scientist, created maps of the top 10% maximum potential intensity expected within 1,000 km of a given point during September, using climate data from the period 1982-1995 (Fig. 3). In the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and western Caribbean have the highest values: 224 mph (100 m/s) or higher. In the Pacific, the southern Philippines, Mexico, and most of Central America also have a top 10% maximum potential intensity of 224 mph (100 m/s) or higher.
Figure 3. Top 10% maximum potential intensity winds within 1,000 km of a given point for tropical cyclones expected during September, using climate data from the period 1982-1995. The only places with an MPI in excess of 110 m/s (246 mph) are the ocean areas of the Middle East. (Image credit: Kerry Emanuel)
Emanuel also created a table showing the top-10% maximum potential intensities for individual cities across the globe. All of these numbers (and the ones in Fig. 3) need to be adjusted upward because the climate has warmed significantly since the 1995 cutoff of the historical data used. A 2022 paper, A potential explanation for the global increase in tropical cyclone rapid intensification, reported that between 1982 and 2017, potential intensity during August-September-October in the Northern Hemisphere tropics increased by 2.3-2.4 mph per decade, or 8.6 mph over the 36-year period (1.02-1.06 m/s per decade). During that same period, Northern Hemisphere tropical sea surface temperatures increased by 0.17-0.23 degree Celsius per decade, or 0.6-0.8 degree Celsius over the 36-year period. A 2021 paper, Poleward expansion of tropical cyclone latitudes, reported similar numbers, with larger increases in potential intensity observed in the eastern Caribbean and western Gulf of Mexico.
These results suggest that the maximum potential intensity numbers in Fig. 3 and in Emanuel’s table should be adjusted upward by about 9 mph (4 m/s). Here are the adjusted numbers for the U.S. from Emanuel’s table showing the top-10% maximum potential intensities for individual cities:
Boston: 78 mph (35 m/s), Cat 1
Honolulu: 186 mph (84 m/s), Cat 5
Miami: 226 mph (101 m/s), Cat 5
Galveston: 220 mph (98 m/s), Cat 5
New Orleans: 231 mph (103 m/s), Cat 5
New York City: 112 mph (50 m/s), Cat 2
San Diego: 72 mph (32 m/s), Tropical Storm
Washington D.C.: 105 mph (47 m/s), Cat 2
Note that for cities like Boston and Washington, D.C., fast-moving storms coming from the south – where they typically move over warmer waters – can arrive at these cities at a strength higher than the local maximum potential intensity. This is why there is a separate entry in Emanuel’s table for the highest maximum potential intensity within 1,000 km of each city. I didn’t show this quantity in the list above, though it is plotted in Fig. 3.
A 300-mph (134 m/s) tropical cyclone is possible in the Persian GulfGlobally, the highest maximum potential intensities are found in the ultrahot waters of the Middle East. There has never been a tropical cyclone observed in the Persian Gulf because it is narrow and prone to high wind shear and dry air.
Figure 4. Category 1 Tropical Cyclone Gulab makes a bid at entering the Persian Gulf on Oct. 3, 2021. (Image credit: NASA World View)
However, for their eye-popping 2015 paper, Grey swan tropical cyclones, Ning Lin and Kerry Emanuel performed modeling showing that strong tropical cyclones can move through the Persian Gulf, representing an underappreciated threat to major cities like Dubai. The modeling showed that a sea surface temperature of 35 degrees Celsius (95°F) can create a maximum potential intensity of 296 mph (132 m/s) in the Persian Gulf. Their worst-case 1-in-30,000-year storm was a 257 mph (115 m/s) Category 5 beast with a central pressure of 784 mb that brought a colossal storm surge of 24 feet (7.5 meters) to Dubai.
The study used the climate of 1980-2010, and sea surface temperatures in the Persian Gulf have warmed significantly since then. Over the period 1981-2012, the Persian Gulf had peak summer sea surface temperatures of 32-35 degrees Celsius (90-95°F). But in July 2020, those temperatures hit 37.6 degrees Celsius (99.7°F). More recently, in August 2023, sea surface temperatures above 36 degrees Celsius (97°F) were measured over portions of the Persian Gulf. Thus, an even stronger storm – with winds over 300 mph (134 m/s) – would be possible in today’s climate.
There has been a recent close call for a strong tropical cyclone entering the Persian Gulf: In 2021, Category 1 Tropical Cyclone Gulab (Fig. 4) entered the Gulf of Oman, which connects to the Persian Gulf. A four-day forecast from the HWRF model (Fig. 5) predicted Gulab would pass over Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, enter the Persian Gulf, and then intensify into a Category 2 storm with a central pressure of 958 mb. Fortunately, Gulab ended up weakening into a tropical storm and making landfall in Oman, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
Figure 5. Four-day windspeed forecast from the HWRF model made on Oct. 1, 2021, for Tropical Cyclone Gulab. The model predicted Gulab would be a Category 2 storm with a central pressure of 958 mb in the Persian Gulf. Purple colors correspond to Category 1 winds (74 mph or greater). (Image credit: Levi Cowan, Tropical Tidbits)
Sources of real-time maximum potential intensity dataKerry Emanuel’s website
University of Wisconsin CIMSS (for active storms)
SHIPS model (for active storms)
Any sane foreign policy would put climate risks, not China, at centre stage
by David Spratt, first published at Pearls&Irritations
Australia’s defence and foreign policy settings are focused on geopolitical rivalry, while far greater systemic risks – especially climate disruption – receive little strategic attention.
