I. Climate Science

Open access notables

Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future

Here we briefly review key advances in the field of climate fingerprinting. Fingerprint studies rely on pattern information to identify human and natural influences on Earth's climate. Our focus is on advances after 2009—the date of the finding by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that emissions of six different greenhouse gases affect Earth's climate and endanger human health and welfare. In contrast to the conclusions from a 2025 review of climate science issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), we demonstrate that post-2009 scientific advances have markedly increased confidence in the identification of significant anthropogenic contributions to global climate change. These advances were enabled by longer and improved observations of climate change, by large single-model and multi-model ensembles of simulations that yield estimates of forced climate change signals and natural variability, and by the application of climate fingerprint methods to a wide array of independently monitored variables. Increasingly, scientists are now able to quantify the impact of human-caused climate change on the probability and intensity of certain types of extreme event, particularly in the case of heat waves and the heavy rainfall in some regions. In tandem with such scientific advances, global warming has also advanced: the post-2009 period included the 10 warmest years in instrumental surface temperature records, enhancing the signal of human-caused warming relative to intrinsic variability. The evidence for pervasive human fingerprints throughout Earth's climate system is incontrovertible.

Extreme Heat and Rainfall Risk Attributed to Cumulative CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuel Producers, Callahan, Earth s Future

Legal and political approaches to climate accountability require demonstrating that a particular emitter contributed to a climate impact, but quantitative solutions to this attribution challenge remain nascent. This study leverages the proportionality of global warming to cumulative CO2 emissions to develop statistical models that directly predict extreme climate risk from cumulative emissions. Results show that cumulative emissions from individual actors have increased the probability of extreme heat and rainfall globally; for example, emissions from the United States have increased the risk of recent extreme heat by at least 50% for one-third of the globe. Focusing on specific events demonstrates that emissions from major fossil fuel firms increased the likelihood of the 2021 Pacific Northwest heat wave by 31% and 2022 extreme rainfall in Pakistan by 7%. These results demonstrate a flexible attribution framework grounded in the proportional relationships that inform climate policy, with the potential to guide efficient climate accountability assessments.

Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances

Precipitation extremes have increased globally in recent decades, consistent with a warming climate. We find that 2024 experienced a record-high frequency of heavy (≥99th percentile; FP≥99) precipitation events globally based on MSWEP (Multi-Source Weighted-Ensemble Precipitation) observations from 1979 to 2025. This extends a long-term trend of ∼0.03%/decade in FP≥99, with similar but more uncertain increases for the 99.9th percentile. Unlike prior high FP≥99 years, 2024’s record was more globally distributed and emerged from a distinct seasonal evolution. El Niño and rare concurrent multi-basin tropical ocean warmth drove elevated extremes early in the year, before lagged global tropospheric responses and long-term warming sustained and amplified extremes through boreal summer. Climate models indicate that years with 2024-level FP≥99 typically require either stronger El Niño forcing or concurrent multi-basin sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies. Diagnostic projections within constrained ensemble members suggest that ∼40% of the 2024 anomaly aligns with global mean temperatures and ∼20% with El Niño variability, with some of the remainder linked to basin-scale SST structure.

A recent doubling of global warming rate signals a 1.5 °C breach by 2028, Jin & Pu, npj Climate and Atmospheric Scienc

Timely and accurate projections of when global warming will exceed the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C threshold are essential for effective climate policy. Existing estimates place this exceedance in the early 2030 s but carry substantial uncertainty. Here we analyze the latest observational temperature records through 2025 and identify a statistically significant doubling of the global warming rate during 2011–2025 (0.40 °C per decade) compared to 1971–2025 (0.20 °C per decade). Extrapolating this accelerated rate projects a crossing of the 1.5 °C threshold by 2028, nearly a decade earlier than previous estimates. Regional analyses attribute this acceleration primarily to intensified warming over East Asia–the North Pacific, mid-latitude Eurasia, and the South Atlantic–Antarctic regions. The ensemble mean of 26 climate models fails to capture the observed doubling of the warming rate, simulating a rate of only 0.29 °C per decade. These findings suggest a narrower window remains to limit warming to 1.5 °C, underscoring the urgency for rapid  and substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

Learning from young conservatives: Increasing pro-environmental behavior change and climate policy support in the United States, Caballero et al., Energy Research & Social Science

This study uses a mixed-methods (i.e., virtual focus groups with group discussion based on live polling results) approach to explore which potential interventions show the most promise for engaging conservatives on the topics of climate policy and household action, specifically among young people in the United States (U.S.). In coordination with the non-profit organization American Conservation Coalition (ACC), we held six virtual focus groups with ACC members from geographically diverse chapters. Using our mixed methods approach, we explored political efficacy, as suggested by ACC members, as well as four messaging types informed by the social psychological literature: superordinate identities, solution aversion, pluralistic ignorance, and personal responsibility. Our results suggest that young conservative study participants identified messages intended to address solution aversion and pluralistic ignorance to be most promising. Our results also suggest that although young conservative participants in the study tend to engage in incremental, convenient pro-environmental behaviors, they are optimistic about the potential for positive spillover effects. Additionally, our focus groups revealed that a promising area of future study is that young conservatives could serve as important messengers for pro-environmental individual action and support for climate and energy policies among their conservative peers. Thus, the study suggests promising topics for research on the role that young conservatives could play in supporting climate and energy-related initiatives.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Spinning Renewable Success Into a Climate Conspiracy: Co-opting the climate science story of RCP8.5, Climate Action Against Disinformation

Fossil fuels cause climate change, and replacing them with renewables will keep our climate safe for human civilization and natural ecosystems. The progress we made towards a cleaner future means that the worst possible fossil fueled warming gets less and less likely. Thanks to the massive growth in renewables, we are finally winning the climate fight- so why are some people claiming exactly the opposite, that it was a hoax all along? Over the years, “Representative Concentration Pathways”, or RCP scenarios have been refined, as renewable energy has gained momentum around the world, pushing the planet away from the most-heavily-fossil-fueled future that represented the worst-case scenario of a climate crisis, and into slightly safer territory. But this good news, tempered as it is by the incredible amount of work remaining to fully decarbonize, is highly technical, scientific, and detailed. That is not, however, how it was portrayed in the fossil fueled disinformation ecosystem, that instead interpreted it as evidence confirming a climate conspiracy theory.

Manufacturing Petropopulism: Exposing the secretive network of front groups shilling for Big Oil in Canada, Abde Amr and Keith Stewart, Greenpeace

The authors' investigation has identified a shadowy and coordinated network of pro–fossil fuel front groups, companies, think tanks, and charities that claim to have reached over one hundred million people. Based on materials and data from the entities involved, this investigation reveals influence efforts by the oil-linked Energy in Action (EIA) network, whose members are receiving funding and support from the Canadian Energy Prosperity (CEP) group, aiming to shape the energy conversation in Canada. Over 30 entities, targeting six different sectors, have been identified as part of a coordinated network, operating under the EIA umbrella and supported by CEP to manufacture support for the oil and gas industry and advance its' narratives. EIA appears to be linked to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), with many network entities receiving direct funding from the oil and gas sector. The network spreads its' influence across diverse sectors, including technology, grassroots advocacy, and industry trade associations, targeting specific groups including women, youth, students, and Indigenous communities among others.

The AI Gas Rush: Risks and Implications of “Bring Your Own Power”, Bangsund et al., Earthjustice

The race to scale artificial intelligence is driving an unprecedented rush to build power plants solely to power data centers that are predominantly gas-powered. These power plants are evading regulations, harming communities and the climate, and are not a solution to rising energy bills. The authors explore and analyzes this trend. Policymakers across the nation are incentivizing or requiring Bring-Your-Own-Power (BYOP) in an attempt to address energy bill impacts from new AI data centers. But AI data center developers are turning to BYOP to gain access to power as quickly as possible (“speed-to-power”) — not to solve the energy bill impacts of AI. The authors find potential ratepayer benefits are not guaranteed, while harms of the massive gas BYOP buildout have been inadequately addressed. 143 articles in 58 journals by 1015 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

A recent doubling of global warming rate signals a 1.5 °C breach by 2028, Jin & Pu, npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01561-y

Forest and bioenergy expansion amplifies climate warming by accelerating regional cloud loss, Liu et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-14133-2026

Ocean thermal inertia sustains a tropical Pacific mean state shift under net zero, Sengupta et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-04082-x

On the Changes in the Connection Between SSWs and Surface Extreme Weather in Response to an Abrupt 4xCO2 Increase, Maeseneire et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045140

Phase Transition of CO2-Driven Equatorial Pacific Warming Pattern Governed by Ocean Dynamics and Remote Forcing, Olonscheck & Kang, AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002437

Stratospheric Temperature Adjustment Robustly Damps the State Dependence of CO2 Radiative Forcing, He & Huang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123839

The Weakest Warming Rate in Spring over the Mid- to High-Latitude Land in a Warming Climate, Dong et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0222.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Temperature sensitivity of the mineral permafrost feedback at the continental scale, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adq4893 21 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

An abrupt shift towards a hotter and drier climate regime in the Western Eurasian Steppe, Piao et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02125-8

Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009129

From paper to proof: revealing Congo Basin warming through rescued climate archives, Muheki et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1455-2026

Global expansion of compound drought–heatwave risk, Sutanto et al., Natural hazards and earth system sciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/nhess-25-3879-2025

Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb1692

Satellite altimetry reveals heterogeneity in global flood peak timing and its shifts, Zhou et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04115-5

Spatiotemporal Evolution of Temperature Extremes Across India's Agro-Climatic Zones, Misra et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70621

Temperature Change in Mode Water Source Regions, Song & Forget, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0127.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Surging compound drought–heatwaves underrated in global soils, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 10.1073/pnas.2410294121 60 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A framework for quantifying the effects of urbanization on regional climate change in a coastal watershed Southeast China: A nonstationary grid-to-grid method, Zhang et al., Anthropocene 10.1016/j.ancene.2026.100590

Extreme Heat and Rainfall Risk Attributed to Cumulative CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuel Producers, Callahan, Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008278

Fingerprint Evidence for Human Effects on Climate: Advances After the 2009 Endangerment Finding, Santer et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef009129

From paper to proof: revealing Congo Basin warming through rescued climate archives, Muheki et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1455-2026

Global Assessment and Error Budget of EarthCARE Column Aerosol Optical Depth: Physical Limits and Quantitative Mitigation, Xiong et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd048195

Uneven attention to climate tipping points, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618666123

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Arctic climate tipping points under delayed CO2 emissions mitigation, Wu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03872-7

Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation Weakening in CMIP6: Labrador Sea Surface Fluxes and Salt Transport Feedback, Lim et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0487.1

East Pacific Easterly Waves in the CESM2 Large Ensemble: Present-Day Characteristics and Projected Future Changes, Zhou & Maloney, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0132.1

Historical to future warm–dry to warm–wet transition over Mongolia and its permafrost regions (1850–2100), MA et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.014

Interpreting Air Temperature Trends Across the Antarctic Peninsula Between 1979 and 2025, Aa et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125798

No critical slowing down in the Atlantic Overturning Circulation in historical CMIP6 simulations, Ben-Yami et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000781

Structural Compactness of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Seeds in Historical and Projected Climates, Lu & Reed, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124707

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Customized Statistically Downscaled CMIP5 and CMIP6 Projections: Application in the Edwards Aquifer Region in South-Central Texas, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004716 10 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A Crucial Role of Land–Atmosphere Interactions in Shaping Subseasonal Convective Variability over the Maritime Continent in Idealized Model Simulations, Jiang & Ma, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0654.1

Evaluating Statistical Downscaling Techniques for Regional Hydroclimatic Change Projections Over CONUS, Lybarger et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046624

Global Asymmetric Temperature Responses of Soil Respiration During Warming and Cooling Phases, Feng et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009547

Impacts of Sea Surface Temperature Warming Pattern Biases on Tropical Cyclone Activity and Hazard, Zhuo et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124022

Resolution Dependence in a Global Atmospheric Simulation From km to 220 m Grid Spacing, Matsugishi et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124411

Resolution Dependence of the Climate Feedback Parameter in Km-Scale Climate Models, Peinado et al., MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) pmh:oai:pure.mpg.de:item_3713425

Role of Shortwave Feedback in Non-Linear Response to CO2 Forcing in GFDL CM4.0, Shrestha et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122888

Southeast Asian climate and weather extremes simulated by the nextGEMS Earth system models, Koseki et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1915833

The role of the QBO for tropical high-cloud variability in CMIP6 models and observations, Jaison et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-14403-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Selecting CMIP6 global climate models (GCMs) for Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment (CORDEX) dynamical downscaling over Southeast Asia using a standardised benchmarking framework, Geoscientific model development, 10.5194/gmd-17-7285-2024 17 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

Antarctic sea ice response to meltwater due to Antarctic ice sheet mass loss in a multi-model ensemble, Pauling et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5761-2026

On the possibility of deep seabed permafrost to occupy Ca. 7 million km2 in the Arctic Ocean, Dobi?ski & Saitô, Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-68112-6

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Environmental and societal consequences of winter ice loss from lakes, Science, 10.1126/science.adl3211 45 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Contribution of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation to Global Mean Sea Level Trends: Revisited, Wang & Chen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124649

Sea-level contribution from Thwaites Glacier doubles in an observation-constrained ice-sheet model, Poinelli et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77976-1

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Ancient terrestrial forests reborn as modern marine ecosystems under shifting sea levels, Lebrato et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-65430-7

Antarctic sea ice over the past 130 000 years – Part 2: A review of its role in the Earth system, Chase et al., Climate of the past Open Access pdf 10.5194/cp-22-1881-2026

Evidence for Limited Atmospheric CO2 Rise at the Miocene Climatic Optimum, Wubben et al., Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology Open Access 10.1029/2025pa005388

Shifts in Antarctic Intermediate Water properties coincide with atmospheric CO2 rise across the Mid-Brunhes Event, Tapia et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.ady4567

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Centennial-scale variations in the carbon cycle enhanced by high obliquity, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01556-5 7 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

A process-based spring phenology framework for projecting climate-change constraints on Chinese hickory cultivation areas, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111506

Climate-driven adaptive microevolution in wild yeasts, Oporto et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618715123

Climate-driven expansion and richness hotspots of forest insect pests revealed by stacked species distribution models, Zhou et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111494

Contrasting climatic controls on bimodal growth of Pinus elliottii plantations between northern and southern subtropical zones, Li et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111526

Cumulative effects of successive marine heatwaves impair physiological resilience in the clam Ruditapes philippinarum., Lebrun et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108467

Determining soil microbial responses to climate change with multi-omics, Wu, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 10.1038/s43017-026-00845-4

Elevated CO2 amplifies contrasting cultivar-specific plant–soil feedbacks mediated by soil biota, Zhang et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70445

Faster-and-tighter nitrogen cycle supports mature forest productivity under elevated CO2, Rumeau et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed2732

Global change threatens the biodiversity of cold regions: Current knowledge and priorities for further research, Renault et al., Ecology 10.1002/ecy.70537

Increasing Climate Constraint on Vegetation Productivity Under Rising CO2 in Northeast Asia, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124463

Local forest structure modifies realized climate vulnerability under macroclimatic forcing: Attribution from a national forest inventory, Ji et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111510

Ocean acidification pushes Mediterranean marine calcifiers toward a tipping point, Frontalini et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-70159-4

Parasitoid insects unveil complex patterns of functional change across elevational bands, Gabrieli et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08816

Phenological Flexibility in Nesting Grassland Birds Over a Half Century Informs Timing of Management, Ellis et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71128

Rapid coral bleaching recovery via symbiont transfer from healthy corals, Webster, Environmental Microbiology Reports 10.1111/1758-2229.12500

Reduced size of larvae and small fish linked to warming and reduced prey density, Lindmark et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08354

Safeguarding global terrestrial vertebrate species from future sea-level rise, Jiang et al., Science 10.1126/science.aed5772

Species-specific reduction of survival and predation in ladybirds exposed to prolonged and intensified heat waves, Cecchetto et al., Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecy.70529

Strengthened sink control under heatwaves contributes to changes in the phenological sequence of photosynthesis and growth, Lin et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111507

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Trajectories of Terrestrial Vegetation Productivity and Its Driving Factors in China's Drylands, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl111391 47 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A Net CO2 Sink in the Korea Strait and East/Japan Sea Revealed by Direct Eddy Covariance Measurements, Hamzah et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024139

Active and passive satellite observations coupled with carbon–nitrogen synergy for urban fossil fuel CO2 emissions monitoring, Yi et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-8475-2026

Air–sea CO2 exchange in the Southern Adriatic Sea: assessing its role as a moderate carbon sink over the last decade (2015–2024), Dentico et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5399-2026

An Activity-Based Inversion Framework for Estimating Sectoral Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions Using Multi-Pollutant Satellite Observations, Qu, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122365

CO2 Emissions From Rivers Draining the Tibetan Plateau Reveal Substantial Increases Over the Past 20 Years, Iwan et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb009016

Contribution of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation to Global Mean Sea Level Trends: Revisited, Wang & Chen, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124649

Disproportionate Soil Inorganic Carbon Loss and Associated CO2 Emission Driven by Soil Acidification, Zhang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008227

Drivers of 2023–2024 Atmospheric CO2 Growth: Role of Northern Mid-to-High Latitude Land Carbon Cycle, Maity et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122221

Elevated CO2 amplifies contrasting cultivar-specific plant–soil feedbacks mediated by soil biota, Zhang et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2745.70445

Fire-derived ozone intensifies carbon loss in Amazon forests under extreme droughts, Brown et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04047-0

Frontal Dynamics Control the Contrasting Burial of Labile Organic Carbon and Refractory Black Carbon in Surface Sediments of the Northwestern South China Sea, Lao et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024605

Global and National CO2 Emission from Lime Production Process and Carbonation sink from 1930 to 2024, Bing et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6741-2026

Groundwater is an overlooked component of the global methane cycle, Li et al., Earth-Science Reviews 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105725

Herbivorous Vertebrates Decrease CO2 Sequestration Across Global Terrestrial Ecosystems, Wu et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2025gb008878

In Situ and Space-Based CO2 Observations Reveal Moisture-Induced Seasonal Compensation of the Western U.S. Carbon Cycle, Rastogi et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2026gb009121

Inferring European fossil fuel CO2 emissions using TROPOMI NO2 data and sector-based NOx : CO2 emission ratios, Schooling et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-13743-2026

Lateral Accounting of Transport in Terrestrial Ecosystems (LATTE): A High-Resolution Global Land-Atmosphere CO2 Flux Data Set From 1961 to 2022 for Atmospheric Inversions and Carbon Budgeting Studies, Ciais et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009142

Long-Term CO2 Emissions From Anthropogenic Sectors and Recent Climatology of India, Jayachandran et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd046124

Mapping Global Terrestrial Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Atmospheric CO2 Carbon Isoscapes for Ecological Studies, Feng et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71002

Mechanisms of air–sea CO2 exchange in the central Baltic Sea, Dong et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-5567-2026

More Frequent and Enhanced Extreme Events of Air–Sea CO2 Fluxes, Cheng et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jd044933

Observation-Constrained Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions Reveal Post-2018 Stabilization in China, Feng et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl121913

Poleward Shift of Arctic Oceanic CO2 Uptake From Asymmetric Seasonal Changes Under Climate Warming, Pan et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007550

Prescribed Fire Mitigates Climate-Driven Aboveground Carbon Losses From Wildfire in High Elevation Ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada, Cale et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009930

Probabilistic Wetland Maps for Mapping Soil Carbon Stock Distribution Across the Pacific Northwest, Stewart et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009633

Quantifying Deep Ocean Methane Along the Central Chilean Margin, Wieman et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124079

Regime shifts in South Florida groundwater: distinguishing upstream recharge from coastal sea level influences (1997–2022), Zeleke et al., Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Open Access pdf 10.1007/s10661-026-16000-x

Satellite observations reveal underestimation of CO2 emissions in Africa and the Middle East, Lin et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aee1447

Sea level-induced oyster reef accretion causes minimal net carbon burial change, Rodriguez et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02121-y

Separating Environmental Modulation From Source Intermittency in Methane Leakage From a Legacy Well in British Columbia, Pullen & Cahill, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046590

Soil Physical Properties in Estimating the CO2 Emissions in Drained Peatland Forests, Tenhovirta et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg009736

Thermally driven CO2 adsorption/desorption and its effect on soil respiration, Abramova et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed9979

U.S. oil and gas methane emission intensity declined 2019–2024 with little indication of federal policy impact, Chen et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-04039-0

Using high frequency observations of δ13C-CH4 and δ2H-CH4 and uncertain regional isotopic signatures to estimate sources of UK methane emissions, Ramsden et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-11421-2026

Warming Amplifies the Variability of Methane Emissions From a Coastal Wetland, Lewis et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009973

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Soil carbon and nitrogen cycling at the atmosphere–soil interface: Quantifying the responses of biocrust–soil interactions to global change, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17519 27 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Assessing the potential and cost of enhanced rock weathering in China, Wang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04136-0

Circular and athermal atmospheric CO2 capture by food waste-derived amyloid sorbents, Dong et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2535689123

Hysteresis of extreme precipitation in East Asia under various CO2 removal pathways, Lee et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78431-x

Mineral Carbonation of Mixed Industrial Residues for Enhanced CO2 Sequestration and Environmental Stabilization: The Role of Slag Composition and Industrial Symbiosis, Pietrobelli et al., Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research Open Access pdf 10.1002/aesr.70261

Strong-Acid Weathering in a Carbonate-Siliciclastic Cropland Diminishes Removal of CO2 From the Atmosphere Without Becoming a CO2 Source, Forgeng et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg009418

Wettability and Interfacial Tension in Carbonate Rocks for CO2 Storage: A Critical Review of Trapping Mechanisms and Governing Factors, Suramairy et al., Greenhouse Gases Science and Technology 10.1002/ghg.70040

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Carbon storage in the built environment: a review, Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability, 10.1088/2634-4505/ad139f 14 cites.

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Decarbonization

A socio-technical analysis of the natural hydrogen hype: Network dynamics and institutional expectation governance, Zini et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104997

Impact of climate change on the photovoltaic power potential in Sweden across 21st century, Ruan et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04091-w

Modeling tensions and tradeoffs in community responses to large scale solar development in rural Georgia, Kurtz et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115660

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Exploring the cost and emissions impacts, feasibility and scalability of battery electric ships, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01655-y 73 cites.

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Aerosols

Effects of solar position and surface albedo on retrieved aerosol optical properties and radiative forcing effects, Ningombam et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106991

Overestimation of Cloud Sensitivity in Orographic Clouds Over the Southern Tibetan Plateau Due To Neglected Dynamical Constraints, Wang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046935

Climate change communications & cognition

From Grand Narratives to Riverbank Realities: How Local Experience Influences Perceptions of Climate Risk and Adaptation in Rural Australian Freshwater Tourism, Downey et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0167.1

Interactions of emotion and political orientation in predicting intentional climate action, Flesch et al., Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2744713

Learning from young conservatives: Increasing pro-environmental behavior change and climate policy support in the United States, Caballero et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.105015

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The Greta Effect: Is there more public support for climate protesters who are young and female?, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103924 4 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Compound climatic extreme events amplify food insecurity, Wang et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103248

Mapping CO2 fixation to two effective parameters: A framework toward data-informed species and model comparison, Stillits et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2609915123

Thermal Vulnerability of Reef Fish and Implications for Subsistence Fisheries Throughout the Caribbean, Cortese et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71118

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Maize breeding for smaller tassels threatens yield under a warming climate, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02161-5 23 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Assessing Probable Maximum Precipitation in the Soummam Basin (Algeria) Using Bias-Corrected Climate Projections, Taguemount et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70626

Climate warming redistributes the seasonality of inland open-water evaporation, Farooq et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105750

Hydrological Extremes Increase Water-Resource Constraints Under Climate Change, Sun et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122652

Hysteresis of extreme precipitation in East Asia under various CO2 removal pathways, Lee et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78431-x

Quantified impact of projected climate change on groundwater recharge and river discharge leveraging the use of open access geospatial data, Jimenez et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/feart.2026.1857327

Record-setting heavy precipitation occurrence in 2024, Thackeray et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeb1692

Regional Trends in Northern Hemisphere Summer Extratropical Cyclone Activity and Their Link to Precipitation and Temperature Trends, Baxter et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access 10.1029/2026jd046609

Satellite altimetry reveals heterogeneity in global flood peak timing and its shifts, Zhou et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04115-5

Shifting Patterns of Precipitation Extremes in the Southeast Atlantic Basin—Brazil: From Observed Trends to Future Projections, Oliveira-Santos et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70629

Structural Compactness of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Seeds in Historical and Projected Climates, Lu & Reed, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124707

Uneven warming–moistening rates amplify atmospheric aridity differences between wet and dry regions, Jin et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105757

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Assessment of Meteorological Drought in a Changing Environment: An Example in the Upper Yangtze River, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd041019 4 cites.

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Climate change economics

Beyond linear assumptions: neural network tracing of climate-driven financial contagion in firms, Niu et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1909195

Heterogeneous effects of climate change on real GDP per capita: evidence from selected MENA countries and Türkiye, Y?lmaz, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1930700

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: A financial disaster in the making: Temperature shocks, climate change and savings, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103782 9 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Citizens’ assemblies propose ambitious climate policy but impacts remain limited, Feldman et al., Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society Open Access pdf 10.1093/cjres/rsaf032

Climate policies neglect risks posed by legacy landfills, Zhang et al., Science 10.1126/science.aem1978

Enhancing fairness in climate action through policy packages, Vandyck et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access 10.1038/s41558-026-02751-5

Firms’ renewable energy adoption and energy taxes: How institutional quality matters, Ruberto, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115631

The embeddedness of Emissions Trading Systems, Barlaup et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2743153

The politics of baselines: A political feasibility framework for energy and climate scenarios, Fornborg, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104981

Why support for net-zero technologies can be politically vulnerable: Evidence from Celtic Sea floating offshore wind, Gregory & Thies, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.105012

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Assessing the impacts of fertility and retirement policies on China’s carbon emissions, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02162-4 29 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Building adaptive capacity of US Gulf Coast city practitioners to extreme weather events, Wong-Parodi et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access pdf 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag330

Crossing the behavioral threshold: social amplification and climate risk management in urban flood evacuation, Tanaka et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100901

Cumulative impact of climate change and adaptation measures on Venice and its lagoon, Canu et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-73719-w

Evaluation of heat stress mitigation potentials of climate change adaptation measures in cities: Scenario analyses for technical- and nature-based solutions using 3D microclimate modelling, Eingrüber et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100894

Overcoming under-adaptive innovation and maladaptation in urban heat governance, Lao & Istrate, Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100895

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Measuring the contribution of nature-based solutions beyond climate adaptation in cities, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102939 25 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

Climate Resilience and Environmental Sustainability of Healthcare Facilities in a Rural District of Pakistan: A Mixed-Methods Assessment Using the WHO Framework, Nazir et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1002/cli2.70065

Climate-amplified wildland–urban interface disasters create persistent internal metal mixtures associated with pulmonary impairment, Maunakea et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2613208123

Compound Heatwaves and Health Inequality: A Nationwide Study on Emergency Admissions and Socioeconomic Vulnerability in South Korea, Kim et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2026gh001920

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: On the Stationarity of the Global Spatial Dependency of Heat Risk on Drought, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl111117 6 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics

Cross border consequences of responses to climate change: Risks and opportunities, Mason et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103245

The geopoliticization of Europe's energy transition: Geopolitical risk and selective transition adjustment across EU member states, Cong et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115663

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Weaponization of climate and environment crises: Risks, realities, and consequences, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103928 12 cites.

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Other

Background Atmospheric CO2 Regulates the Local and Non-Local Climate Impacts of Amazon Deforestation, Lee et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007636

Intensification of near-inertial currents in the Atlantic Ocean over the past two decades, Zheng et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78555-0

Springtime Soil Moisture Teleconnections Drive Summertime Warming in the Western United States, Zhang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0459.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Global wildfire activity re-visited, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102894 6 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Climate change reshapes the global mercury cycle, Feinberg & Saiz-Lopez, Science 10.1126/science.aeh7034

Discovery as public infrastructure: Renewing the social contract for science, Carbajo et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag312

Uneven attention to climate tipping points, Wang et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2618666123

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The role of forestry sciences in combating climate change and advancing sustainable development goals, Frontiers in Forests and Global Change, 10.3389/ffgc.2024.1409667 27 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

2026 Global Climate Investing Survey, CoreData Research, Robeco

The number of investors making climate change a strategic priority has increased slightly to 47%, rising further to 62% over the next two years. The tide is also turning in North America, where there is now growing support for climate investing, following a large backlash that began in the U.S. in 2023. Both mark a turning point after several years of declining commitments, as governments globally made net zero a lower priority – and commitment that comes back after a cycle like that is of a different quality from commitment that never had to. 75% believe that war in the Middle East, and the disruption it is causing to oil and gas markets, will moderately or significantly accelerate the transition to renewable energy. 63% think the increasing adoption of AI will have a positive effect on accelerating the development of sustainable infrastructure. 64% say the slowdown in government support for net-zero goals has not affected their commitment to net zero. 63% expect physical climate risks to have a moderate or significant effect on their organization’s strategic asset allocation over the next five years.

10 New Insights in Climate Science 2026/2027, Future Earth, The Earth League, and the World Climate Research Programme, Future Earth, The Earth League, and the World Climate Research Programme

Ocean heat content keeps climbing as Earth’s energy imbalance grows. Sea level rise in a warming world: acceleration, ice mass loss, and long-term commitment. Water gaps widen as continental drying accelerates. A larger overshoot of 1.5°C increases the risk of irreversible impacts, forces greater reliance on carbon dioxide (CO?) removal, and narrows adaptation options. Bundled interventions for food system transformation can deliver major gains for human health and planetary stability. The social cost of carbon has been severely underestimated. Advances in attribution science demonstrate individual emitters’ climate effects. Climate clubs can limit carbon leakage, but fairness shapes their feasibility and effectiveness. Organized obstruction prevents effective climate policy through denial, delay, dilution and distraction. A just energy transition is threatened by geopolitical risks and fragmentation.

Offshore wind a safe bet for East Asia’s future, Lu et al., Ember

The share of offshore wind in the total renewable energy pipeline across Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is 84%, compared to the global average of just 21%, totaling 82 GW. East Asia represents 8% of the global offshore wind pipeline, and 2026 policy reforms across the three markets signal the region's growth opportunity. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan aim to scale up offshore wind to more than 30 GW across the region by 2030. Market readiness is needed now to meet these goals.

Western Seams Analysis, Aurora Energy Research, Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council

Modeling shows that a single, West-wide market produces the lowest total system cost because no market boundaries means a single operator can maximize efficient dispatch at lowest-cost energy resources across the entire region. Best-in-class seams management in a multi-market West can unlock up to $840 million in annual cost savings that would be lost in uncoordinated, poorly-managed seams agreements.

The AI Gas Rush: Risks and Implications of “Bring Your Own Power”, Bangsund et al., Earthjustice

The race to scale artificial intelligence is driving an unprecedented rush to build power plants solely to power data centers that are predominantly gas-powered. These power plants are evading regulations, harming communities and the climate, and are not a solution to rising energy bills. The authors explore and analyzes this trend. Policymakers across the nation are incentivizing or requiring Bring-Your-Own-Power (BYOP) in an attempt to address energy bill impacts from new AI data centers. But AI data center developers are turning to BYOP to gain access to power as quickly as possible (“speed-to-power”) — not to solve the energy bill impacts of AI. The authors find potential ratepayer benefits are not guaranteed, while harms of the massive gas BYOP buildout have been inadequately addressed.

Behind the Bill: What’s Driving Increases in Electricity Costs in Maine?, Heather Sanborn, Office of the Public Advocate (Maine)

A typical Central Maine Power (CMP) household’s monthly bill rose from about $91 in October 2020 to about $157 in October 2026, an increase of $66 (72%). The total price went from 16.6 to 28.6 cents per kilowatt-hour. No single cause explains it. Three parts of the bill account for about $57 of the $66; energy supply (+$30), driven mainly by New England natural gas prices; local distribution (+$18), with storm costs alone adding $12; transmission (+$9), driven by infrastructure replacement and high federally set profits. Stranded costs, mostly from Maine’s community solar program, added about $9. Focusing on that issue alone misses about $57 of the $66 increase. About $27 of the total would be expected from general inflation.

Manufacturing Petropopulism: Exposing the secretive network of front groups shilling for Big Oil in Canada, Abde Amr and Keith Stewart, Greenpeace

The authors' investigation has identified a shadowy and coordinated network of pro–fossil fuel front groups, companies, think tanks, and charities that claim to have reached over one hundred million people. Based on materials and data from the entities involved, this investigation reveals influence efforts by the oil-linked Energy in Action (EIA) network, whose members are receiving funding and support from the Canadian Energy Prosperity (CEP) group, aiming to shape the energy conversation in Canada. Over 30 entities, targeting six different sectors, have been identified as part of a coordinated network, operating under the EIA umbrella and supported by CEP to manufacture support for the oil and gas industry and advance its' narratives. EIA appears to be linked to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), with many network entities receiving direct funding from the oil and gas sector. The network spreads its' influence across diverse sectors, including technology, grassroots advocacy, and industry trade associations, targeting specific groups including women, youth, students, and Indigenous communities among others.

Powering Rural Prosperity: The Local Economic Impact of Utility-Scale Wind and Solar Developments, Ohler et al., University of Missouri

A growing literature documents a relationship between renewable energy development and local economic outcomes. Yet, important gaps remain in understanding how these effects manifest in rural economies, across technologies, and within specific sectors. Using county-level data on U.S. energy installations between 2001-2023, the authors examine how renewable energy adoption shapes sector-specific economic activity, focusing on GDP, employment, and wages in rural counties. They extend prior work in three ways. First, they focus explicitly on rural outcomes, where utility-scale renewable development is concentrated but where economic structures may limit local benefits. Second, they incorporate solar adoption alongside wind, enabling a comparison of technology-specific impacts. Third, they move beyond aggregate measures to conduct a sectoral analysis, identifying how effects vary across industries. Wind development is associated with significant GDP gains concentrated in the utilities sector, while solar development is associated with modest wage and employment gains driven largely by utilities and construction. For very large utility-scale solar, e.g. 5MW or 20MW, agriculture, construction, and utility GDP increase with solar adoption. Neither technology is associated with detectable declines in agricultural GDP, employment, or wages, providing little evidence of substantial disruption to agricultural production or related labor markets. These findings provide a more nuanced understanding of the local economic consequences of the energy transition and highlight the importance of technology type and sectoral composition in shaping rural development outcomes.

Data Center Policy in Ohio: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, Scioto Analysis

Data centers have had a major impact on Ohio's economy. Between 2013 and 2026, we estimate that Ohio data centers produced a net social benefit of $62 billion in the state. Data centers produced $77 billion in total benefits, mostly from employment: they created about 96,000 new jobs and added $75 billion in wages. They also produced $15 billion in total costs, mostly from emissions and higher utility prices. When data centers draw power from the statewide grid, electricity bills rise for Ohio ratepayers. If current policy stays the same, the authors estimate that higher electricity prices will cost Ohio ratepayers $16 billion between 2027 and 2034. As energy use rises, emissions rise as well, and the largest costs come from air pollutants that harm local public health, including nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter 2.5. Under the status quo, these pollutants account for about $41 billion of the $62 billion in total costs between 2027 and 2034, compared to $220 million from carbon, since the authors count only Ohio's share of the global cost of carbon. The data center industry is beginning to respond to some of these issues. Every company planning new data centers in Ohio has committed to closed-loop cooling, which uses zero excess water, but more electricity. Additionally, 19% of planned data center capacity in Ohio is set to use behind-the-meter generation, meaning companies will build their own power plants instead of relying on the statewide grid. This keeps new data centers from raising electricity prices for Ohio ratepayers and it is cleaner for most pollutants.

Spinning Renewable Success Into a Climate Conspiracy: Co-opting the climate science story of RCP8.5, Climate Action Against Disinformation

Fossil fuels cause climate change, and replacing them with renewables will keep our climate safe for human civilization and natural ecosystems. The progress we made towards a cleaner future means that the worst possible fossil fueled warming gets less and less likely. Thanks to the massive growth in renewables, we are finally winning the climate fight- so why are some people claiming exactly the opposite, that it was a hoax all along? Over the years, “Representative Concentration Pathways”, or RCP scenarios have been refined, as renewable energy has gained momentum around the world, pushing the planet away from the most-heavily-fossil-fueled future that represented the worst-case scenario of a climate crisis, and into slightly safer territory. But this good news, tempered as it is by the incredible amount of work remaining to fully decarbonize, is highly technical, scientific, and detailed. That is not, however, how it was portrayed in the fossil fueled disinformation ecosystem, that instead interpreted it as evidence confirming a climate conspiracy theory.

451,000 at Risk, Where Action Can Save Lives During the Super El Niño, Greenstone et al., Climate Impact Lab, University of Chicago

The authors project that 451,000 lives will be lost due to heat the first nine months (June-February) of El Niño, compared to a normal year. This is about 65 times larger than the 6,800 people believed to be dead or missing from the recent Nepal flash flood. In just the next 6 months, this includes 239,000 ± 11,000 deaths across the globe. With current forecasts suggesting El Niño will remain in place through spring 2027, all of these numbers likely will grow even higher, particularly as effects such as higher-than-average temperatures and heat-related deaths will linger into June and July.

No Time to Recover: Compounding Crises, Depleted Fiscal Buffers, and What It Means for Developing Economies, Molina et al., United Nations Development Program

Seven months into the Middle East crisis, developing countries face compounding pressures: renewed energy price surges following the July ceasefire breakdown, a potentially record El Niño, and global benchmark interest rates at multi-decade highs. Governments have cushioned energy price increases at substantial fiscal cost, with global explicit fossil fuel subsidies potentially exceeding $1 trillion this year. Yet containment is becoming unsustainable. Across 130 countries, gasoline and diesel prices have risen by averages of 26 and 38 percent since the conflict began, with increases widening in nearly two-thirds of countries between June and September. Higher prices have contributed to protests and unrest. The authors estimate that full transmission of the energy and food price shock could push an additional 130 million people below $6.85 a day, 121 million below $3.65, and 66 million below $2.15, overwhelmingly in developing countries. These figures represent potential exposure, not observed poverty increases. Fully compensating households would cost approximately 1.1 percent of developing-country GDP; protecting only those below $6.85 would cost around 0.3 percent. However, fiscal constraints and rising debt service increasingly divert resources from long-term development.

Driven by Dirty Steel: The Pollution Behind Europe's Automotive Supply Chain, Mighty Earth

The automakers analyzed in this report have set ambitious carbon-neutrality targets, yet their continued reliance on coal-based steel from ArcelorMittal, Tata Steel, and Acciaierie d’Italia undermines these commitments and perpetuates significant environmental and public-health harms. If European automakers pushed for change in European steel manufacturing, these three steel producers would be required to adjust. Without that pressure, as the authors demonstrate, these companies will remain heavily invested in aging blast furnace operations and fossil gas that generate high levels of greenhouse gases and toxic pollutants, causing elevated rates of respiratory illness, premature death, and degraded air and water quality in surrounding communities.

How Spending for Flood Adaptations Affects the Federal Budget, Chad Shirley, Congressional Budget Office

Flooding is among the costliest natural disasters in the United States. Over the next few decades, damage from flooding is expected to worsen because of continued coastal development and changes in the climate. The authors examine how spending for flood adaptations today might affect the federal government’s potential costs for disaster relief later, as well as what households are likely to pay for flood insurance that is subsidized by the federal government.

Beyond the Funding Gap. A Global Assessment of the Loss of USAID's Environment and Climate Programming, Monica Bansal and Hadas Kushnir, One Earth Partners

The authors document the on-the-ground consequences of the 2025 U.S. foreign assistance withdrawal on global environmental programming and identifies vulnerabilities in the funding ecosystem left behind. They begin by establishing the baseline: the distinctive role the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played in the environmental sector, including both its strengths and structural flaws. They then presents ten major findings on the effects of the withdrawal across five focus countries, including direct impacts to policy, people, and the environment; institutional and economic impacts; and diplomatic and geopolitical effects. They close with recommendations for funders and for U.S. foreign assistance on how to stabilize and rebuild momentum going forward. The information in the report comes from on-the-ground sources and media articles.

Climate adaptation’s delivery gap: Turning national plans into action, Ellena et al., Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change

The challenge is no longer recognizing the need for adaptation, but rather delivering it at scale. Adaptation gaps are already evident and are projected to widen according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whereas the U.N. Environment Program estimates that annual adaptation finance needs in developing countries could reach US$310-365 billion by 2035, compared with roughly US$26 billion in international public finance in 2023. Two recent initiatives address this bottleneck directly including the Adaptation Accelerator Hub (AAH) and the National Adaptation Plan Implementation Alliance (NIA). The authors explains how these two initiatives are complementary rather than in competition. These two initiatives are part of a single adaptation delivery chain that runs from national priorities to measurable results on the ground. The AAH operates at the country end of that chain - the “missing middle piece” between strategies and financing decisions, whereas the NIA operates at the system end, aligning the actors and the finance that surround it. Their value depends on keeping that division of roles and actions explicit and testable. The message for the next phase of cooperation is that the frontier is shifting from planning alone toward parallel delivery, even as many countries are still completing their National Adaptation Plan. About New Research

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Does onshore wind power need subsidies to compete with fossil fuels?

Unsubsidized onshore wind is now generally cheaper than building fossil fuel plants.

Cost of energy sources are compared using “levelized cost of energy,” or the average lifetime cost to build and run a power plant divided by electricity produced. A 2026 report estimated the mean LCOE of unsubsidized onshore wind at $68 per megawatt-hour, compared to $90 for new natural gas plants and $124.50 for coal.

Developments like supply chain maturation, improved monitoring, and larger, more productive turbines have allowed the LCOE of onshore wind to decrease by 70% since 2010. 

While recent inflation, rising interest rates, and trade barriers have increased costs across all energy generation technologies, onshore wind is still cheaper than fossil fuel plants and projected to decrease further in the long-term.

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Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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Next week, diplomats from around the world will descend on Yerevan, Armenia, to negotiate a series of decisions under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 

Between 19 and 30 October, 196 parties will gather to hammer out the precise wording of the dozens of legal texts that make up the decisions under the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD.

This year’s summit is particularly significant, as it marks the halfway point between the agreement of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the deadline for achieving its targets.

The CBD has found that countries are currently not on track to meet 22 out of the framework’s 23 targets. 

During the fortnight, delegates will also be negotiating decisions relating to the two supplemental protocols to the CBD: the Cartagena Protocol, which covers biosafety; and the Nagoya Protocol, which covers access and benefit-sharing for the use of genetic resources. 

(The Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols, which are each governed by a “meeting of the parties”, or “MOP”, have fewer parties than the CBD as a whole, with 173 and 141, respectively.)

Carbon Brief is tracking the progress of countries towards consensus on dozens of negotiating texts using the interactive table below. 

The tracker includes texts from the COP, as well as the MOPs for the Cartagena and Nagoya protocols. It also includes draft decisions from the most recent subsidiary body meetings, as these form the starting point for the negotiations in Yerevan. 

The CBD has three subsidiary bodies: the subsidiary body on scientific, technical and technological advice (SBSTTA), the subsidiary body on implementation (SBI) and the subsidiary body on article 8(j) and other provisions (SB8J). 

SB8J focuses on issues related to the Indigenous peoples and local communities. It was established at COP16 in Cali, Colombia, in 2024. 

The first two columns of the interactive tracker list the topic of each agenda item and the relevant body, with subsequent columns including dates, page counts and links to the original documents.

The table is searchable and can be sorted using the arrows in the header.

@media screen and (max-width: 895px){ .editorial-iframe{ height: 1100px !important } } @media screen and (max-width: 459px){ .editorial-iframe{ height: 1170px !important } } @media screen and (max-width: 370px){ #tableIframe.b-wide-image{ padding:0px !important } }

Areas of disagreement in UN draft texts are denoted by square brackets. Counting the brackets in a particular iteration of a text therefore gives a sense of how far parties are from reaching consensus. 

The bracket column is colour-coded, with dark green indicating a low number of brackets and red indicating a high number of brackets remaining. 

Texts can also present parties with choices using “options” or alternatives (“alt”), which are counted together in the sixth column of the table. 

The key discussions in Yerevan will centre around two agenda items in particular. The first is the global review, which will assess progress towards the GBF and make recommendations for accelerating action. 

The second is finance, which can be separated into two parts: resource mobilisation and the financial mechanism. On resource mobilisation, biodiverse global south countries are likely to push for an increased amount of international finance for conservation. 

Disagreement over the creation of the financial mechanism led to the suspension of COP16 in Cali in October 2024, as parties failed to find agreement on the mobilisation of finance before the end of the summit. 

Global south countries want the establishment of a separate financial mechanism under the control of the CBD; global north countries largely prefer to maintain the existing mechanism, which sits under the Global Environment Facility. 

At the resumed session of COP16 in Rome in early 2025, countries agreed on a roadmap that would lead to the establishment of a permanent mechanism.

related Analysis: Lula presidency saved at least 20,000km2 of Brazilian Amazon since 2022 28.09.2026 International policy Why land-use emissions have fallen by a third this century – in six charts 17.08.2026 Climate pollutants Analysis: 84% of nations miss deadline to identify ‘nature-harming’ subsidies by 2025  28.07.2026 International policy UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo  15.07.2026 Nature

The post Interactive: Tracking negotiating texts at the COP17 biodiversity summit appeared first on Carbon Brief.

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, October 4, 2026 thru Sat, October 10, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (5 items)

• Climate Fraud 101: Big Oil's Climate Deception Explained in 101 Documents, 1957-2026 The Center for Climate Integrity's 'Climate Fraud 101' documents seven decades of costly fossil fuel industry deception about human-caused climate change and climate change impacts. Center for Climate Integrity, Eva Carpenter, Davis Allen, Megan Matthews, Kert Davies, Sep 30, 2026.
• Trump Mocked Over 'Biggest Ice Cube' Claim During Texas Climate Rant The president did not specify which ice measurement he meant, while National Snow and Ice Data Center figures do not show a record-high Arctic extent. IBT, James RJ Florentino, Oct 02, 2026.
• Opinion: I used to believe climate change was a hoax 'My experience shows why local politicians need to push back against climate denialism.'' The Tyee, Erin Blondeau, Oct 05, 2026.
• New Documents Add to Evidence in Climate Deception Case Against ExxonMobil Court filings by the Massachusetts attorney general’s office include previously undisclosed documents, revealing new details about internal deliberations at the oil giant. Inside Climate News, By Nicholas Kusnetz, Oct 07, 2026.
• Inside the web of pro-oil and gas groups shaping Canada`s climate change narrative New research by Greenpeace Canada lays out a web of pro-oil-and-gas groups working together to influence public opinion on climate change The Narwhal , Carl Meyer, Oct 09, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (4 items)

• Chevron Gave $150K to Bay Area Group Accused of Using AI to Fight Heat Pump Rule The group claimed victory after regulators recommended delaying landmark rules that would eventually phase out gas water heaters in 2.8 million homes. DeSmog, Miranda Green, Oct 5, 2026.
• The American Livestock Industry`s Main Lobbying Group Treated Climate Change as a PR Problem New research has revealed more examples of the National Cattlemen’s Association’s efforts to downplay and deny the industry’s greenhouse gas emissions. Inside Climate News, Georgina Gustin, Oct 07, 2026.
• Who`s telling you climate change is no big deal? A new report traces the financial connections behind conservative media’s latest attack on climate science. HEATED, Emily Atkin, Oct 08, 2026.
• To Block Solar Energy Projects, One Community Lumped Them in With Junkyards and Adult Bookstores Heated opposition to energy modernization via photovoltaic and wind generation systems is fanned by ample misinformation. Inside Climate News, By Dan Gearino, Oct 08, 2026.

Miscellaneous (4 items)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #40 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 27, 2026 thru Sat, October 3, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Oct 04, 2026.
• Revealed: the methane mega-leaks from UN climate summit host Turkey Exclusive: Cop31 leader calling for global curbs on climate-heating gas has landfills producing some of world’s worst plumes The Guardian, Damian Carrington and Ruth Michaelson and Ayça Aldatmaz, Oct 05, 2026.
• Did the hot summer make more people worry about climate change? The Conversation, Lorraine Whitmarsh & Bella Zanin, Oct 06, 2026.
• An Influential Voice in the Climate Debate Has Died at 66 Joe Romm was a prolific writer who never hesitated to take on climate change deniers and the fossil-fuel industry — or even ostensible allies. New York Times, Clay Risen, Oct 06, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (4 items)

• Climate leaders push for more solar energy by 2030 Prominent climate leaders have called on governments, businesses, institutions and the public to make a push for solar power before the decade is out, repowering the world with cheap, clean energy. Is that possible? DW, Sarah Steffen, Oct 02, 2026.
• The world without solar and wind? Clean energy does not simply “add to” global energy use; it displaces fossil sources that would otherwise get built. The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Oct 05, 2026.
• Scientists who put faith in technology less likely to take climate action ‘Techno-optimism’ may lead to reliance on unproven solutions at expense of societal changes needed The Guardian, Matthew Taylor, Oct 07, 2026.
• Hoping for a `new normal` climate is pointless. We must learn to adapt Three researchers urge clear-eyed honesty in coming to grips with the aftermath of our climate blunder The Conversation, James Hopeward, Andrew Lowe, Melissa Nursey-Bray, Oct 08, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (3 items)

• Supreme Court to Tackle Preemption Issues in Corporate Climate Accountability Litigation Background on Suncor with an overview of the preemption issues raised by the fossil fuel companies, potential outcomes of the Suncor hearing, and implications for other climate cases. Climate Law Blog, Margaret Barry, Oct 01, 2026.
• Supreme Court's new term kicks off with blockbuster climate change case A new Supreme Court term begins Monday with arguments in a blockbuster case about the reach of state power. NPR, Carrie Johnson, Oct 05, 2026.
• US supreme court hears big oil`s bid to block climate damage lawsuits How court will lean is unclear amid Suncor Energy and ExxonMobil’s attempt to stop lawsuits at state level The Guardian, Hilary Beaumont, Oct 05, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (2 items)

• Global review reveals major blind spots in our understanding of climate change impacts on Mediterranean ecosystems A new global review of observed climate change impacts on plant communities reveals major gaps in where and how we monitor some of the world's most climate-vulnerable ecosystems. Phys.org, University of Cape Town, Oct 06, 2026.
• World`s largest penguin colony suffers `enormous population crash` Chinstrap penguins on Zavodovski Island in Antarctica down by two-thirds since 2011, probably due to climate crisis The Guardian, Jonathan Watts, Oct 07, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (2 items)

• As the planet warms, cities like Bangkok could be increasingly inundated by deadly floods In the long-term, extreme floods will undoubtedly strike Bangkok again due to a combination of climate, geography and urbanisation. The Conversation, Kimberley Reid, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Atmospheric Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Oct 06, 2026.
• Only about half of U.S. teens can correctly identify the causes of climate change Teens who reported hearing some or a lot about climate change from their teachers were more likely to answer the questions correctly than those who had not. Yale Climate Connections, YCC Team, Oct 09, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (2 items)

• The bipartisan energy bill tearing the climate movement apart A long-awaited permitting reform proposal would make renewables easier to build, but at a potential cost to communities and the environment. Grist, Austin Corona, Oct 08, 2026.
• Tories overstate net zero cost by nearly £500bn in apparent spreadsheet error Shadow prime minister Badenoch’s flagship conference policy document cites £957bn estimate, twice the total in climate advisers’ data. The Guardian, Peter Walker, Oct 09, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (2 items)

• After Outcry, Monitors the Trump Administration Tried to Scrap Return to Sea Under pressure from Congress, a network of ocean monitors that provides vital data to meteorologists, climate scientists, oceanographers and the fishing industry is being restored. NYT, Eric Niiler, Oct 03, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #41 2026 A weekly survey of freshly published academic, government and NGO research dealing with matters of anthropogenic climate change and how we can best deal with it. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Oct 08, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

A booklet published by the UK’s opposition Conservative party includes a “cost of net-zero” that appears to have been doubled by a spreadsheet error.

The “common sense” policy document argues that “what people ultimately want is a government competent enough to solve the problems for which it takes responsibility”.

In a section that says “sophisticat[ed]…modelling” should not be a substitute for “political judgement”, the “Right Way” document disparages various estimates of the cost of net-zero.

The Conservative document then claims – incorrectly – that the government’s official adviser, the Climate Change Committee (CCC), had put the cost of net-zero at close to £1tn. It says:

“In 2020, the CCC estimated that its route to net-zero would cost £957bn.”

In fact, the CCC’s 2020 estimate was exactly half this amount – £478bn – and last year it published a revised figure of £108bn, largely as a result of the falling cost of electric vehicles (EVs).

Spreadsheet error

The Conservative party’s erroneous claim appears to stem from another report that had accidentally added up numbers twice, using a spreadsheet published by the CCC in 2020.

The 2020 spreadsheet contains a table listing the additional investments that would be needed to build a net-zero economy, from low-carbon electricity generation through to heat pumps and EVs.

These extra capital expenditures, listed as “CAPEX”, add up to a total of £1.38tn over the 30 years of 2020-50. They are set against operational savings, listed as “OPEX”, of £0.90tn.

Added up over 2020-50, the combined CAPEX and OPEX figures come to a total of £478bn.

In addition to the annual sectoral CAPEX and OPEX figures, the CCC’s 2020 spreadsheet also has a line giving combined totals for each year. It appears that someone has added all of these numbers together, resulting in the savings and costs being counted twice.

This double-counted total for the cost of net-zero amounts to £957bn – as shown in the image below – and it appears to be the source of the claim in the Conservative booklet.

At the time of publication in 2020, the CCC said that the £478bn net cost of net-zero amounted to less than 1% of GDP over 30 years – and that the large investment needed would not only result in savings due to lower fossil-fuel imports, but that it would boost GDP overall, by around 2%.

In 2025, the CCC revised its estimates for investment costs and operating savings to £670bn and £562bn respectively, giving a net total of £108bn over 2025-50, or less than 0.2% of GDP.

Earlier this year, the committee said that cutting emissions to net-zero would cost less than a single fossil-fuel price shock and that doing so would have benefits worth £110bn per year.

Paper trail

The erroneous claim in the Conservative document is referenced to the CCC’s 2020 advice on the UK’s sixth “carbon budget”, which, as explained, does not contain the £957bn figure.

The earliest online use of the £957bn figure found by Carbon Brief is a 12 January 2026 article in the Spectator, by retired engineer and self-described “accidental energy analyst” David Turver.

A day later, Turver repeated the mistaken number in a report for the free-market Institute of Economic Affairs. His report cites figure 5.3 of the CCC’s 2020 advice.

However, as set out above, the CCC spreadsheet containing the data for figure 5.3 only adds up to £478bn, half the figure claimed by Turver.

It appears that Turver accidentally added up all of the numbers in the CCC spreadsheet, without noting that it already included a line for the annual total. This results in double-counting the cost.

(Turver’s report also triggered a slew of inaccurate headlines stating that net-zero would cost £7.6tn – or even £9tn. These figures, which came from Turver’s report, were based, among other things, on the implicit assumption that fossil fuels and the cars, boilers and power plants that use them are all free.)

After Turver’s report and article in January 2026, the erroneous £957bn figure was repeated in March by the Great British Think Tank. The organisation has the tagline “data, not vibes” and says of its work: “Every figure [is] sourced from official public bodies.”

The £957bn figure then appeared in the Conservative “Right Way” document in October 2026.

related Analysis: EVs are now nine times cheaper than petrol or diesel to drive in the UK  24.09.2026 Oil and gas CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’ 16.09.2026 Emissions Revealed: England’s June 2026 heatwave sparked record demand for ambulances 14.09.2026 Health and society Factcheck: Reform UK’s 45 false or misleading claims about climate and energy 11.09.2026 UK policy

The post Factcheck: UK Conservatives double the ‘cost of net-zero’ after spreadsheet blunder appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Open access notables

Committed Antarctic Ice Sheet mass loss by the end of the twenty-first century, Lin et al., Nature Geoscience

The Antarctic Ice Sheet is the largest source of uncertainty in sea-level rise projections, with uncertainties propagating through emissions scenarios, atmosphere–ocean general circulation models, ice-sheet dynamics and sea-level physics. In ice-sheet model intercomparison exercises, these uncertainties—typically attributed to intermodel differences—stem from modelling choices that may bias ensembles towards commonly adopted approaches regardless of observational consistency. Here we quantify how each individual physical assumption cascades into projection uncertainty using a machine-learning emulation framework, which also enables Bayesian calibration against satellite observations to reduce projection bias. Our results suggest it is very likely (≥0.92 probability) that the Antarctic Ice Sheet is committed to twenty-first-century mass loss, even under aggressive emissions-reduction scenarios. Higher emissions drive greater Antarctic mass loss by 2100 (≥0.89 probability), directly elevating near-term coastal risks. Under very high-emissions scenarios, we identify cascading mechanisms that could produce up to 25.4 cm of sea-level rise by 2100 (95th percentile; median = 15.7 cm) while remaining consistent with satellite observations. Effective management of these risks to densely populated coastal communities requires rapid emissions reductions and improved constraints on climate model selection, sliding laws and ice-shelf melt parameterizations. 

Hysteresis and irreversibility in permafrost physical response to increase and decrease of CO2 emissions, Watanabe et al., Earth System Dynamic

Boreal permafrost over the Northern Hemisphere high latitudes, defined as areas where the ground temperature is below 0 °C for two or more years, stores more than twice as much carbon as the atmosphere. Therefore, thawing of the permafrost, a tipping element, due to global warming may lead to additional carbon emissions and accelerate the warming. To investigate the permafrost response to increase and decrease of CO2 emissions, we conducted a series of numerical experiments using an emission-driven Earth System Model, MIROC-ES2L, and adopting idealized overshooting scenarios in which a prescribed CO2 emission of 10 PgC yr−1 is given until the global warming level reaches different values between 2 and 8 °C followed by the negative emission until the cumulative emission becomes zero.

We found that the response of permafrost area to surface warming and cooling is reversible but has hysteresis for all the emission scenarios. Furthermore, the permafrost property such as the ratio of frozen to liquid water was shown to have irreversibility in the deep soil layer; part of the frozen area in the initial condition was replaced by a mixed water-ice area in the final state despite ground temperature returning almost to the initial condition. Sensitivity experiments reveal that the hysteresis and irreversibility are attributed to the delay of the soil freezing and melting associated with the soil heat conductivity and specific heat of water phase change. This result indicates that once permafrost thaws with warming it will continue for decades after warming diminishes and the delay in the permafrost recovery is larger at global warming levels greater than 2 °C. An offline calculation shows that the additional CO2 emission during the permafrost hysteresis cycle accounts for about 0.6 %–41 % of the cumulative carbon emission released from thawed permafrost in flat10 and NEC experiments.

Trends and Extremes of Near-Surface Dry-Bulb, Wet-Bulb, and Dewpoint Temperature across Southeast Asia and Northern Australia (1980–2021), May et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatolog

Trends in seasonal average dry-bulb temperature T, wet-bulb temperature TWB, and dewpoint temperature TD over the last 42 years (1980–2021) were analyzed over the Southeast (SE) Asian and tropical northern Australian region. All three variables show broad positive trends in most areas, except for relatively weak, nonsignificant trends over northern Australia. Trends in TD and TWB are as high as 0.5°C decade−1 in parts of SE Asia, with generally slightly smaller observed trends in TWB than in T. Trends over the ocean tend to be less variable and slightly weaker on average. We observe an increased occurrence of extreme events in recent years (the 2010s) compared to earlier decades. The T, TWB, and TD extremes occur substantially more frequently during El Niño years, in addition to an underlying increasing trend.

Advancing a Coordinated Strategy for Decision-Relevant Climate Data Products for the United States, Ullrich et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society

Climate adaptation practitioners, planners, and policymakers rely on historical reconstructions and future projections of regional to local climate for adaptation, resilience, and risk management. To serve the many needs of these users, climate data must be relevant for informing the decision-making process (“salient”), consistent with our physical understanding of the global Earth system (“credible”), backed by expert judgment (“authoritative”), and publicly available and ready for use (“accessible”). As more decision-relevant climate data products are being developed to address outstanding needs, important challenges have emerged around the selection, evaluation, use, and standardization of these data products. This article examines opportunities and challenges associated with regional climate data for the United States and describes nascent efforts to build a coordinated strategy among communities of producers and users to maximize the utility of decision-relevant datasets. A community of practice (CoP) is now emerging to benefit both end users and data producers. The CoP will enable enhanced evaluation protocols, improved uncertainty quantification, and eased data distribution and usage, informed by ongoing input on data needs and feedback on quality and usability of data from a wide range of user communities. Broad coordination among interested parties and periodic reviews of the state of the field are vital to the success of this community of practice.

They reduce, we reduce: Perception of other countries’ climate effort predicts support for climate policies, Tam et al., PLOS Climate

As public support influences policy choices, it is crucial to understand how people view climate policies. Based on the premise that individuals tend to be conditional cooperators, we derived the “They Reduce, We Reduce” hypothesis, according to which citizens’ support for climate policies in their own country is higher if they perceive a stronger climate effort by other countries. We tested this hypothesis with a survey study (N = 4,000) in China, India, Japan, and the United States. Findings show that participants who perceived that other countries were likely and willing to take action to reduce climate change, or that the major emitters in the world were currently making substantial efforts, were more supportive of implementing climate policies in their own country. We also observed interindividual variations in this effect, though the patterns differed between countries: The policy attitudes of individuals who felt personally obligated to combat climate change and those who supported their country’s unconditional efforts were less tied to such perceptions. These findings suggest that people respond to other countries’ actions, and policy attitudes should be understood in the context of global climate governance, with reciprocity playing an important role in mobilizing public support.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Economic, Consumer Cost, Pollution Impacts of Federal Energy Policy Changes In 48 U.S. States, Energy Innovation

Federal policy changes since January 2025 will harm the 48 contiguous U.S. states with higher energy prices, lost economic growth and jobs, worse air pollution and healthcare costs, and less grid reliability. Households will pay an additional $920 billion for energy between 2026-2040 – about $6,500 cumulatively per household across that period and $640 per household in 2035. Cutting policies that drive transportation sector innovation and efficiency will inflate gasoline prices 54 cents per gallon in 2035 and 93 cents per gallon in 2040, atop upward pressure from the Iran war. OBBBA and federal cuts to domestic manufacturing and innovation will cost 390,000 jobs per year on average, totaling 6.2 million job-years lost to state economies. Slowing down electrification and domestic energy manufacturing will lower GDP, spilling into other economic sectors, costing state economies $1.3 trillion in cumulative GDP losses. Worsening local air pollution will cause 37,000 additional premature deaths and raise healthcare costs by $72 billion, contributing to rising household costs alongside rising energy prices and goods inflation. All federal energy policy decisions and climate repeals will generate 9.3 billion tons of CO2e emissions, roughly 580 million tons per year.

Offshore Wind Lease Buyouts. Picking Winners and Losers Costs Taxpayers Billions, Taxpayers for Common Sense

As of September 2026, the Department of the Interior (DOI) has agreed to pay energy companies up to $3.9 billion to cancel 12 leases they previously obtained at competitive auctions, on the condition that they make equivalent investments in conventional energy projects instead. These buyouts carry significant implications for American taxpayers and consumers, and there could be more to come. Concerns with offshore wind lease buyouts include the following; Costs Taxpayers $3.9 Billion to Cancel Projects Already Underway: The agreements would return billions in taxpayer revenue already deposited into the federal Treasury to wind developers in exchange for terminating their offshore wind leases; Picks Winners and Losers: The Administration is using billions in refunds to steer investment toward specific energy sectors, manipulating the free market. These cancellations run counter to market trends and private investment decisions. Companies won these leases through competitive auctions; now the Administration is determining which projects and energy sectors qualify for taxpayer-funded refunds; Decreases Planned Domestic Energy Supply: The 12 canceled leases were expected to support projects with a combined nameplate capacity of 19.2 gigawatts (GW), enough to power 6.6 million households. Their cancellation deprives consumers of a future source of domestic energy production; Undermines Energy Security: Robust and diverse energy sources strengthen the domestic energy market. Energy companies paid billions of dollars to secure federal offshore wind leases to diversify their energy portfolios, and now the Administration is undermining their diversification efforts. Although the Administration claims the refunds support new investments, some agreements count investments companies had already made, meaning these taxpayer-funded refunds will not lead to new investment or increase future energy supply.