Blinded to the greater risks, the Albanese Government and the security commentariat have spent four, unrelenting years making the case that China is the biggest threat to Australia’s future.
Defence and foreign policy, encapsulated in the AUKUS agreement, tie Australia to a nation currently engaged in what the historian Timothy Snyder calls “Superpower Suicide”: “a systematic undoing of American power by Americans” in which “fighting a war for no reason we can name, losing it, and covering our defeat with genocidal and apocalyptic propaganda” had led to ”rapid and catastrophic decline as the result of specific choices in the last year”.
The AUKUS cargo cult – with Labor, the LNP and One Nation marching arm in arm – means the Parliament and the nation have spent little time even considering what may be the greatest threats to our future.
In risk management, there are potential events so destructive that they are termed catastrophic because of their capacity for human death or suffering on a massive scale, such that societies may never fully recover. This may be called existential risk or in actuarial terms, the “risk of ruin”, which colloquially in financial and gambling circles is the risk of “losing everything”. Catastrophic events include nuclear war, climate change, biosecurity threats including pandemics, and disruptive digital technologies.
Every year the World Economic Forum surveys private and public sector global leaders on the big risks. The 2025 WEF Global Risk Report lists the ten most severe risks on a 10-year horizon. The top four, and five of the ten, are related to climate-change and nature degradation: extreme weather, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, critical change to Earth systems, natural resource shortages, and pollution.
Of the other five, three are digital disruption: misinformation and disinformation, adverse outcomes of AI technologies, and cyber espionage and warfare. Rounding out the top ten are inequality and social polarisation. State-based armed conflict and geoeconomic confrontation don’t make the top ten, though they are in short-term (two-year) listing.
So is China or climate disruption the biggest threat? Global leaders understand what the Australian Government denies.
What would climate-disruption look like on a geo-political scale, given the warming is accelerating and is likely to exceed 3 degrees Celsius? Two decades ago, American security analysts noted that “nonlinear climate change will produce nonlinear political events… beyond a certain level climate change becomes a profound challenge to the foundations of the global industrial civilisation that is the mark of our species”.
They produced a 3-degree scenario, in which “the internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible.”
In Chatham House’s Climate change risk assessment 2021, the security think-tank found that impacts likely to be locked in for the period 2040–50 unless emissions rapidly decline – which they are not – include a global average 30 per cent drop in crop yields by 2050, and the average proportion of global cropland affected by severe drought exceeding 30 per cent a year. They concluded that cascading climate impacts will “drive political instability and greater national insecurity, fuelling regional and international conflict”.
The consequences of climate disruption will strike everywhere. Last November, Iceland designated the potential collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) a national security concern and an existential threat, so that it could plan for worst-case scenarios and preventative action.
A disturbing new research paper finds it is likely that AMOC will have slowed by half this century, and scientists fear it is close to a tipping point. Peter Ditlevsen of the University of Copenhagen calls AMOC collapse a going-out-of-business scenario for north-west European agriculture. In addition, the monsoons that typically deliver rain to West Africa and South Asia would become unreliable, and huge swaths of Europe and Russia would plunge into drought.
AMOC collapse would challenge European foundations, including the viability of nations and states, and of the EU and NATO, moving climate from the realm of environmental and culture wars to the heart of the matter: human security, social breakdown, mass displacement and death.
And it is not a security threat par excellence in 50 years time, but right now, as the Icelandic Government has recognised, because systemic changes now under way will make such an outcome inevitable unless the world applies strategic focus, resources and collective political will to trying to avert such a catastrophe right now.
Yet a search of Hansard finds no mention of AMOC in either house of Australia’s Parliament, from any MP or Senator, over the term of the Albanese government. That is depressing, but not unexpected. The government ordered a climate and security risk assessment from the Office of National Intelligence when it came to power, and immediately suppressed the report, refusing to articulate ‘frankly terrifying’ security risks.
And of course AMOC is but one in an array of climate-security risks: the northern quarter of Australia – where the government is spending billions upgrading military bases – will become unliveably hot in three or four decades from now. And declining crop yields: researchers estimate that beyond 2°C warming, which is perhaps only 15 years away, “the declines in suitable areas for the 30 crops [analysed] become more pronounced – in some cases approaching and passing 50 per cent”. That in itself would cause global chaos. There are scores more, including Himalayan water wars, mass people displacement, and drowned states.
A recognition that climate poses an existential – and perhaps the most pressing – risk to Australians’ future would mean that any Australian foreign policy, defence or strategic review would place it at the centre of concern. Instead the government has done the opposite, barely giving climate a token tick in such recent documents.
Epitomised by the tedious performances of the Defence Minister, Australia is doggedly pressing on with its “America first, Earth last” strategy. But this moment requires clarity about the existential nature of the climate threat to humanity’s future; and a collective regional commitment to strategic action.
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