Climate Fraud 101. Big Oil’s Climate Deception Explained in 101 Documents (1957–2026), Megan Matthews and Kert Davies, The Center for Climate Integrity

For decades, fossil fuel industry leaders were warned that, unless action was taken, communities across the globe would suffer catastrophic harms caused by their products. What they did with that knowledge is the story of the most consequential corporate deception campaign in world history. The authors highlight decades of Big Oil’s climate lies through 101 documents showing that the industry knew and lied about its' central role in the climate crisis. 159 articles in 86 journals by 872 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Asymmetry in carbon cycle feedbacks and transient climate response under positive and negative CO2 emissions, Chimuka & Zickfeld, Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-6211-2026

Background trade winds and climate sensitivity control the eastern equatorial Pacific warming pattern, Stuivenvolt-Allen & Fedorov, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aec5746

Global climate impact of land-surface change driven by radiative effects, Vrese et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77834-0

Impacts of increasing CO2 on diurnal migrating tide in the equatorial lower thermosphere, McLandress & Fomichev, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2005gl025345

Impacts of Mean State Ocean Heat Transport on Climate and Its Response to CO2 Forcing, Gornitz et al., Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 10.1111/nyas.14006

Instantaneous heating rate forcing differentiates tropical high-cloud adjustments across greenhouse gases, Chen et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aef7462

Modulation of precession-forced Asian–African monsoon and arid climate variability by obliquity, Lei et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access 10.1038/s41612-026-01566-7

Temperature-Modulated Ocean CO2 Uptake in Response to CO2 Increase and Decrease, Xu & Gao, PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 10.1104/pp.112.206961

The 2022 Record-Breaking Northeastward Shift of South Asian High Since 1980: The Role of the Gulf Stream, Zhu et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70623

Why April Stands Out: Monthly Impacts of Internal Variability on Arctic Amplification, Gale et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd047413

“Young Get Older, But Old Get Younger”: Warming-Induced Circulation Change Explains Contrasting Pattern of Projected Pacific Deoxygenation, Taylor et al., AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2025av002278

 

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Observations of climate change, effects

Climate-change-amplified wind-related economic losses during Cyclone Harry (2026), Faranda et al., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1002/qj.70314

Historical Trend and Future Projection of Summer Temperature Extremes in Nepal, Paudel et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70610

Increased Arctic Winter Rain-on-Snow-Induced Melt Events Detected by Spaceborne Passive Microwave Remote Sensing, Tao et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0414.1

State of the Climate in Asia 2025, Danielopol et al., Environmental Conservation 10.1017/s0376892903000109

State of Wildfires 2025–2026, Medicine, The Lancet Respiratory Medicine 10.1016/s2213-2600(26)00256-0

Trends and Extremes of Near-Surface Dry-Bulb, Wet-Bulb, and Dewpoint Temperature across Southeast Asia and Northern Australia (1980–2021), May et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-24-0214.1

Tropical belt expansion and its impacts on climate variability in the Mediterranean from 1980 to 2022, Darrag et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-14031-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Sustained greening of the Antarctic Peninsula observed from satellites, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01564-5 46 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

Advancing a Coordinated Strategy for Decision-Relevant Climate Data Products for the United States, Ullrich et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society pdf 10.1175/bams-d-24-0303.1

Annual growth rates of column-averaged CO2 inferred from Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON), Lindqvist et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-15-13023-2015

Climate Change Contribution to Seasonal Forecast Anomalies Using Constrained CMIP6 Projections, Ledoux--Xatard et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70061

Comparison of Gridded Precipitation Datasets Used in Climate and Drought Monitoring in the Contiguous United States, Schumacher et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-26-0022.1

Defining the Anthropocene using precise geological evidence, Barlow et al., Journal of Applied Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1111/1365-2664.12587

Instrumental Artefacts Can Reverse Apparent Lightning–Climate Trends, Wieser et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124367

Synchronized Declines in Global Landsat Cloud Occurrence Probability and Area, Yang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0038.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Energy balance closure at FLUXNET sites revisited, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 10.1016/j.agrformet.2024.110235 58 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Climate Change Projections for Mexico in the 21st Century, Tejeda-Aguilar et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70605

Climate warming amplifies coastal hypoxia response to extreme river discharge, HAO et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04106-6

Near-Surface Extreme Wind Events and Their Responses to Climate Forcings in a Hierarchy of Global Climate Models, Zhang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0148.1

Strong latitudinal contrasts in global wet/dry patterns since the Last Glacial Maximum and under future warming, Zhang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04078-7

Temperature-Modulated Ocean CO2 Uptake in Response to CO2 Increase and Decrease, Xu & Gao, PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 10.1104/pp.112.206961

The Response of Tropical Land–Ocean Precipitation Partitioning to SST and CO2 Increase in Global Storm-Resolving Simulations, Schulz & Hohenegger, Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0041.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Fire weakens land carbon sinks before 1.5 °C, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01554-7 30 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A Novel Precipitation-Concentration Kriging Ensemble Drought Assessment Framework (PCK-EDAF) for Spatially Consistent and Reliable Drought Projection Under CMIP6 Climate Scenarios, Fatima & Ali, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70588

Discrepancies in Extreme Daily and Monthly Precipitation Trends Between Observations and Earth System Models, Zarei & Destouni, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1764771

Eye-Tracking EzGCM, an Online Climate Modeling Tool, to Evaluate Three Dimensions of Usability, Brown et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-24-0134.1

Net release of CO2 from thawing permafrost soil carbon predicted to occur earlier in this century, Ping, Soil Horizons Open Access pdf 10.2136/sh2013-54-4-gc

The Influence of Historical Sea Surface Temperature Patterns on Regional Precipitation Trends, Dai, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/nclimate1633

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Enhancing Winter Climate Simulations of the Great Lakes: Insights from a New Coupled Lake-Ice-Atmosphere (CLIAv1) Model on the Importance of Integrating 3D Hydrodynamics with a Regional Climate Model, , 10.5194/gmd-2024-146 5 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

A Decade of Monthly Frontal Ablation at 147 Tidewater Glaciers in Svalbard, Pyles et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-7319-2026

Committed Antarctic Ice Sheet mass loss by the end of the twenty-first century, Lin et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02102-1

Decoded Antarctic snow accumulation history reconciles observed and modeled trends in accumulation and large-scale warming patterns, Schneider et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1395-2026

Four decades of glacier changes in Karzok, Ladakh regulated by climatic and non-climatic drivers (1980–2023), Prajapati et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2025.105275

Hysteresis and irreversibility in permafrost physical response to increase and decrease of CO2 emissions, Watanabe et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/esd-17-1135-2026

Increased Arctic Winter Rain-on-Snow-Induced Melt Events Detected by Spaceborne Passive Microwave Remote Sensing, Tao et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0414.1

Modeling the 21st-century response of Greenland’s Zachariæ Isstrøm and Nioghalvfjerdsfjorden Glaciers to atmosphere?ocean forcing and friction laws, Dong et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2025.11.006

Physical mechanism of winter extreme sea ice decline events from a Pan-Arctic viewpoint, Jiang et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109385

Reduced surface hoar in a warming world, Rudisill et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5585-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Winter snowpack loss increases warm-season compound hot-dry extremes, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01734-8 15 cites.

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Sea level & climate change

Compound coastal flood exposure in global deltas: an integrated assessment of sea-level rise, subsidence, and socioeconomic dynamics, Wu et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2025.100775

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Shaping the Coast: Accounting for the Human Wildcard in Projections of Future Change, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004504 3 cites.

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Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Deep waters in the Southwest Pacific do not record a release of excess respired carbon during the early deglacial CO? rise, Hayward, The Journal of Foraminiferal Research 10.2113/32.3.274

Explaining Glacial-Interglacial CO2 Changes Requires Multiple Ocean Processes, Griffiths et al., Journal of Experimental Botany Open Access pdf 10.1093/jxb/erx278

Extreme North American heatwaves in 1941 and 2021 drove widespread but contrasting impacts, Anderson & Chartrand, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04055-0

The Glacial-Interglacial CO2-Temperature Relationship, Ganopolski & Roche, Quaternary Science Reviews 10.1016/j.quascirev.2009.09.019

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Global hydroclimate perturbations during the Toarcian oceanic anoxic event, Earth-Science Reviews, 10.1016/j.earscirev.2024.104946 16 cites.

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Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Aperiodic Clustered and Periodic Hexagonal Vegetation Spot Arrays Explained by Inhomogeneous Environments and Climate Trends in Arid Ecosystems, Pinto-Ramos et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118462

Climate stress priming of juvenile Southern California giant kelp (Macrocystis pyrifera) to marine heatwaves, Smith et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1938610

Compound food failure on a deteriorated mast system drives Japan’s bear conflict crisis, Xiao et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aej8134

Coupling of Pacific and Indian Ocean variability disrupted by 19th century volcanism, Wang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-76705-y

Diatom–lipid–copepod nexus under threat by global change, Jónasdóttir et al., Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0369

Fine-root responses to warming and elevated CO2 vary among plant functional types, Griffin & Prager, Tree Physiology 10.1093/treephys/tpw133

Habitat-Forming Macroalgae Show Greater Resilience to Marine Heatwaves Than Models Predict, Yet Chronic Ocean Warming Remains Poised to Deliver Considerable Future Declines, Davis et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.72604

Impact of climate change on environmental niche dynamics of resident and migratory ducks in the Eastern Himalayan wintering grounds, Mahananda et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-74143-w

Increasing atmospheric evaporative demand leads to reducing stability of terrestrial ecosystems to droughts, Zhu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105743

Investigating Coastal Vegetation Dynamics and Ecosystem Impacts Under Elevated CO2 and Temperature: A Process-Based Approach, ESA, Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America 10.1890/0012-9623-94.4.310

Long-term forest-line dynamics in the French Pyrenees: an accelerating upward shift related to forest context, global warming and pastoral abandonment, Delpouve et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-22-7725-2025

New climate regime restructures the ecology of Canada’s Northern Great Lakes, Rühland et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2603271123

Ocean acidification reshapes phytoplankton phosphorus metabolism under phosphate-limited conditions, wang et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02113-y

Overwintering Strategies Drive Climate Change Impacts on Body Mass in Northern Mammals, Leach et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71132

Spatial Variability and Long-Term Trends in Winter Phytoplankton of the Warming Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Yuan et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2026gb009273

Spatial variation and predictors of plant species' intrinsic climate sensitivity across the conterminous United States, Qu et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08894

The short-term effects of ocean acidification on the epiphytic bacterial community of Sargassum thunbergii via high-throughput sequencing, Ji et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107531

Vegetation Phenology Shifts Under Climate Change: Cross-Season Mechanisms and Consequences for Ecosystem Productivity, Liu et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71112

Warmer temperature accelerates senescence by modifying the aging-dependent changes in the mosquito transcriptome, altering immunity, metabolism, and DNA repair, Martin et al., Immunity & Ageing Open Access 10.1186/s12979-025-00551-7

Wet-to-Dry Cascades May Increasingly Drive Wildfire Activity in Non-Forested Ecosystems, and Further Amplify the Risk of Urban Interface Fire Disasters, in a Warming Climate, Swain & Stephens, Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.70681

[Review] Climate change and animal infectious diseases: a systematic review of emerging evidence, Houe et al., Frontiers in Veterinary Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fvets.2019.00301

“Wildlife and Climate” Scientific Consensus on the Roles of Wild Animals in the Global Carbon Cycle and Natural Climate Solutions, Roberts et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71115

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Climate change driven effects on transport, fate and biogeochemistry of trace element contaminants in coastal marine ecosystems, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01679-y 118 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A high-resolution urban CO2 transport model with anthropogenic and biogenic fluxes, Wu et al., Elementa Science of the Anthropocene Open Access 10.1525/elementa.138

ABCFlux v2: Arctic–boreal CO2 and CH4 monthly flux observations and ancillary information across terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, Virkkala et al., Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) Open Access pmh:oai:www.research-collection.ethz.ch:20.500.11850/806633

Amazon River Plume Control on Carbonate Chemistry in the Western Tropical Atlantic, Batista et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2026gb009389

Climate Change Induced Seasonal Amplification of the Indian Ocean CO2 Sink, ESA, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment Open Access pdf 10.1890/1540-9295-11.6.284

CO2 and CH4 fluxes from standing dead trees in a northern conifer forest, Hettwer, DigitalCommons (California Polytechnic State University) pmh:oai:digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu:etd-5303

Drought-induced peatland carbon loss exacerbated by elevated CO2 and warming, Quan et al., Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) Open Access pmh:oai:www.research-collection.ethz.ch:20.500.11850/785250

Ecosystem respiration during snowmelt and soil thaw leads to a rare annual CO2 net loss in a boreal fen, Särkelä et al., Työväentutkimus Vuosikirja Open Access pmh:oai:helda.helsinki.fi:10138/638997

Future methane measurement campaigns require basin-specific sampling strategies, Daniels & Hammerling, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04089-4

High-Resolution Modeling to Quantify CO2 Emissions From an Industrial Point Source, Zhao et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-15-12623-2015

Improved estimation of net ecosystem CO2 exchange over North America using LSTM-based flux upscaling (2001–2021), Huang & Wei, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20482273

Interhemispheric Asymmetry in Air-Sea CO2 flux Trends Across Eastern Boundary Current Systems Under a High Warming Scenario, Banerjee & Kumar, Global Biogeochemical Cycles 10.1029/2025gb008860

Lake eutrophication increases unprotected organic carbon pools in sediments, Gong et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04103-9

Modeling Carbon Emissions Driven by Land-Use Change: Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis of Dynamic Global Vegetation Models, Dong et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gb009219

N2O Emissions From the Eastern Tropical Indian Ocean, Martinez-Rey et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-12-4133-2015

Net release of CO2 from thawing permafrost soil carbon predicted to occur earlier in this century, Ping, Soil Horizons Open Access pdf 10.2136/sh2013-54-4-gc

Northern typical forested swamp soil CO? efflux dynamics, Geng et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1925894

Overlooked contribution of organic alkalinity in Arctic Ocean margins biases ocean acidification estimates, Song et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04072-z

Previously Unrecognized Land-Use Control on Deep Soil CO2 Sink, Sultan, New Phytologist Open Access pdf 10.1111/j.1469-8137.2009.02974.x

Saline Permafrost and Cryopegs as Potentially Important Sources of CO2—Assessing Organic Carbon Mineralization Potentials on the Alaskan Coastal Plain, Seemann et al., Publication Database GFZ (GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences) Open Access pdf pmh:oai:gfzpublic.gfz.de:item_5039705

Substantially underestimated winter CO2 sources of the Southern Ocean, Horton et al., Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 10.1111/nyas.12586

Temperature-Modulated Ocean CO2 Uptake in Response to CO2 Increase and Decrease, Xu & Gao, PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 10.1104/pp.112.206961

The Detectability of Extreme CO2 Flux Events Using Atmospheric Observations, He et al., Remote Sensing Open Access pdf 10.3390/rs10060839

The role of the tropical carbon balance in determining the large atmospheric CO2 growth rate in 2023, Sage et al., Annals of Botany Open Access pdf 10.1093/aob/mcad160

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Arctic soil carbon trajectories shaped by plant–microbe interactions, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02147-3 32 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

A Review of Experimental Approaches to CO2 Injectivity in Geological Storage: Methods, Controlling Factors, and Challenges, Zhou et al., Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering 10.1007/s13369-025-10982-5

A systematic review of carbon sink pathways and deployment strategies, Ma et al., The Science of The Total Environment 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2025.180833

Advances in CO2 Capture Materials: From Strategies to CO2-Based Fertilizers for a Sustainable Future, Novella, Frontiers in Thermal Engineering Open Access pdf 10.3389/fther.2023.1301616

Advances in CO2 Capture Materials: From Strategies to CO2-Based Fertilizers for a Sustainable Future, Novella, Frontiers in Thermal Engineering Open Access pdf 10.3389/fther.2023.1301616

Characterization and Performance Evaluation of Biochar-Modified Wellbore Cement Under Geological CO2 Storage Conditions, Gan et al., Geoenergy Science and Engineering 10.1016/j.geoen.2024.213510

Comprehensive Evaluation of Fault Sealing for CO2 Geological Storage in Low-Permeability Reservoirs, Amer et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-025-03032-5

Ideas and perspectives: Max MACS – constraining the potential global scale of Marine Anoxic Carbon Storage for CO2 removal, Raven et al., Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) Open Access pmh:oai:www.research-collection.ethz.ch:20.500.11850/801836

Measuring large-scale mCDR using a novel Atmospheric CO? Perimeter Flux (ACPF) method, Fiekowsky et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1941538

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The Impact of Drought on Terrestrial Carbon in the West African Sahel: Implications for Natural Climate Solutions, Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences, 10.1029/2024jg008143 4 cites.

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Decarbonization

Carbon catalysts for CO2 conversion: From carbon emissions to zero-carbon solutions, Rusdan et al., Nanomaterials Open Access pdf 10.3390/nano12213877

Gaps in mind: Political and spatial cleavages in local onshore wind attitudes in Germany, Radtke, Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115475

Physics-informed large models for wind and solar forecasting: A carbon-aware framework for decarbonized power systems, Sulaima et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development Open Access 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102146

Turning Wind Into Value: Hydrogen Storage and Trade as Variation Management Strategies for Offshore Wind Integration, Marnate & Grönkvist, Wind Energy Open Access 10.1002/we.70155

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Solar cells combined with geothermal or wind power systems reduces climate and environmental impact, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01739-3 22 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Reduced Longwave Absorption of Magnesium Sulfate Aerosol as an Alternative to Sulfuric Acid for Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Odelskii et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20446772

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement in Deep Water Formation Regions Under Low and High Emission Pathways, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004213 12 cites.

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Aerosols

Anthropogenic aerosol reduction contributes to faster flash drought onset in a changing climate, Wei, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.22113395

Climate change communications & cognition

Climate anxiety is associated with increasing distress and diminishing returns in pro-environmental behaviours: A cross-sectional study of Australian youth, Lykins et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103234

They reduce, we reduce: Perception of other countries’ climate effort predicts support for climate policies, Tam et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000755

[Comment] Reframing the climate anxiety focus ahead of COP30: the imperative of addressing the policy-action gap, Ip et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101397

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Truth and democracy in an era of misinformation, Science, 10.1126/science.ads5695 31 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Circularity measures enhance resilience of net zero pathways for agriculture, Henn et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04052-3

Climate-driven agricultural migration improves livelihoods but risks nationalizing deforestation and climate vulnerability: evidence from Kafinda game management area in Zambia, Chama et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100889

Cover Crops as Nature-Based Climate Solutions in the Midwestern US: Potential Benefits, Knowledge Gaps, and Opportunities for Transdisciplinary Work, Barnes et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2024ef005691

Diffusive CH4 Emissions From Agricultural Ditches Overshadow CH4 Sinks by Upland Fields, Wu et al., Aberdeen University Research Archive (Aberdeen University) pmh:oai:aura.abdn.ac.uk:2164/26702

Potential for Expanding Sorghum Production in Europe in the Face of Climate Change, Davoudkhani et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef007503

The effects of peat thickness and water table depth on CO2 and N2O emissions from agricultural peatlands – a process-based modelling approach, Kajasilta et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3567-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Climate change mitigation policies in agriculture: An overview of sociopolitical barriers, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.916 19 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

A Multimodel Perspective of Droughts in Future Climate and Implications for Irrigation in Malawi, Likoya et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology Open Access 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0060.1

A potential overestimation of CO2 physiological effects on evapotranspiration, Bonfils et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-17-0005.1

Comparison of Gridded Precipitation Datasets Used in Climate and Drought Monitoring in the Contiguous United States, Schumacher et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-26-0022.1

[Feature] Groundwater depletion in a drying world, McQuillan, The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101372

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: The contribution of Arabian Sea warming to decreasing summer precipitation in the northern Greater Mekong Subregion, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107714 8 cites.

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Climate change economics

Climate-change-amplified wind-related economic losses during Cyclone Harry (2026), Faranda et al., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1002/qj.70314

Correcting for spatial and temporal dependence in estimating the economic effect of extreme heat, Wyner & Brill, Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeg1967

On the Inherent Ambiguity of Extreme Event Costs Attributed to Climate Change, Match et al., AGU Advances Open Access 10.1029/2026av002546

The impact of international clean energy finance and public policies on the low-carbon energy transition: Evidence from Egypt and Brazil, De?irmenci & Ünsal, Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115647

Why Japan’s sovereign climate finance took a transition-bond form: bureaucratic mediation in an eco-developmental state, Kobayashi & Lin, Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.33321252

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: A multi-model assessment of inequality and climate change, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02151-7 71 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

Challenges in the decarbonization of the UK electrical power system by 2030: A techno-economic analysis of current and alternative policies, Or et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115633

Geopolitical fragmentation and energy transition inequalities: Climate policy uncertainty, sanctions, and the oil and gas sector, Nguyen et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.115048

Hydrogen in the European power sector – A case study on the impacts of regulatory frameworks for green hydrogen, Asimakopoulou, Yearbook of International Environmental Law Open Access 10.1093/yiel/yvad035

Ownership structures shape climate-policy effectiveness in electricity generation, Grant et al., Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115644

Repurposing the past, powering the future - socio-economic impacts of hybrid pumped hydro storage in Greece and Poland's coal regions, Kruczek et al., Energy Research & Social Science 10.1016/j.erss.2025.104386

The unequal flight: Policy design and public support for carbon taxation of air travel, Pizzo et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104994

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Scenario analysis of supply- and demand-side solutions for circular economy and climate change mitigation in the global building sector, Journal of Industrial Ecology, 10.1111/jiec.13557 43 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

A framework to quantify managed retreat outcomes for households and communities, Lauer et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100890

Accelerating climate change adaptation in cities: a global analysis of urban strategies, drivers, and co-benefits, Liu et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2025.2598520

Assessing power system vulnerability to climate-related stressors and shocks: The case of Indonesia, Aji et al., Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development Open Access 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102147

Climate change and the weather-energy Nexus in US energy demand, Akad?r? et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-74518-z

Climate Change Increases Water Scarcity Risks and Adaptation Needs in China, Zhang et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef007712

Climate change, gendered identities, and adaptation strategies in rural Tanzanian households, Mbunda, Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2025.2603542

Editorial: Receiving communities and climate destinations, Tanner & Wilsterman, BioScience Open Access pdf 10.1093/biosci/biaf065

FRAME-PS: a typology-specific method for assessing climate resilience in urban public spaces, Ronael & Oruç, Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103173

Greening schools for climate-resilient, inclusive and liveable cities, Ruíz-Mallén et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-025-02519-3

Innovation for Climate Change Adaptation: A Meta-Analysis, Woime & Dilebo, Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1002/cli2.70066

Mainstreaming Equitable Climate Action through Growth Management Planning in Washington State, United States, Chang et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-24-0158.1

Mapping resilience pathway of smallholder farming community to cyclone-led climate disasters in coastal West Bengal, India, Panja et al., Global Environmental Change 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2025.103108

When adaptation is not a policy domain: Institutional embedding of climate change adaptation in Thailand’s human settlements governance, Schipper, One Earth Open Access 10.1016/j.oneear.2020.09.014

Wisdom of the Past, Power for the Future: Centering Local Traditions in Community Organizing to Codevelop Climate Adaptation Practices, Jean et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-24-0133.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Landslide Hazard Is Projected to Increase Across High Mountain Asia, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef004325 33 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

A Review of Airborne Pollen and Its Interactions With Air Pollutants, Urbanization, and Climate Change: Implications for Human Health and Monitoring Gaps, Dhawan et al., Current Allergy and Asthma Reports 10.1007/s11882-025-01241-6

Forecasted Heat and Vulnerable Populations: Understanding Limitations Associated with New Tools, Hiscox et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0052.1

How climate change affects mosquito-borne infectious disease: The different trajectories of malaria and dengue, Cumming et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aei0953

Integrated governance for improved climate and health outcomes in Southern African cities: a review, Matewa et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2655964

The impact of climate change on human health and pharmaceuticals, O'Flynn et al., Analytical Methods 10.1039/d0ay02098b

[Articles] Quantifying the health-care burden of temperature in the National Health Service in England: an economic analysis of resource use and costs, Fahr et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101373

[Correspondence] Suicidality in climate change and mental health research, Bayliss et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101399

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Tracking climate adaptation in hospitals: An inventory of structural measures, Climate Risk Management, 10.1016/j.crm.2024.100657 9 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human culture

Sociability Under Anthropogenic Change: From Individual Behaviour to Population-Level Consequences, Kowalczyk & Pietrzak, Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74205

Other

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: A comparative study of strategic petroleum reserve policies of major countries in the world, Energy Policy, 10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114362 23 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

[Comment] A call to action: climate leadership at the World Health Assembly, Cavendish & Nogueira, The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101389

[Feature] Groundwater depletion in a drying world, McQuillan, The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101372

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago: Science for transformative change: the IPCC, boundary work and the making of useable knowledge, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1408513 8 cites.

buffer/IOPN Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Offshore Wind Lease Buyouts. Picking Winners and Losers Costs Taxpayers Billions, Taxpayers for Common Sense

As of September 2026, the Department of the Interior (DOI) has agreed to pay energy companies up to $3.9 billion to cancel 12 leases they previously obtained at competitive auctions, on the condition that they make equivalent investments in conventional energy projects instead. These buyouts carry significant implications for American taxpayers and consumers, and there could be more to come. Concerns with offshore wind lease buyouts include the following; Costs Taxpayers $3.9 Billion to Cancel Projects Already Underway: The agreements would return billions in taxpayer revenue already deposited into the federal Treasury to wind developers in exchange for terminating their offshore wind leases; Picks Winners and Losers: The Administration is using billions in refunds to steer investment toward specific energy sectors, manipulating the free market. These cancellations run counter to market trends and private investment decisions. Companies won these leases through competitive auctions; now the Administration is determining which projects and energy sectors qualify for taxpayer-funded refunds; Decreases Planned Domestic Energy Supply: The 12 canceled leases were expected to support projects with a combined nameplate capacity of 19.2 gigawatts (GW), enough to power 6.6 million households. Their cancellation deprives consumers of a future source of domestic energy production; Undermines Energy Security: Robust and diverse energy sources strengthen the domestic energy market. Energy companies paid billions of dollars to secure federal offshore wind leases to diversify their energy portfolios, and now the Administration is undermining their diversification efforts. Although the Administration claims the refunds support new investments, some agreements count investments companies had already made, meaning these taxpayer-funded refunds will not lead to new investment or increase future energy supply.

Climate Fraud 101. Big Oil’s Climate Deception Explained in 101 Documents (1957–2026), Megan Matthews and Kert Davies, The Center for Climate Integrity

For decades, fossil fuel industry leaders were warned that, unless action was taken, communities across the globe would suffer catastrophic harms caused by their products. What they did with that knowledge is the story of the most consequential corporate deception campaign in world history. The authors highlight decades of Big Oil’s climate lies through 101 documents showing that the industry knew and lied about its' central role in the climate crisis.

10th edition of the Copernicus Ocean State Report, Grégoire et al., Copernicus Publication

The authors present information on the state, variability, and ongoing changes in the marine environment of the global ocean and the European regional seas over the past decades up to close to real time. Using observation-based (remote sensing, in situ) and ocean reanalysis data, the authors provide a comprehensive 4-dimensional (latitude, longitude, depth, and time) analysis of the Blue, Green, and White Ocean. The OSR is intended to act as a reference, providing a unique ocean monitoring dashboard for the scientific community and for policy makers and others with decision making responsibilities.

Communication to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee regarding the European Commission’s sustainability indicators and the current data centre build-out, Emmanouilidou et al., Lighthouse Reports

The European Commission is withholding vital environmental information from the public, undermining citizens’ ability to participate meaningfully in one of the most critical environmental issues of our time: the enormous and accelerating data centre build-out. The long awaited rating scheme, now published, offers the appearance of transparency. While the Commission claims it is “the most comprehensive worldwide” transparency initiative around the environmental impact of data centres, it fails to provide the information that communities are entitled to. Absent are the real figures that the Commission holds on how much strain each data centre imposes on the electrical grid, how much water it uses and how much waste heat it emits. In their place are labels corresponding to “efficiency ratios” that conceal more than they reveal. This leaves the industry able to engage in a phoney war against the ratings scheme, which contains most of the carve outs and evasions they have lobbied for, while depriving the public of its right to know. The authors are challenging the Commission with a communication to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, the body that reviews whether officials are fulfilling their legal obligations regarding environmental democracy.

Global Financing for Coal Flatlines as Banks Move in Opposite Directions, Urgewald et al., Urgewald et al

The authors use a dataset to track loans and underwriting from 744 commercial banks to companies operating across the thermal coal value chain. Between 2022 and 2025, these banks channeled $467 billion to the coal industry. Financial flows to the sector are, however, highly concentrated: Chinese banks account for 62% ($289 billion), US banks for 14% ($67 billion) and Japanese banks for 6% ($28 billion) of total bank support to the coal industry. The four years covered in the dataset directly follow COP 26 in Glasgow, where governments agreed to accelerate the phase-down of coal, and financial institutions made high-profile net-zero commitments. The authors show that global bank financing for coal has remained broadly flat since Glasgow, averaging around $117 billion per year, but this aggregate figure masks a growing rift within the banking industry. While total coal financing of EU banks declined, financial flows from UK banks to the coal industry grew by 17% since the Glasgow COP. This increase was, however, mainly driven by Barclays and to a lesser degree by HSBC.

The Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2026 Survey Report, Seah et al., Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

The report is the first comprehensive overview of climate change perspectives specific to the Southeast Asian region. Conducted yearly since 2020, the surveys aim to provide a general sense of the prevailing views of Southeast Asian citizens towards climate change issues. The reports contain the results and analysis of views towards questions such as climate adaptation and mitigation, climate change impacts, low-carbon transitions and climate policy, among other topics. The 2026 survey gathered the views of 3,706 respondents from eleven ASEAN member states.

Climate on the Floor: India’s Parliamentary Discourse on Environment since the Paris Agreement, Hajira Puthige, Centre for Financial Accountability

The author examines the evolution of India’s legislative engagement with the climate crisis during the critical decade following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015. The analysis addresses whether parliamentary scrutiny is keeping pace with the country’s growing climate vulnerabilities and if current parliamentary discussions reflect the level of ambition that the climate crisis demands. The report covers the period from December 2015 to December 2025, focusing on a dataset of 8,702 parliamentary questions raised in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The analysis is organized into eight key thematic areas: Clean Energy and Decarbonisation; Extreme Weather and Natural Disasters; Forests and Land Use; Climate Change and Global Impacts; Environment; Mitigation, Adaptation and Carbon Management; Climate Finance and Markets; and Global Climate Governance.

Sound Check: Climate Risk and Resilience in Canada's Live Music Sector, Lansley et al., The Canadian Live Music Association

Climate disruption now poses a material economic risk to Canada’s live music sector. Live music contributes C$10.92 billion to Canada’s GDP, supports more than 101,000 FTE jobs, and attracts nearly 20 million visitors annually. Without stronger preparedness, coordination, and financial support, extreme weather could place an estimated C$1.2 billion to C$3.0 billion of Canadian music-event and festival economic value at risk between now and 2040, with a central estimate of approximately C$1.8 billion. Drawing on national disruption data, climate projections, the Canadian Live Music Association’s Climate Contingency survey, interviews, and focus groups, the authors found that climate risk is now a structural issue for live music in Canada. The sector is adapting, but not at the scale or pace required to protect its economic, cultural, tourism, employment, and community value.

Interim heat mortality monitoring report, England in May and June 2026, United Kingdom Health Security Agency, Government of the United Kingdom

During the May and June 2026 heat events there were an estimated total of 2,877 heat-associated deaths, an estimated 753 heat-associated deaths occurred during the May heat episode, an estimated 2,124 heat-associated deaths occurred during the June heat episode, and the mortality burden is already close to the highest annual totals previously recorded by the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA). During summer 2026, England experienced 2 notable heat events, one in May and the other in June, both of which were exceptional for different reasons. The May heat event occurred unusually early in the season, with record-breaking temperatures following a period of unseasonably cool weather. The June event was characterized by its' intensity and formed part of a broader period of sustained hot weather across Europe. Given the public health significance of these events, and the considerable interest from policymakers, partners and the public, UKHSA has produced this interim report to provide an early assessment of heat-associated mortality. Such early assessments will only be undertaken following extraordinary periods of heat and would not normally be produced for routine heat events.

Innovation on Hold: One Year Since DOE’s Mass Award Terminations, Boyd et al., US. Department of Energy Alumni and Network and Lawyers for Good Government

On October 1, 2025, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) took an unprecedented step by terminating 321 awards worth over $8 billion in clean energy grant funding. DOE has since conceded that these awards were canceled "based solely" on the award recipient state’s political identity (targeting "blue states"). When combined with earlier rounds of cuts in clean energy demonstration projects, over $12.5 billion in Congressionally appropriated energy research, development, and deployment funding was terminated last year. The authors track the lasting impacts to the Department’s grant mechanisms and awards management processes. This latest analysis of federal spending data, court filings, and direct awardee feedback shows that despite DOE’s statements that project portfolio reviews are complete, the majority of affected projects—whether terminated, "retained," or "ghosted"—remain functionally frozen.

Missouri's State Energy Plan, Missouri Department of Natural Resources

At the core of this State Energy Plan are four primary goals: Energy independence, nuclear enablement, grid reliability and economic growth (Figure 1). These goals establish a consistent framework to assess current system conditions, evaluate how different resource and investment decisions perform and identify priorities for consideration. No single course of action or set of investments optimizes all objectives at once. Rather, a portfolio of actions is needed to balance affordability, reliability, economic growth and community prosperity under a range of conditions. This portfolio, including new policies and legislation, will drive toward these goals and a brighter future for Missouri.

Thriving Economy Project, Budzinski et al., Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition

The report is a policy blueprint designed to modernize the economy, charting a path towards growth and prosperity for all Americans. The menu of policy options will strengthen America’s economic competitiveness, ensure a stable and resilient food supply, create good jobs, preserve and strengthen the natural systems that underpin the economy, and deliver affordable, reliable energy to American families and businesses. Rather than repeatedly rebuilding after disaster strikes, the authors believe public policy should reduce risk before it materializes, reward long-term investment, align fragmented programs around shared outcomes, and equip state, local, and Tribal partners with the tools and certainty they need to act. Critical to achieving these goals is the use of forward-looking climate data so the government can ensure that new homes, bridges, and energy systems are built for the climate that people will actually face, rather than one that no longer exists. Upfront investments lead to systems that can not only withstand the climate of the future, but thrive in it.

Flood Insurance: Congressional Action Could Help Increase Coverage for At-Risk Properties, Government Accountability Office

The authors examined (1) the extent to which consumers purchase flood insurance, (2) the effectiveness of the mandatory purchase requirement, (3) factors affecting consumers’ decisions to purchase flood insurance, and (4) potential actions to increase consumers’ purchase of flood insurance. The authors identified four actions that could help increase NFIP and private flood insurance coverage. Each would require statutory authority from Congress; incorporate all sources of flood risk into purchase requirement determinations which could help ensure that more at-risk properties have coverage; make property-level flood risk information publicly available to potentially increase awareness of flood risk; require lenders to provide flood insurance quotes for federally backed mortgages to better signal the need for coverage; and increase National Flood Insurance Program coverage limits to allow property owners to obtain coverage that is better aligned with potential flood losses.

Southern California Fires Incident Analysis Report, Kerber et al., UL Research Institutes' Fire Safety Research Institute

The January 2025 fires in Southern California, including the Palisades and Eaton Fires, occurred under extreme wildfire conditions characterized by powerful Santa Ana winds, critically dry vegetation, and rapid fire spread originating in vegetation and extending into the built environment. These fires became among the most deadly, destructive, and costly wildfire disasters in California history, testing communities, emergency responders, infrastructure systems, and government agencies at every level. The findings demonstrate that outcomes were shaped by the interaction of multiple interlinked systems rather than any single factor or failure. California and local jurisdictions had established numerous prevention, preparedness, and response programs prior to the fires, including defensible space inspection programs, fuels reduction efforts, community preparedness initiatives, evacuation systems, mutual aid agreements, and extensive fire suppression resources. The analysis concludes that future wildfire resilience requires coordinated improvements across landscapes, communities, infrastructure systems, emergency management organizations, and response operations. Priority recommendations include strengthening community-scale risk reduction, enhancing preparedness for large, wind-driven community conflagrations; improving situational awareness and operational intelligence; expanding wildfire-resistant construction and community preparedness programs; strengthening evacuation and interoperability systems; improving infrastructure resilience; and establishing standardized, post-suppression procedures.

Economic, Consumer Cost, Pollution Impacts of Federal Energy Policy Changes In 48 U.S. States, Energy Innovation

Federal policy changes since January 2025 will harm the 48 contiguous U.S. states with higher energy prices, lost economic growth and jobs, worse air pollution and healthcare costs, and less grid reliability. Households will pay an additional $920 billion for energy between 2026-2040 – about $6,500 cumulatively per household across that period and $640 per household in 2035. Cutting policies that drive transportation sector innovation and efficiency will inflate gasoline prices 54 cents per gallon in 2035 and 93 cents per gallon in 2040, atop upward pressure from the Iran war. OBBBA and federal cuts to domestic manufacturing and innovation will cost 390,000 jobs per year on average, totaling 6.2 million job-years lost to state economies. Slowing down electrification and domestic energy manufacturing will lower GDP, spilling into other economic sectors, costing state economies $1.3 trillion in cumulative GDP losses. Worsening local air pollution will cause 37,000 additional premature deaths and raise healthcare costs by $72 billion, contributing to rising household costs alongside rising energy prices and goods inflation. All federal energy policy decisions and climate repeals will generate 9.3 billion tons of CO2e emissions, roughly 580 million tons per year.

Surging Water Costs amid the US Affordability Crisis, Food and Water Watch

Households across the United States are grappling with rising drinking water bills, stretching their ability to make ends meet. The authors compiled and analyzed water billing data for the 500 largest community water systems in 2025, which collectively served 155 million people (45% of the US). They compared typical household water bills in 2025 to those in 2015, using data from a previous investigation. From 2015 to 2025, household drinking water bills increased faster than inflation, grocery prices, and median household income. The average community water system increased household drinking water bills by 62%. Water bills increased at 1.6 times the overall inflation rate and more than 2 times the rate for groceries. Water bills increased 19% faster than the US median household income, forcing households to spend a higher portion of their stretched incomes on water. In Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, and West Virginia, water bills grew about twice as fast as their corresponding statewide median household incomes. Climate change-driven droughts and other severe weather patterns continue to threaten water supplies and infrastructure globally, generating expenses that will be pushed onto ratepayers. Continued expansion of water-intensive industries like factory farming and hyperscale data centers also compound threats on local water supplies.

Bankable by design: Financing ASEAN’s energy system transformation, Alnie Demoral and Dinita Setyawati, Ember

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) energy transition financing challenge is shifting beyond utility-scale renewable energy toward making distributed renewable energy, battery storage and transmission infrastructure bankable at scale. The authors examine the factors shaping investment decisions across ASEAN, drawing on project-level evidence, techno-economic modelling and market assessments to identify the barriers that continue to constrain deployment. They found that market design, transaction costs, revenue certainty and value-capture mechanisms are now as important as access to capital in determining project bankability, and outline policy and financing interventions that can help accelerate the region’s clean energy transition. About New Research

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This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Barbara Grady

As the Western United States grapples with severe drought, leading cities to scramble for water and farmers to abandon some crops, a new scientific study has found that 122 major oil, gas, coal, and cement companies and state-owned operations are partially responsible.

The study found that climate change from all climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions over the last 70 years has resulted in a 36% decline in annual average mountain snowpacks, the major source of surface water in Western states – and that about 40% of that decline is linked to the climate pollution caused by just 122 companies.

The annual loss attributable to those 122 companies is equivalent to the amount of water held by Lake Mead, the nation’s largest reservoir, at full capacity. 

The authors of the peer-reviewed paper, “Carbon emissions exacerbating the Western US water crisis,” also found that global warming from greenhouse gas emissions has led to a 13% decline in average annual streamflows from mountains to the lower-lying areas that depend on them, and to a 4.3% increase in the need for agricultural irrigation. The study attributed about half the streamflow declines and roughly half the increased need for irrigation to the warming caused by the 122 companies. In other words, those companies’ products resulted in a 6% fall in streamflows in the region, according to the study. 

Nine scientists from the University of California at Merced and the Union of Concerned Scientists contributed to the study, published August 25 in the Nature magazine affiliate Communications Earth & Environment. 

The West relies on snowpack 

Summers are dry in the Western U.S. 

Precipitation occurs in winter, with much of it stored as snowpack in the mountains. The West’s multibillion-dollar agriculture industry and the reservoirs supplying cities and towns in 11 states depend on melted snow carried by rivers, streams, and water conveyance systems in late spring and summer. If the snowpack is scant or if snow melts early, water shortages can occur in summer when water demand is highest. 

The West’s historic megadrought has persisted for two decades. With less surface water available, farmers have had to pump more groundwater for irrigation, depleting aquifers so much that the ground is sinking in many agricultural areas. Some farmers in the Southwest have had to abandon crops or fallow fields for lack of sufficient water. Corpus Christi, Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Phoenix are just some of the cities facing severe water shortages.

Tying drought to specific companies 

Emily Williams, lead study author and a postdoctoral research scientist at the University of California at Merced, said in an interview that the study allowed scientists to disentangle how much worse water scarcity became over the decade 2014 to 2024 because of climate-change-induced atmospheric warming, as well as how much worse it became specifically because of the warming emissions generated by 122 companies and their products. 

“It lets us get beyond how much more intense climate change is becoming to look at specific impacts like snowpack decline as well as specific sources” of emissions, she said. Her team found impacts on water resources “not just from climate change but because of emissions traceable to specific sources.” 

The 122 companies cited in the study are the world’s biggest producers of climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions cumulatively up to 2024; they are all coal, oil, gas, and cement producers. That list, known in climate science as the carbon majors and compiled by other scientists, is based on publicly reported coal, oil, gas, and cement production data along with scientific formulas for calculating emissions per unit of product produced. Since 2024, the list has grown to include 178 entities.

Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell are the fourth-, fifth-, eighth-, and ninth-biggest cumulative emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, according to the most recent version of the list. The world’s three highest emitters are state-owned coal, oil, and gas companies from the former Soviet Union, China, and Saudi Arabia (Saudi Aramco). U.S. coal producers Core Natural Resources and Peabody Energy are also in the top 25 carbon majors. 

The study authors based their calculations on emissions since 1950, rather than earlier, because that was the decade when major oil and gas companies began to suspect that use of their products would cause changes to the Earth’s climate. Engineers at ExxonMobil who studied the issue determined that burning large amounts of fossil fuels would affect planetary climate systems. After its engineers shared their conclusions with management in the 1970s, ExxonMobil at first expanded that research to learn more and then – a decade later – pivoted to hiding the scientific findings and denying the existence of climate change, as reported in the Pulitzer Prize finalist series “The Road Not Taken” by Inside Climate News. Other major oil companies did the same. 

The study authors wrote that “roughly 70% of global industrial carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions since 1854 are traceable to 122 fossil fuel producers and cement manufacturers (“Carbon Majors”), and ~97% of these emissions occurred after 1950.” 

U.S. oil companies remain silent

When asked on August 27 for a comment on the water crisis study, Chevron – the largest U.S. emitter since 1950 – sent an automatic thank-you note but did not respond to the question by publication. 

Chevron’s second quarter earnings report, released August 12, highlighted record-breaking oil production. The report said the company “achieved new U.S. upstream production record of nearly 2.1 million barrels of oil equivalent per day and record U.S. refinery throughput of over 1 million barrels per day” as well as “competitive growth” in operations “around the globe.” Chevron also has embarked on developing oil resources in Venezuela, which has large deposits of heavy crude – a variety of oil that’s highly polluting to process. 

A media relations receptionist for ExxonMobil, the second-largest U.S. emitter, politely pledged to convey the reporter’s question to the media relations team, but the company did not respond. 

The methodology that Williams and her eight colleagues used involved overlaying observational data of recorded temperatures, precipitation, relative humidity, and hydrologic conditions annually over the decade 2014 to 2024 in seven water basins across the Western states with global climate models. Then they introduced emissions data in three variable scenarios to disentangle the effect of emissions from the carbon majors. One scenario included all human-caused emissions since 1950, the second included no anthropogenic emissions, and the third scenario excluded emissions traced to the 122 companies. 

“By comparing these scenarios and using pattern scaling, we calculated how much of the observed changes in snowpack, streamflow, and irrigation demand are attributable to climate change and specifically to emissions from the Carbon Majors,” the authors wrote.

Governments seek damages from polluters 

The study is part of a growing body of what’s called attribution science. As scientific consensus has solidified around climate change resulting from atmospheric warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels, emissions of methane, and destruction of forests, scientists are looking more deeply at the impacts of that warming, how to minimize future warming, and the specific sources of the emissions. 

Similar studies have attributed the size of areas burned in intense wildfires, specific measures of sea level rise, and the increased likelihood and intensity of extreme heat events to emissions from the carbon majors. 

Read: Scientists agree: Climate change is real and caused by people

“We have a choice of how much worse climate change is going to get, and that is a function of how much emissions we allow,” Williams said. She said some changes to the planet’s climate system are already irreversible, but we do have a choice to avoid others and the worsening of some that are already baked in.

Many states and cities around the world are taking the biggest climate polluters to court in hopes of getting financial resources to help them address damages from extreme hurricanes, wildfires and floods whose intensification can be linked to climate change. 

Two states – New York and Vermont – have passed climate superfund laws requiring that the biggest historical emitters help pay for climate damages incurred in their states. Many other states, including California, are considering such legislation. New York’s law was recently struck down in court, but the state also plans to appeal the decision. Meanwhile, several states are suing major fossil fuel companies over the damage they allege was wrought by their emissions.

“As climate impacts become increasingly severe, communities will be asking for more action” to help recover from damage and adapt to climate changes, said Carly Phillips, another author of the water study and senior research scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists. 

Communities, states and small countries are bearing an unfair share of the costs of the impacts of emissions, Phillips contended, compared with the companies that ignored the looming crisis for decades and even lobbied Congress against taking action sooner.

 “Given the outsized contribution of certain entities to the problem – 122 companies is a very small number – there should be some accountability,” she said.

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

//

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Twenty years ago, wind, solar and other non-hydro renewables were close to a rounding error. In 2005 they supplied a mere 2.0% of the world’s electricity generation. By 2015 that had risen to 6.8%, and by 2025 it was up to 19.8%. According to the IEA Electricity 2026 outlook, non-hydro renewables will supply around 21.8% of global electricity in 2026, edging past natural gas (21.6%) to become the second-largest source of power after coal.1

That is a remarkable pace of growth from an industry that barely existed two decades ago. But not everyone is impressed; many commenters on social media have responded to these figures by pointing out that despite the growth of renewables, fossil fuel generation continues to grow as well. They aren’t wrong; global coal generation set a record in 2024. Gas generation reached a new high in 2025.

Their point is that clean energy isn’t replacing fossil fuels at all. It’s simply being piled on top of them to feed an ever-growing appetite for electricity, making this an “energy addition” rather than an energy transition. Global fossil electricity generation around 50% higher today than it was in 2005. Coal generation rose by 3,300 TWh and gas by 3,200 TWh. The world burns more coal for power now than it did when wind and solar started taking off.

This argument has been made in the past both by skeptics of growth and by energy systems modelers. The historian Jean-Baptiste Fressoz argues in More and More and More (2024) that “far from the industrial era passing through a series of transformations, each new phase has in practice remained almost wholly entangled with the previous one.” Coal mining created a huge new demand for timber for pit props, while the oil age ran on steel made with coal. Vaclav Smil has made the same point about today’s clean energy boom more bluntly: ”We use more fossil fuels today than at any time in history… Renewables are not replacing fossil fuels; are joining them.”

The question of counterfactuals

The problem with the “addition” argument is that it compares the world today with the world in 2005, rather than with the world as it would have been without clean energy. Electricity demand has not grown because wind turbines and solar panels were built. It has grown because of what the IEA describes as “rising consumption from industry, electric vehicles, air conditioning and data centers”. Demand growth is located overwhelmingly in emerging and developing economies, which accounted for about 80% of global demand growth in 2025 and an average of 95% over the past decade.

Global electricity demand rose by 75% (13,600 TWh) between 2005 and 2025. That demand had to be met by something. Wind and solar supplied 5,400 TWh of new demand, hydro 1,500 TWh, bioenergy and other renewables 530 TWh, nuclear 85 TWh, and fossil fuels the remaining 6,100 TWh. But over the past decade the balance has shifted sharply toward clean energy. Since 2015, wind and solar supplied 57% of demand growth, compared with 29% for fossil fuels. And in 2025, according to Ember’s Global Electricity Review 2026, “wind and solar grew by 841 TWh, meeting 99% of global electricity demand growth”.

A 2024 study by Brantley Liddle found that “intermittent renewables (solar and wind) have unitary displacement effect.” In other words, each unit of wind and solar power displaced about one unit of coal and oil generation. Fossil generation has kept rising in many years because demand has grown faster than clean energy could be added. That is very different from clean energy failing to displace anything.

And electricity demand will continue to rapidly grow, particularly if we succeed in reducing global emissions by electrifying sectors of the economy that currently burn fossil fuels. Most scenarios where we reach net zero emissions involve a doubling or tripling of electricity generation.

So if we want to assess the real world emissions impact of wind and solar buildout over the past 20 years, the right question to ask is not “did fossil use go down?” but rather “how much higher would it have been?”

A world without wind and solar

To answer this, I built a counterfactual for the global power sector in which wind and solar (and geothermal, which is less than 2% of the total) stopped growing in 2005. In every separate country, their generation is held at 2005 levels, while electricity demand, nuclear, hydro and bioenergy follow their real-world paths.2 The missing clean generation has to come from somewhere, and in this counterfactual it comes from fossil fuels.

The key choice is which fossil fuels are used to fill in the gap. A wind farm in China or India displaces coal, while one in Texas or the UK mostly displaces gas. So rather than assuming a single global fossil mix, the analysis fills each country’s gap with that country’s own coal, gas and oil mix in each year, using data for about 200 countries from Ember. This keeps real-world coal-to-gas switching like what occurred during the US shale gas boom in place, rather than crediting it to renewables.3

Without wind and solar growth since 2005, global power-sector CO2 emissions in 2025 would have been 28% higher, at 16.9 billion tonnes rather than 13.2 billion. This adds up to 3.7 billion tonnes avoided in 2025, which is about three-quarters of the total CO2 US emissions that year (or roughly 1.5x EU emissions).

Between 2006 and 2025, wind and solar avoided about 23 billion tonnes of CO2. The biggest assumption I’ve made is what fossil fuel fills in the gap: if every missing kilowatt-hour had come from gas, avoided emissions would be 15 billion tonnes, while if it was all coal it would have been 30 billion.

This lines up almost exactly with Ember’s own estimate. Using a simpler method (and a 2000 baseline rather than 2005 baseline), Ember’s Global Electricity Review 2026 found that “had wind and solar not grown since 2000, fossil generation would have been 30% higher in 2025, and emissions 28% higher.”

While its true that global electricity emissions have yet to clearly peak, it may well be imminent; emissions went down in 2025 and may be on track to decline in 2026 as well, though rapid increases in demand from vehicle electrification and data centers have made this a bit more challenging.4 But there are many countries in which electricity emissions have already peaked and declined substantially, and where clean energy has played a key role in those declines.

Already replacing fossil fuels in some countries

Globally, clean energy has not yet led to fossil fuel use peaking in the electricity sector. In 2025, fossil generation was essentially flat (down ~0.3%). But that global total hides a lot of country-level variability. In many wealthier economies, where demand has grown more slowly, clean energy has driven real emissions reductions (even when accounting for the outsourcing of some industrial production).

Between 2005 and 2025, power-sector CO2 emissions fell by 75% in the UK, 55% in the European Union and 37% in the United States.

The reasons why differ from place to place:

• In the EU, wind and solar account for about 85% of the decline (512 of 601 million tonnes), even though falling nuclear output pushed emissions up by about 100 million tonnes.

• In the UK, the decline had three main drivers: wind and solar (56 million tonnes), lower domestic generation (58 million tonnes, partly because the UK now imports more power), and the near-elimination of coal, which went from 45% of UK fossil generation to effectively zero (36 million tonnes).

• In the US, switching from coal to cheaper natural gas cut emissions by 682 million tonnes, slightly more than wind and solar (606 million tonnes), while a 12% rise in electricity use added 352 million tonnes. Coal’s share of US fossil generation fell from 69% to 29%.

Without wind and solar growth, EU power emissions would have fallen by only about 16% since 2005 rather than 55%, US emissions by about 17% rather than 37%, and UK emissions by about 53% rather than 75%. In these regions clean energy has not just met new demand, its actually pushed fossil generation down.

What about temperatures?

Avoided emissions translate into avoided warming, but the story here has an important twist. Coal plants don’t just emit CO2. They also emit sulfur dioxide, which forms aerosols that reflect sunlight and cool the planet. A world with more coal would also have had more of this aerosol pollution and the cooling it causes, though exactly how much depends on the use of scrubbers, the sulfur content of the coal, and a number of other factors.

To capture the complex dynamics here, I ran the counterfactual emissions (CO2, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, black and organic carbon, and methane leaked from coal mines and gas supply chains) through the FaIR climate model, using a 841 parameter ensemble constrained to match the climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedback values assessed in the IPCC AR6 as well as observed warming.

The CO2 avoided by solar and wind growth between 2005 and 2025 has prevented about 0.01C of warming. Adding the methane that would have leaked from the extra coal mining and gas production, the gross effect is larger still. But the extra sulfur that would have been emitted by fossil fuels in that counterfactual world would have masked most of that for now. Taking everything together, the net avoided warming in 2025 is only about 0.002C (−0.008 to +0.009C).

However, this comparison is a bit apples and oranges. Aerosols wash out of the atmosphere within days to weeks, while CO2 persists for centuries (and the warming from CO2 for millennia). Once the extra aerosols clear, the avoided warming from wind and solar deployment to date settles at about 0.01C by 2035. Cooling from sulfur pollution depends on how much is being emitted in a given year, while the warming from CO2 depends on how much has built up over time. So while a new coal plant (in our counterfactual world) would lead to an immediate spike of cooling sulphate aerosols, that effect would be overtaken by warming from CO2 – which will persist long after the coal plant is closed and the cooling from sulfur emissions is gone. Trading a small, temporary cooling from air pollution for permanent warming is a bad bargain, and it comes with catastrophic public health costs of breathing that pollution.

These warming numbers are modest, but they reflect only 20 years of deployment. Much of it is also very recent: 60% of all the emissions wind and solar avoided came in the last five years. The world has emitted roughly 2,600 billion tonnes of CO2 since 1850, so 23 billion tonnes is just under 1% of that total.

More importantly, the 0.01C is only the effect to-date of what has been built so far, assuming the counterfactual world’s extra emissions stopped at the end of 2025. In reality, the wind and solar fleet will keep running and keep growing. At today’s rate, each additional year of operation avoids roughly 3.7 billion tonnes of CO2, and that rate is rising quickly as deployment accelerates.

Addition and displacement at the same time

Clean energy has been an addition to the global power system, but not in the sense the critique implies. It has been added alongside rapidly growing demand that would have existed anyway, and it has displaced fossil generation that would otherwise have been built and burned. Both things are true at once, which is why fossil use can rise while clean energy is still cutting emissions.

Without the wind and solar built since 2005, the world’s power plants would be emitting 28% more CO2 today. Over the long term, the world would be warmer. The warming avoided so far is small (and partly hidden by the side effects of cleaner air), but it grows with every year that clean energy continue producing power. Many countries have already seen their power sector emissions decline, the world as a whole appears to now be on the cusp of absolute declines in electricity sector emissions.

Methods, code and data for this analysis are available over at my GitHub.

1 The 2026 breakdown here is: 10.3% of global generation from solar, 9.1% from wind, 2.2% from bioenergy, and 0.3% from geothermal. Note that the analysis later in the piece looking at what would have happened without clean energy growth excludes bioenergy from its analysis, given the complexity of emissions accounting there.

2 There is a mechanism by which clean energy could in principle add to demand: if cheap wind and solar lower electricity prices, people and firms may use more power. That rebound effect is real, but it would need to be enormous to account for demand growth on the scale seen, and lower cost power can also enable emissions reductions through increased electrification (heat pumps, EVs, etc.). Accounting for a rebound would at most modestly reduce the avoided emissions we estimate.

3 Additional methodological details: Europe is treated as a single interconnected grid, so that Scandinavian wind displaces German and Polish coal and gas rather than fossil plants Sweden doesn’t have. Plants can’t run above realistic capacity factors; where existing plants would be maxed out, the model builds new ones in the fuel each country has been adding. Emissions are calculated from combustion emission factors that vary by country and year, drawn from CEDS, the US EIA and Chinese official statistics, and are net of the emissions from manufacturing the wind turbines and solar panels themselves.

4 Not all electricity demand increases are a bad thing from an emissions standpoint. Vehicle electrification is driving more demand growth than data centers globally, and that demand is coming at the direct expense of oil consumption (and associated emissions).

Recent months have reinforced the case for accelerating action on the energy transition and climate, particularly from a European perspective.

Let’s list the reasons why:

• this summer has been like no other in Europe, with five major heatwaves across the continent and provisional data from the UK Met Office showing temperatures in London approximately 4°C above the long-term baseline average (1991-2020);
• internationally, 2026 has been marked by a series of extreme weather events, from the tragic landslide in Nepal caused by a melting glacier to a deadly winter storm bringing widespread fatalities across North America;
• all this against the backdrop of a super El Niño likely to generate even more extreme weather across the globe in the coming months;
• growing recognition, reflected in UK Energy Security and Net Zero Secretary of State Miatta Fahnbulleh’s warning that the war in Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz have shown how exposure to global fossil fuel markets raises energy costs;
• the war has also led to an explosion in electric vehicle sales, particularly in Asia. Across the first half of 2026, electric car sales in Europe grew around 35-40% compared with the same period in 2025; in the UK it’s up about 25% over the same period;
• according to WindEurope, Europe installed 8.8GW in the first half of 2026, a 30% increase on H1 2025. Renewables provided 53.1% of electricity generated by the UK’s Major Power Producers between March and May, with renewable generation up 22% year on year.;
• a breakthrough on the costs of energy storage, with global benchmark costs for four-hour battery storage projects falling by 27% year-on-year in 2025.

On the face of it, the case for accelerating the transition has never been stronger. But despite this, the state of multilateral action on climate change can probably be summed up by the collective shrug in response to the Climate Summit convened by the outgoing UN Secretary-General in New York on 23 September. In his final UNGA week, Antonio Guterres again argued that fossil fuel expansion “defies science, economics and common sense”. In language reflecting an increasing sense of alarm and urgency, he talked about this being the last generation “who can avert climate catastrophe”.

The weakened state of climate multilateralism is often attributed to a geopolitical environment in which political consensus has fractured and climate science is more openly challenged. This is evident not only in North America but in several European countries. But are there still opportunities this autumn for the pendulum to swing back towards concerted policy action that reflects the favourable platform that science, technology and economics are providing?

All roads on climate tend to lead to the COP, which this year will meet in Antalya, Turkey, from 9-20 November. COP31 will feature an unusual co-hosting arrangement between Turkey and Australia, alongside a pre-COP meeting hosted by Fiji and Tuvalu from 5-8 October. Crucially, the Pacific gathering will give small island states a platform to highlight the existential threat posed by climate change.

As for COP31 itself, the co-hosts face the challenge of providing a central focus for a COP where no single major negotiated decision is expected and which is being described as an “implementation COP”. But two key themes are emerging:

• a “35 by 35” global electrification target, designed to accelerate the transition by increasing the share of global final energy demand met by electricity to 35% by 2035, up from the present 20%;
• ecosystem resilience, and the impact of severe climate shocks on food and water systems.

Serious discussion of both issues will be welcome. Yet many increasingly view the COP process, and the wider UN system, as unable to move beyond being a talking shop. Which is why, perhaps even more than is usual at a COP, some of the more consequential action in Antalya may take place in the margins outside the formal negotiations.

This would be consistent with the most significant outcomes from COP30 in Belém, with the emergence of two separate “coalitions of the willing” to work on international roadmaps: to transition away from fossil fuels (TAFF); and to halt and reverse global deforestation.

This TAFF initiative in particular will be put to the test of COP politics, even if it’s not on the formal agenda. Twelve months on from its birth in Belém, and seven months since the coalition of nearly 60 countries met in Santa Marta, Colombia, to kickstart work on a global TAFF process, there will be pressure to start turning high-level ambitions into concrete plans. This will mean attention on the Netherlands, which co-hosted Santa Marta with a Colombian government that has since been replaced by a new administration not committed to the initiative, and Ireland and Tuvalu, which will host a “Santa Marta 2.0” in the Pacific next July. These governments will want to show whether their initiative can work alongside the COP process and even restore some faith in the value of international cooperation to tackle global challenges. Other members of the coalition may also face questions about whether their domestic policies match their claims to international leadership: from the UK Government, which will also take on the G20 presidency in 2027, to Canadian and Australia governments, where fossil fuel production policy is moving in a different direction.

Looking beyond COP31, there are still grounds for optimism, whether through existing institutions or coalitions such as TAFF. The possibility, if recent reports are to be believed, that China could host COP33 in 2029 could be a game-changer, another Paris moment for the UNFCCC and multilateralism to demonstrate that it can deliver more than rhetoric. But back in the present, the science is making clear that delaying meaningful action, even now, will only do further harm. As the Belém Declaration on a TAFF spelled out nearly 12 months ago, action needs to be accelerated.

As progressives gather in Antalya, they may therefore do well to keep two overarching priorities at top of mind.

First, revisit the Belém Declaration as a constant reminder that limiting global temperature rises requires a “shared determination to work collectively towards a just, orderly and equitable transition away from fossil fuels”. This work will require, as the Declaration detailed, a focus on economic diversification, reducing structural dependence on fossil fuel revenues and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. Progressive policymakers will also need to consider how to support a step-change in finance for the Global South, given the vulnerability of many emerging and developing economies to both the transition and the physical impacts of climate change. The work that has begun since the Santa Marta conference – both in the Santa Marta workplan and the separate but closely linked Brazilian COP Presidency TAFF exercise – will give policymakers the tools to start implementing TAFF in practice. That collective effort can begin in the discussions in and around COP31, even if not yet in the formal negotiations.

Second, one of the most positive developments this year has been the reframing of climate around energy security, risk and resilience. The statement by the UK Prime Minister at the same UNGA week where the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit yielded little tangible progress, that “the climate crisis is now a national security threat for countries around the world”, is a sign of an evolving narrative. As is this line from the recent Green Central Banking newsletter: “maybe resilience, for lack of a better word, is a new, pragmatic way to ensure climate action and collaboration still take place in an ever more geopolitically fragmented world.”

COP delegates will also be mindful that they are convening just after the US mid-terms on 3 November.

Many of the underlying conditions (economic, technological and scientific) are in place for governments to make this autumn one of significant progress on climate ambition. The case for framing the transition around economic opportunity and 21st-century energy security is clear. Policymakers may remain cautious in the current geopolitical environment; but this is time to seize the moment.

The post Can a Sweltering Summer Create an Autumn of Opportunity for the Transition? appeared first on Carbon Tracker Initiative.

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections

A crisis is brewing for the U.S. electricity grid – one that could make your electric bill skyrocket and thwart efforts to address climate change.

To understand the problem, think of transmission lines – the poles and wires that transport electricity from power plants to homes and businesses – as an interstate highway system for electrons. Like too many cars on the road, too many electrons traveling across power lines can cause traffic jams.

These sorts of jams haven’t been a problem until just recently, as power-hungry data centers proliferate and demand from electric vehicles, heat pumps, and air conditioning grows.

As a result, Americans’ electricity rates, which already spiked by more than one-third over the past five years, are poised to keep rising.

Read: Home electricity bills are skyrocketing. For data centers, not so much.

What’s more, when rising demand meets inadequate grid capacity, that slows efforts to address climate pollution. When new clean power sources are stymied by too much traffic on power lines, existing fossil fuel power plants are forced to remain in service and burn gas and coal more often. And when data centers are unable to connect to the grid, they often build dirty on-site natural gas power generation instead.

Adding more transmission lines to the grid would ease congestion, but on average, permitting and building a new transmission line in the U.S. takes a decade. Some big multistate transmission lines have taken over three decades to complete. And the Trump administration recently axed Congress’ attempts to accelerate the process.

A bipartisan group of senators just released a bill that would reform permitting for transmission lines and other large projects, speeding up the process for constructing new lines. But time is running short in this session of Congress, and the stakes of inaction are high.

"Failing to pass permitting reforms would have real consequences for all of us,” said Zach Zimmerman, director of research and policy for Grid Strategies, a power sector consulting firm, in an email. “Every year that major transmission projects are delayed means higher system costs and less ability to move power where it is needed during extreme weather. Without reform, we will continue to pay more for the grid.”

The U.S. has struggled to modernize its grid

The demand for electrons on the U.S. power grid remained relatively flat for decades, increasing by a mere 5% between 2005 and 2023.

Now that’s changed: Analysts at the consulting firm ICF forecast that U.S. residential electricity rates could rise another 15% to 40% over the next five years and double by 2050, with power grid traffic jams being a root problem.

U.S. electricity demand from 2000 to 2025 (blue) in terawatt-hours (TWh) and the range of forecasts (green) by various groups. (Image credit: created by Dana Nuccitelli with data from Ember, Princeton REPEAT, American Clean Power, Bank of America Institute, Enverus Intelligence Research, and McKinsey & Company)

In 2024, the Department of Energy concluded that the U.S. would need between a doubling and quadrupling of its transmission capacity by 2050 in order to affordably meet growing power demand and maintain grid reliability.

To create that capacity would require a build-out of roughly 5,000 miles per year of high-capacity regional transmission, plus additional miles of interregional transmission, according to Grid Strategies. But it took the U.S. nine years, from 2017 through 2025, to build the last 5,000 miles of transmission lines, Grid Strategies estimated.

The only recent year that came close to the 5,000-mile target was 2013, when Texas built close to 3,000 miles of transmission lines. That was the result of a 2005 Texas state law that encouraged building transmission lines in areas with high potential for wind power, known as “competitive renewable energy zones.”

U.S. transmission build-out has since stagnated, averaging just 600 new miles per year since 2017.

Read: How blue California and red Texas became green powerhouses

Miles of new high-voltage transmission lines built in the U.S. per year between 2010 and 2025, compared to the Grid Strategies estimated need of 5,000 new miles per year. (Image credit: Created by Dana Nuccitelli with data from Grid Strategies and Americans for a Clean Energy Grid)

For comparison, China has been building over 1,000 miles of ultrahigh voltage power lines per year. Ultrahigh voltage transmission lines are like the high-speed rail of transmission. They can carry more electrons more efficiently than America’s high-voltage transmission lines.

Congress has failed to speed up transmission line permitting

Like Texas, Congress passed a law in 2005 in an effort to spur more transmission lines, but with far less success.

One challenge transmission projects face is obtaining permits in every state and local jurisdiction along their proposed path. That can be an onerous and time-consuming process with many potential veto points. In contrast, Congress in the 1938 Natural Gas Act gave the entity now known as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the authority to act as a one-stop shop for interstate natural gas pipeline permits.

Lawmakers tried to establish a similar process for interstate transmission lines in the 2005 Energy Policy Act. That law instructed the Department of Energy to establish “National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors.” These are areas where it would be in the nation's interest to build electrical transmission lines relatively quickly, for example, to relieve traffic jams on the grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission would then have the authority to permit transmission lines along these corridors in consultation with states.

But for over 15 years, the Department of Energy was unable to designate any such corridors due to a series of court decisions in favor of states, landowners, and environmental groups, ruling that the bill’s language was insufficiently clear. Congress subsequently tried to clarify its intent in the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.

And that effort seemed to succeed. In December 2024, the Department of Energy finally advanced three proposed National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors in the areas identified as having the greatest need for additional transmission capacity.

The Department of Energy’s “rough approximation for illustrative purposes” of its three retained proposed National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors in December 2024. (Image credit: U.S. Department of Energy)

But in August 2026, Trump’s Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced that he was canceling these three proposed corridors. Despite acknowledging the importance of building new transmission lines, Wright characterized these proposals as part of “a climate-alarmist agenda” intended by the Biden administration “to advance their Green New Scam agenda and accelerate decarbonization.”

What’s next?

Zimmerman of Grid Strategies identified several measures that could speed up domestic transmission permitting and development.

For example, Congress could allow important transmission projects to move directly to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for permitting, rather than waiting for the Department of Energy to first define national interest corridors. That would also depoliticize the process, because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission operates more independently from the White House than the Department of Energy.

Zimmerman also pointed to a 2024 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rule called Order 1920. That rule, among other things, requires utilities and regional grid operators to consider the next 20 years of power demand forecasts in their transmission planning rather than simply considering short-term needs.

There’s also “a need for Congress to improve permitting for large-scale transmission and address interregional transmission. And establishing a transmission investment tax credit would be helpful,” Zimmerman said by email.

In order to avoid prolonged fights over who pays for how much of a proposed transmission line, Congress could also establish a formula for fairly allocating its costs among the beneficiaries and define the types of benefits that should be included in that cost allocation.

Congress narrowly failed to pass the Energy Permitting Reform Act in 2024, which would have implemented many of Zimmerman’s recommendations. An analysis by energy systems experts at the nonpartisan think tank RMI estimated that the transmission permitting reform provisions in that bill could have allowed enough clean energy to connect to the U.S. grid to reduce the country’s climate pollution by billions of tons.

This week, a group of senators introduced the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, which also includes many of Zimmerman’s recommendations. A preliminary analysis of some of the transmission provisions in the bill from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions estimated that they would cut climate pollution by billions of tons in the next 15 years while reducing Americans’ electricity bills by $19 billion and lessening the risks of widespread power outages.

“This analysis shows that practical reforms to transmission planning and interconnection processes can unlock more clean energy, reduce our reliance on natural gas, lower costs for consumers, and help build a cleaner, more reliable electric grid,” said Nat Keohane, president of the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. “These benefits are within reach if we move quickly to modernize the systems that power our nation.”

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

//

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 27, 2026 thru Sat, October 3, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (7 items)

• Midterm Battleground State Poll: Political Priorities & Opinions on the Clean Energy Transition The data relating to “climate hushing” is particularly revealing, showing that — by large margins — battleground state voters (a) want politicians to spend more time talking about climate change (not less), and (b) are more likely to vote for candidates who make transitioning away from fossil fuels a top priority if elected. Environmental Voter Project, EVP staff, Sep 22, 2026.
• Gavin Newsom condemns Democrats` `climate hushing`, predicts Trump`s downfall and expects AOC to run in 2028 Energy modernization means more affordable energy and politicians should not be afraid to say it. The Guardian, Mark Hertsgaard, Sep 24, 2026.
• Fed up with Brazil’s politicians not listening, a climate scientist runs for office Luciana Gatti, who studies carbon uptake in the Amazon, aims to join Brazil’s lower house in this weekend’s elections Science, Daniel Grossman, Sep 28, 2026.
• Alito`s Recusal From Climate Case: Too Little, Too Late? The justice’s participation in the Boulder case already may have been pivotal, and his continued stock holdings—including in fossil fuels—keep an ethics cloud over the Supreme Court. Inside Climate News, Marianne Lavelle, Sep 29, 2026.
• AI Was Supposed to Cut Emissions. Instead, Fossil Fuel Companies Are Using It to Find More Oil and Gas. A new study found AI-driven fossil fuel productivity could increase emissions. Here are examples of companies already using AI to boost production. Desmog, Sarah Hofmann, Sep 30, 2026.
• A Climate Change Rebrand More politicians have stopped talking about the climate, but love of money and risky geopolitics leave the 'green transition' still moving forward. NYT, Katrin Bennhold, Oct 01, 2026.
• Texas can`t hide from climate change by stopping students from learning about it Climate change will shape the future of Texas. Students should be allowed to learn about it. The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Oct 02, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (7 items)

• `Concerning` low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals. Carbon Brief, Ayesha Tandon, Sep 25, 2026.
• Who is responsible for limiting global warming to 1.5°? Climate mitigation as systems integration: researcher models and quantifies Interlocking systemic changes spanning government, industry and households necessary for adhering to a 1.5°C warming limit. Phys.org, Irene Ketting, Sep 27, 2026.
• Godzilla El Niño is about to hit the Arctic. How bad will it be? Part 1 of a 2-part collaboration between Dave Borlace ("Just have a Think") and Ella Gilbert (Dr Gilbz) about possible connections between the Super El Nino and Artic sea ice in the northern and Antarctica in the southern hemisphere. "Just have a Think" on Youtube, Dave Borlace, Sep 27, 2026.
• “Godzilla” El Niño = crashing Antarctic sea ice? Part 2 of a 2-part collaboration between Dave Borlace ("Just have a Think") and Ella Gilbert (Dr Gilbz) about possible connections between the Super El Nino and Artic sea ice in the northern and Antarctica in the southern hemisphere. Dr Gilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, Sep 27, 2026.
• The impacts of this year`s record-shattering El Niño El Niño will drive severe drought from Indonesia to the Southern Africa and northern South America, with wetter winters from the US Gulf Coast to Southern South America. The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Sep 28, 2026.
• Planetary Health Check 2026 The 2026 Planetary Health Check identifies 7 of 9 planetary boundaries as exceeded and includes a special focus on carbon sinks. Planetary Health Check, Carlos Nobre et al. , Sep 29, 2026.
• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #40 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly survey of academic, government and NGO climate research. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Oct 01, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (7 items)

• Explainer: How sea level rise poses an `existential threat` to humans, heritage and nature Here, Carbon Brief unpacks some of the key ways that sea level rise threatens both societies and ecosystems. Carbon Brief, Giuliana Viglione, Sep 22, 2026.
• Sea level rise is reshaping a California beach town and threatening a key rail line “The constant pressure is sea level rise,” said Sean Vitousek, research oceanographer with the U.S. Geological Survey. “It is going to keep rising, and rising, and the beaches will retreat landward.” AP News, Amy Taxin, Sep 27, 2026.
• Antarctica`s ice loss is locked in, and extra snowfall won`t save it - that`s bad news for low-lying coastal areas elsewhere The Conversation, Yucheng Lin, Robert Kopp, Sep 30, 2026.
• Past emissions will continue warming the planet for decades New research shows that past emissions from oil, gas, coal, and cement will continue to affect the environment and increase the odds of extreme weather for decades. Futurity, U. Washington, Sep 30, 2026.
• Swiss glaciers suffer another year of record ice loss Switzerland's glaciers lost more than 5% of their ice in 2026, marking another year of rapid decline. NPR, Imogen Foulkes, Sep 30, 2026.
• Gas from thawing Arctic permafrost is changing world's climate future Two recent studies project that by the end of this century, methane in permafrost liberated by warming due to burning of fossil fuels will add a quarter degree Celsius of warmth to Earth's atmosphere. AP News, Seth Borenstein, Oct 02, 2026.
• Europe`s Extreme Summer Triggered Cascading Climate Shocks A summer of record heat, severe drought and compounding impacts tested Europe's infrastructure and resilience. Inside Climate News, Bob Berwyn, Oct 02, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (4 items)

• Scrutinizing the Achievement of Climate Targets, Part I: The Widening Reach of Implementation Litigation Columbia University's Sabin Center for Climate Change Law does a deep dive into the role of judiciaries and courts in forcing governments to actually do as they say they will to deal with climate change mitigations. Climate Law Blog, Joe Udell and Filippo Fantozzi, Sep 28, 2026.
• Inside the anti-climate campaign against researchers A POLITICO investigation reveals more than 100 open records requests demanding documents from climate scientists nationwide. Politico, Chelsea Harvey, Lesley Clark and Corbin Hiar, Sep 29, 2026.
• States want to make Big Oil pay for climate harm. Now, courts are weighing in. New York’s "climate superfund” law has suffered two losses in court, while a U.S. Supreme Court case next week could determine the fate of similar efforts nationwide. Grist, Joseph Winters, Sep 30, 2026.
• The surprising allies backing Boulder`s climate case before the Supreme Court Ranchers, conservative legal scholars, and former Republican EPA chiefs are siding against oil companies. Here's why. Grist, Kate Yoder, Oct 01, 2026.

International Climate Conferences and Agreements (1 item)

• `We want action`: Fijian climate activist sends message ahead of UN talks in Pacific Lavenia Naivalu has seen the impact of the climate crisis first-hand and is determined to amplify Pacific voices at this year’s pre-Cop summit in Fiji The Guardian, Sera Sefeti, Oct 02, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 item)

• Australia`s climate chief promises harder line on misinformation Senior public servant says bureaucrats will speak up about misinformation that risks policy progress. Politico, Miriam Webber, Oct 01, 2026.

Miscellaneous (1 item)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #39 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 20, 2026 thru Sat, September 26, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Sep 27, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Open access notables

Centuries of global heating from Carbon Majors: Dependence on future emissions pathways, Frierson & Henrie, PLOS Climate

We perform simulations that attribute the amount of global warming due to corporations, governments and other entities into the future. We utilize the Finite Amplitude Impulse Response (FaIR) model run until 2500, and the Carbon Majors dataset, a database with the emissions history associated with the top 178 oil, gas, coal, and cement producers. We perform counterfactual experiments to calculate the warming attributable to the emissions associated with these entities, using several different future emissions scenarios. The future atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) anomaly attributable to a company’s past emissions is smaller with less ensemble spread in a lower emissions future than it is in a high emissions future. This is due to smaller carbon cycle feedbacks with lower emissions. However, the temperature change from past emissions is larger in a lower emissions future, even with the smaller change in CO2. This is due primarily to the logarithmic sensitivity of CO2 radiative forcing to concentration. Methane concentration post-2080 experiences a negative anomaly, due to a decrease in methane lifetime from elevated temperature, which is a small negative feedback. For any future emissions scenario, the historical emissions from oil, gas, coal, and cement producers affect many aspects of the climate system, including CO2 in the atmosphere and other parts of the carbon cycle, methane, ozone, and stratospheric water vapor. The total radiative forcing induced by these elements stays positive throughout all simulations, which in turn causes positive temperature perturbations. Thus in addition to the damages that have already occurred, we expect the Carbon Majors to be responsible for calculable climate damages for many centuries into the future.

Global Emissions Since the Paris Agreement Have Intensified Europe's Recent Heatwaves, Trok et al., Geophysical Research Letters

Understanding the consequences of continued greenhouse-gas emissions requires determining whether recent emissions can be robustly linked to changes in extreme weather events. However, current approaches have a limited ability to quantify changes in extreme weather caused by small subsets of anthropogenic emissions, particularly for individual events. To address these limitations, we train a generative machine-learning model to predict spatially-explicit changes in daily surface temperature at different levels of cumulative emissions, conditional on the event's observed meteorological conditions. Using this approach, we find strong evidence (>95% probability) that the combined effects of anthropogenic emissions released since the 2015 UN Paris Agreement have increased the intensity of Europe's summer temperature extremes since 2021. Additionally, our results suggest >99% probability that regional-mean temperature during Europe's high-impact June 2025 heatwave would have been lower (median estimate of 0.34°C) if the same large-scale meteorological conditions had occurred under 2015 levels of cumulative emissions.

Permafrost-Thaw Driven Acid-Rock Drainage Threatens Arctic Aquatic Ecosystems, Skierszkan, AGU Advances

A new study in this issue of AGU Advances (Evinger et al., 2026) documents abrupt onset of acid-rock drainage from thawing permafrost in Alaska's Brooks Range. Similar findings emerged from a publication in Science earlier this year (Skierszkan et al., 2026a, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aea2898). This Viewpoint provides a broader regional context of the phenomenon, highlighting widespread acid-rock drainage within northwestern North America's permafrost zone. Acid-rock drainage is accelerating release of metals and acidity at toxic concentrations in thousands of seepages in regions undergoing permafrost thaw. As such, it may be of the most consequential recently recognized environmental hazards caused by cryosphere loss. This widespread outcome of global warming presents a major risk to water resources and aquatic ecosystems.

Abrupt Onset and Persistent Downstream Effects of Acid Rock Drainage on Rivers Across Northwest Arctic Alaska, Evinger et al., AGU Advances 

Warming in the Arctic is accelerating permafrost thaw, leading to changes in the water quality of streams and rivers that provide important ecosystem services to rural communities. In Arctic Alaska, a growing concern is the increasing number of rivers affected by natural acid rock drainage, a process that occurs when certain minerals are exposed to air and water, releasing acid, sulfate, and a mixture of major and trace metals. Here, we examined the effects of acid rock drainage on river chemistry across six watersheds in Alaska's Brooks Range. Acid rock drainage inputs were extremely acidic, with concentrations of nickel, zinc, and cadmium similar to those observed in mine-impacted rivers outside the region. Acidic, metal-rich inputs to rivers raised metal levels downstream by up to 70 times, with the potential for long range transport (>100 km). We used long-term water quality records to constrain the timing of onset to 2019–2020, which coincided with warm, snowy conditions of the preceding winters. Collectively, our findings document the recent and abrupt onset of acid rock drainage that releases toxic metals to Arctic rivers, with implications for wildlife and humans.

Understanding the Gateway: Unpacking the Mechanisms, Boundaries, and Outcomes of Climate Consensus Messaging, Göbel et al., Journal of Environmental Psycholog

Communicating the scientific consensus on climate change acts as a gateway to increasing climate beliefs, a process described by the Gateway Belief Model (GBM). Although the effectiveness of this approach is well-documented, critical gaps in the literature persist. Few studies have scrutinized the risks of low-consensus messages and their correctability, the potential for consensus messaging to have an impact beyond self-reported measures, or the cognitive mechanisms driving belief updates. This study addresses these three critical areas in a German sample (N = 941). First, we demonstrate the powerful adverse effect of a low-consensus message on the perceived scientific consensus (PSC) and show that this effect can be corrected through subsequent accurate messaging. Second, we introduce learning as a novel cognitive outcome, finding that high-consensus messaging can act as a gateway to knowledge acquisition. Third, we explore initial confidence as a key psychological moderator, revealing that it influences belief updating under certain conditions.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Planetary Health Check 2026, Caesar et al., Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

The Planetary Health Check (PHC) provides an annual assessment of the state of the Planet. It is structured around the Planetary Boundaries: the nine critical processes that regulate stability, resilience, and the conditions that support life on Earth. For each boundary, one or two indicators, known as control variables, are used to assess its status. These show whether conditions remain within the Safe Operating Space – the range in which the risk of destabilizing the Planet remains low. Beyond a boundary lies the Zone of Increasing Risk, followed by the High-Risk Zone, where the risk of large-scale and potentially irreversible changes becomes high. The 2026 Planetary Health Check finds that seven of the nine Planetary Boundaries are transgressed, and trends for all seven continue to point in the wrong direction, indicating further deterioration in the conditions that support long-term planetary stability.

The Billion Dollar Deal: How the Fossil Fuel Industry Bought the Trump Administration, Cashed In, and Left Americans to Pay the Price, Senate Democrats Anti-Corruption Initiative, Senate Environment & Public Works Committee

The authors trace the massive fossil fuel and polluting industry donations to President Trump and Republican campaigns during the 2024 election cycle and demonstrates how the industries unlocked power over executive branch agencies in the form of personnel and policy decisions. Senate Democratic investigators found over the course of 19 investigations into Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory rollbacks, 13 investigations into nine other agencies, and another 13 investigations into 88 separate polluters, backed by original analyses of campaign finance filings, corporate earnings, and investor communications. The near-total refusal of the Trump Administration—and the fossil fuel administration that runs it—to cooperate with legitimate Congressional oversight complicated the investigations, but truth has a way of finding the light, and some corruption casts a shadow too unmistakable to conceal. 134 articles in 64 journals by 882 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

AMOC Discrepancies across Reanalyses and Models Limit Dynamical Understanding, Raganato et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0618.1

Contrasting aerosol–cloud feedbacks across a warming Arctic, Chua et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02114-x

Exploring the Genesis and Climatic Drivers of Marine Heatwaves in the Indonesian Maritime Continent: Insights from South Java and Karimata Strait, Iskandar et al., Dynamics of Atmospheres and Oceans 10.1016/j.dynatmoce.2026.101709

Iceberg Freshwater Transport Alleviates Future Weakening of Antarctic Bottom Water Formation, Shi & Li, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20710821

Reassessing the Role of the Antarctic Slope Current in Poleward Ocean Heat Transport, Aguiar et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023934

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A climate change signal in the tropical Pacific emerges from decadal variability, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52731-6 20 cites.

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Observations of climate change, effects

A country-level storyline attribution of global warming on heat-related extremes in South America, León-FonFay et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100961

Climatic and Hydrological Changes Drive Contemporary Fire Regime Transitions in the World's Largest Wetland, Barros-Rosa et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71089

Decreasing Translation Speed of Rapid Expansion Tropical Cyclones Over the Western North Pacific, Li & Tang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125625

Earlier and faster heatwave onset on land under a warming climate, Xu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02762-2

Long-term temperature, oxygen and water clarity trends in Swiss lakes, Bärenbold et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6527-2026

Nighttime warming dominates the thermal evolution of lakes across China, Chen et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78114-7

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
South America is becoming warmer, drier, and more flammable, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01654-7 75 cites.

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Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A 30-year synthetic climatological normal dataset for Ghana generated using the CDSim framework, Osei et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1798088

Capability of Planet Dove for monitoring the world's coastlines, Cavanaugh et al., Remote Sensing of Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115630

GloSVeT: a global 0.05° monthly mean surface soil and vegetation component temperature dataset (2003–2023), Liu et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6885-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Accuracy of daily extreme air temperatures under natural variations in thermometer screen ventilation, Atmospheric Science Letters, 10.1002/asl.1256 7 cites.

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Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Assessing Taiwan's Future Climate: High Resolution Projections and Regional Impacts From Statistical Downscaling of CMIP6 Data, Chen et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70431

Centuries of global heating from Carbon Majors: Dependence on future emissions pathways, Frierson & Henrie, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001036

Changing Antecedent Land-Surface Conditions Can Amplify Future Heat Extremes Across New Zealand, Debsharma et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124647

Climate change is projected to widen global inequalities in ocean-derived wellbeing, Zhang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04070-1

Global Emissions Since the Paris Agreement Have Intensified Europe's Recent Heatwaves, Trok et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl125079

Mediterranean cyclones from pre-industrial to future climate: changes in extreme wind, precipitation and compound precipitation–wind events, Doensen et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/wcd-7-1899-2026

One History, Many Futures: Exploring Climate-Driven Changes in Estuarine Water Temperature and Salinity (Sado Estuary Case Study), Biguino et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007408

Projected Future Changes of Australian Boundary Currents—Insights From Dynamical Downscaling Simulations, Jin et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024251

Reduced Asian monsoon influence on Mediterranean summers in a warmer climate, Yu et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02091-1

Volcanic Aerosol Forcing Suppresses Tropical African Rainfall: Mechanisms and Modulation by a Warmer Climate, Yu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046721

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Arctic Amplification of marine heatwaves under global warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52760-1 25 cites.

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Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Atmospheric nudging in weather and climate modeling: Bias reduction, mechanism isolation, and attribution, Orbe et al., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 10.1002/qj.70300

CMIP6 data usage: lessons learned from more than 200 million downloads, Lavoie et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-8977-2026

Fifteen years of regional climate downscaling in CORDEX-Australasia, Evans et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001066

Impact of Model Resolution on Antarctic Bottom Water Representation in Coupled Climate Models, Shu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023640

Simulation of Coastal El Niño Events in CMIP6 Models and Its Relationship to Mean-State and ENSO Biases, Tello & Karamperidou, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl120974

Systematic Overestimation of Global Peak Runoff Synchronization in CMIP6 Models, Yang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122766

The NASA-GISS ModelE2.1-CC2 ESM: development and evaluation, Romanou et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-9131-2026

The North American CORDEX-CMIP6 WRF evaluation run: comparing historical simulations from 25 km to convection-permitting scales, Stuivenvolt-Allen et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-8995-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
AI-empowered next-generation multiscale climate modelling for mitigation and adaptation, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01527-w 88 cites.

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Cryosphere & climate change

A comprehensive rock glacier inventory for the Peruvian Andes (PRoGI): dataset, characterization and topoclimatic attributes, Medina et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-345-2026

Dynamic thinning and grounding line retreat in Porpoise Bay, Wilkes Land, East Antarctica, Weatherley et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5509-2026

Impact of climate forcing time step in an ice-sheet firn model, Aker et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5475-2026

Listening to Tsunami Waves Induced by Glacier Calving, G?owacki et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125399

Permafrost Detachment Slides: A Distinct High-Magnitude Permafrost Mass Wasting Process, Young et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124103

Permafrost-Thaw Driven Acid-Rock Drainage Threatens Arctic Aquatic Ecosystems, Skierszkan, AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002822

Sea level & climate change

North Atlantic sea level budget revisited, Song et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-2903-2026

Warming and Sea-Level Rise Transform Intertidal Sediment Thermal Dynamics, Liu et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008924

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Coupled increases in pelagic fish productivity and export productivity during the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, Zhou et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77863-9

Dead Sea Warming and the Origin of Salt Giants, Guillerm et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124167

Palaeocene climate warming as a catalyst for wildfire intensification, Theurer et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-72676-8

Reconstructing Climate From Coral Skeletal Banding: Statistical Effects of Replicating Cores and Observers, Hedger et al., Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026pa005546

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Abrupt Onset and Persistent Downstream Effects of Acid Rock Drainage on Rivers Across Northwest Arctic Alaska, Evinger et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002407

Abrupt pH changes overestimate the responses of Chaetoceros muelleri to ocean acidification, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77753-0

Changes in Potential Suitable Habitats, Species Turnover, and Conservation Gaps of Wild Plants in the Tarim Basin, China, Chen et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74393

Climate Change Impacts on the Distribution Patterns and Habitat Suitability of the Oriental Stork (Ciconia boyciana) in China: Implications for the “30 × 30” Conservation Targets, Chen et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.74424

Climate mitigation contributes more to population persistence than evolutionary adaptation in a long-lived seabird, Jenouvrier et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2620362123

Climate-Driven Hydraulic Traits Shift in Natural and Planted Forests: Patterns, Drivers, and Future Acclimation, Bai et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef006678

Climate-Driven Shifts in Flowering Phenology of Wild Tropical Plants Uncovered by Century-Long Herbarium and Photographic Records, Xue et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71130

Complete Chloroplast Genomes of Five Ulmus pumila Cultivars: Comparative Analysis, Evolutionary Dynamics, and Germplasm Authentication Implications, Wang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74352

Economic incentives for conifers may limit broadleaf expansion in climate-adaptive European forests, Djahangard et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04087-6

Natural disturbances from bark beetle outbreaks and windthrow increasingly affect Europe's most mature and carbon-rich forests, Besnard et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5983-2026

Ocean dynamics amplify remote warming effects of reforestation, Banville et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1315-2026

Ocean warming and acidification reveal transcriptional plasticity in the gastropod Hexaplex trunculus, Sarropoulou et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108426

Permafrost-Thaw Driven Acid-Rock Drainage Threatens Arctic Aquatic Ecosystems, Skierszkan, AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002822

Projecting Impacts of Marine Heatwaves and Their Effects on Long-Term Changes in Marine Ecosystems Over the 21st Century, Luzinais et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71123

The Future of Native Bees in Australia Under Environmental and Anthropogenic Change, Howard & Prendergast, Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74363

Unprecedented Warming and Increased Herbivory Drive Collapse of Japan's Kelp Forests, Harvey et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71106

We Are Dying to Eat You: Cannibalism and Disease Transmission Under Global Climate Change, Rougeau & Elderd, Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74403

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change and deer in boreal and temperate regions: From physiology to population dynamics and species distributions, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17505 26 cites.

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GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A 7-Year Eddy Covariance Dataset of the Energy, Water Vapour and Carbon Dioxide Fluxes Observed in a Siberian Dwarf Pine Ecosystem, Iwata et al., Geoscience Data Journal Open Access pdf 10.1002/gdj3.70101

A Global Database of Soil Methane uptake (SMUD), Jiang et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6783-2026

An assessment of a CO2 transport model simulations using surface, aircraft and satellite data (2015–2021), Das et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2025.121754

Assessment of CO2 storage potential in global marine sediments based on machine learning methods, Zhang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2025.105210

C-PEAT's Global Peatland Carbon Database (v.2025), Loisel et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6485-2026

Examining challenges and uncertainties associated with using water table management to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from grassland peat soils, Pierce et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104495

Global carbon dioxide flux into the surface ocean intensified by rain-induced dilution, Witte et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02112-z

Global dispersal of macroalgae-derived recalcitrant DOC may substantially contribute to deep-ocean carbon storage, Feng et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeg3815

Methane emissions from penguin colonies reshape the natural greenhouse gas budget, Román et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01556-9

Methane oxidation in African lakes increases with phytoplankton and outweighs photosynthesis-driven oxic methane production, Borges et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-78255-9

Minimal impact of recent decline in C4 vegetation abundance on atmospheric carbon isotopic composition, Lavergne et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03102-6

Natural disturbances from bark beetle outbreaks and windthrow increasingly affect Europe's most mature and carbon-rich forests, Besnard et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5983-2026

Natural methane emissions feedbacks in MAGICC v. 7.6, Sloughter et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-9063-2026

Optimized wetland rewetting strategies can control methane, carbon dioxide, and oxygen responses to water table fluctuations, Zhao et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03163-7

Pelagic sea cucumbers in the Galapagos: Midwater grazers that short-circuit deep-sea carbon flux, Robison, Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecy.70536

Responses of Soil Organic Matter and Minerals to Winter and Growing Season Climate Change, Goebel et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71110

Simulation and analysis of CO2 concentration in China from 2009 to 2021 based on the WRF-Chem model, Liu et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2025.108732

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Inland water greenhouse gas emissions offset the terrestrial carbon sink in the northern cryosphere, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adp0024 40 cites.

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CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Assessing Earth system responses in mitigation scenarios with activity-driven simulation of carbon dioxide removal, Schwinger et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/esd-17-1341-2026

Fast and selective CO2 capture from outdoor air by covalent organic frameworks, Zhou et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-025-01735-1

Land use sequestration potential and uncertainties in India’s net-zero pathway, Rajbanshi et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.21853095

Pathways for biochar carbon removal: A national foresight study, Campion et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104988

The Triassic Mercia Mudstone Group: Sealing the UK's net zero future, Mcevoy et al., Earth-Science Reviews Open Access 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105678

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Carbon sequestration potential of tree planting in China, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52785-6 101 cites.

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Decarbonization

Regional dynamics of agrivoltaics adoption: Stakeholder perceptions and barriers in Maryland, USA, Morash & Pavao-Zuckerman, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.115066

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Solar transpiration–powered lithium extraction and storage, Science, 10.1126/science.adm7034 244 cites.

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Geoengineering climate

Biogeochemical and Carbonate Chemistry Response to Natural and Anthropogenic Mineral-Based Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement, Mehta et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009697

Constraints on Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement: Limited Olivine Dissolution and Secondary Precipitation During Periclase Addition to Seawater, Mehta et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009977

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Next steps for assessing ocean iron fertilization for marine carbon dioxide removal, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1430957 17 cites.

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Black carbon
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Microplastic and Associated Black Particles From Road-Tire Wear: Implications for Radiative Effects Across the Cryosphere and in the Atmosphere, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd041116 26 cites.

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Aerosols

Climate impact of contrail cirrus from hydrogen combustion aircraft, Pettersson et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-13485-2026

Volcanic Aerosol Forcing Suppresses Tropical African Rainfall: Mechanisms and Modulation by a Warmer Climate, Yu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046721

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A machine learning paradigm for necessary observations to reduce uncertainties in aerosol climate forcing, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52747-y 27 cites.

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Climate change communications & cognition

Information on public opinion has lasting effects on second-order climate beliefs, but minimal and ephemeral effects on first-order beliefs, Barnfield et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102901

Strategic Frame Differentiation in Environmental Communication: Evidence from China Daily's Bilingual Climate Change Reporting, Yang et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2674274

The Importance of Accounting for Stakeholder Values, Power Relationships and Language in Constructing Relevant and Trustworthy Climate Information, Maraun et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2024ef005618

Understanding the Gateway: Unpacking the Mechanisms, Boundaries, and Outcomes of Climate Consensus Messaging, Göbel et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102913

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Understanding ecological grief as a response to climate change-induced loss in Ghana, Climate and Development, 10.1080/17565529.2024.2407342 17 cites.

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Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Agricultural liming is a carbon sink in the Mississippi River Basin, Suhrhoff et al., Nature Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41586-026-11040-2

Association between climate variability adaptation practices and household food security in three agro-ecological zones of northwestern Ethiopia, Nega et al., Discover Sustainability Open Access 10.1007/s43621-026-04827-w

Comparative analysis of methane flux measurement methods under continuous flooding and alternate wetting and drying in Arkansas rice fields, Ranniku et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111488

Evaluating farmers' adaptation strategies amid rising heat and climatic extremes in San Diego County, California, Bross et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100880

Manure to insect farming for feed mitigates nitrogen and greenhouse gas emissions, Cheng et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2604870123

Modeling the agricultural suitability of key crops under climate change scenarios in british columbia using spatial machine learning, Vakhshoori et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111492

Multi-Decadal Analysis on the Impact of Climate Change, Genetic Gain, Cultivar Type, and Harvest Timing on Main and Ratoon Rice Yield and Quality, Wilson et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70679

Regional dynamics of agrivoltaics adoption: Stakeholder perceptions and barriers in Maryland, USA, Morash & Pavao-Zuckerman, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.115066

The carbon footprint of the farming of edible brown alga Sargassum naozhouense, Sun et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107738

The impact of climate risk on forestry ecological total factor productivity: evidence from double machine learning, Wang et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1930608

[Personal View] Promoting climate-resilient agriculture and food security through school feeding, Singh et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101414

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Inventory of methane and nitrous oxide emissions from freshwater aquaculture in China, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01699-8 32 cites.

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Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Anthropogenic warming is projected to divert atmospheric rivers toward densely populated Asia, Liang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04075-w

Characterizing meso-level organizations engaged in climate change adaptation work in Africa: A configurational analysis, Ma et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104503

Climate change integrated intensity-duration-frequency analysis for the coastal cities of Kochi and Kozhikode, India, Drissia & Radhakrishnan, Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103163

Decreasing Translation Speed of Rapid Expansion Tropical Cyclones Over the Western North Pacific, Li & Tang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125625

Emerging Hydroclimatic Risks in Pakistan: Regional Projections of Precipitation Characteristics Under CMIP6 Scenarios, Khan, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70577

Evaluation and Projection of Northwest China's Extreme Precipitation Using Statistically Downscaled CMIP6 Models, Zhang et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70237

Observed Decreases in Seasonal Drought across the Northeastern United States, Wargo et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0103.1

Reversed variation of September and October rainfall over West China and its enhanced linkage to Arctic Sea ice in the Pacific sector since the early 1990s, Wang et al., Atmospheric Research Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109364

Tree-ring δ18O reveals a consistent decrease in April precipitation in southeastern China since the 1950s and its linkage to global climate phenomena, Wang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2025.105249

Volcanic Aerosol Forcing Suppresses Tropical African Rainfall: Mechanisms and Modulation by a Warmer Climate, Yu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046721

Water Storage Capacity Dynamics in Drained Boreal Peatlands: Responses to Rewetting and Climate Change, Salimi et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124233

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Dynamic assessment of the impact of compound dry-hot conditions on global terrestrial water storage, Remote Sensing of Environment, 10.1016/j.rse.2024.114428 20 cites.

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Climate change economics

Climate- and nature-related transition risks in Brazil: capital stranding and financial vulnerability, Scala et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.33980207.v1

Measuring the compound flood risk from economic growth, sea-level rise and land subsidence on insurance affordability in China's coastal cities, Lin et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100877

New labour and agricultural damages improve climate cost estimates, Moore et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02749-z

The impact of financing cost differences on global energy and industry decarbonization, Waidelich et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02756-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:

Reducing the cost of capital to finance the energy transition in developing countries, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01606-7 116 cites.

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Climate change mitigation public policy research

A critical political economy of climate obstruction: forests, fossils, and foundations of developmentalism in Indonesia, Fünfgeld, Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2025.2609768

Carbon pricing and clean energy markets: Policy effectiveness in an era of trade wars, Jiang, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115624

Institutional betrayal in climate action: Youth experiences and future pathways, Nosek et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104497

Policy, trade, and opinion dynamics in the transition to electric vehicles in Canada, Khajehdehi et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1088/2634-4505/aea89b

Resistance as climate change mitigation: Contested emissions from Japan's anti-coal movement, Thiri et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104976

Time–frequency and distributional heterogeneity in the drivers of consumption-based carbon emissions across the E7 emerging economies, Fakhrullah et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1933128

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Green hydrogen transitions deepen socioecological risks and extractivist patterns: evidence from 28 prospective exporting countries in the Global South, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103731 70 cites.

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Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

From awareness to action: Climate change knowledge, perceived impacts, and adaptation responses in coastal Keta, Ghana, Agyemang & Nunekpeku, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104502

From Policy to Participation: How Trust and Communication Shape Climate Resilience in Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Badu et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2734419

Heat, water, and hillsides: An integrated diagnosis of compounded climate risks for coastal adaptation in Brazil, Torres et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103164

Resolving the fire governance paradox in an increasingly fire-prone world, Devenish et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04090-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Urban water infrastructure: A critical review on climate change impacts and adaptation strategies, Urban Climate, 10.1016/j.uclim.2024.102132 98 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human health

An open-access workflow combining climate model projections with epidemiological frameworks to assess air quality mortality, Wells et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1847091

Our lands, our minds: research and action agenda on Indigenous mental health in a changing climate, Hill et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1724441

[Articles] Projecting and valuing climate change impacts on anxiety and depression in the contiguous USA: a damage function approach, Belova et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101426

[Comment] Framing climate change, migration, and health as a syndemic, Schwerdtle et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101443

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Temperature-Driven Dengue Transmission in a Changing Climate: Patterns, Trends, and Future Projections, GeoHealth, 10.1029/2024gh001059 19 cites.

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Climate change & geopolitics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
“We rather not connect trade to politics, let alone geopolitics” – The changing role of Russia as a landscape pressure for zero-carbon energy transitions, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103775 12 cites.

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Climate change impacts on human culture

Impact of climate change on ski tourism and its adaptation research: Progress and prospects, YANG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.013

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Hajj pilgrims suffer from climate extremes, Science, 10.1126/science.adr2696 3 cites.

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Other

Artificial Intelligence and Climate Risk Shocks, Chen et al., Risk Analysis Open Access pdf 10.1111/risa.70371

Women, cuckoos, and new generations among darkening peaks: temporalities of climate crisis in the Himalayas and beyond, Diemberger, Apollo (University of Cambridge) Open Access pmh:oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/408385

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Evolution of the Hunga Hydration in a Moistening Stratosphere, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl110841 18 cites.

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Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Addressing Epistemic Risk in Actionable Earth System Science, Emard et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access pdf 10.1175/bams-d-24-0218.1

Carbon removal projects need to get justice right, Fritz et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02739-1

COP29 at the climate crossroads: achievements, gaps, and implications for a warming world, Khan et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2025.1685999

[Personal View] Leave no one behind: a call to include people with disabilities in climate change and health research, Kim et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101440

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Diversity in IPCC author’s composition does not equate to inclusion, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02150-8 9 cites.

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Book reviews

Climate unrest comes to a fictionalized France, Dames, UNC Libraries Open Access 10.17615/z3vg-n281

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Global Recommendations on Nationality and Statelessness in the Context of Climate Change, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness

The authors focus on practical measures that States and other stakeholders can take now to identify and protect stateless persons, and to reduce and prevent statelessness in climate-vulnerable contexts. The recommendations are intended to support practical action to prevent new cases of statelessness, reduce existing statelessness, and protect those whose rights are at risk in the context of climate change. They can be advanced through international, regional, national and local measures, including by integrating safeguards into nationality laws, and by informing efforts to strengthen civil registration and identity systems, human mobility frameworks, disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response, and climate adaptation planning.

Software Developers on Climate Change, AI, and Sustainable Software: A survey of GitHub users, Summer 2026, Vorreuter et al., Yale Program on Climate Change Communication

This report is based on findings from a survey of GitHub users conducted between June 30 – August 9, 2026. 1,039 GitHub users were interviewed (18+) in the 50 U.S. states and Washington, D.C. All questions were administered online in English using the Qualtrics platform. Portions of this survey use validated items from Climate Change in the American Mind (CCAM), a nationally representative U.S. survey. These shared items make it possible to compare GitHub users’ responses to estimates from the U.S. general population, with the sampling caveats described in the Survey Method appendix. The purpose of the survey is to establish a baseline measure of software developers’ climate change beliefs and risk perceptions, their views on AI’s environmental impact, their perceptions of software efficiency as a lever for sustainability, and their expectations for employers, cloud providers, governments, and GitHub in addressing environmental effect. More than eight in ten respondents (86%) say global warming is happening, while 7% say it is not happening, and 6% say they do not know. A majority of respondents (53%) say global warming is caused mostly by human activities, and an additional 31% say it is caused by a combination of human activities and natural changes. About 1 in 10 (9%) say it is caused mostly by natural changes in the environment.

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2026, Abraham et al., Climate Policy Initiative

Continued growth in turbulent times is led by private finance in domestic markets. Energy security is becoming more affordable per climate dollar. However, the rate of finance growth must increase dramatically to meet needs. Retreating international public flows create opportunity for domestic and catalytic solutions in Emerging Market and Developing Economies. Increased adaptation spending can sustain development gains.

Warming temperatures fueled evaporation, which, combined with low levels of rainfall, led to the agricultural drought this summer (Ireland), Bergin et al., ICARUS Climate Research Centre, Maynooth University, Met Éireann, and Teagasc

A new rapid attribution study shows that increased temperatures and evaporation levels directly linked to climate change will make for drier farming and land conditions. Human-caused warming has already increased the likelihood of extreme July Potential Evapotranspiration (PET) by approximately 8-fold and the intensity by 7% in Ireland. As global temperatures increase, the authors expect the likelihood and intensity of future July PET events to further increase, with a nearly 6% increase in PET on present levels expected at 3°C of warming globally. Really dry Julys in terms of low precipitation levels, like those experienced this summer, are becoming rarer. However, when these exceptionally dry Julys do occur, they are expected to bring even less rainfall. The evidence indicates that it was the PET which exacerbated the effects of the low rainfall conditions and therefore exacerbated the drought conditions experienced across Ireland in July 2026. In general, drying in July is being driven by rising temperatures, which leads to more evaporation, rather than changes in precipitation. Maximum and minimum summer temperatures are following the expected trend and it is becoming not only more likely to have warm summers, as experienced this year, but future summers are also set to become warmer, not just during the day but also at night.

451,000 at Risk, Greenstone et al., Climate Impact Lab

Scientists project that global land temperatures will be 1.2°C/2.1° F above normal in the coming months due in large part to the current “Super El Niño” that began in June and is expected to last through Northern Hemisphere spring. These anomalously warm conditions will resemble the higher temperatures that climate change is projected to deliver 20 years in the future and will lead to 44% more extremely hot days than expected in a normal year. El Niño is effectively pushing the world into the future – exposing people to temperatures that will not be the norm for another two decades – before people have time to adapt and protect ourselves. As a result, a projected 451,000 lives will be lost due to heat the first nine months (June-February) of El Niño, compared to a normal year. This is about 65 times larger than the 6,800 people believed to be dead or missing from the recent Nepal flash flood. In just the next 6 months, this includes 239,000 ± 11,000 deaths across the globe. With current forecasts suggesting El Niño will remain in place through spring 2027, all these numbers may grow even higher, particularly as effects such as higher-than-average temperatures and heat-related deaths will linger into June and July.

Germany’s Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, German Government

The roadmap lays out the policy framework and the key strategies Germany will be pursuing in the various sectors in order to achieve its goal of climate neutrality and thus transition away from the use of fossil fuels no later than 2045. The scientific reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicate that ambitious climate action is urgently needed to mitigate the risks posed by climate change and secure prosperity for future generations. In spite of the progress being made, unceasing efforts are still needed. It is not only in Germany that climate policy faces massive challenges in view of the constantly shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic parameters. International cooperation on climate action and transitioning away from fossil-fuel-generated energy is absolutely critical in this regard.

Supply disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz stress test Southeast Asia's gas buildout, Warda Ajaz, GEM

Southeast Asia’s gas buildout shifts at the edges, but more than 100 GW of power remains in development. The author identified more than 100 GW of gas power capacity in development in May 2024, compared with roughly 106 GW still planned. Over that period, individual projects have moved into and out of development, but the overall scale of planned gas power capacity has remained above 100 GW. The region has planned more liquefied natural gas (LNG) import capacity even as the risks of reliance on LNG have become harder to ignore. LNG import capacity in development has risen from about 47 million tons per annum (mtpa) in 2024 to roughly 70 mtpa today, even as the Hormuz disruption tightened supply and drove up LNG prices in Asian markets. The continued expansion of LNG import infrastructure risks deepening exposure to the same supply disruptions and price volatility the crisis has brought to the fore. Domestic gas may cushion the shock in some countries, but it will not remove the region’s growing exposure to imported LNG. The author identifies at least 20 fields that could add around 62 bcm/y of production capacity by 2035, but new supply takes years to develop and may not even supply domestic power markets. The short-term pursuit of domestic gas offers no quick or assured fallback for countries exposed to tightening global LNG markets.

Americans’ views of data centers have turned more negative, Brian Kennedy, Pew Research Center

Americans have grown more negative toward the possible environmental and economic effects of data centers since the beginning of the year. And a majority say they’d be uncomfortable if a new data center started operating in their area. More than half of Americans (54%) now say data centers are mostly bad for the environment, up from 39% in January. Half say they are mostly bad for home energy costs, up from 38%. And 49% say they are mostly bad for people’s quality of life nearby, up from 30%. The new survey was conducted from July 20 to Aug. 9 among 10,548 U.S. adults. Just 4% of Americans think data centers have a mostly good effect in each of these areas.

Soybean: A Producers Guide to Drought Preparation and Recovery in the Southeastern United States, Plumblee et al., US. Department of Agriculture, Southeast Climate Hub

Drought is a natural part of the Southeastern United States climate and a threat to agricultural productivity and profitability. Whether slow developing or rapid onset, droughts can have negative effects on agricultural crops and livestock, depending on timing, severity, and length. Droughts are expected to become increasingly common in the Southeast due to increasing temperatures, longer dry periods between rain events, and growing water demand across the region.

Planetary Health Check 2026, Caesar et al., Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

The Planetary Health Check (PHC) provides an annual assessment of the state of the Planet. It is structured around the Planetary Boundaries: the nine critical processes that regulate stability, resilience, and the conditions that support life on Earth. For each boundary, one or two indicators, known as control variables, are used to assess its status. These show whether conditions remain within the Safe Operating Space – the range in which the risk of destabilizing the Planet remains low. Beyond a boundary lies the Zone of Increasing Risk, followed by the High-Risk Zone, where the risk of large-scale and potentially irreversible changes becomes high. The 2026 Planetary Health Check finds that seven of the nine Planetary Boundaries are transgressed, and trends for all seven continue to point in the wrong direction, indicating further deterioration in the conditions that support long-term planetary stability.

U.S. Green Bank 50 Impact Report. Growing the Clean Economy: How U.S. Green Banks Mobilize Capital, Reduce Energy Costs, and Benefit American Communities, Green Bank 50

The U.S. Green Bank 50’s inaugural Impact Report is based on an analysis of a robust survey with responses from 48 Green Banks financing clean energy projects across the country, supplemented by more than 200 case studies, independent market research, and dozens of conversations with Green Bank executive leadership teams. The authors analyze the economic, energy, and environmental effects Green Banks have delivered to date; describes emerging strategic partnerships that pair aligned capital from new allies, such as Community Development Financial Institutions, or CDFIs, with the origination capacity of the Green Banks; discusses strategies to open secondary markets and promote the securitization of quality Green Bank loans; and provides recommendations for how Green Banks can bring community-focused clean energy lending to scale.

The Billion Dollar Deal: How the Fossil Fuel Industry Bought the Trump Administration, Cashed In, and Left Americans to Pay the Price, Senate Democrats Anti-Corruption Initiative, Senate Environment & Public Works Committee

The authors trace the massive fossil fuel and polluting industry donations to President Trump and Republican campaigns during the 2024 election cycle and demonstrates how the industries unlocked power over executive branch agencies in the form of personnel and policy decisions. Senate Democratic investigators found over the course of 19 investigations into Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory rollbacks, 13 investigations into nine other agencies, and another 13 investigations into 88 separate polluters, backed by original analyses of campaign finance filings, corporate earnings, and investor communications. The near-total refusal of the Trump Administration—and the fossil fuel administration that runs it—to cooperate with legitimate Congressional oversight complicated the investigations, but truth has a way of finding the light, and some corruption casts a shadow too unmistakable to conceal.

U.S. Hydropower Market Report (2026 edition), Uría-Martínez et al., Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The authors describe the steady growth for one of America’s most affordable and reliable sources of domestic energy. They analyze the latest data from public and commercial sources, as well as findings from other Department of Energy research and development projects, to provide a comprehensive overview of the American hydropower and pumped storage hydropower (PSH) fleet and industry trends. The authors show that from 2010 to 2025, the U.S. hydropower fleet grew to include 2,258 hydropower plants and a total generating capacity of 80.55 gigawatts (GW), adding 2.1 GW to the national energy mix—enough to power 1.6 million American homes. This amounts to 5.6% of total electricity across the country. In addition, the 41-plant PSH fleet grew to a total generating capacity of 22.23 GW and storage capacity of 553 GWh or 82.1% of all utility-scale energy storage capacity, adding 1.7 GW through facility upgrades.

Developing Water Reuse Regulations: A State-Level Guide, Gerringer et al., The WateReuse Association

Each state has different drivers, regulatory landscapes, and rulemaking processes that affect how and why utilities and industry pursue water reuse. The guide provides entry points at the state level for readers to understand their local context and suggestions for how to navigate and engage in the rulemaking process in a way that protects public health and the environment.

State-Level Climate Security: Ohio, Madelyn MacMurray and Caroline Mallory, Council on Strategic Risks

Ohio faces escalating exposure to extreme precipitation, flooding, heat, and drought. In the first six months of 2026, the state accrued between $2 and $5 billion in natural disaster costs, ten times higher than the $250-$500 million in damages usually amassed by June. Aging infrastructure, legacy industrial pollution, and rapidly expanding energy demand from data centers compound these hazards, straining the systems that protect Ohioans from a changing climate.

Security, Integration and Industrial Policy: China’s 15th Energy Five-Year Plan, Michal Meidan and Anders Hove, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP; 2026–2030) arrives at a pivotal moment for the country’s energy system. It is the final full planning cycle before China’s 2030 carbon-peaking deadline, but it comes also in the context of a difficult external environment, weaker domestic demand in parts of the traditional economy, and a growing imperative to secure the technologies, materials and infrastructure required for China’s industrial development. The resulting energy agenda seeks to reconcile three objectives: energy security, industrial and technological leadership, and China’s climate commitments.

Carbon without borders: Building Europe’s CO2 market, Alevtyna Prykhodko, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

As Europe moves from carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) ambition towards large-scale deployment, the challenge is no longer simply how much infrastructure to build, but how to create a functioning carbon management market. The author examines how the coordination of CO? demand, transport and storage can shape CCS development, and why expanding individual parts of the value chain in isolation may not be enough to unlock deployment. Drawing on scenario, corridor and financial analysis alongside stakeholder interviews, the author explores how infrastructure choices can influence both the scale and geography of Europe’s emerging CCS market. The author highlights the role of industrial clusters and cross-border corridors, the potential of emerging storage regions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the policy choices that could determine which regions participate in, and benefit from, Europe’s future CO? network.

Will There Be an African Energy Revolution? That Depends on Who Funds What, Charles Kenny, Center for Global Development

The reach of electricity in Africa is rapidly extending, not least thanks to an explosion in imports of solar panels. This is good news for the quality of life of people in the region and is the primary route to sustainably extend electricity access, but it imposes some challenges on the utility sector. Most of the panels are being used domestically and at small scale. This worsens what were already considerable financial challenges for utility scale private provision. And it suggests a vital role for publicly funded electricity infrastructure to ensure high-quality, financially sustainable power provision, especially to industry

A Framework on Implementing a Compliance Solution Under the EU Methane Emissions Regulation, Rabbani et al., The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

The European Commission (EC) has introduced the concept of Compliance Solutions as a mechanism for complying with the Monitoring, Reporting and Veri?cation (MRV) requirements of the European Union Methane Emissions Regulation (EU MER) for imports of LNG/gas/oil from Producers in exporting countries. The goal of this paper is to provide stakeholders a framework to design and evaluate Compliance Solutions that are consistent with the EU MER and the EC Recommendations on Compliance Solutions. The authors introduce key concepts, framework principles, and design requirements to implement Certification and Trace and Claim Compliance Solutions for Producers, intermediaries, and Importers in complex supply chains aligned with the EC’s Recommendations and internationally recognized standards on verification schemes and chain of custody programs where additional prescription is warranted. As a case study, the authors assess the potential for the U.N. Environment Program’s International Methane Emissions Observatory/Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (IMEO/OGMP) to establish an independent entity that could serve as a Compliance Solution Provider against the framework presented.

A Research Strategy for Ocean-based Carbon Dioxide Removal and Sequestration 2026, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

The report is part of an ongoing effort to evaluate marine carbon dioxide removal (CDR) approaches and identify research priorities needed to inform future decision making. The authors examine marine CDR approaches using a common framework that considers scientific readiness, carbon removal performance, scalability, environmental and social impacts, governance readiness, and justice considerations.

Accelerating Climate Progress with AI: From Science to Action: Proceedings of a Workshop (2026), National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

A workshop was held on January 13-14, 2026 to discuss the innovative ways AI can enhance climate science and foster resilience, with a focus on decision making and adaptation measures. The workshop brought together experts from government, nonprofits, the private sector, and academia to explore cross-sectoral engagement, identify critical applications where AI can help support climate decision making at speed and scale, and consider how AI's broader societal impacts affect approaches to addressing climate change. The publication presents a summary of the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

Beyond the blue line: Tackling climate, peace, and security challenges in Abyei, Andrew Yaw Tchie and Katongo Seyuba, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Abyei, a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan, faces interconnected climate, peace and security challenges that affect local communities and the operating environment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Drawing on the experiences of UNISFA, the authors examine existing responses to climate, peace and security challenges and opportunities to strengthen them. They recommend greater integration of climate, peace and security considerations into mission planning, training, early warning and preparedness, alongside support for community-level adaptation and social cohesion.

Considerations for Federal Leasing of Onshore Energy: Oil and Gas and Geothermal Power, McPherron et al., Congressional Research Service

Both oil and gas (O&G) and geothermal power are long-standing energy sectors for the United States. The two sectors have many similar characteristics, including use of subsurface resources, ability to provide baseload electricity production, development timelines, drilling technologies and processes, and types of environmental impacts. The technologies also have significant differences. O&G is a more mature sector, with more investment potential and more potential for competitive leasing, but it depends on finite, carbon-intensive resources. Geothermal power has growth potential due to developing technologies like enhanced geothermal systems and the potential to deliver lower-carbon electricity. Geothermal power also has challenges to greater deployment, including high capital costs, difficult operating conditions, lower profit margins on electricity compared to fossil fuels, and other market challenges. These similarities and differences influence how current onshore federal leasing and permitting laws and regulations impact each sector and can inform what changes might be relevant for the future management and development of federal lands and resources.

U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: Overview and Considerations for Congress, Kathryn Kynett, Congressional Research Service

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) in 2009 in response to a congressional directive mandating economy-wide reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. EPA described the program's purpose as gathering comprehensive emissions data to inform the development of future climate change policies. The GHGRP requires reporting from three broad groups of covered entities. Direct-emitting facilities in covered source categories report the GHG emissions released directly from their on-site processes and fuel combustion. Suppliers of fuels and industrial gases report the potential emissions associated with their products if combusted, released, or oxidized. Facilities that inject carbon dioxide (CO2) underground must report the quantities of CO2 injected or sequestered underground. Reporting is generally subject to emissions thresholds for both direct-emitting facilities and suppliers, primarily a threshold of 25,000 metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MTCO2e) per year, although certain source categories are required to report regardless of their emissions levels. There is no threshold for CO2 injection facilities, which must report all quantities of CO2 sequestered or injected underground. Beginning in 2025, EPA initiated a series of actions to reconsider the scope and requirements of the GHGRP. In its 2025 proposed rule, EPA asserts that Section 114 does not authorize continued economy-wide data collection, that the data are not needed to carry out the CAA, and that eliminating most reporting requirements would relieve reporting entities of compliance costs. EPA estimates the proposal would produce significant cost savings for reporting entities. Stakeholder positions on EPA's proposal reflect a range of views.

U.S. Satellite Capabilities for Tracking the Wildfire Life Cycle, Keating-Bitonti et al., Congressional Research Service

Satellite capabilities support virtually every stage of the wildfire life cycle: characterizing the prefire environment (e.g., seasonal climate predictions, vegetation); detecting and monitoring wildfires and smoke; and assessing postfire hazards (e.g., debris flows, flash floods) and ecosystem recovery. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) notes that certain satellites provide "information about the location, duration, size, temperature, and power output of those fires that would otherwise be unavailable" through ground-based sensors, aerial drones, or aircraft. These approaches may provide complementary data to satellites, particularly when satellite data are limited in spatial and/or temporal (i.e., the time between observations of the same area) resolution and given the money and time to develop and deploy new satellites.

Midterm Battleground State Poll: Political Priorities & Opinions on the Clean Energy Transition, Beacon Research, Environmental Voter Project

The authors present key findings from a survey of 5,014 likely midterm voters across eight US Senate battleground states. The survey was conducted via online panel from August 28 – September 11, 2026. With large, balanced samples in each of the eight states surveyed — Alaska (460), Iowa (506), Maine (512), Michigan (708), Georgia (713), North Carolina (707), Ohio (507), and Texas (901) — these are functionally eight state-specific polls that can also be viewed as one larger, multi-state survey. The data relating to “climate hushing” is particularly revealing, showing that — by large margins — battleground state voters (a) want politicians to spend more time talking about climate change (not less), and (b) are more likely to vote for candidates who make transitioning away from fossil fuels a top priority if elected.

How Durable are Used Electric Vehicles?, New AutoMotive, British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association

High-mileage electric cars are less likely to fail an Ministry of Transport (MOT) than equivalent petrol cars. Analysis of 47.4 million MOT tests found relatively little difference between electric and petrol cars at lower mileages once age and mileage are taken into account. From around 60,000 miles, however, the picture begins to change. Electric Vehicle (EV) MOT failure rates level off at approximately 16%, while those for petrol and diesel cars continue to climb. Among vehicles aged three to eight years with 90,000–120,000 miles on the clock, 16.5% of EVs failed their MOT compared with 22.1% of petrol cars. The authors also found no evidence that the additional weight of EVs results in more suspension problems, although EVs recorded more tire defects. Battery health is not assessed as part of an MOT and is therefore outside the scope of the study.

The Hidden Health Costs of AI Data Centers: More Power, More Pollution, Fewer Federal Protections, Environmental Protection Network

As AI data centers drive enormous new demand for electricity the authors find that federal policy is moving in the wrong direction for health, weakening pollution safeguards, accelerating approvals, reducing public information and participation, and diminishing the science and enforcement capacity needed to understand and control pollution. The authors document at least 30 federal actions since January 2025 that, taken together, increase pollution-related health risks as data centers expand. Those risks extend well beyond the data-center fence line, including pollution from on-site generators and turbines and from power plants supplying enormous new electricity loads many miles away.

Beyond indicators. Unpacking the greening agriculture agenda in the Near East and North Africa region, Tutundjian et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

The authors present a Near East and North Africa (NENA)-specific analysis within the broader global framework for greening agriculture, examining progress, persistent gaps and the particular conditions shaping agricultural transformation across the region. They combine Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and environmental indicators with an assessment of policy, governance and institutional frameworks to provide a more comprehensive picture of greening agriculture in Near East and North Africa (NENA). The analysis highlights structural challenges related to water scarcity, soil and land degradation, biodiversity, climate change and inefficient resource use, while demonstrating how global and headline indicators may not fully capture country- and region-specific realities. The authors examine the extent to which enabling policy and institutional frameworks are supporting the transition towards more sustainable and resilient agrifood systems.

New Data for Africa’s Changing Climate: Mapping Risks, Readiness and Policy Action, The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Global Green Growth Institute, and the World Bank

The African continent is highly vulnerable to climate-related risks. At the same time, Africa contributes only 4% of global energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. Policymakers need foundational data on key climate indicators to point the way towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient path. Yet these data remain limited for most African countries. The authors aim to fill the gap in foundational data. First, they show how African countries and cities are exposed to major climate-related hazards, such as extreme heat, and assesses countries’ adaptation readiness. Second, they describe the climate mitigation policy landscape in African countries along with key policy trends. In doing so, they break new ground by building on novel datasets that use robust methods developed by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) and the World Bank, covering 28 African countries that jointly account for around 73% of African GHG emissions.

Recharged: Repowering America's Solar Fleet with Storage for a New Era of Demand, Price et al., Crux and Foundry-Logic

America's first generation of solar plants is aging out at the exact moment the grid can least afford to lose the capacity. What owners do with aging solar plants — retire them or reinvest to rebuild them — is an increasingly significant question for the solar market and the nation’s electricity system. The authors attempt to define an emerging market opportunity. They size the technical potential of U.S. solar repowering — the capacity it could unlock and the investment it would represent — using a bottom-up model of the installed fleet by installation year and segment. They also set out the variables including interconnection and permitting, capital sources, and tax credits and equipment rules, that owners and market participants will need to work through as they approach the opportunity.

Second-hand EVs retain their value better than industry claims, Transportation and Environment

Electric cars are retaining their value better than the leasing industry claims. This has major implications for potential buyers and the pricing of leasing deals and puts pressure on leasing companies, carmakers and governments to accelerate the EV shift. The discrepancy stems from how the value loss is calculated. The industry commonly relies on used-car transaction estimates for leasing and financing deals. In the four largest EU markets – Germany, France, Italy, and Spain – 2025 data on used transactions shows a 12.9 percentage point depreciation gap between combustion and electric cars. However, The authors' analysis reveals five key variables are omitted from these calculations. Adjusting for them reduces the gap by 80% to just 2.6 percentage points.

Renewing renewables: The next chapter in the energy transition, Lassen et al., Wood Mackenzie

As the first great wave of turbines and modules reach the end of their design life, owners are having to decide whether to abandon their sites, invest in extending their lifespans or renew them. The authors forecast that more than 2.5 terawatts of wind and solar projects will face this decision in the 2040s. As the transition to a new era of renewal occurs, repowering old sites with new equipment will become as important a driver of installations and output growth as opening new ones. The authors quantify the coming wave of decommissioning and repowering and show why, for many markets, this overlooked issue will be one of the most important factors shaping future growth.

Utilize Coalition white paper: A practical framework for measuring grid utilization, Noah Goldmann and Molly Knoll, Utilize Coalition

As states begin putting grid use into law and regulation, the authors offer a framework to measure how infrastructure is used over time, interpret that information in context, and use it to achieve better outcomes for customers. The authors provide a practical framework for utilities, regulators, policymakers, and stakeholders working to understand and apply grid use. Used alongside existing planning metrics and processes, use can help decision-makers distinguish where existing infrastructure can do more, where targeted solutions can address constraints, and where new investment is needed. About New Research

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Australia is lagging behind traditional allies and failing to take the climate threat seriously, according to a distinguished group of former senior security officials, in an open letter published in metropolitan newspapers today . Signatories to the letter include former Defence Force Chief, Adm. Chris Barrie, and Air Vice-Marshall John Blackburn, former Air Force Deputy Chief.

Australia faces a summer of deadly heat, with an unprecedented “super” El Niño underway forecast to bring record global temperatures over the next year. Climate disruption, extreme heatwaves and drought threaten Australians’ health and livelihoods, our energy and transport systems, water security, crops and livestock, and food prices.

The Australian Government has said little about these threats. A 2022 Office of National Intelligence report on climate and security risks remains hidden. There has been no systemic policy action.

• Open letter: https://www.aslcg.org/open-letter/
• Newspaper full-page statement: https://www.aslcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/ASLCG_OpenLetter_AClimateSecurityPlan.pdf
• Webinar: https://events.humanitix.com/climate-security-has-the-penny-finally-dropped

The letter published by the security leaders group says that: “One of Australia’s closest security partners, the United Kingdom, has moved decisively to put climate risk at the heart of its foreign and security policy, and has established a dedicated high-level climate security taskforce. Its planning includes food and water security, supply chains, economic disruption and regional instability. Australia should now urgently take comparable steps.”

The UK has established its first dedicated Climate Security Taskforce, bringing together security, military and academic expertise to identify gaps, assess risks and strengthen national preparedness. The UK Government explicitly linked overseas climate shocks to domestic food prices, supply chains and national security.

Specific actions the Government should take include:

• Tell Australians the risks — Release a public version of the 2022 climate-security assessment.
• Build climate-threat intelligence and early warning capacity — Create dedicated capability to detect emerging risks to food, water, energy, infrastructure and regional stability.
• Prepare for food and price shocks — Stress-test Australia’s food system and plan for shortages, supply disruption and rising prices.
• End the fossil-fuel contradiction — such as the Beetaloo Basin, and accelerate decarbonisation. Since 2022, 37 new, expanded or extended fossil-fuel projects have been approved by the Australian Government
• Establish a Climate Security Taskforce — Bring together defence, intelligence, climate, emergency, food and economic expertise.
• Put climate risk at the centre of national-security planning — Develop an overarching national-security strategy with climate disruption and human security at its core.

Next Wednesday 7 October webinar: Lessons from the UK: https://events.humanitix.com/climate-security-has-the-penny-finally-dropped

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

The 2026-27 El Niño is on track to be the strongest event in the instrumental record. The latest (September 2026) runs of the 14 seasonal forecast models that I track over at the Climate Dashboard put the event’s peak at around 4.1C in the Niño 3.4 region (with the middle 80% of ensemble members between 3.4C and 4.6C), well above the prior record of 2.75C during the 2015-16 El Niño.1

I’ve previously written about how unprecedenteted this event will be. The question I get asked most often now is a more practical one: what does it actually mean for the weather where I live?

I recently published a piece in Nature on the impacts of El Niño and what countries should do to prepare. But I can only fit so much in a short journal article, and there is vast scientific literature on regional El Niño impacts that has accumulated over the past few decades.

This post walks presents a map of higher-confidence El Niño impacts, with an in-depth discussion of each different region. Some of the canonical El Niño impacts show up in nearly every strong event on record, while others turn out to be closer to a coin flip when looking at the record of past events.

Expected regional impacts of the 2026-27 El Niño. Shading shows confidence from the teleconnection literature and the observed record of strong events. Shapes show where at least 80% of 13 seasonal forecast models agree on the sign of the rainfall or temperature anomaly (NMME and Copernicus C3S, September 2026 initialization). Regional impacts beyond the models’ forecast range (e.g. summer 2027) are drawn by hand. Each label shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s models agree.

If you want to dig into a particular region, I’ve put togehter an interactive version of this map over at the Climate Dashboard. Clicking on a region brings up how it fared in each of the eight past strong El Niños, what each of this year’s forecast models shows, and a short summary of the relevant research. You can also replay any past strong event across the whole map, step through the forecast season by season, or click anywhere to see the raw model forecast for that spot. 

Likelihoods but not guarantees

El Niño events shift the odds of different climate outcomes, but not every El Niño has the exact same impacts (Mason and Goddard 2001). As NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center puts it in their current ENSO discussion: “With an event of this magnitude, the chances of experiencing impacts consistent with El Niño are larger, but they are not guaranteed.”

To get at how much the odds shift, I’ve leaned on three separate lines of evidence for each region. The first is the published literature on El Niño teleconnections (the physical pathways by which a warm tropical Pacific changes rainfall and temperature elsewhere). I’ve assessed these with IPCC-style confidence levels like high, medium-high, and medium confidence. You can find links to the individual studies I’ve relied on below, with more details shown over at the Climate Dashboard when clicking on a particular region.

The second is the current generation of dynamical seasonal forecasts: 13 independent modeling systems (six from NOAA’s North American Multi-Model Ensemble and seven from the European Copernicus Climate Change Service), which let us see where the models agree and disagree with the teleconnection literature during this particular event.

The third is the past performance during strong El Niño events. For every region on the map I went back to the eight strong events since 1957 (1957-58, 1965-66, 1972-73, 1982-83, 1997-98, 2009-10, 2015-16 and 2023-24) and checked how often that region was drier or wetter than a typical ENSO-neutral year.2 The figure below shows the results. Each cell is one past event, colored by how dry or wet it was relative to neutral years, with a check mark wherever it landed on the expected side.3

Each cell shows rainfall (or temperature) in one of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 (Nov–Jan Oceanic Niño Index ≥ 1.5 °C), for the season shown on the impacts map, relative to ENSO-neutral years after removing long-term trends. Checks mark events on the expected side of the neutral-year median. Data from GPCC v2025, Berkeley Earth, GHCN-Daily stations (Hawaii and Western Pacific islands) and GPCP (Central Pacific islands, 1979 onward only). Model agreement is from the September 2026 forecasts.

A few things jump out here. Across the 26 regions on the map, 86% of region-events went the expected way (176 of 205). The two biggest east Pacific events, 1982-83 and 1997-98, gave the expected impacts in every single region. The two earliest events delivered in only 68% of regions, which likely reflects both sparser rain gauge networks in the 1950s and 60s and genuine differences between events.

That being said, the teleconnection literature draws in part from these same events, particularly 1982-83 and 1997-98, so these hit rates partly restate the evidence the literature was built on. It’s also worth noting that no past event looks like the one forecast for this winter. All eight of these are “strong” events, and 2026-27 is forecast to be well beyond any of them. In the regions with the most reliable signals that probably means larger impacts. But it also means we are extrapolating well outside the training data here.

Asia, Australia and the Pacific

The western tropical Pacific is where El Niño’s fingerprint is clearest, because it is where the atmosphere’s rising branch of the Walker circulation normally sits. When that rising air shifts east toward the central Pacific, the islands and archipelagos that normally sit under it dry out.

Close-up of the impacts map for Asia, Australia and the Pacific. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

Indonesia and the Maritime Continent are the single most reliable El Niño impact on the planet. September through December was drier than the median neutral year in all eight past strong events, and in six of them it was drier than any neutral year in the record. Past strong events resulted in around 73% of normal rainfall, and all 13 models agree on drought this autumn. The main risk for the region is fire. Burning on drained peatlands responds very nonlinearly to drought, and the fires during the 1997 El Niño released an estimated 3 to 9 billion tonnes of CO2, equivalent to 13% to 40% of global fossil fuel emissions that year. The haze from the 2015 fires has been linked to around 100,300 excess deaths across Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

The Philippines has an equally consistent record, dry from December through April in all eight strong events (with a median of 58% of normal rainfall). This is driven by an anomalous high pressure system that sets up over the western North Pacific during El Niño winters (Lyon and Camargo 2009). Every one of the 13 models shows it this year.

The western Pacific islands, from Palau and Guam through Micronesia, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, were drier than normal (i.e. than in a typical neutral year) in all eight events. These islands also see sea level drop as the warm water sloshes east, which can expose and kill shallow reef flats (Widlansky et al. 2015).

On the other hand, the central Pacific islands of Kiribati and Tuvalu get deluged. Satellite-era data show September to May rainfall there wetter than in any neutral year in each of the five strong events since 1982, with a median of around double normal.

Southern China tends to be wetter from winter through spring, fed by moisture flowing around the same western Pacific high pressure system. The observed record is weaker than for the Philippines, with 5 of 8 strong events wetter than normal, though the big events were very wet (1982-83 brought around 200% of normal rainfall and 2015-16 164%). The models are in strong agreement (12 of 13) on heavier than normal rainfall this year.

The Yangtze basin is generally expected to experience heavy summer rain in the year after a strong El Niño, when the Indian Ocean warms up and acts as a “capacitor” that sustains the western Pacific high pressure system into summer. That signal was real in 1998, the year of catastrophic Yangtze floods. In June and July, when the East Asian monsoon rain band normally sits over the basin, it was wetter than normal during 6 of 8 past strong events, including all six since 1972. However, next summer is beyond the range of any current seasonal forecast, so no model-based odds are available.

The southern Mekong basin (Cambodia, southern Laos and southern Vietnam) was drier than normal in March to May of the year after the El Niño peak in 7 of 8 strong events, with a median of around 71% of normal rainfall. The teleconnections literature suggests that the ENSO drought signal in mainland Southeast Asia is “most consistent and expressed over the largest areal extents during March-May of the year when the ENSO events decay.” The models show a bit less agreement this year (only 4 of 6 models that extend through May show drying) and the literature notes the relationship varies between events, so it shows up on the map as only medium confidence.

In India, the the textbook example of El Niño is a weaker than normal Indian monsoon. North and central India were drier than normal in all eight years during which strong El Niño events developed, and the 2026 monsoon was running around 12% below normal by mid-August. But that season is already behind us; the monsoon in the year after a strong El Niño was drier than normal in only 1 of 8 cases (1966), with the other seven running between 102% and 115% of normal. Part of this is that strong El Niños often flip into La Niña by the following summer, and part of it is that eastern Pacific events like this one appear less effective at suppressing Indian rainfall in the first place (Kumar et al. 2006). Either way, the data do not support calling for a weak 2027 monsoon.4

Sri Lanka’s northeast monsoon (October to December) was wetter than normal in all eight strong events, with a median of 126% of normal (Zubair and Ropelewski 2006). However, Sri Lanka was also on the wet side in 8 of 12 La Niña years, so the island’s autumn rain is less tied to El Niño specifically than the count might suggests. Southern India shows a similar observed record (7 of 8), but it is not on the map because this year’s models disagree about it (only 5 of 13 show a wet signal).

Southeast Australia (Victoria and Tasmania) was drier than normal between September and November in 7 of 8 strong events, with a median of 81% of normal and a severe 44% in 2015. The El Niño dry signal is concentrated in spring, when it is reinforced by the positive Indian Ocean Dipole that often accompanies El Niño (Cai et al. 2009), and it has a habit of reversing in summer. In 2023-24, national rainfall ran 20% below average in spring before summer came in 19% above average. And for eastern Australia more broadly, this year’s models show little signal at all (only 10 of 13 lean dry, which is not significant). It’s worth noting that the 2019-20 Black Summer fires, often associated with El Niño in the public mind, happened during a record positive Indian Ocean Dipole with only borderline El Niño conditions.

Africa

El Niño’s effects on Africa run through the Indian Ocean. This year a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (warm water off East Africa, cool water off Sumatra) has been developing alongside it. That combination points in opposite directions for the two halves of the continent.

Close-up of the impacts map for Africa. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

Southern Africa probably the most potentially disasterious impact on the map, because summer rain there feeds the maize crop that tens of millions of people depend on. December to February was drier than normal in 6 of 8 strong events, consistent with Pomposi et al. (2018), who estimate an around 80% chance of below-normal rain in a strong El Niño. The two clear misses were early in the record (1957-58 and 1965-66). The largest recent failure was 1997-98, when the expected regional drought failed to materialize. That has been attributed to regional circulation features (the Angola Low and Botswana High) that vary independently of ENSO, and it isn’t something we can rule out this year. But the most comparable recent case suggests we will see a bigger impact this year: in 2023-24, with an Indian Ocean Dipole almost as strong as 1997’s, southern Africa had the driest season of all eight events (69% of normal), prompting a $5.5 billion regional humanitarian appeal for more than 61 million people. All 13 models show drought this coming summer.

The Horn of Africa (southern Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) was wetter than normal between October and December in all eight strong events, with 1997 at 241% of normal and 2023 at 175%. Here the Indian Ocean Dipole matters more than El Niño itself. In model studies the influence of the dipole on the short rains is “overwhelming as compared to that of ENSO,” and World Weather Attribution’s analysis of the catastrophic 2023 floods found “no significant role of ENSO but a significant influence of the IOD.” Because strong eastern Pacific El Niños tend to come with positive dipole events, the hit rate here is really a record of the two acting together. That is also what it looks like will occur this year, as all 13 models show a wet season.

The Sahel is not on the map. Its El Niño signal mostly falls on the summer rainy season of the developing year (which for this event was 2026), and even then it was drier than normal in only 3 of 8 strong events. The literature agrees this is one of the weakest teleconnections, with El Niño explaining only a small share of Sahel rainfall variability (Pomposi et al. 2020).

South America Close-up of the impacts map for South America. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

The Amazon was drier than normal between October and May in 7 of 8 strong events, and in each of the last five (from 1982-83 onward) it was drier than any ENSO-neutral year in the record. All 13 models agree for this season. But the Amazon is also strongly impacted by longer-term climate changes. A World Weather Attribution study found that “the severity of the [2023-24] drought… is largely driven by climate change,” with El Niño and warming contributing about equally to the rainfall deficit but the drying trend almost entirely due to warming. Fire risk also depends heavily on land management practices, as the large majority of Amazon fires are set by people.

Northern South America (Colombia, Venezuela and the Guianas) was drier than normal in December to February in all eight strong events, with a median of 71% of normal (Poveda et al. 2011). All 13 models agree this year. Northeast Brazil’s March to May rainy season was drier than normal in 6 of 8 events (Hastenrath 2011). That signal depends on tropical Atlantic temperatures as well as the Pacific, which is why it shown as only medium-high confidence. It also has a dashed outline on the map, because after the last El Niño the 2024 rainy season came in right at normal (100%).

The coast of northern Peru and Ecuador is where El Niño got its name, and where its impacts can be most violent. Normally a desert, the coast floods when the ocean just offshore warms enough to support deep convection. Only 1982-83 and 1997-98 brought truly extreme rains, with the coastal grid cells averaging more than double normal rainfall from December to April. Other strong events ranged from somewhat below to somewhat above normal, and in 2023-24 the expected coastal rains largely failed after Peru had set aside around $1.2 billion for flood preparation. What distinguished 1982-83 and 1997-98 was very warm water right along the coast. This year looks more like those two events than the others; in mid-September the far eastern Pacific (the Niño 1+2 region) was running 4.6C above normal, compared to 3.5C in 1997, 2.1C in 2015 and 2.6C in 2023 at the same point. I’ve rated this high confidence provided that coastal warmth persists as predicted by current models.

Southeastern South America (Uruguay, northeastern Argentina, southern Brazil and Paraguay) was wetter than normal between September and February in 7 of 8 strong events (Grimm and Tedeschi 2009), while the 2023-24 season was close to normal. The devastating Rio Grande do Sul floods of May 2024 came much later – in the autumn after the El Niño’s peak – though one attribution study found the El Niño approximately doubled their likelihood (albeit with a very wide uncertainty range).

The Altiplano, the high plateau shared by southern Peru, western Bolivia and northern Chile, gets most of its rain from December to March, and El Niño tends to suppress it. A warmer tropical atmosphere strengthens the upper-level westerly winds over the Andes, which cuts off the easterly flow that normally carries Amazon moisture up onto the plateau (Garreaud and Aceituno 2001). All 13 models show a dry summer this year, one of the strongest model signals anywhere on the map. The observed record is weaker as only 5 of 8 past strong events were drier than normal. The link is closest over the drier western part of the plateau (Vuille et al. 2000) and weaker toward Lake Titicaca in the north, so I’ve rated the region medium confidence.

In Chile, Montecinos and Aceituno (2003) find that during El Niño “there is a tendency for the occurrence of above-average precipitation between 30° and 35°S in winter [June–July–August (JJA)] and from 35° to 38°S in late spring [October–November (ON)].” October and November were wetter than normal in 7 of 8 strong events (with a median of 170% of normal) and in all six moderate El Niños, and all 13 models agree this year.

Further south, the same literature finds relatively dry summers between about 38°S and 41°S during El Niño, and the observed record agrees (7 of 8 strong events drier than normal from January to March), but this year’s models are split (only 8 of 13 show a drier January and February), so I’ve left it off the map. The Atacama Desert does get rare heavy rains in El Niño years, but historically these have come in the winter of the developing year (Vargas et al. 2000), which for this event has already passed.

North and Central America Close-up of the impacts map for North America, Central America and Hawaii. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

The US Gulf Coast and Southeast was wetter than normal between December and February in all eight strong events, with 1982-83 at 151% and 1997-98 at 168% of normal (Ropelewski and Halpert 1986). The strengthened subtropical jet stream also brings wetter winters to Cuba and the Bahamas, which were wetter than normal in all eight strong events, with a median of 163% of normal (Giannini et al. 2000). This year all 13 models agree on wetter than normal conditions in both regions.

Southern California, the US Southwest and northern Mexico were wetter than normal between December and March in 7 of 8 strong events, with 1982-83 and 1997-98 both around double normal. The exception was 2015-16 when coastal southern California ended up at only 60% to 68% of normal despite 9 of 10 seasonal models predicting a wet winter that year. Rerun for 1982-83 and 1997-98, those same models called for wet winters (9 of 9 and 10 of 11), which is what happened. El Niño explains at most around a third of West Coast winter rainfall variability even in strong years, so a lot comes down to where individual storms go.

Northern California is a bit more ambigious. It was wetter than normal between December and March in 6 of 8 strong events, including 2015-16 (120% of normal) when Southern California missed, and 1982-83 and 1997-98 were both well above normal (173% and 156%). All 13 models lean wet this year. The misses were 1965-66 (75%) and 2009-10 (90%). However, the signal is not very specific to El Niño. Northern California was also on the wet side in 7 of 12 La Niña winters, only 2 of 6 moderate El Niños were wet, and the El Niño relationship across all winters since 1950 is weak. Past work has generally found the El Niño rainfall signal is concentrated in Southern California, and I’ve added it to the map as only medium confidence for this year.

Further north, El Niño winters tend to be drier in interior British Columbia and the inland Northwest, with lower snowpack (Shabbar et al. 1997). This was observed in 7 of 8 past events, though the typical dry anomaly is small (~95% of normal), so I’ve assigned it only medium confidence.

Central Canada tends to have mild winters during El Niño, with the strongest warmth just west of Hudson Bay (Shabbar and Khandekar 1996). All eight strong El Niño winters were warmer than the typical neutral winter once long-term warming is removed, and the four since 1997 were strikingly warm (2023-24 was Canada’s warmest winter on record). But La Niña winters were also on the warm side in 7 of 12 cases, and it is sensitive to how the warming trend is removed so I’ve assigned it medium confidence.

Hawaii is usually dry during El Niño winters, particularly in eastern Pacific events like this one (Lu et al. 2020). A composite of long-running Hawaiian rain gauges shows November to March was drier than normal in every strong event since 1972 (six of six, with a median of 69% of normal), though 1957-58 and 1965-66 were both wet. All 13 models show a dry winter this year.

Central America and the southern Caribbean (Costa Rica, Panama and the Caribbean coast of Colombia) tend to be drier during El Niño winters. During the 2023 El Niño, drought restricted traffic through the Panama Canal. But December to February is the dry season across much of this region anyway, and in the places where it normally rains during those months drier conditions only occurred in 5 of 8 past events. The more robust Central American signal is midsummer drought during the developing year (e.g. July and August 2026), which has already passed.

While some of the literature on teleconnections suggests that El Niño drives drier conditions in the Ohio Valley, this year’s models lean wet there (only 3 of 13 show drying), and the observed record is a coin flip as it was only drier in 4 of 8 past strong events.

Europe

Europe is conspicuously absent from the map, which has surprised some people given the summer heat and drought across the continent this year. For most of Europe we simply don’t know what El Niño will do this winter.

Multi-model seasonal forecasts for Europe (top) and the winter North Atlantic Oscillation in each strong El Niño winter since 1950 (bottom).

The textbook late-winter pattern (cold northern Europe, wet south) mostly shows up when a sudden stratospheric warming occurs, which can’t be forecast months in advance (Ineson and Scaife 2009). The link may also have weakened since the 1970s. Past strong El Niño winters split 4 to 4 on the North Atlantic Oscillation, 5 of 8 showed a wet UK and central Europe in autumn, and 5 of 8 had a cold Scandinavian late winter. The models (12 of 13) lean wet for the UK and central Europe from October to December this year, but the shifts are small.

The global picture

Because global temperature lags the tropical Pacific by a few months, 2027 is almost certain to be the warmest year on record. My latest forecast, which combines six global temperature datasets with the 14-model ENSO forecast, gives it a 95% to 96% chance, up from around 85% in April. El Niño-driven drought and fire in the tropics also weaken the land carbon sink, which is why the growth rate of CO2 at Mauna Loa hit a record 3.33 ppm in 2024. A similar spike in 2027 is likely. The fourth global coral bleaching event was driven by the 2023-24 El Niño on top of longer-term warming and affected 84% of the world’s reef area. A stronger event arriving before those reefs have recovered raises the risk of widespread mortality next year.

The most reliable El Niño impacts are clustered around the tropical Pacific and in the Americas. Drought in Indonesia, the Philippines, the western Pacific islands and northern South America, and wet winters from the Gulf Coast to Cuba, have shown up in essentially every strong event since the 1950s, and this year’s models agree. Southern Africa, the Amazon and the Horn of Africa are nearly as consistent. Those are the places where preparation (water storage, food reserves, fire management, flood defenses) is urgently needed now before the rains or droughts arrive.

The impact I’d flag most for policymakers is on food. Of the major climate modes of variability, “only El Niño can force globally synchronous crop failures,” because it simultaneously affects breadbaskets on multiple continents. The map shows drought risk for maize in southern Africa, rice in the Philippines and Southeast Asia and a range of crops in northern South America during the first half of 2027.

Its also worth remembering that this event is forecast to be well beyond anything in the observed record, and the two most similar past events (1982-83 and 1997-98) showed the expected impacts in every region on the map.

I’ll update the map when the October forecasts come in, and I’ve put the code and data to reproduce this analysis on my GitHub here.

1 These numbers are from the September initializations of the 14 models tracked on our Climate Dashboard, with each model weighted equally, and use the same convention as NOAA’s Oceanic Niño Index (each month relative to a centered 30-year climatology). The regional impact forecasts in this post use a slightly different set of 13 models that publish rainfall and temperature fields (NMME and Copernicus C3S). For each region, the model check averages every model over the region’s whole season up to February 2027, the last month all 13 cover; seasons that fall mostly after that use the six NMME models, which run through May.

2 Strong events are those with a November–January Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) of at least 1.5C. For each region I compared its average rainfall (or temperature) in the season on the map to ENSO-neutral years, after removing a long-term trend fitted to the neutral years only. An event counts toward the tally if it lands on the expected side of the median neutral year. Percentages of normal are relative to the 1991–2020 average. The main precipitation data are GPCC’s new Precipitation Analysis Monthly Version 2025. The full methods, including all sensitivity tests, are in the GitHub repository.

3 One note on how to read the numbers here: the counts (like 7 of 8) compare each event with a typical ENSO-neutral year, while the percentages (like 70% of normal) are relative to the 1991–2020 average. These usually tell the same story, but not always, because a few very wet or very dry years can pull the average away from a typical year.

4 This is consistent with the long-standing observation that the ENSO-monsoon relationship has weakened since the 1980s. The strongest El Niño on record at the time, 1997, produced a near-normal monsoon even in the developing year (around 102% of normal in our data for north and central India).

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The UK has avoided the need for gas imports worth £5.9bn since the start of the Hormuz crisis as a result of record electricity generation from wind and solar, reveals Carbon Brief analysis.

While gas prices are surging towards levels not seen since the 2022 energy crisis, the UK has been generating record amounts of power from wind and solar, up 14% year-on-year.

This unprecedented clean-power generation is directly cutting the need for gas-fired electricity, which is down by nearly 10% year-on-year in 2026 to date.

In total, wind and solar have generated a record 41% share of the UK’s electricity needs in 2026 to date, compared with 25% from gas, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis.

The figure below shows that wind and solar generation has avoided the need for UK gas imports worth a total of £5.9bn since the outbreak of war between the US and Iran in February 2026.

The analysis shows that these avoided gas imports would have required the UK to secure the equivalent of more than 100 additional tanker deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The £1.3bn import saving in September 2026 to date is the result of record wind and solar output, at nearly 10 terawatt hours (TWh), combined with surging gas prices.

Wholesale gas prices in the UK have remained elevated ever since Russia cut off supplies to Europe in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Gas averaged 90p per therm from 2023 until the start of this year, roughly three times above 2019 prices, before the Covid and Ukraine crises.

Since the outbreak of war in the Middle East in March, gas prices have climbed higher still, averaging 134p per therm or nearly four times the level seen in 2019.

In September 2026 to date, gas prices have averaged 189p per therm, reaching their highest level since the global energy crisis in 2022, as shown in the figure below.

UK gas prices are spiking again because winter is approaching – meaning higher demand for heating – and there is no end in sight for the Hormuz crisis.

At the same time, European gas stocks are low. This means Europe will have to compete with Asia to secure the cargoes of LNG needed to keep warm.

In the UK, high wholesale gas prices are hitting household gas bills under the price cap set by energy regulator Ofgem – but thanks to clean energy, electricity bills have barely increased.

From this Thursday, 1 October, typical household gas bills will be 33% higher than they were in April, some £200 per year, according to thinktank Nesta.

In contrast, household electricity bills will only have risen 4%, according to Nesta’s analysis.

Andrew Sissons, director for sustainable future at Nesta, explained in a social media post that “the link between electricity and gas prices has already begun to break”.

The UK and other fossil-fuel importing nations are being hit not only by high gas prices, but also by high prices for oil, diesel and other refined fuels. The EU has reportedly had to pay an extra €100bn for fossil-fuel imports since the start of the crisis.

For example, UK diesel prices this week hit record levels of nearly £2 per litre. In contrast, recent Carbon Brief analysis shows that electric cars are up to nine times cheaper to drive.

In her speech to the Labour party conference this week, energy secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh said that energy bills were high because the UK is “exposed to global fossil-fuel markets”.

In his own conference speech, prime minister Andy Burnham said the expansion of clean energy was easing the impact of high gas prices on electricity bills. He said:

“We are already taking more control of our electricity prices with a massive expansion of home-grown renewables and nuclear. I have asked Miatta to speed up the breaking of the link between what we pay for power at home and the international gas market, to get bills down.”

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This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler

The Trump administration is continuing it’s war on climate science. This time, instead of attacking climate science in general, as they tried (and failed) to do with the DOE Climate Working Group, they are going after the U.S. National Climate Assessment (NCA).

The NCA is required at least every four years under the 1990 Global Change Research Act and it serves as the evidentiary basis for a lot of government climate planning in the U.S. Because of this, it’s frequently attacked by the Merchants of Doubt and weakening it is a clear goal of this administration.

There was some chatter that the administration would try to write an entire new version of the NCA that would deny well-established climate science, but my guess is that they have abandoned this. The NCA is a “Highly Influential Scientific Assessment” and therefore must follow specific rules. These include rules about how to select authors, peer review, etc. Following those rules would make it impossible to produce the biased, climate-denying report that they require. And if they don’t follow the rules, they’d lose the inevitable court challenges.

So they instead, they are proposing to amend the Fifth National Climate Assessment (NCA5) by (basically) removing references to the highest emissions scenarios, RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5, which produces the most warming:

This is justified on two grounds: 1) RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is not an expected emissions scenario and 2) it is not policy relevant. Point 1 is irrelevant since the NCA5 does not refer to it as business as usual, baseline, etc. And Point 2 is just wrong. My comment below expands on these points.

The USGCRP is presently soliciting comments. You can tell USGCRP understands their arguments are weak since they go out of their way to make it as hard as they can for people to comment on it: They’re limiting the comment window to 15 days and comment length to 3,500 words.

Below is my comment on this. If you see any errors, please leave a comment below or email me.

Public Comment on the Proposed Amendment to the Fifth National Climate Assessment Summary

I write to oppose the proposed amendment. It should be rejected in its entirety.

The amendment rests on two false premises: 1) that NCA5 presents RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5 results as expected, baseline, or business-as-usual futures, and 2) that RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 scenario runs are not useful for policy deliberations. As described here, neither of these premises is true.

First, NCA5 accurately describes RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 as very high emissions scenarios throughout the report. Second, because of uncertainty in many climate parameters (e.g., climate sensitivity), the temperatures produced under RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 are a reasonable upper bound on what the future climate might be. These scenarios are therefore worth examining not as expected outcomes but as plausible worst cases. Eliminating RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 therefore commits one of the cardinal sins of risk assessment: assuming the worst-case will not occur.

In addition, NCA5 frequently uses these scenarios in global-warming-level analysis, which evaluates impacts at different levels of warming but makes no claim about how likely any level of warming is.

Overall, removing RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 analyses would strip sound science from the assessment and make it harder for U.S. policymakers to evaluate the risks of climate change.

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1. NCA5 does not present results with RCP8.5 or SSP5-8.5 as business-as-usual

The term “RCP8.5” and “SSP5-8.5” appear 113 times in NCA5 — 74 mentions of “RCP8.5” and 39 of “SSP5-8.5”. I have inventoried all of them. They appear in 98 passages. Eighty-four of those describe the pathway as a very high scenario and six as a high scenario; the remaining eight carry no descriptor in the sentence itself. NCA5 never refers to RCP8.5 or SSP5-8.5 as business-as-usual or anything similar. Thus, NCA5 already labels the scenario correctly.

2. RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 emissions may be implausible, but temperatures are not

Much of the RCP8.5 discourse misses a key point: in trying to understand future climate changes, our focus is not primarily on emissions. Rather, it is on temperature, which is what drives most climate impacts. So the key question is: are the temperatures predicted by today’s climate models driven by RCP8.5 implausible?

To quantify this, I ran the FaIR climate emulator (v2.2.4, Leach et al., 2021) between 1750 and 2100 under SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5 emissions from RCMIP v5.1.0. Climate-response uncertainty was represented by the 841-member calibrated and constrained parameter ensemble of fair-calibrate v1.4.1. This analysis shows that the warmest of the SSP2-4.5 runs reach the median SSP5-8.5 run (Figure 1).

Fig. 1. Global surface air temperature (GSAT) for two different scenarios, SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5. The spread within each scenario represents parameter uncertainty in the model. It shows that 0.5% of SSP2-4.5 runs predict warming above the median SSP5-8.5 run.

Let me be precise about what this result means. The spread within each scenario in Figure 1 is not noise. Each of the 841 parameter defines a plausible set of uncertain parameters that determine how the climate system responds to emissions: how sensitive it is to carbon dioxide, how quickly the ocean takes up heat, how strongly aerosols cool, how the carbon cycle responds, etc. Because the ensemble was constrained against observations, every one of these descriptions is consistent with the warming observed to date.

The real climate system, of course, has one true set of these properties. This analysis shows that we cannot rule out that the real climate system driven by a SSP2-4.5 emissions delivers warming at the end of the century equal to what a typical model produces under SSP5-8.5 (around 4°C).

The median temperatures in the RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 ensemble are therefore plausible, even if the emissions that produced them are not. As discussed in the next section, this is important for risk assessment.

One might reasonably wonder why we need SSP5-8.5 to estimate the upper limit of SSP2-4.5 runs. Why can’t we just use SSP2-4.5 runs to evaluate the upper limit? You certainly could specifically analyze high-sensitivity models driven by SSP2-4.5 to determine the worst-case scenario, but the available literature doing that is sparse compared to the literature describing RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 results and doing that would require a wholesale revision of the NCA5 that is not being considered here.

Keeping the RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 runs as a plausible upper limit is particularly important given that recent research has emphasized the possibility that models are underestimating future warming. Gyuleva et al. (2026), for example, use the Earth’s energy imbalance to suggest that models with higher transient climate response more accurately fit the planetary energy balance observations of the last few decades. Armour et al. (2024) show further that the strongest evidence against high-sensitivity models, their poor reproduction of the warming since the 1970s, does not actually rule those models out.

In addition, the SSP2-4.5 scenario contains enormous amounts of carbon removal (Anderson & Peters, 2016). In 2100, for example, total carbon capture & sequestration (CCS) in that scenario is 32 GtCO2[1]. Our willingness and ability to implement CCS at this level (about 75% of today’s total CO2 emissions) is entirely hypothetical (Daigle & Ravikumar, 2026). It is therefore possible that we will not do so, meaning that SSP2-4.5 will be understating emissions. This would push SSP2-4.5 temperatures even further into the range of temperatures simulated by RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5.

Thus, the median global temperature predicted by today’s models driven by RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is a plausible upper limit of warming this century. To the best of my knowledge, there is no analysis that opposes this conclusion and I do not believe the case can be made on current evidence. The proposed amendment does not attempt it.

3. Risk assessment should not confine itself to the most likely outcome

Reaching RCP8.5-level temperatures with SSP2-4.5 emissions, while plausible, is not likely. But that does not mean we should ignore it. In fact, conventional risk management tells us that, when consequences are severe, low-probability extreme outcomes can determine the response.

Levees are built to withstand the hundred-year flood, not the average year. Nuclear power plants’ safety systems are designed against worst-case scenarios, not average operations. Insurance companies maintain solvency by accounting for the worst-case claims scenario, not typical scenarios. In the national defense arena, Vice President Cheney famously said that, if there is a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build a nuclear weapon, “we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.”[2]

It is in this role that RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is valuable: as a plausible upper bound of the temperature distribution given SSP2-4.5 emissions. This contradicts the claim in the amendment that RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is not policy relevant. In fact, adopting this amendment would mean that our risk assessment would ignore tail risk. This would go against best practices of risk assessment. I also note that the amendment presents this as a correction of a scientific error, when in reality it’s a value judgement about what role upper limit risks should play in deciding how to respond to climate change.

4. Global warming levels

The amendment also ignores other ways the NCA5 uses RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5. In many places, NCA5 does not use RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 as a possible emissions trajectory but to predict impacts at various global warming levels (GWLs). In other words, the analysis estimates the climate impacts when the planet is 2°C, 3°C, or 4°C warmer than preindustrial.

For example, Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.13 map U.S. temperature, precipitation, and sea surface temperature at 1.5°, 2°, 3°, and 4°C of global warming; Figures 2.11 and 2.12 map extreme heat and extreme precipitation at 2°C; Figures 1.14 and 1.15 in the Overview and Figure 30.3 for the Pacific Islands do the same. The report’s findings are read off these figures: e.g., at 2°C of global warming, U.S. average temperature very likely rises 4.4°–5.6°F (p. 2-21), tropical cyclone winds are 5% faster (p. 2-26), and Midwest extreme precipitation intensifies by 10%–15% (p. 24-19).

None of these are predictions that these temperatures will occur. Rather, they answer a different question: what happens when the climate reaches that temperature.

The amendment’s plausibility argument does not address this alternate use and it performs none of the analysis needed to separate warming-level results from genuinely emissions-dependent ones. It simply declares RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 off-limits, which could be used to strike the GWL analysis from the NCA5. It offers no justification for discarding RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 scenarios in GWL analyses, which is of value even if reaching the top of the temperatures range is unlikely.

Recommendation

Reject the proposed amendment in its entirety.

The amendment fails to correct any errors in the NCA5 and is inconsistent with the underlying science. First, NCA5 accurately describes results with RCP8.5. Second, the amendment declares RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 off-limits to federal decision-making but doesn’t address the fact that the median temperatures predicted from these scenarios is plausible. Third, it presents an institutional judgment about risk tolerance (that we should ignore worst-case scenarios) as though it were a scientific correction. Fourth, it proposes to jettison research about impacts at global warming levels. Thus, adopting the amendment would leave the country less prepared for future climate impacts, including lower probability but high severity outcomes.

Anderson, K., & Peters, G. (2016). The trouble with negative emissions. Science, 354(6309), 182-183, doi:10.1126/science.aah4567

Armour, K. C., Proistosescu, C., Dong, Y., Hahn, L. C., Blanchard-Wrigglesworth, E., Pauling, A. G., Jnglin Wills, R. C., Andrews, T., Stuecker, M. F., Po-Chedley, S., Mitevski, I., Forster, P. M., & Gregory, J. M. (2024). Sea-surface temperature pattern effects have slowed global warming and biased warming-based constraints on climate sensitivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(12), e2312093121, doi:10.1073/pnas.2312093121

Daigle, H., & Ravikumar, A. (2026). Can we sequester carbon fast enough? Growing disconnect between models and reality. Environmental Research: Energy, 3(3), 031001, doi:10.1088/2753-3751/ae987b

Gyuleva, G., Fischer, E., Knutti, R., & Sippel, S. (2026). Recent Temperature and Energy Imbalance Trends Point to Higher Estimates of Future Warming. Earth’s Future, 14(8), e2026EF008356, doi:10.1029/2026EF008356

Leach, N. J., Jenkins, S., Nicholls, Z., Smith, C. J., Lynch, J., Cain, M., Walsh, T., Wu, B., Tsutsui, J., & Allen, M. R. (2021). FaIRv2.0.0: a generalized impulse response model for climate uncertainty and future scenario exploration. Geosci. Model Dev., 14(5), 3007-3036, doi:10.5194/gmd-14-3007-2021

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Barbara Grady

As the Western United States grapples with severe drought, leading cities to scramble for water and farmers to abandon some crops, a new scientific study has found that 122 major oil, gas, coal, and cement companies and state-owned operations are partially responsible.

The study found that climate change from all climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions over the last 70 years has resulted in a 36% decline in annual average mountain snowpacks, the major source of surface water in Western states – and that about 40% of that decline is linked to the climate pollution caused by just 122 companies.

The annual loss attributable to those 122 companies is equivalent to the amount of water held by Lake Mead, the nation’s largest reservoir, at full capacity. 

The authors of the peer-reviewed paper, “Carbon emissions exacerbating the Western US water crisis,” also found that global warming from greenhouse gas emissions has led to a 13% decline in average annual streamflows from mountains to the lower-lying areas that depend on them, and to a 4.3% increase in the need for agricultural irrigation. The study attributed about half the streamflow declines and roughly half the increased need for irrigation to the warming caused by the 122 companies. In other words, those companies’ products resulted in a 6% fall in streamflows in the region, according to the study. 

Nine scientists from the University of California at Merced and the Union of Concerned Scientists contributed to the study, published August 25 in the Nature magazine affiliate Communications Earth & Environment. 

The West relies on snowpack 

Summers are dry in the Western U.S. 

Precipitation occurs in winter, with much of it stored as snowpack in the mountains. The West’s multibillion-dollar agriculture industry and the reservoirs supplying cities and towns in 11 states depend on melted snow carried by rivers, streams, and water conveyance systems in late spring and summer. If the snowpack is scant or if snow melts early, water shortages can occur in summer when water demand is highest. 

The West’s historic megadrought has persisted for two decades. With less surface water available, farmers have had to pump more groundwater for irrigation, depleting aquifers so much that the ground is sinking in many agricultural areas. Some farmers in the Southwest have had to abandon crops or fallow fields for lack of sufficient water. Corpus Christi, Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Phoenix are just some of the cities facing severe water shortages.

Tying drought to specific companies 

Emily Williams, lead study author and a postdoctoral research scientist at the University of California at Merced, said in an interview that the study allowed scientists to disentangle how much worse water scarcity became over the decade 2014 to 2024 because of climate-change-induced atmospheric warming, as well as how much worse it became specifically because of the warming emissions generated by 122 companies and their products. 

“It lets us get beyond how much more intense climate change is becoming to look at specific impacts like snowpack decline as well as specific sources” of emissions, she said. Her team found impacts on water resources “not just from climate change but because of emissions traceable to specific sources.” 

The 122 companies cited in the study are the world’s biggest producers of climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions cumulatively up to 2024; they are all coal, oil, gas, and cement producers. That list, known in climate science as the carbon majors and compiled by other scientists, is based on publicly reported coal, oil, gas, and cement production data along with scientific formulas for calculating emissions per unit of product produced. Since 2024, the list has grown to include 178 entities.

Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell are the fourth-, fifth-, eighth-, and ninth-biggest cumulative emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, according to the most recent version of the list. The world’s three highest emitters are state-owned coal, oil, and gas companies from the former Soviet Union, China, and Saudi Arabia (Saudi Aramco). U.S. coal producers Core Natural Resources and Peabody Energy are also in the top 25 carbon majors. 

The study authors based their calculations on emissions since 1950, rather than earlier, because that was the decade when major oil and gas companies began to suspect that use of their products would cause changes to the Earth’s climate. Engineers at ExxonMobil who studied the issue determined that burning large amounts of fossil fuels would affect planetary climate systems. After its engineers shared their conclusions with management in the 1970s, ExxonMobil at first expanded that research to learn more and then – a decade later – pivoted to hiding the scientific findings and denying the existence of climate change, as reported in the Pulitzer Prize finalist series “The Road Not Taken” by Inside Climate News. Other major oil companies did the same. 

The study authors wrote that “roughly 70% of global industrial carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions since 1854 are traceable to 122 fossil fuel producers and cement manufacturers (“Carbon Majors”), and ~97% of these emissions occurred after 1950.” 

U.S. oil companies remain silent

When asked on August 27 for a comment on the water crisis study, Chevron – the largest U.S. emitter since 1950 – sent an automatic thank-you note but did not respond to the question by publication. 

Chevron’s second quarter earnings report, released August 12, highlighted record-breaking oil production. The report said the company “achieved new U.S. upstream production record of nearly 2.1 million barrels of oil equivalent per day and record U.S. refinery throughput of over 1 million barrels per day” as well as “competitive growth” in operations “around the globe.” Chevron also has embarked on developing oil resources in Venezuela, which has large deposits of heavy crude – a variety of oil that’s highly polluting to process. 

A media relations receptionist for ExxonMobil, the second-largest U.S. emitter, politely pledged to convey the reporter’s question to the media relations team, but the company did not respond. 

The methodology that Williams and her eight colleagues used involved overlaying observational data of recorded temperatures, precipitation, relative humidity, and hydrologic conditions annually over the decade 2014 to 2024 in seven water basins across the Western states with global climate models. Then they introduced emissions data in three variable scenarios to disentangle the effect of emissions from the carbon majors. One scenario included all human-caused emissions since 1950, the second included no anthropogenic emissions, and the third scenario excluded emissions traced to the 122 companies. 

“By comparing these scenarios and using pattern scaling, we calculated how much of the observed changes in snowpack, streamflow, and irrigation demand are attributable to climate change and specifically to emissions from the Carbon Majors,” the authors wrote.

Governments seek damages from polluters 

The study is part of a growing body of what’s called attribution science. As scientific consensus has solidified around climate change resulting from atmospheric warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels, emissions of methane, and destruction of forests, scientists are looking more deeply at the impacts of that warming, how to minimize future warming, and the specific sources of the emissions. 

Similar studies have attributed the size of areas burned in intense wildfires, specific measures of sea level rise, and the increased likelihood and intensity of extreme heat events to emissions from the carbon majors. 

Read: Scientists agree: Climate change is real and caused by people

“We have a choice of how much worse climate change is going to get, and that is a function of how much emissions we allow,” Williams said. She said some changes to the planet’s climate system are already irreversible, but we do have a choice to avoid others and the worsening of some that are already baked in.

Many states and cities around the world are taking the biggest climate polluters to court in hopes of getting financial resources to help them address damages from extreme hurricanes, wildfires and floods whose intensification can be linked to climate change. 

Two states – New York and Vermont – have passed climate superfund laws requiring that the biggest historical emitters help pay for climate damages incurred in their states. Many other states, including California, are considering such legislation. New York’s law was recently struck down in court, but the state also plans to appeal the decision. Meanwhile, several states are suing major fossil fuel companies over the damage they allege was wrought by their emissions.

“As climate impacts become increasingly severe, communities will be asking for more action” to help recover from damage and adapt to climate changes, said Carly Phillips, another author of the water study and senior research scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists. 

Communities, states and small countries are bearing an unfair share of the costs of the impacts of emissions, Phillips contended, compared with the companies that ignored the looming crisis for decades and even lobbied Congress against taking action sooner.

 “Given the outsized contribution of certain entities to the problem – 122 companies is a very small number – there should be some accountability,” she said.

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• ‘Brazil is back’
• New Jersey-sized forest
• Election significance
• ‘Greenest’ policies 
• Soy moratorium and Brazilian congress

An area of Amazon forest roughly the size of the US state of New Jersey has remained standing due to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s leadership of Brazil, according to Carbon Brief analysis. 

Lula beat Jair Bolsonaro in the 2022 election to become president of the nation that is home to nearly 60% of the Amazon rainforest. 

Forest loss surged during Bolsonaro’s far-right presidency and dropped sharply under the left-wing Lula, with Amazon deforestation likely to hit its lowest level on record this year. 

Now, as another presidential election approaches, Lula is facing off against Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, whose “anti-environmental” policies are similar to his father’s.

Carbon Brief’s analysis suggests that at least 20,000 square kilometres (km2) of deforestation has been avoided since Lula took office and prioritised Amazon protection.

The analysis is based on modelling by an international research team of an alternative scenario in which Brazil’s flagship forest code legislation was not enforced – a proxy for Jair Bolsonaro’s leadership. 

Experts tell Carbon Brief that this estimate is likely “conservative” and that actual deforestation under Bolsonaro could have been “much higher”. 

With Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro tied in the polls, the upcoming election is expected to significantly shape the level of environmental action in the world’s fourth-largest emitter, whose emissions are largely driven by deforestation. 

‘Brazil is back’

When Jair Bolsonaro was president of Brazil between 2019 and 2022, he championed the nation’s powerful agribusiness sector and oversaw an unprecedented increase in Amazon deforestation.

Bolsonaro weakened regulations, slashed federal agency budgets and empowered illegal activities in the Amazon, while attacking Indigenous and environmental groups.

This meant that the forest code – Brazil’s flagship legislation that requires landowners to preserve and restore forest on their property – was not properly enforced.

After Lula’s presidential victory in 2022, he promised to target “zero deforestation” by 2030, telling the COP27 UN climate summit that “Brazil is back”.

Lula rolled back Bolsonaro’s wave of deregulation and reinstated a deforestation “action plan”. Led by celebrated environmentalist Marina Silva, the environment ministry scaled up enforcement and policing activities in the Amazon. 

As a result, annual deforestation in the Amazon has more than halved from 11,594km2 per year in 2022 to 5,731km2 in 2025.

Data from August 2025 to July 2026 – the timespan used in government records – is yet to be released, but preliminary satellite alerts put the deforestation figure at 2,874km2.

While the final figure is likely to be higher, experts still think Amazon deforestation in 2026 could hit its lowest level since records began in 1988.

New Jersey-sized forest

Compared to a scenario in which Bolsonaro won in 2022, Carbon Brief analysis suggests that at least 20,000km2 of Amazon forest remains standing today due to Lula’s leadership.

This area – roughly the size of Wales, Belize, Slovenia or the US state of New Jersey – is indicated by the grey area in the chart below.

Each year covers a period from August to July. Deforestation data is from INPE’s PRODES dataset, except for the 2026 figure. This is based on INPE’s DETER real-time satellite alert data, which tends to give lower estimates than PRODES. The “Bolsonaro” projections are based on a scenario with no forest code enforcement, from a 2023 study.

This analysis is based on a 2023 study on the role of nature-based solutions in Brazil’s pathway to net-zero emissions. This was a refined update of a 2018 study that used the same GLOBIOM-Brazil model, from researchers at the University of Oxford, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE).

It is based on a comparison of forest code implementation with a “baseline” scenario in which the code is not enforced, reflecting the kind of weak governance seen under the Bolsonaro administration. (See Carbon Brief’s 2022 article for more details of this modelling.)

Dr Aline Soterroni, a University of Oxford researcher who led the 2023 analysis, tells Carbon Brief that the reversal seen under Lula “shows how quickly deforestation can respond to political will”.

However, she stresses that the modelling of the “no forest code” scenario is “relatively conservative”, with deforestation remaining high but not rising. 

Deforestation in this scenario – used here as a proxy for a Bolsonaro election win – is tempered by slower demand growth for Brazilian beef and soy, says Soterroni. She notes that the scenario also does not capture the potential for illegal forest clearing in response to weak governance.

Indeed, some experts anticipated in 2022 that a Bolsonaro victory would send deforestation rates rising to near-record levels.

Claudio Angelo, international policy coordinator at Brazil’s Climate Observatory, tells Carbon Brief that if Bolsonaro had won in 2022, “we have reason to believe [this would have resulted] in much higher rates than during his first term”.

Angelo says the “political signal” would likely have driven an “explosion of wildcat mining” and illegal deforestation in the Amazon. He also points to efforts – including by Flávio Bolsonaro – to formally dismantle the forest code in the Brazilian congress, during Jair Bolsonaro’s first term.

Soterroni notes that deforestation rates did not immediately drop following Lula’s election, as suggested by modelling of a full “forest code compliance” scenario. She says this reflects the “gradual and imperfect process” of restoring and enforcing the law.

Nevertheless, she tells Carbon Brief:

“The key message from our modelling is the contrast between these trajectories: weak environmental governance keeps deforestation substantially higher than full implementation of the forest code. That message remains relevant today.”

Election significance

With Jair Bolsonaro in prison for plotting a coup after losing the 2022 election, his son Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator for Rio de Janeiro, is standing against Lula in the upcoming contest for president.

There are 13 candidates, but Flávio Bolsonaro and Lula are by far the frontrunners and are currently neck-and-neck in opinion polls. 

If Lula wins, experts say he is likely to continue with the “zero deforestation by 2030” agenda that has already had a pronounced impact on forest loss. 

As the chart below shows, periods when Amazon deforestation fell in recent history all occurred during Lula’s three terms as president. 

In contrast, experts say Flávio Bolsonaro, a climate sceptic who has indicated he will continue his father’s political agenda and favour agribusiness and mining, will likely drive a surge in deforestation. Angelo tells Carbon Brief:

“At the risk of sounding alarmist, I’ve been saying that Lula’s re-election is the only thing standing between us and a wide destruction of the Amazon.”

A Bolsonaro win would be a “tremendous disaster”, says Dr Patricia Pinho, deputy science director at the Amazon Environmental Research Institute, adding: 

“I don’t think we can afford four years of increasing deforestation [and] violence against Indigenous peoples.” 

Dr David Lapola, an ecologist focused on Amazon research at the University of Campinas in Brazil, says he believes deforestation “would certainly rise” and Brazil’s climate and deforestation goals “would be thrown in the trash bin”. He tells Carbon Brief: 

“The Bolsonaro administration in the 2019-2022 period showed that the deconstruction of environmental policies and institutes can be done very, very quickly. 

“In a matter of a few months, they can destroy what has been constructed over decades of environmental policy and activism in Brazil.” 

‘Greenest’ policies 

Lula has the “greenest” policy proposals of Brazil’s six top-polling presidential candidates, according to analysis by the Climate Observatory. 

The analysis identifies 16 “positive and detailed” environmental commitments in Lula’s proposals, including reaffirming his “zero deforestation by 2030” goal. 

Flávio Bolsonaro, on the other hand, has one positive environmental commitment and seven “clearly anti-environmental” proposals. 

The right-wing politician has committed to zero “illegal” deforestation by 2029. However, he has also previously led an attempt to change the forest code, opening up large tracts of previously out-of-bounds forest for legal clearance by extractive industries. 

Given this, Angelo tells Carbon Brief that he is sceptical about the 2029 pledge. 

“The only way you can trust him on this is to think that he is going to revoke the forest code and make all illegal deforestation legal.”

Brazilian presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro with a cardboard cutout of his father, former president Jair Bolsonaro. Credit: ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo

Lula is also the only major candidate to list a clear target for cutting national emissions, sticking with Brazil’s existing goal to cut emissions by 59-67% by 2035, compared to 2005 levels. 

Overall, the Climate Observatory notes that climate change and environmental issues “are off the radar for most candidates”, who are instead focusing on the economy and security issues. 

Pinho adds that deforestation and the Amazon have not been at the “forefront” of this election, compared to 2022. 

If Bolsonaro wins, up to 95% of the Amazon would fall under the leadership of right-wing national governments – including those in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – reported Mongabay. It noted that presidents in all these nations “explicitly favour agribusiness and mining over environmental conservation”.

If no candidate receives a majority of votes in the first round of Brazil’s election on 4 October, a runoff will take place on 25 October, as has happened at every presidential election since 1998.

Soy moratorium and Brazilian congress

Other factors will also play a role in future deforestation in Brazil, regardless of the next president. 

One is the effective end of the Amazon soy moratorium. This is a voluntary agreement signed by companies committing to not buy soya beans grown on land in the Brazilian Amazon that was deforested after 2008. 

Conservation organisation WWF’s international director general, Kirsten Schuijt, previously described it as the “most impactful voluntary supply chain policy ever implemented”. 

However, major grain traders withdrew from the agreement earlier this year, effectively bringing it to an end. Pinho describes this move as a “huge destruction” of Brazil’s environmental protections. 

Research shows the moratorium prevented around 18,000km2 of deforestation in its first decade of operation from 2005-16. 

In contrast, a 2026 study estimated that the end of the moratorium could result in 14,000km2 of additional deforestation in the Amazon by 2036. 

Alongside choosing a new president on 4 October, Brazilian voters will elect state governors and members of congress, which will also factor into future environmental impacts.

Right-leaning parties, including the far-right Liberal Party linked to the Bolsonaros, currently hold half the seats of the two chambers of congress. 

This has led to conflict between lawmakers and Lula. For example, in 2025, congress bypassed Lula’s veto of several aspects of a controversial piece of legislation dubbed the “devastation bill”. 

Pinho says that the potential for a right-wing congress and president would be “devastating for the environmental and climate agenda”. 

Lapola notes that a Flávio Bolsonaro presidency “would consolidate the view in Brazil that environmental protection is solely a matter of political preference, and not a crucial need of all people”. He adds: 

“Land pillage, destruction of precious biodiversity and scorning of Indigenous peoples simply cannot be a nation’s project in the 21st century. We have got to be smarter than that, for sure.”

related Q&A: What change of power in Colombia could mean for world’s fossil-fuel transition 26.06.2026 International policy Brazil’s biodiversity pledge: Six key takeaways for nature and climate change 16.01.2026 Nature policy COP30: Could Brazil’s ‘Tropical Forest Forever’ fund help tackle climate change? 05.11.2025 COP30 Belém Guest post: How Caribbean states are shaping climate legislation 10.10.2025

The post Analysis: Lula presidency saved at least 20,000km2 of Brazilian Amazon since 2022 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 20, 2026 thru Sat, September 26, 2026. Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (8 items)

• Interview with Senator Sheldon Whitehouse: ''Call Out the Corruption Propelling the US Climate Retreat'' The Rhode Island senator, who could lead the Judiciary Committee if Democrats win in November, urges stronger messaging and a focus on Supreme Court reform. Inside Climate News, Marianne Lavelle, Sep 20, 2026.
• Whitehouse: Call Out the Corruption Propelling the US Climate Retreat The Rhode Island senator, who could lead the Judiciary Committee if Democrats win in November, urges stronger messaging and a focus on Supreme Court reform. Inside Climate News, Marianne Lavelle, Sep 20, 2026.
• Let`s Talk Climate Annual NY Times climate conference opens in difficult times for sensible climate policy. NYT > Climate and Environment, Katrin Bennhold, Sep 20, 2026.
• We Need to Stop Talking Like Climate Change Is Partisan 'People who raise awareness about climate change know that how you communicate your message matters, and there’s much to learn from them.'' TIME, Katharine Hayhoe and Dana R. Fisher, Sep 21, 2026.
• How Saudi oil scientists ended up working on the world`s most important climate reports Guardian investigation reveals fossil fuel links of IPCC authors, with experts declaring the body’s conflict of interest policy ‘not fit for purpose’ The Guardian, Damian Carrington, Eoghan Gilmartin, Silvia Lazzaris, Rita Cruz, Simon Guichard and David Haas, Sep 21, 2026.
• Effort begins to fill the void left by terminated US climate report First paper added to community collection is a roadmap for research. Ars Technica, Scott K. Johnson, Sep 22, 2026.
• The climate scientist Kate Marvel sheds light on why she left NASA this year. One of the most prominent climate scientists to resign from the federal government during the second Trump administration described the “chaotic” conditions inside NASA that led to her departure. NYT, Raymond Zhong, Sep 23, 2026.
• Trump cut their climate jobs. This secretive network found them new ones. Climate Reserve is quietly building a lifeline for America's lost climate workforce, one job at a time. Grist, Kate Yoder, Sep 24, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (4 items)

• Losing your way of life to climate change matters — and we need a way to measure it Climate losses extend beyond property and income. Policymakers need ways to assess what people value, experience and ultimately stand to lose. Nature, Manasi Kumar, Sep 21, 2026.
• The worst El Niño in recorded history is brewing — here’s how governments must prepare From southern Africa to the Amazon, the risks are mounting and the window for action is rapidly closing. Nature, Zeke Hausfather, Sep 22, 2026.
• Scientists link fossil fuel producers to the West`s worsening water shortages A new study blames 122 companies for contributing to severe drought in the region. Yale Climate Connections, Barbara Grady, Sep 22, 2026.
• An Existential Threat to the Oil Industry Can fossil energy giants be held responsible for extreme weather? The Atlantic, Ross Andersen, Sep 23, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (3 items)

• Why I turned down funding for my Miami story Behind-the-scenes ethical choices by an accomplished climate communicator. HEATED, Emily Atkin, Sep 21, 2026.
• How to stay smart in the age of AI: the science of critical thinking There is growing concern that AI can blunt memory and reasoning. But science shows ways to keep the brain sharp. Nature, Helen Pearson, Sep 23, 2026.
• Twenty years after An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore still believes in the climate fight: `We are going to win this` Former US vice-president still has optimism for climate advocacy two decades after groundbreaking documentary The Guardian, Oliver Milman, Sep 23, 2026.

Miscellaneous (3 items)

• 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #38 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 13, 2026 thru Sat, September 19, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Sep 19, 2026.
• Energy Transition is No Longer About Climate Change 'Global Energy analyst Jeff Currie tells Bloomberg the Energy Transition is “TurboCharged” – but it’s not about climate, and maybe never was. By far the biggest growth in energy consumption is going to come from the developing world in Asia and Africa, and those countries are no longer willing to be held hostage to fossil fuels.'' This is Not Cool, greenman3610, Sep 19, 2026.
• Jensen Huang talks about AI and climate change like a supervillain With AI, he says, ‘in order to save you, they’ve got to hurt you first.‘ The Verge, Justine Calma, Sep 24, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (2 items)

• Suncor Helped Lead Climate Denial Group Spreading ‘Uncertainties’ With a U.S. Supreme Court decision looming on whether the company can be held liable for climate deception, internal documents show a campaign to question science. Desmog, Geoff Dembicki, Sep 21, 2026.
• Judge Dismisses Unusual Climate Suit Claiming Oil Giants Broke Antitrust Law The lawsuit, filed by Michigan, claimed oil companies colluded to obstruct solar power and to misrepresent climate risks, making energy costlier. NYT, Karen Zraick, Sep 22, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 items)

• For Climate-Vulnerable Countries, Debt Costs 25 Times More Than Climate Action As climate disasters intensify, mounting debt is leaving vulnerable countries with less money to prepare, recover and invest in climate action. Inside Climate News, Alissa de Chassey, Sep 19, 2026.
• `Way Too Hot`: Britain`s Hospitals Were Not Built for 96-Degree Summers Patients and workers in one of the country’s largest hospitals sweltered in a heat wave last month. Experts say the whole country must urgently adapt. New York Time, Megan Specia and Andrew Testa, Sep 21, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (2 items)

• Skeptical Science New Research for Week #39 2026 Skeptical Science's latest weekly survey of research on anthropogenic climate change, climate change impacts, and how we're dealing with it all. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Sep 23, 2026.
• `Robust little` vessel begins treacherous 22,000km journey around Antarctica in the name of climate science World news The Guardian, Petra Stock, Sep 25, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (2 items)

• Trump renames AI in off-the-rails rant against ‘hoax’ concerns Trump Truth Social post likens AI skeptics to global warming and climate change warnings from environmentalists. The Independent, John Bowden, Sep 21, 2026.
• AI`s Meet-Cute With Climate Denial Just in time for Climate Week NYC, President Trump calls concerns over global warming and artificial intelligence a “hoax.” Inside Climate News, By Dan Gearino, Sep 24, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (2 items)

• Fact brief - Does wind power require backup from fossil fuels? Skeptical Science's latest climate solutions denial debunking, created in cooperation with Gigafact and Columbia Univesity's Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Sep 22, 2026.
• Coalition vows to 'take a chainsaw' to climate laws, offshore wind The Coalition would cancel offshore wind zones, scrap climate laws for heavy industry and car makers, and attempt to lift the ban on nuclear if it wins power. ABC News, Jake Evans, Sep 23, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

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Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals.

Provisional data from the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) shows that Antarctic sea ice hit its annual winter peak on 14 September, with an extent of 17.59m square kilometres (km2).

The organisation notes that the data is still preliminary, adding that “large fluctuations in extent are typical of Antarctic sea ice near the seasonal maximum”.

One expert tells Carbon Brief that it is “concerning to see these low values persisting”, but says that scientists need more time to determine whether this represents a “structural shift” in Antarctic sea ice extent.

Meanwhile, at the Earth’s other pole, Arctic sea ice reached its annual minimum on 12 September, ranking as the joint-10th lowest in the satellite record.

The NSIDC notes that the last 20 years have seen the lowest 20 Arctic sea ice extents in the satellite record.

Antarctic peak

Dr Lettie Roach, a polar climate scientist at the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany, tells Carbon Brief that this year’s Antarctic sea ice maximum was “well below average for the season”. She warns that, “after several decades of stable or increasing winter Antarctic sea ice conditions, it is concerning to see these low values persisting”.

She adds:

“Compared with the Arctic, it’s less clear how recent changes in Antarctic sea ice are attributable to human-caused warming vs natural variability. We need more years of observations to better understand whether this is truly a structural shift.”

Dr Clare Eayrs, a postdoctoral researcher at the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), tells Carbon Brief that, since recording a “near-average February minimum” extent, Antarctic sea ice has “returned to unusually low winter coverage”.

She notes that Antarctic sea ice extent in July and August this year were the fifth and fourth lowest on record, respectively, adding that “all five of the lowest July extents have occurred since 2022 and all four of the lowest August extents since 2023”.

The chart below shows Antarctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2023 (mid blue), the year of the smallest winter sea-ice maximum on record.

Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Eayrs tells Carbon Brief that the regional pattern of Antarctic sea ice cover “changed substantially during the growth season”.

For example, she says that “in April, the Bellingshausen Sea remained almost entirely ice-free, while the neighbouring Amundsen Sea had more ice than usual”.

However, by late August, changes in atmospheric pressure and wind meant that “the Bellingshausen deficit had largely recovered, while ice was unusually scarce in the Amundsen Sea and across much of East Antarctica”. 

Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic. Credit: Carbon Brief
Arctic minimum

Meanwhile, the Arctic recorded its minimum summer sea ice extent on 12 September. At 4.60m km2, this year ties with 2025, 2010 and 2008 as the 10th-lowest sea ice extent on record.

The chart below shows Arctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2012 (mid blue), the year of the smallest summer sea-ice minimum on record.

Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Roach tells Carbon Brief that although this minimum is not “record setting”, it is still “lower than any sea ice minimum before 2007”. She adds:

“Human-caused climate change has reduced Arctic sea ice cover and thickness, so the region is fundamentally different compared to a few decades ago.”

Scientists have been tracking Arctic sea ice thickness using a reanalysis produced called the Pan-Arctic Ice Ocean Modeling and Assimilation System (PIOMAS) since 1979.

In March 2026, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) terminated a global dataset of air pressure that scientists relied upon to produce PIOMAS, forcing both datasets to stop publishing updates.

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The PIOMAS website says it will take “considerable effort and time” to find alternative data to use in their reanalysis. It adds that “we don’t yet have a good sense if that’s possible with available funds and if so, when we will be able to resume production of a new PIOMAS timeseries”.

Roach also notes that August saw record-breaking heat sweep across much of the world, explaining that high temperatures “extended into Arctic coastal regions, close to regions with substantial sea ice loss – particularly the Barents-Kara and East Siberian seas”.

Dr Zack Labe, a scientist at Climate Central, tells Carbon Brief that the absence of a new record does not mean that ice cover is becoming more “resilient”. He says:

“Local weather patterns across the Arctic play a really important role in year-to-year sea-ice extent, even as the long-term trend is clearly downward.”

Labe tells Carbon Brief that weather in the Arctic this summer was “influenced mainly by lower pressure toward the central Arctic, which brought cloudier and cooler conditions that limited surface melt and delayed the start of the melt season”.

He explains that this “was most obvious across parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas, where the melt season didn’t really kick off until after early July, which was more than two weeks later than normal”. 

In contrast, he says, the Atlantic side of the Arctic “had a much more extreme summer”, with sea ice in the Barents Sea recording its “earliest melt-out on record”.

This was partly due to “unusually warm air and ocean temperatures”, Labe says. He notes, for example, that parts of western Siberia saw unusually persistent temperatures more than 5C above the 1981-2010 average for much of the summer, which extended out over the Kara Sea and contributed to substantial ice melt in this area”.

Map showing main regions of the Arctic. Credit: Carbon Brief

Labe tells Carbon Brief that, going forward, scientists need “more data and observations of other sea-ice metrics, like ice thickness, which may give us better insight into the overall condition of the ice pack, especially during years like 2026 when it is very fragmented”.

(In March 2026, Arctic sea ice reached its peak extent for this winter, clocking in as the joint-smallest in a satellite record going back almost half a century.)

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The post ‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak appeared first on Carbon Brief.